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Iran Policy and the European Union [October 18, 2017]
"On October 13, 2017, President Trump announced a new U.S. strategy on Iran. He stated that, under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA; P.L. 114-17), he would not be certifying that continued Iran sanctions relief is proportionate to the measures taken by Iran to terminate its illicit nuclear program. That and other INARA certification requirements are related to, but separate from, Iran's nuclear obligations under the July 14, 2015, multilateral nuclear agreement (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA). The withholding of INARA certification does not automatically end U.S. participation in the JCPOA, which the UK, France, Germany, the United States, Russia, and China negotiated with Iran. But the President linked continued U.S. participation to congressional and allied action to address deficiencies in the JCPOA that he identified in his October 13 statement [...]."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Mix, Derek E.; Katzman, Kenneth
2017-10-18
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Iran Sanctions [October 13, 2017]
"The multilateral nuclear accord (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA) provides Iran broad relief from U.S., U.N., and multilateral sanctions on Iran's civilian economic sectors. On January 16, 2016, upon the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) certification that Iran had complied with the stipulated nuclear dismantlement commitments, U.S. Administration waivers of relevant sanctions laws took effect, relevant executive orders (E.O.s) were revoked, and corresponding U.N. and EU sanctions were lifted ('Implementation Day'). Remaining in place have been those secondary sanctions (sanctions on foreign firms) that have been imposed because of Iran's support for terrorism, its human rights abuses, its interference in specified countries in the region, and its missile and advanced conventional weapons programs, as well as sanctions on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and designated commanders, subunits, and affiliates. [...] As part of a shift to assertively counter Iran's regional activities and strategic weapons programs, the Trump Administration has designated for sanctions additional missile and IRGC-related entities. The Administration asserts its steps do not conflict with U.S. commitments under the JCPOA and the Administration has continued to implement the agreement, including renewing waivers of sanctions laws suspended in accordance with the JCPOA. Were the Administration to decide to end U.S. participation in the JCPOA, it could revoke waivers, decline to renew waivers, or trigger a provision of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (P.L. 114-17) under which Congress might act on legislation to reimpose sanctions."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2017-10-13
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Doing Business with Iran: EU-Iran Trade and Investment Relations [October 25, 2017]
"With the easing of nuclear-related sanctions on Iran by the United States, European Union and United Nations under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), signed on July 14, 2015, many foreign firms have begun to resume business with Iran. However, on October 13, 2017, President Trump announced he would not issue the certification that sanctions relief is 'proportionate' to the measures taken by Iran to terminate its nuclear program. This decision has raised questions over the possible reimposition of U.S. economic sanctions. The EU, which views the JCPOA as a binding international commitment, is threatening to take action to protect its firms from reimposed secondary sanctions. No matter the actions of EU governments, EU companies might base their responses on a calculation of their economic interests in Iran versus risks to their position in U.S. markets."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cimino, Cathleen; Katzman, Kenneth
2017-10-25
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The Independent Payment Advisory Board (IPAB): Frequently Asked Questions [October 31, 2017]
"This report responds to frequently asked questions about the Independent Payment Advisory Board (IPAB), including the board's background, current status, controversial issues including legal challenges, and recent legislative efforts to repeal the IPAB"
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2017-10-31
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Iran: Politics, Human Rights, and U.S. Policy [June 2, 2017]
"Beginning in 2010, the United States orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to persuade it to agree to strict limits on the program--pressure that contributed to the June 2013 election of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani as president of Iran and the eventual negotiation of a 'Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action' (JCPOA). The JCPOA, which began formal implementation on January 16, 2016, exchanged broad sanctions relief for nuclear program limits intended to ensure that Iran would require at least a year to produce a nuclear weapon after a decision to do so. President Obama asserted that the implementation of the JCPOA presented an opportunity to construct a new and more positive U.S. relationship with Iran. However, Iran has continued to test ballistic missiles; maintained support for regional movements such as Hamas, Lebanese Hezbollah, and Houthi rebels in Yemen; arrested additional U.S.-Iran dual nationals; and conducted high speed intercepts of U.S. naval vessels in the Persian Gulf. The Trump Administration has characterized Iran as an adversary of the United States and stated a commitment to countering Iran's regional influence--although without taking steps that would conflict with U.S. commitments under the JCPOA. The Administration has not articulated a hope or intent to develop an improved relationship with Iran [...] The United States has supported programs to promote civil society in Iran, but successive U.S. Administrations, including the Trump Administration, have stopped short of adopting policies that specifically seek to overthrow Iran's regime."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2017-06-02
