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Searching for Stable Peace in the Persian GulfThe author examines America's dual containment policy for the Persian Gulf and shows how adherence to the policy has eroded. Key allies of the United States withhold support for military action against Iraq, despite evidence that the Iraqis are clandestinely producing weapons of mass destruction. Similarly, U.S. allies have concluded potentially lucrative deals with Iran to exploit central Asian oil resources, despite Washington's opposition to them. The author concludes with recommended courses of action the United States should follow to maintain its leadership role in the region.Army War College (U.S.)Katzman, Kenneth2002-02-02
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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy [January 26, 2011]"Following two high-level policy reviews on Afghanistan in 2009, and another completed in December 2010, the Obama Administration asserts that it is pursuing a well resourced and integrated military-civilian strategy intended to pave the way for a gradual transition to Afghan leadership. The transition is to begin in July 2011 and be completed by the end of 2014, although U.S. officials say that the U.S. intent is for a long term relationship with Afghanistan that might include U.S. military involvement long after 2014. The policy is intended to ensure that Afghanistan will not again become a base for terrorist attacks against the United States. At the same time, there appears to be a debate within the Administration and between the United States and Pakistan over whether the war effort should be widened somewhat to include stepped up attacks on Afghan militants inside Pakistan. That debate raises the question of the degree to which Pakistan envisions Afghanistan as part of its strategy to avoid encirclement by or pressure from Pakistan's historic rival, India. At the same time, Afghanistan is achieving ever higher degrees of economic and political integration with its neighbors in Central Asia and the Middle East."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2011-01-26
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [January 19, 2011]This Congressional Research Service (CRS) report discusses U.S. concerns and policy responses to Iran. "The Obama Administration views Iran as a major threat to U.S. national security interests, a perception generated not only by Iran's nuclear program but also by its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. Particularly in its first year, the Obama Administration altered the previous U.S. approach by offering Iran's leaders consistent and sustained engagement with the potential for closer integration with and acceptance by the West. To try to convince Iranian leaders of peaceful U.S. intent and respect for Iran's history and stature in the region, the Obama Administration downplayed discussion of potential U.S. military action against Iranian nuclear facilities and repeatedly insisted that it did not seek to change Iran's regime. It held to this position even at the height of the protests by the domestic opposition 'Green movement' that took place for the six months following Iran's June 12, 2009, presidential election but largely ceased in 2010. [...] Congressional resolutions and legislation since mid-2009 show growing congressional support for steps to enhance the opposition's prospects, or, at the very least, to sharply increase international criticism of Iran's human rights practices. Some observers believe that initiatives in the 112th Congress are likely to focus on providing additional help to those in Iran who want to change the regime. However, Obama Administration officials say they believe that the opposition's prospects are enhanced by a muting of U.S. public support for the opposition."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2011-01-19
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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy [February 18, 2011]"Following three policy reviews on Afghanistan, the latest in December 2010, the Obama Administration asserts that it is pursuing a well-resourced and integrated military-civilian strategy intended to pave the way for a gradual transition to Afghan leadership beginning in July 2011 and to be completed by the end of 2014. Amid widespread doubts that Afghan governance and security institutions will be strong enough to protect themselves by that time, U.S. officials say that the U.S. intent is for a long term relationship with Afghanistan that might include U.S. military involvement long after 2014. The policy is intended to ensure that Afghanistan will not again become a base for terrorist attacks against the United States."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2011-02-18
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Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy [March 2, 2011]"After experiencing serious unrest during the late 1990s, Bahrain's Sunni Muslim-dominated government undertook several steps to enhance the inclusion of the Shiite majority in governance. However, protests erupting following the uprising that overthrew Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak on February 11, 2011, demonstrate that Shiite grievances over the distribution of power and economic opportunities remain unsatisfied. The continuing unrest--in which opposition factions have escalated their demands in response to the use of force by the government--comes four months after the October 23, 2010, parliamentary election. That election, no matter the outcome, would not have unseated the ruling Al Khalifa family from power, but the Shiite population was hoping that winning a majority in the elected lower house could give it greater authority. In advance of the elections, the government launched a wave of arrests intended to try to discredit some of the hard-line Shiite leadership as tools of Iran. The main Shiite faction, an Islamist group called 'Wifaq' (Accord), won one more seat than it did in the 2006 election but still ended up short of a majority (18 out of the 40 seats) in the elected lower house. […]The 2011 unrest, which was met by an initial violent government crackdown on February 17, 2011, directly affects U.S. national security interests. Bahrain, in exchange for a tacit U.S. security guarantee, has provided key support for U.S. interests by hosting U.S. naval headquarters for the Gulf for over 60 years and by providing facilities and small numbers of personnel for U.S. war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2011-03-02
