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Kuwait: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy [Updated October 28, 2019]From the Summary: "Kuwait has been pivotal to the decades-long U.S. effort to secure the Persian Gulf region because of its consistent cooperation with U.S. military operations in the region and its key location in the northern Gulf. Kuwait and the United States have a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA), under which the United States maintains over 13,000 military personnel in country and prepositions military equipment to be able to project power in the region."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2019-10-28
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Iran Sanctions [May 18, 2016]"U.S. sanctions --and U.S. attempts to impose multilateral and international sanctions -have been a significant component of U.S. Iran policy since the 1979 revolution. The objectives of U.S. sanctions have evolved over time. In the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. sanctions were intended to try to compel Iran to cease supporting acts of terrorism and to limit Iran's strategic power in the Middle East more generally. Since the mid-2000s, U.S. sanctions have focused on compelling Iran to ensuring that Iran's nuclear program is for purely civilian uses and, since 2010, the international community has cooperated with a U.S.-led and U.N.-authorized sanctions regime in pursuit of that goal. Still, sanctions against Iran have multiple objectives and address multiple perceived threats from Iran simultaneously. This report analyzes U.S. and international sanctions against Iran and provides some examples, based on open sources, of companies and countries that conduct business with Iran. CRS [Congressional Research Service] has no way to independently corroborate any of the reporting on which these examples are based and no mandate to assess whether any firm or other entity is complying with U.S. or international sanctions against Iran. The sections below are grouped according to functional theme, in the chronological order in which these themes have emerged."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2016-05-18
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Iran: Politics, Gulf Security, and U.S. Policy [March 30, 2016]"President Obama has asserted that the JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action] has the potential to produce the added benefit of improving U.S.-Iran relations. However, since the deal was finalized, Iran, Iran has tested ballistic missiles and vowed to continue doing so, it has sought new conventional arms from Russia, it has maintained its support for such regional movements and factions such as Syrian President Bashar Al Assad of Syria and Lebanese Hezbollah, and the United States has indicted seven Iranians for cyberattacks on the United States. The Arab states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman) and other U.S. allies such as Israel continue to assert sanctions relief provides Iran with additional political and financial resources to continue such objectionable activities. The United States and the GCC states have a long-standing and extensive security relationship that enables the United States to maintain about 35,000 military personnel at facilities throughout the Gulf. To try to reassure the GCC that Iran's regional influence can and will be contained, U.S. officials have held several high level meetings with GCC leaders to increase security cooperation, including pledging additional U.S. arms sales. The second U.S.-GCC summit will be held in Riyadh on April 21. Domestically, Rouhani and the JCPOA appear to have broad support, but many Iranians say they also want greater freedoms of expression and assembly. Rouhani's public support was demonstrated by the strong showing of moderate conservative candidates in the February 26 elections for the parliament and a key clerical body. However, it is not clear that the election results will enable Rouhani to limit the hardliner control of the judiciary or the security forces that are the main instruments to curb dissent and free expression."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2016-03-30
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United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy [August 16, 2016]"The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has been a significant U.S. partner in Gulf security for more than two decades, and the alliance has expanded in recent years to address multiple regional threats. However, UAE regional policy is becoming increasingly assertive, in some cases not necessarily acting in concert with the United States but rather with some allies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman). The UAE's assertiveness might reflect doubts about the U.S. security commitment to the GCC states after the United States negotiated the July 2015 comprehensive nuclear deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA) with Iran."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2016-08-16