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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy [August 22, 2017]
"The United States, partner countries, and the Afghan government are attempting to reverse recent gains made by the resilient Taliban-led insurgency since the December 2014 transition to a smaller international mission consisting primarily of training and advising the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). The Afghan government has come under increasing domestic criticism not only for failing to prevent insurgent gains but also for its internal divisions that have spurred the establishment of new political opposition coalitions. In September 2014, the United States brokered a compromise to address a dispute over the 2014 presidential election, but a September 2016 deadline was not met for enacting election reforms and deciding whether to elevate the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) position to a prime ministership. The Afghan government has made some measurable progress in reducing corruption and implementing its budgetary and other commitments. It has adopted measures that would enable it to proceed with new parliamentary elections, but no election date has been set."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth; Clayton, Thomas
2017-08-22
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Iran: Politics, Human Rights, and U.S. Policy [August 22, 2017]
"Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, the United States and Iran have been at odds politically and diplomatically over the perceived threat posed by Iran to a broad range of U.S. interests. U.S. officials also express a broad range of concerns about Iran's human rights abuses, including its repeated detentions of U.S.-Iran dual nationals. During the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. officials identified Iran's support for militant Middle East groups as the primary threat posed by Iran to U.S. interests and allies. Iran's nuclear program took precedence in U.S. policy after 2002 as the potential for Iran to develop a nuclear weapon increased. Beginning in 2010, the United States orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to persuade it to agree to strict limits on the program--pressure that contributed to the June 2013 election of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani as president of Iran and the eventual negotiation of a 'Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action' (JCPOA). The JCPOA, which began formal implementation on January 16, 2016, exchanged broad sanctions relief for nuclear program limits intended to ensure that Iran would require at least a year to produce a nuclear weapon after a decision to do so."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2017-08-22
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Iran Sanctions [August 04, 2017]
"U.S. sanctions--and U.S. attempts to achieve imposition of multilateral and international sanctions on Iran--have been a significant component of U.S. Iran policy for several decades. In the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. sanctions were intended to try to compel Iran to cease supporting acts of terrorism and to limit Iran's strategic power in the Middle East more generally. Since the mid-2000s, U.S. sanctions have focused on ensuring that Iran's nuclear program is for purely civilian uses and, since 2010, the international community has cooperated with a U.S.-led and U.N.-authorized sanctions regime in pursuit of that goal. Still, sanctions against Iran have multiple objectives and address multiple perceived threats from Iran simultaneously. This report analyzes U.S. and international sanctions against Iran and provides some examples, based on open sources, of companies and countries that conduct business with Iran. CRS has no way to independently corroborate any of the reporting on which these examples are based and no mandate to assess whether any firm or other entity is complying with U.S. or international sanctions against Iran."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2017-08-04
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Afghanistan: U.S. Rule of Law and Justice Sector Assistance [November 9, 2010]
"Developing effective Afghan justice sector institutions is considered by many observers to be essential in winning the support of the Afghan population, improving the Afghan government's credibility and legitimacy, and reducing support for insurgent factions. Such sentiments are reinforced in the face of growing awareness of the pervasiveness of Afghan corruption. To this end, establishing the rule of law (ROL) in Afghanistan has become a priority in U.S. strategy for Afghanistan and an issue of interest to Congress. Numerous U.S. programs to promote ROL are in various stages of implementation and receive ongoing funding and oversight from Congress. Major programs include the following: State Department's Justice Sector Support Program (JSSP) and Corrections System Support Program (CSSP); U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID's) formal and informal ROL stabilization programs (RLS); Justice Department's (DOJ's) Senior Federal Prosecutors Program, which, with State Department funds, provides legal mentoring and training; and Defense Department's (DOD's) operational support through Combined Joint Task Force 101 (CJTF-101), as well as through Combined Joint Interagency Task Force 435 (CJIATF-435)."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Wyler, Liana Sun; Katzman, Kenneth
2010-11-09
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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy [October 2, 2017]