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Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy [February 18, 2011]"After experiencing serious unrest during the late 1990s, Bahrain undertook several steps to enhance the inclusion of the Shiite majority in governance. However, protests erupting following the uprising that overthrew Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak on February 11, 2011, demonstrate that Shiite grievances over the distribution of power and economic opportunities remain unsatisfied. The new unrest comes four months after smaller protests against the efforts by the Sunni-led government's efforts to maintain its tight grip on power in the October 23, 2010, parliamentary election. That election, no matter the outcome, would not have unseated the ruling Al Khalifa family from power, but the Shiite population was hoping that winning a majority in the elected lower house could give it greater authority with which to challenge the ruling family. In advance of the elections, the government launched a wave of arrests intended to try to discredit some of the hard-line Shiite leadership as tools of Iran. The main Shiite faction, an Islamist group called 'Wifaq' (Accord), won one more seat than it did in the 2006 election but still ended up short of a majority (18 out of the 40 seats) in the elected lower house. Underlying the unrest are Bahraini leadership concerns that Iran is supporting Shiite opposition movements, possibly in an effort to install a Shiite led, pro-Iranian government on the island. These fears are occasionally reinforced by comments from Iranian editorialists and political leaders that Bahrain should never have become formally independent of Iran. On the other hand, Bahrain's Shiite oppositionists accuse the government of inflating the Iran threat, and the contacts between Iran and the opposition, to discredit the opposition politically. Bahrain's rulers have tried to avoid inviting Iranian aggression, in part by signing energy agreements with Iran and by allowing Iranian banks and businesses to operate there."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2011-02-18
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [March 4, 2011]"The Obama Administration views Iran as a major threat to U.S. national security interests, a perception generated not only by Iran's nuclear program but also by its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. Particularly in its first year, the Obama Administration altered the previous U.S. approach by offering Iran's leaders consistent and sustained engagement with the potential for closer integration with and acceptance by the West. To try to convince Iranian leaders of peaceful U.S. intent and respect for Iran's history and stature in the region, the Obama Administration downplayed any discussion of potential U.S. military action against Iranian nuclear facilities or efforts to try to change Iran's regime. The Administration held to this position even at the height of the protests by the domestic opposition 'Green movement' that took place for the six months following Iran's June 12, 2009, presidential election but largely ceased in 2010. However, as of February 2011, the Administration may be shifting to increased support of the Green movement. No nuclear agreement appears within reach with Iran, the Green movement has reactivated in the wake of the February 2011 ousting of Egyptian President Mubarak by a youth-led democracy movement similar to the Green movement, and many in the 112th Congress believe the United States should support virtually all popular democracy movements in the Middle East, including in Iran."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2011-03-04
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United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy [March 10, 2011]"The UAE's [United Arab Emirates] relatively open borders, economy, and society have won praise from advocates of expanded freedoms in the Middle East while producing financial excesses, social ills such as prostitution and human trafficking, and relatively lax controls on sensitive technologies acquired from the West. The UAE government is authoritarian, although it allows substantial informal citizen participation and consensus-building. The openness of its society and its economic wealth have allowed the UAE to largely avoid the popular unrest in the Middle East thus far. [...] Partly because of substantial UAE federal government financial intervention and ample financial reserves, the political and social climate remained calm through the 2008-2009 global financial crisis and recession. The downturn hit Dubai emirate particularly hard and called into question its strategy of rapid, investment-fueled development, especially of luxury projects. Many expatriate workers left UAE after widespread layoffs, particularly in the financial and real estate sectors, and the decline affected property investors and the economies of several neighboring countries, including Afghanistan. The downturn also touched Afghanistan in the form of major losses among large shareholders of Kabul Bank, Afghanistan's largest private banking institution. At the outset of 2011, however, some economists were becoming more optimistic that Dubai emirate was poised for a rebound. For the Obama Administration and many in Congress, there are concerns about the UAE oversight and management of a complex and technically advanced initiative such as a nuclear power program. This was underscored by dissatisfaction among some members of Congress with a U.S.-UAE civilian nuclear cooperation agreement. The agreement was signed on May 21, 2009, and submitted to Congress that day. It entered into force on December 17, 2009. However, U.S. concerns about potential leakage of U.S. and other advanced technologies through the UAE to Iran, in particular, are far from alleviated."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2011-03-10