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United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy [June 24, 2015]"The UAE has been a significant U.S. partner in Gulf security for more than two decades, and the alliance has deepened further in the course of U.S.-led efforts to pressure Iran to agree to strict limits on its nuclear program and to try to defeat the Islamic State organization. Under a 1994 U.S.-UAE defense cooperation agreement (DCA), about 5,000 U.S. military personnel are stationed at UAE military facilities, particularly the large Al Dhafra air base. The UAE was the first Gulf state to order the most sophisticated missile defense system sold by the United States (the THAAD), demonstrating support for U.S. efforts to assemble a coordinated regional missile defense network against Iran. The UAE has a long-standing territorial dispute with Iran and has implemented economic sanctions against it, even though doing so has adversely affected some of the UAE's large and politically influential trading community. Suggesting continued wariness of Iranian ambitions in the Gulf, the UAE has sought U.S. assurances that the United States will maintain its commitment to Gulf security. Regionally, the UAE has become increasingly assertive against extremist Islamic organizations, to the point of undertaking even some unilateral military action in post-Qadhafi Libya. The UAE has joined U.S.-led airstrikes against the Islamic State in Syria; financially assisted the military-led government of Egypt that ousted the elected Islamist president in 2013; supported moderate Islamist rebel groups in Syria; and worked against other Muslim Brotherhood-related organizations in the region such as Hamas."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2015-06-24
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Iran Sanctions [November 3, 2015]From the Overview and Objectives: "U.S. sanctions have been a major feature of U.S. Iran policy since Iran's 1979 Islamic revolution, but the imposition of U.N. and worldwide bilateral sanctions on Iran that began in 2006 and increased dramatically as of 2010 is recent by comparison. The objectives of U.S. sanctions have evolved over time. In the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. sanctions were intended to try to compel Iran to cease supporting acts of terrorism and to limit Iran's strategic power in the Middle East more generally. Since the mid-2000s, U.S. sanctions have focused on compelling Iran to ensuring that Iran's nuclear program is for purely civilian uses and, since 2010, the international community has cooperated with a U.S.-led and U.N.-authorized sanctions regime in pursuit of that goal. Still, sanctions against Iran have multiple objectives and address multiple perceived threats from Iran simultaneously. This report analyzes U.S. and international sanctions against Iran and provides some examples, based on open sources, of companies and countries that conduct business with Iran. CRS has no way to independently corroborate any of the reporting on which these examples are based and no mandate to assess whether any firm or other entity is complying with U.S. or international sanctions against Iran. The sections below are grouped according to functional theme, in the chronological order in which these themes have emerged in U.S. policy toward Iran."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2015-11-03
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Iran Sanctions [January 21, 2016]From the Summary: "Broad international sanctions imposed on Iran during 2010-2013 harmed Iran's economy and contributed to Iran's acceptance of agreements that exchange constraints on its nuclear program for sanctions relief. The sanctions and related diplomatic pressure, at least in part, caused or contributed to the following: [1] Iran's crude oil exports to fall from about 2.5 million barrels per day (mbd) in 2011 to about 1.1 mbd by mid-2013. The effect of that export volume reduction has been further compounded by a fall in oil prices since mid-2014. [2] Iran's economy to shrink by about 10% in the two years that ended in March 2014. The economy stabilized in 2014-15 as a result of modest sanctions relief under an interim nuclear agreement that went into effect on January 20, 2014. That accord allows Iran to access $700 million per month of hard currency from oil and other product sales, and caps Iran's crude oil exports at the 1.1 mbd level. [3] Constriction of Iran's ability to procure equipment for its nuclear and missile programs and to import advanced conventional weaponry. However, these effects have not prevented Iran from continuing to develop its missile programs or from militarily assisting pro-Iranian movements and governments in the region. [4] The June 2013 election as president of Hassan Rouhani, who articulated a priority of obtaining relief from international sanctions and isolation."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2016-01-21
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Iran Sanctions [January 12, 2016]"Broad international sanctions imposed on Iran during 2010-2013 harmed Iran's economy and contributed to Iran's acceptance of agreements that exchange constraints on its nuclear program for sanctions relief. [...] The comprehensive nuclear accord (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA), finalized on July 14, 2015, entails far broader sanctions relief. U.S., U.N., and multilateral sanctions on Iran's energy, financial, shipping, automotive, and other sectors are to be suspended or lifted once Iran complies with key nuclear commitments under the agreement ('Implementation Day') - a milestone that might be reached in mid-late January 2016. The relief will allow Iran to freely export crude oil and to access a net amount of nearly $60 billion in foreign exchange reserves."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2016-01-12