"The United States, partner countries, and the Afghan government are attempting to reverse recent gains made by the resilient Taliban-led insurgency since the December 2014 transition to a smaller international mission consisting primarily of training and advising the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). The Afghan government has come under increasing domestic criticism not only for failing to prevent insurgent gains but also for its internal divisions that have spurred the establishment of new political opposition coalitions. In September 2014, the United States brokered a compromise to address a dispute over the 2014 presidential election, but a September 2016 deadline was not met for enacting election reforms and deciding whether to elevate the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) position to a prime ministership. The Afghan government has made some measurable progress in reducing corruption and implementing its budgetary and other commitments. It has adopted measures that would enable it to proceed with new parliamentary elections, but no election date has been set."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth; Thomas, Clayton (Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs)
2017-10-02
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Iran Sanctions [September 15, 2017]
"U.S. sanctions--and U.S. attempts to achieve imposition of multilateral and international sanctions on Iran--have been a significant component of U.S. Iran policy for several decades. In the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. sanctions were intended to try to compel Iran to cease supporting acts of terrorism and to limit Iran's strategic power in the Middle East more generally. Since the mid2000s, U.S. sanctions have focused on ensuring that Iran's nuclear program is for purely civilian uses and, since 2010, the international community has cooperated with a U.S.-led and U.N.authorized sanctions regime in pursuit of that goal. Still, sanctions against Iran have multiple objectives and address multiple perceived threats from Iran simultaneously."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2017-09-15
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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy [November 7, 2017]
"The United States, partner countries, and the Afghan government are attempting to reverse recent gains made by the resilient Taliban-led insurgency since the December 2014 transition to a smaller international mission consisting primarily of training and advising the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). The Afghan government has come under increasing domestic criticism not only for failing to prevent insurgent gains but also for its internal divisions that have spurred the establishment of new political opposition coalitions. In September 2014, the United States brokered a compromise to address a dispute over the 2014 presidential election, but a September 2016 deadline was not met for enacting election reforms and deciding whether to elevate the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) position to a prime ministership. The Afghan government has made some measurable progress in reducing corruption and implementing its budgetary and other commitments. It has adopted measures that would enable it to proceed with new parliamentary elections, but no election date has been set."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth; Thomas, Clayton (Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs)
2017-11-07
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Iran: Politics, Human Rights, and U.S. Policy [November 01, 2017]
"Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, the United States and Iran have been at odds politically and diplomatically. During the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. officials identified Iran's support for militant Middle East groups as the primary threat posed by Iran to U.S. interests and allies. Iran's nuclear program took precedence in U.S. policy after 2002 as the potential for Iran to develop a nuclear weapon increased. Beginning in 2010, the United States orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to persuade it to agree to strict limits on the program-- pressure that contributed to the June 2013 election of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani as president of Iran and the eventual negotiation of a 'Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action' (JCPOA). The JCPOA, which began formal implementation on January 16, 2016, exchanged broad sanctions relief for nuclear program limits intended to ensure that Iran would require at least a year to produce a nuclear weapon after a decision to do so."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2017-11-01
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Iran Nuclear Agreement [September 15, 2017]
"Multilateral negotiations regarding Iran's nuclear program date back to 2003 after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported on the existence of clandestine nuclear facilities at Natanz. In October of that year, Iran concluded an agreement with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom under which Iran temporarily suspended aspects of its nuclear program, including enrichment of uranium, and signed an Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement, but also asserted its right to develop nuclear technology. In January 2006, Tehran announced that it would resume research and development on its centrifuges at Natanz. After that time, Iran held multiple rounds of talks with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (collectively known as the P5+1)."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth; Kerr, Paul K.
2017-09-15
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Iran: Efforts to Preserve Economic Benefits of the Nuclear Deal [Updated February 26, 2019]
"On May 8, 2018, President Trump announced that the United States would cease implementing U.S. commitments under the 2015 multilateral Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran. On November 5, 2018, at the end of a 'wind down period,' all pre-JCPOA U.S. sanctions on foreign firms that conduct transactions in all of Iran's core economic sectors, including energy, banking, shipping, and manufacturing, went back into effect. These include sanctions on 'petroleum-related transactions' and transactions by foreign banks with Iran's Central Bank. In addition, foreign firms that transact business with entities designated by the United States for sanctions could face virtual exclusion from the U.S. economy."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cimino-Isaacs, Cathleen D.; Katzman, Kenneth; Mix, Derek E.