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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy [March 8, 2011]"Stated U.S. policy is to ensure that Afghanistan will not again become a base for terrorist attacks against the United States. Following three policy reviews on Afghanistan, the latest in December 2010, the Obama Administration asserts that it is pursuing a well-resourced and integrated military-civilian strategy intended to pave the way for a gradual transition to Afghan leadership beginning in July 2011 and to be completed by the end of 2014. [...] Many strategists, using lessons learned from other U.S.-led campaigns, doubt that Afghanistan can be rendered sufficiently stable unless militants are denied safe haven in Pakistan. That debate raises the question of the degree to which Pakistan envisions Afghanistan as part of its strategy to avoid encirclement by or pressure from Pakistan's historic rival, India. Nonetheless, Afghanistan is achieving ever higher degrees of economic and political integration with its neighbors in Central Asia and the Middle East. Others believe that the crucial question is the quality and extent of Afghan governance. In particular, President Hamid Karzai's failure to forcefully confront governmental corruption has caused a loss of Afghan support for his government. Others believe that governance is expanding and improving slowly and does not constitute an impediment to the U.S.-led transition plan. Still others say that strong economic growth and economic development might be sufficient to win the support of the population. Several major mining, agricultural export, and even energy development programs, mostly funded by private investment rather than international aid donors, have gotten under way in the past few years, with more in various stages of consideration or contract award. Additional development has been accomplished with foreign, particularly U.S., help: through the end of FY2010, the United States has provided over $54.5 billion in assistance to Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, of which about $30 billion has been to equip and train Afghan forces. For FY2012, about $18 billion in aid (including train and equip) is requested, in addition to about $100 billion for U.S. military operations there."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2011-03-08
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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy [June 3, 2011]"Stated U.S. policy is to ensure that Afghanistan will not again become a base for terrorist attacks against the United States. Following three policy reviews on Afghanistan, the latest in December 2010, the Obama Administration asserts that it is pursuing a well-resourced and integrated military-civilian strategy intended to pave the way for a gradual transition to Afghan leadership that will begin in July 2011 and be completed by the end of 2014. To carry out U.S. policy, a total of 51,000 additional U.S. forces were authorized by the two 2009 reviews, bringing U.S. troop numbers to their current level of about 99,000, with partner forces adding about 42,000. Under current plans, the transition to Afghan security leadership will start with seven areas announced by President Hamid Karzai on March 22. This transition is to be accompanied by a drawdown of U.S. forces, with the specific size and scope of the drawdown reportedly to be announced later in June 2011. Amid widespread doubts that Afghan governance and security institutions will be strong enough to protect themselves by that time, U.S. officials say that the U.S. intent is for a long term relationship with Afghanistan that might include U.S. military involvement long after 2014. The start of the transition coincides with a senior personnel transition under way, announced April 28; top U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) commander General Petraeus has been named CIA Director; Lt. Gen. John Allen has been named his replacement; and Ambassador Ryan Crocker has been named to replace Karl Eikenberry as U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2011-06-03
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Kuwait: Security, Reform, and U.S. Policy [April 26, 2011]"Kuwait was pivotal to two decades of U.S. efforts to reduce a threat posed by Iraq. After U.S. forces liberated Kuwait from Iraqi invading forces in February 1991, Kuwait was the central location from which the United States contained Saddam during 1991-2003, and it hosted the bulk of the U.S.-led force that invaded Iraq in March 2003 to remove Saddam from power. It is the key route through which U.S. troops have been withdrawing from Iraq during 2009-2011. Kuwait's relations with the current government of Iraq are hampered, in part, by issues not fully resolved from the August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, although a January 12, 2011, visit by the Kuwaiti prime minister appeared to represent a major, at least symbolic, breakthrough. With the strategic threat from Iraq sharply reduced, Kuwait is cooperating with U.S.-led efforts to contain Iranian power in the Gulf. At the same time, like the other Gulf monarchy states, Kuwait seeks to maintain normal economic and political relations with Iran so as not to provoke Iran or cause it to increase its support to pro-Iranian movements in Kuwait."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2011-04-26
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [November 1, 2006]"According to the Administration's 'National Security Strategy' document released on March 16, 2006, the United States 'may face no greater challenge from a single country than Iran.' That perception intensified following the military confrontation between Iranian-armed and assisted Lebanese Hezbollah and Israel in July-August 2006. To date, the Bush Administration has pursued several avenues to attempt to contain the potential threat posed by Iran. However, the Administration's focus on preventing an Iranian nuclear weapons breakthrough has brought diplomatic strategy to the forefront of U.S. policy. As part of that effort, the Bush Administration announced May 31 it would negotiate with Iran in concert with U.S. allies if Iran suspends uranium enrichment; in past years the Bush Administration had only limited dialogue with Iran on specific regional issues. However, Iran did not comply with an August 31, 2006, deadline to cease uranium enrichment, contained in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1696 (July 31, 2006), dividing the United States and partner countries over whether to continue diplomacy with Iran and whether and how to move to impose international sanctions on it."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2006-11-01