2019-02-26
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Coalition-Building Against Iran [March 12, 2019]
From the Document: "As part of its efforts to maximize pressure on Iran, the Trump Administration is urging a wide variety of international actors to adopt Iran policies similar and complementary to those of the United States. The Administration arguably is attempting to isolate Iran politically and diplomatically by fashioning a multilateral 'coalition of the willing' consisting of U.S. allies and partners in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. It is implementing its strategy in international issue-focused meetings, special U.S.-organized and long established multilateral forums such as the United Nations, and bilateral discussions. One particular, although not exclusive, goal is to persuade the other JCPOA parties to follow the Trump Administration's May 2018 step of abrogating the multilateral nuclear agreement with Iran (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA), and reimpose economic sanctions."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2019-03-12
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Iran's Foreign and Defense Policies [September 25, 2018]
"Successive Administrations have identified Iran as a key national security challenge, citing Iran's nuclear and missile programs as well as its long-standing attempts to counter many U.S. objectives in the region. Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats, in his February 13, 2018, annual worldwide threat assessment testimony before Congress, assessed that 'Iran will seek to expand its influence in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, where it sees conflicts generally trending in Tehran's favor...' and 'Iran will develop military capabilities that threaten U.S. forces and allies in the region.... 'Successive National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs) have required an annual report on Iran's military power, which has in recent years contained assessments of Iran similar to those presented publicly by the intelligence community."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2018-09-25
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Bahrain: Unrest, Security, and U.S. Policy [October 11, 2018]
"An uprising against Bahrain's Al Khalifa ruling family that began on February 14, 2011, has diminished in intensity, but punishments of oppositionists and periodic demonstrations continue. The mostly Shiite opposition to the Sunni-minority-led regime has not achieved its goal of establishing a constitutional monarchy, but the unrest has compelled the ruling family to undertake some modest reforms. The mainstream opposition uses peaceful forms of dissent, but small factions, reportedly backed by Iran, have claimed responsibility for bombings and other attacks on security officials. The Bahrain government's repression has presented a policy dilemma for the United States because Bahrain is along time ally that is pivotal to maintaining Persian Gulf security. The country has hosted a U.S. naval command headquarters for the Gulf region since 1948; the United States and Bahrain have had a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) since 1991; and Bahrain was designated by the United States as a 'major non-NATO ally' in 2002. There are over 7,000 U.S. forces, mostly Navy, in Bahrain. Bahrain relies on U.S.-made arms, but, because of the government's use of force against protesters, the Obama Administration held up some new weapons sales to Bahrain and curtailed U.S. assistance to Bahrain's internal security organizations. In 2014, Bahrain joined the U.S. - led coalition against the Islamic State and flew strikes against the group's fighters in Syria that year, and has expressed willingness to join a U.S.-backed concept for a broad Arab coalition to counter Iran (Middle East Strategic Alliance)."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2018-10-11
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Efforts to Preserve Economic Benefits of the Iran Nuclear Deal [June 27, 2018]
"On May 8, 2018, President Donald Trump announced that the United States would cease implementing U.S. commitments under the 2015 multilateral Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran. He indicated that, by the end of a 'wind down period' (by November 4, 2018), all U.S. sanctions in place prior to the JCPOA--which target foreign firms that conduct transactions in all of Iran's core economic sectors, including energy, banking, shipping, insurance, manufacturing, and hard currency trading--would go back into effect. These include sanctions on 'petroleum-related transactions' and transactions by foreign banks with Iran's Central Bank. Several hundred Iranian and third country entities will again be designated by the United States as sanctioned entities, meaning that foreign firms that transact business with these entities could face exclusion from the U.S. economy and financial system."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cimino-Isaacs, Cathleen D.; Katzman, Kenneth; Mix, Derek E.
2018-06-27
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Iran's Foreign and Defense Policies [May 23, 2018]
"Successive Administrations have identified Iran as a key national security challenge, citing Iran's nuclear and missile programs as well as its long-standing attempts to counter many U.S. objectives in the region. Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats, in his February 13, 2018, annual worldwide threat assessment testimony before Congress, assessed that 'Iran will seek to expand its influence in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, where it sees conflicts generally trending in Tehran's favor ...' and 'Iran will develop military capabilities that threaten U.S. forces and allies in the region....' Successive National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs) have required an annual report on Iran's military power, which has in recent years contained assessments of Iran similar to those presented by the intelligence community."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2018-05-23
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Bahrain: Unrest, Security, and U.S. Policy [Updated February 5, 2019]
"An uprising against Bahrain's Al Khalifa ruling family that began on February 14, 2011, has diminished in intensity, but punishments of oppositionists and periodic demonstrations continue. The mostly Shia opposition to the Sunni-minority-led regime has not achieved its goal of establishing a constitutional monarchy, but the unrest has compelled the ruling family to undertake some modest reforms. The mainstream opposition uses peaceful forms of dissent, but small factions, reportedly backed by Iran, have claimed responsibility for attacks on security officials. Elections for a legislative body, held most recently during November 24-December 1, 2018, were marred by the banning of opposition political societies and allegations of gerrymandering to prevent opposition victories, but observers praised the newly elected lower house of the Assembly for naming a woman as its speaker."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2019-02-05
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Iran's Foreign and Defense Policies [Updated January 16, 2019]
"Successive Administrations have identified Iran as a key national security challenge, citing Iran's nuclear and missile programs as well as its long-standing attempts to counter many U.S. objectives in the region. The Trump Administration has defined Iran and its regime as a particularly significant threat to U.S. national security, accusing the regime of 'destructive behavior at home and abroad.' Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats, in his February 13, 2018, annual worldwide threat assessment testimony before Congress, assessed that 'Iran will seek to expand its influence in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, where it sees conflicts generally trending in Tehran's favor' and 'Iran will develop military capabilities that threaten U.S. forces and allies in the region.' Successive National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs) have required an annual report on Iran's military power, which has in recent years contained assessments of Iran similar to those presented publicly by the intelligence community."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2019-01-16
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Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options [August 23, 2018]
"Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, the United States and Iran have been estranged and at odds. During the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. officials identified Iran's support for militant Middle East groups as the primary threat posed by Iran to U.S. interests and allies. Iran's nuclear program took precedence in U.S. policy after 2002 as the potential for Iran to develop a nuclear weapon increased. In 2010, the Obama Administration orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to persuade it to agree to strict limits on the program--pressure that contributed to the June 2013 election of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani as president of Iran and the negotiation of a nuclear agreement--the 'Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action' (JCPOA). The JCPOA exchanged sanctions relief for limits on Iran's nuclear program. The JCPOA reduced the potential threat from Iran's nuclear program, but did not contain strict or binding limits on Iran's ballistic missile program; its regional influence; its conventional military programs; and its human rights abuses."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2018-08-23
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Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options [Updated March 6, 2019]
From the Document: "Ever since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, the United States and Iran have been at odds, although to varying degrees of intensity. During the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. officials identified Iran's support for militant Middle East groups as the primary threat posed by Iran to U.S. interests and allies. Iran's nuclear program took precedence in U.S. policy after 2002 as the potential for Iran to develop a nuclear weapon increased. In 2010, the Obama Administration orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to persuade it to agree to strict limits on the program. The pressure contributed to the June 2013 election of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani as president of Iran and the July 2015 multilateral nuclear agreement-- the 'Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action' (JCPOA). That agreement exchanged sanctions relief for limits on Iran's nuclear program, but did not contain binding limits on Iran's ballistic missile program or any curbs on its regional influence or its human rights abuses."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2019-03-06
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Kuwait: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy [Updated March 4, 2019]