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Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) [April 26, 2006]"No firms have been sanctioned under the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), and it has terminated with respect to Libya. Renewed in August 2001 for another five years (P.L. 107-24), ILSA is scheduled to expire in August 2006. In the 109th Congress, H.R. 282 (passed by the House on April 26, 2006) and S. 333 would extend it indefinitely and modify it, including imposing a time limit for the Administration to determine whether an investment violates ILSA. This report will be updated. See also CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2006-04-26
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Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance [May 5, 2011]"The limited capacity and widespread corruption of all levels of Afghan governance are factors in debate over the effectiveness of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan and in planning for the July 2011 beginning of a transition to Afghan security leadership. That transition is to be completed by the end of 2014, a timeframe agreed to by the United States, its international partners, and the Afghan government--although some believe that timetable might be accelerated in the aftermath of the May 1, 2011, U.S. killing of Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden. Afghan governing capacity has increased significantly since the Taliban regime fell in late 2001, but many positions, particularly at the local level, are unfilled or governing functions are performed by unaccountable power brokers. Widespread illiteracy and ethnic and factional ties limit the development of a competent bureaucracy, although U.S. and other programs are attempting to address these deficiencies. On corruption, President Hamid Karzai has accepted U.S. help to build emerging anti-corruption institutions, but these same institutions have sometimes caused a Karzai backlash when they have targeted his allies or relatives. Effects of corruption burst into public view in August 2010 when the large Kabul Bank nearly collapsed due in part to losses on large loans to major shareholders, many of whom are close to Karzai. Some in Congress have sought to link further U.S. aid to clearer progress on the corruption issue."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2011-05-05
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Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy [April 20, 2011]"Protests that erupted in Bahrain following the uprising that overthrew Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak on February 11, 2011, demonstrate that Shiite grievances over the distribution of power and economic opportunities were not satisfied by previous efforts to include the Shiite majority in governance. Possibly because of concerns that a rise to power of the Shiite opposition could jeopardize the extensive U.S. military cooperation with Bahrain, the Obama Administration has criticized the use of violence by the government but has praised the Al Khalifa regime's offer of a dialogue with the demonstrators. It has not called for the King to step down, and Administration contacts with his government are credited by many for the decision of the regime to cease using force against the protesters as of February 19, 2011. However, as protests escalated in March 2011, Bahrain's government, contrary to the advice of the Obama Administration, invited security assistance from other neighboring Gulf Cooperation Council countries and subsequently moved to forcefully end the large gatherings. [...] Unrest in Bahrain directly affects U.S. national security interests. Bahrain, in exchange for a tacit U.S. security guarantee, has provided key support for U.S. interests by hosting U.S. naval headquarters for the Gulf for over 60 years and by providing facilities and small numbers of personnel for U.S. war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Bahraini facilities are pivotal to U.S. strategy to deter any Iranian aggression as well as to interdict the movement of terrorists and weapons-related technology on Gulf waterways. The United States has designated Bahrain as a 'major non-NATO ally,' and it provides small amounts of security assistance to Bahrain."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2011-04-20
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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy [April 15, 2011]"Stated U.S. policy is to ensure that Afghanistan will not again become a base for terrorist attacks against the United States. Following three policy reviews on Afghanistan, the latest in December 2010, the Obama Administration asserts that it is pursuing a well-resourced and integrated military-civilian strategy intended to pave the way for a gradual transition to Afghan leadership that will begin in July 2011 and be completed by the end of 2014. To carry out U.S. policy, a total of 51,000 additional U.S. forces were authorized by the two 2009 reviews, bringing U.S. troop numbers to their current level of about 100,000, with partner forces adding about 41,000. Amid widespread doubts that Afghan governance and security institutions will be strong enough to protect themselves by that time, U.S. officials say that the U.S. intent is for a long term relationship with Afghanistan that might include U.S. military involvement long after 2014."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2011-04-15
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Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights [April 1, 2011]"Iraq's political system is increasingly characterized by peaceful competition and formation of cross-sectarian alliances, although ethnic and sectarian infighting continues, sometimes involving the questionable use of key levers of power and legal institutions. This infighting--and the belief that holding political power may mean the difference between life and death for the various political communities--significantly delayed agreement on a new government that was to be selected following the March 7, 2010, national elections for the Council of Representatives (COR, parliament). With U.S. diplomatic intervention, on November 10, 2010, major ethnic and sectarian factions agreed on a framework for a new government, breaking the long deadlock. Their agreement, under which Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki serves a second term, was implemented in the formation of a broad-based cabinet on December 21, 2010. The participation of all major factions in the new government was considered stabilizing politically and created some political momentum to act on key outstanding legislation crucial to attracting foreign investment, such as national hydrocarbon laws. The new government took action on some long-stalled initiatives, including year-long tensions over Kurdish exports of oil. However, the lack of a broader and sustained focus on governance, or on improving key services, such as electricity, created popular frustration that manifested as protests since February 2011. The protests were possibly inspired by the wave of unrest that has broken out in many other Middle Eastern countries but were not centered on overthrowing the regime or wholesale political change. Some force was used to suppress them, but the major effect was to renew tensions among and within major factions rather than to inspire new attempts to improve government performance."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2011-04-01
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [April 18, 2011]"The Obama Administration views Iran as a major threat to U.S. national security interests, a perception generated not only by Iran's nuclear program but also by its materiel assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. Throughout its first year, the Obama Administration altered the previous U.S. approach by offering Iran's leaders consistent and sustained engagement with the potential for closer integration with and acceptance by the West. To try to convince Iranian leaders of peaceful U.S. intent and respect for Iran's history and stature in the region, the Obama Administration downplayed any discussion of potential U.S. military action against Iranian nuclear facilities or efforts to try to change Iran's regime. The Administration held to this position even at the height of the protests by the domestic opposition 'Green movement' that took place for the six months following Iran's June 12, 2009, presidential election but largely ceased in 2010. Without obtaining agreement from Iran to implement a compromise outlined on October 1, 2009, during 2010 the Administration worked to expand international economic sanctions against Iran. Major sanctions were imposed on Iran by U.N. Security Council (Resolution 1929), as well as related 'national measures' by the European Union, Japan, South Korea, and other countries. Additional measures designed to compel foreign firms to exit the Iranian market were contained in U.S. legislation passed in June 2010 (the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act, P.L. 111-195). Still, the Administration and its partners assert that these sanctions were intended to support diplomacy with Iran to limit its nuclear program. Iran attended December 6-7, 2010, talks in Geneva with the six powers negotiating with Iran, but no substantive progress was reported."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2011-04-18
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Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy [March 10, 2011]"After experiencing serious unrest during the late 1990s, Bahrain's Sunni Muslim-dominated government undertook several steps to enhance the inclusion of the Shiite majority in governance. However, protests erupting following the uprising that overthrew Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak on February 11, 2011, demonstrate that Shiite grievances over the distribution of power and economic opportunities remain unsatisfied. The continuing unrest--in which some opposition factions have escalated their demands in response to the initial use of force by the government--comes four months after the October 23, 2010, parliamentary election. That election, no matter the outcome, would not have unseated the ruling Al Khalifa family from power, but the Shiite population was hoping that winning a majority in the elected lower house could give it greater authority. In advance of the elections, the government launched a wave of arrests intended to try to discredit some of the hard-line Shiite leadership as tools of Iran. The main Shiite faction, an Islamist group called 'Wifaq' (Accord), won one more seat than it did in the 2006 election but still ended up short of a majority (18 out of the 40 seats) in the elected lower house. Possibly because of concerns that a rise to power of the Shiite opposition could jeopardize the U.S. military cooperation with Bahrain discussed below, the Obama Administration criticized the early use of violence by the government but has subsequently praised the Al Khalifa regime for its offer of a dialogue with the demonstrators to resolve the crisis. It has not called for the King to step down. Administration contacts with the regime are widely credited for the decision of the regime to cease using force against the protesters as of February 19, 2011."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2011-03-10