From the Document: "Kuwait has been pivotal to the decades- long U.S. effort to secure the Persian Gulf region because of its consistent cooperation with U.S. military operations in the region and its key location in the northern Gulf. Kuwait and the United States have a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA), under which the United States maintains over 13,000 military personnel in country and prepositioned military equipment in Kuwait to project power in the region. Only Germany, Japan, and South Korea host more U.S. troops than does Kuwait, which hosts the operational command center for U.S.- led Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) that has combatted the Islamic State."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2019-03-04
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Iran's Foreign and Defense Policies [Updated March 15, 2019]
From the Document: "Successive Administrations have identified Iran as a key national security challenge. The Trump Administration encapsulated its assessment of the threat posed by Iran in a late September 2018 State Department report entitled 'Outlaw Regime: A Chronicle of Iran's Destructive Activities.' The report outlines Iran's malign activities as well as a litany of other activities the Administration termed 'the Iranian regime's destructive behavior at home and abroad.' The U.S. intelligence community testified in January 2019 that 'Iran's regional ambitions and improved military capabilities almost certainly will threaten U.S. interests in the coming year, driven by Tehran's perception of increasing U.S., Saudi, and Israeli hostility, as well as continuing border insecurity, and the influence of hardliners.' Successive National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs) have required an annual report on Iran's military power, which has in recent years contained assessments of Iran similar to those presented publicly by the intelligence community."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2019-03-15
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Iran Sanctions [Updated May 21, 2019]
From the Overview and Objectives: "This report analyzes U.S. and international sanctions against Iran. CRS [Congressional Research Service] has no way to independently corroborate whether any individual or other entity might be in violation of U.S. or international sanctions against Iran. The report tracks 'implementation' of the various U.S. laws and executive orders as designations and imposition of sanctions. Some sanctions require the blocking of U.S.-based property of sanctioned entities. CRS has not obtained information from the executive branch indicating that such property has been blocked, and it is possible that sanctioned entities do not have any U.S. assets that could be blocked."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2019-05-21
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Iran's Foreign and Defense Policies [Updated May 8, 2019]
From the Introduction: "Successive Administrations have identified Iran as a key national security challenge. The Trump Administration encapsulated its assessment of the threat posed by Iran in a late September 2018 State Department report entitled 'Outlaw Regime: A Chronicle of Iran's Destructive Activities.' It outlines Iran's malign activities as well as a litany of other activities the Administration terms 'the Iranian regime's destructive behavior at home and abroad.' The U.S. intelligence community testified in January 2019 that 'Iran's regional ambitions and improved military capabilities almost certainly will threaten U.S. interests in the coming year, driven by Tehran's perception of increasing U.S., Saudi, and Israeli hostility, as well as continuing border insecurity, and the influence of hardliners.' An annual Defense Department report on Iran's military power required by successive National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs), generally contain assessments similar to those presented publicly by the intelligence community."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2019-05-08
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Iran's Foreign and Defense Policies [Updated July 23, 2019]
From the Introduction: "Successive Administrations have identified Iran as a key national security challenge. The Trump Administration assessed the threat posed by Iran in a September 2018 State Department report entitled 'Outlaw Regime: A Chronicle of Iran's Destructive Activities,' which outlined Iran's a litany of Iranian actions that the Administration terms 'the Iranian regime's destructive behavior at home and abroad.' The U.S. intelligence community testified in January 2019 that 'Iran's regional ambitions and improved military capabilities almost certainly will threaten U.S. interests in the coming year, driven by Tehran's perception of increasing U.S., Saudi, and Israeli hostility, as well as continuing border insecurity, and the influence of hardliners.' An annual Defense Department report on Iran's military power required by successive National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs) generally contain assessments similar to those presented by the intelligence community."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2019-07-23
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Iran Sanctions [Updated July 12, 2019]
From the Summary: "Successive Administrations have used sanctions extensively to try to change Iran's behavior. Sanctions have had a substantial effect on Iran's economy but little, if any, observable effect on Iran's conventional defense programs or regional malign activities. During 2012-2015, when the global community was relatively united in pressuring Iran, Iran's economy shrank as its crude oil exports fell by more than 50%, and Iran had limited ability to utilize its $120 billion in assets held abroad. [...] On April 22, 2019, the Administration announced it would not renew any SREs [Significant Reduction Exceptions] when they expire on May 2, 2019, instead seeking to drive Iran's oil exports as close to zero as possible. On May 3, 2019, the Administration ended some waivers for foreign governments to provide technical assistance to some JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action]-permitted aspects of Iran's nuclear program. The economic difficulties and other U.S. pressure measures have prompted Iran to cease performing some of the nuclear commitments of the JCPOA."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2019-07-12