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [June 9, 2011]"The Obama Administration views Iran as a major threat to U.S. national security interests, a perception generated not only by Iran's nuclear program but also by its materiel assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. Throughout its first year, the Obama Administration offered Iran's leaders consistent and sustained engagement with the potential for closer integration with and acceptance by the West. To try to convince Iranian leaders of peaceful U.S. intent, the Obama Administration downplayed any discussion of potential U.S. military action against Iranian nuclear facilities or efforts to try to change Iran's regime. […] Others in and outside the 112th Congress believe that the U.S. focus should remain on pressing Iran economically and diplomatically. Sanctions, by some accounts, have slowed Iran's nuclear program directly and may be contributing to a widening schism between Iran's Supreme Leader and its President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad but have not evidently caused Iran to fundamentally rethink its nuclear negotiating position. The apparent slowing of Iran's nuclear program has, at least temporarily, quieted discussion in Israeli and U.S. expert circles about using military action to set Iran's nuclear program back. The Administration has stepped up arms sales to regional states that share the U.S. suspicions of Iran's intentions."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2011-06-09
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Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy [March 21, 2011]"Protests that erupted in Bahrain following the uprising that overthrew Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak on February 11, 2011, demonstrate that Shiite grievances over the distribution of power and economic opportunities were not satisfied by previous efforts to include the Shiite majority in governance. Possibly because of concerns that a rise to power of the Shiite opposition could jeopardize the extensive U.S. military cooperation with Bahrain, the Obama Administration criticized the early use of violence by the government but subsequently praised the Al Khalifa regime for its offer of a dialogue with the demonstrators. It did not call for the King to step down, and Administration contacts with his government are widely credited for the decision of the regime to cease using force against the protesters as of February 19, 2011. However, as protests escalated in March 2011, Bahrain's government, contrary to the advice of the Obama Administration, invited security assistance from other neighboring Gulf Cooperation Council countries and subsequently moved to end the large gatherings. Some believe the crackdown has largely ended prospects for a negotiated political solution in Bahrain, and could widen the conflict to the broader Gulf region."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2011-03-21
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [February 14, 2011]"The Obama Administration views Iran as a major threat to U.S. national security interests, a perception generated not only by Iran's nuclear program but also by its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. Particularly in its first year, the Obama Administration altered the previous U.S. approach by offering Iran's leaders consistent and sustained engagement with the potential for closer integration with and acceptance by the West. To try to convince Iranian leaders of peaceful U.S. intent and respect for Iran's history and stature in the region, the Obama Administration downplayed any discussion of potential U.S. military action against Iranian nuclear facilities or efforts to try to change Iran's regime. It held to this position even at the height of the protests by the domestic opposition 'Green movement' that took place for the six months following Iran's June 12, 2009, presidential election but largely ceased in 2010."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2011-02-14
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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy [December 29, 2010]"Following two high-level policy reviews on Afghanistan in 2009, and another completed in December 2010, the Obama Administration asserts that it is pursuing a well resourced and integrated military-civilian strategy intended to pave the way for a gradual transition to Afghan security leadership to begin in July 2011 and be completed by the end of 2014. [...] The December 2010 review took into account the effect of the addition of U.S. combat troops to Afghanistan in 2009 and 2010, intended to create security conditions to expand Afghan governance and economic development. A total of 51,000 additional U.S. forces were authorized by the two reviews, which has brought U.S. troop levels to about 98,000 as of September 4, 2010, with partner forces holding at about 41,000. [...] As reflected in the overview of the Administration review, released December 16, 2010, the top U.S./NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organzation] commander in Afghanistan, General David Petraeus, and his associates believe that insurgent momentum has been blunted, although gains remain 'fragile and reversible.' [...] Many assess that President Hamid Karzai's refusal to forcefully confront governmental corruption has caused a loss of Afghan support for his government, while others note that strong economic growth and economic development are additional causes for optimism. In order to try to achieve a strategic breakthrough that might force key insurgent leaders to negotiate a early political settlement, General Petraeus is attempting to accelerate local security solutions and experiments similar to those he pursued earlier in Iraq, and to step up the use of air strikes and special forces operations against Taliban commanders. In order to take advantage of an apparent new willingness by some insurgent commanders to negotiate, Karzai has named a broad-based 70-member High Peace Council to oversee negotiations. However, there are major concerns among Afghanistan's minorities and among its women that reconciliation could lead to compromises that erode the freedoms Afghans have enjoyed since 2001."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2010-12-29
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Middle East: Selected Key Issues and Options for the 112th Congress [January 3, 2011]"The Middle East, broadly defined as an area stretching from North Africa to Afghanistan, presents an array of challenges to U.S. foreign policy. Although the United States maintains strong relations with several key Arab and non-Arab states such as Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Turkey, other state and non-state actors, such as Iran, the Lebanese Shiite group Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Palestinian Sunni group Hamas, are aligned against U.S. interests. The United States and its regional and international allies continue to work to limit the influence of these actors while advocating for economic and political reform to address ongoing socioeconomic challenges and to promote democracy and a greater respect for human rights in the region. Members of the 112th Congress may face any number of issues in or relating to the Middle East including the war in Afghanistan, terrorism, foreign assistance, democracy promotion, and ongoing effects of the global financial crisis. This report provides an overview of key issues, a summary of past congressional action on these issues, and options for congressional consideration during the 112th Congress. Key issues include: Iran Sanctions; Preserving Israel's Qualitative Military Edge; Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process; U.S. Aid to the Palestinians; Saudi Arabia: Arms Sales and Security Cooperation; Yemen; Iraq: Defining Post-2011 Relations; Turkey; U.S. Policy Toward Syria; U.S. Support for Lebanon; U.S. Democracy Promotion in Egypt; [and] Islam, Al Qaeda, and U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy This report also contains a section, Appendix A, with links to relevant Congressional Research Service reports, along with analyst contact information."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth; Blanchard, Christopher M.; Addis, Casey L.2011-01-03
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Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks [February 7, 2011]"Iraq's political system is increasingly characterized by peaceful competition and formation of cross-sectarian alliances, although ethnic and sectarian infighting continues, sometimes involving the questionable use of key levers of power and legal institutions. This infighting--and the belief that holding political power may mean the difference between life and death for the various political communities--significantly delayed agreement on a new government that was to be selected following the March 7, 2010, national elections for the Council of Representatives (COR, parliament). With U.S. intervention, on November 10, 2010, major ethnic and sectarian factions agreed on a framework for a new government, breaking the long deadlock. Their agreement, under which Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki would serve another term, was implemented in the presentation by him of a broad-based cabinet on December 21, 2010, in advance of a December 25 constitutional deadline. The participation of all major factions in the new government, while stabilizing politically, could complicate efforts to pass key outstanding legislation crucial to attracting foreign investment, such as national hydrocarbon laws. However, there may be early indications that the new government is acting on long stalled initiatives, including year long tensions over Kurdish exports of oil."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2011-02-07
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [December 22, 2010]"The Obama Administration views Iran as a major threat to U.S. national security interests, a perception generated not only by Iran's nuclear program but also by its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. Particularly in its first year, the Obama Administration altered the previous U.S. approach by offering Iran's leaders consistent and sustained engagement with the potential for closer integration with and acceptance by the West. To try to convince Iranian leaders of peaceful U.S. intent and respect for Iran's history and stature in the region, the Obama Administration downplayed discussion of potential U.S. military action against Iranian nuclear facilities and repeatedly insisted that it did not seek to change Iran's regime. It held to this position even at the height of the protests by the domestic opposition 'Green movement' that emerged following Iran's June 12, 2009, presidential election. [...] There is broad agreement that the U.S., U.N. [United Nations], and other sanctions enacted since mid-2010 are pressing Iran economically. However, because the sanctions have not and might not cause Iran to fundamentally alter its commitment to its nuclear program, some are pressing the Administration not to de-emphasize military action as a means of setting Iran's nuclear program back. The Administration has stepped up arms sales and engagement with regional states that might be helpful to contain Iranian power, were Iran's nuclear program to advance dramatically. Some believe that only a victory by the domestic opposition in Iran, which in late 2009 appeared to pose a potentially serious challenge to the regime's grip on power, can permanently reduce the multiplicity of threats posed by Iran's regime. Congressional resolutions and legislation since mid-2009 show growing congressional support for steps to enhance the opposition's prospects, or, at the very least, to sharply increase international criticism of Iran's human rights practices. However, Obama Administration officials say they believe that the opposition's prospects are enhanced by a muting of U.S. public support for the opposition."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2010-12-22
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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy [November 19, 2010]"Following two high-level policy reviews on Afghanistan in 2009, the Obama Administration asserts that it is pursuing a well resourced and integrated military-civilian strategy intended to pave the way for a gradual transition to Afghan security leadership beginning in July 2011. The pace of that transition is to be determined by conditions on the ground, as determined by a formal DOD and a White House review of the Afghanistan situation in December 2010. The policy is intended to ensure that Afghanistan will not again become a base for terrorist attacks against the United States. At the same time, the Administration is attempting to counter the perception in the region, particularly among Pakistan, India, the Afghan insurgency, and within the Afghan political establishment that U.S. involvement will be sharply reduced after July 2011. That perception may, among other consequences, be inflaming the traditional rivalry between Pakistan and India, in this case to deny each other influence in Afghanistan. As of November 2010, the Administration is stressing that a transition to Afghan leadership would not likely be completed until 2014, with only gradual handover to the Afghans prior to then. The November 19-20, 2010, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit meeting in Lisbon is to map out the transition to Afghan lead and presumably convince partner countries to remain deployed until at least that time."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2010-11-19
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Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance [June 1, 2011]"The limited capacity and widespread corruption of all levels of Afghan governance are factors in debate over the effectiveness of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan and in planning for the July 2011 beginning of a transition to Afghan security leadership. That transition is to be completed by the end of 2014, a timeframe agreed to by the United States, its international partners, and the Afghan government, although some believe that timetable might be accelerated in the aftermath of the May 1, 2011, U.S. killing of Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden. Afghan governing capacity has increased significantly since the Taliban regime fell in late 2001, but many positions, particularly at the local level, are unfilled. Many governing functions are performed at least informally by unaccountable power brokers. Widespread illiteracy and ethnic and factional ties limit the development of a competent bureaucracy, although U.S. and other programs are attempting to address these deficiencies. On corruption, President Hamid Karzai has accepted U.S. help to build emerging anti-corruption institutions, but these same institutions have sometimes caused a Karzai backlash when they have targeted his allies or relatives. Effects of corruption burst into public view in August 2010 when the large Kabul Bank nearly collapsed due in part to losses on large loans to major shareholders, many of whom are close to Karzai. Some in Congress have sought to link further U.S. aid to clearer progress on the corruption issue, and the issue is expected to be an additional significant factor in debate about the pace of a U.S. troop drawdown from Afghanistan."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2011-06-01
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Iran Sanctions [May 25, 2011]"There appears to be a growing international consensus to adopt progressively strict economic sanctions against Iran to try to compel it to verifiably confine its nuclear program to purely peaceful uses. In January 2011, Secretary of State Clinton claimed that sanctions have accomplished a core objective of slowing Iran's nuclear program. However, nuclear talks in December 2010 and in January 2011 made virtually no progress, suggesting that Iran's leaders do not feel sufficiently pressured by sanctions to offer major concessions to obtain a nuclear deal. Because so many major economic powers have imposed sanctions on Iran, the sanctions are, by all accounts, having a growing effect on Iran's economy. The sanctions are reinforcing the effects of Iran's economic mismanagement and key bottlenecks. Among other indicators, there have been a stream of announcements by major international firms since early 2010 that they are exiting the Iranian market. Iran's oil production has fallen slightly to about 3.9 million barrels per day, from over 4.1 million barrels per day several years ago, although Iran now has small natural gas exports that it did not have before Iran opened its fields to foreign investment in 1996. The United States and its allies appear to agree that sanctions should continue to target Iran's energy sector and should try to isolate Iran from the international financial system."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2011-05-25
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Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy [September 29, 2010]"After experiencing serious unrest during the late 1990s, Bahrain undertook several steps to enhance the inclusion of the Shiite majority in governance. However, the Sunni-led government's efforts to maintain its tight grip on power have stirred new unrest among Bahraini Shiites in advance of October 23, 2010, parliamentary elections. That election, no matter the outcome, would not produce a new executive, but achievement of a Shiite majority in the elected lower house could give the opposition greater authority with which to challenge the ruling Al Khalifa family. In advance of the elections, the government has launched a wave of arrests intended to try to discredit some of the hardline Shiite leadership as fomenters of violence and tools of Iran. The crackdown has perhaps contributed to increasing Shiite popular protests in advance of the elections. [...] Bahrain has few external security options other than relying on some degree of U.S. security guarantee. Bahrain has tried to earn that guarantee by hosting U.S. naval headquarters for the Gulf for over 60 years and by providing facilities and small numbers of personnel for U.S. war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States has designated Bahrain as a 'major non-NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] ally,' and it provides small amounts of security assistance to Bahrain. On other regional issues such as the Arab-Israeli dispute, Bahrain has tended to defer to Saudi Arabia or other powers to take the lead in formulating proposals or representing the position of the Persian Gulf states, collectively. These areas of strong U.S.-Bahrain cooperation have caused some public criticism of successive U.S. Administrations, including by some in Congress, for muting criticism of Bahrain's human rights record in the interests of ensuring Bahrain's cooperation on security issues. In September 2004, the United States and Bahrain signed a free trade agreement (FTA); legislation implementing it was signed January 11, 2006 (P.L. 109-169)."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2010-09-29