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Iran, Gulf Security, and U.S. Policy [January 14, 2016]"Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, a priority of U.S. policy has been to reduce the perceived threat posed by Iran to a broad range of U.S. interests, including the security of the Persian Gulf region. In 2014, a common adversary emerged in the form of the Islamic State organization, reducing gaps in U.S. and Iranian regional interests, although the two countries have often differed over how to try to defeat the group and still disagree on many other issues. The finalization on July 14, 2015, of a 'Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action' (JCPOA) between Iran and six negotiating powers could enhance Iran's ability to counter the United States and its allies in the region, but could also pave the way for cooperation to resolve regional conflicts."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2016-01-14
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Iran, Gulf Security, and U.S. Policy [December 29, 2015]"In 2014, a common adversary emerged in the form of the Islamic State organization, reducing gaps in U.S. and Iranian regional interests, although the two countries have often differed over how to try to defeat the group and still disagree on many other issues. The finalization on July 14, 2015, of a 'Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action' (JCPOA) between Iran and six negotiating powers could enhance Iran's ability to counter the United States and its allies in the region, but could also pave the way for cooperation to resolve regional conflicts. […] The JCPOA has the potential to improve U.S.-Iran relations, but relations with Iran on regional issues have worsened in some respects since the agreement was finalized. In October and November 2015, Iran tested ballistic missiles that appear to constitute violations of applicable U.N. Security Council resolutions. Iran has also increased its involvement in the Syria conflict in support of President Bashar Al Assad of Syria, whose brutal tactics against domestic armed opponents is, according to U.S. officials, fueling support for the Islamic State organization with brutal tactics. […] Domestically, Rouhani and the JCPOA appear to have broad support, but many Iranians say they also want greater easing of media and social restrictions. Iran's judiciary remains in the hands of hardliners who continue to prosecute dissenters and hold several U.S.-Iran dual nationals on various charges--including U.S.-Iranian journalist Jason Rezaian. Another dual national was arrested after the JCPOA was finalized."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2015-12-29
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Iran Sanctions [March 23, 2016]"Broad international sanctions imposed on Iran during 2010-2013 harmed Iran's economy and contributed to Iran's acceptance of agreements that exchange constraints on its nuclear program for sanctions relief. […]The comprehensive nuclear accord (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA), finalized on July 14, 2015, provides broad sanctions relief from U.S., U.N., and multilateral sanctions on Iran's energy, financial, shipping, automotive, and other sectors. Sanctions were suspended or lifted upon the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) certification on January 16, 2016, that Iran had complied with the stipulated nuclear dismantlement commitments under the agreement ('Implementation Day'). Iran is now able to freely export crude oil and to access its foreign exchange reserves held in foreign banks - a net amount (gross amount minus what is committed to creditors) of nearly $60 billion. On Implementation Day, Administration waivers of relevant sanctions laws went into effect and relevant Executive Orders were revoked through a new Executive Order 13716. […] The Administration asserts that Iran will likely use sanctions relief primarily to resurrect its economy rather than try to expand its regional influence. However, the JCPOA contains no formal requirements or restrictions on how Iran should spend its national funds. Some in Congress have proposed legislation to sanction Iran's continued missile development and Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which supports pro-Iranian movements and governments as well as helps secure the regime."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2016-03-23
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [December 17, 2014]"During the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. officials identified Iran's support for militant Middle East groups as a significant threat to U.S. interests and allies. A perceived potential threat from Iran's nuclear program emerged in 2002, and the United States has orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to try to compel it to verifiably confine that program to purely peaceful purposes. The pressure has harmed Iran's economy and might have contributed to the June 2013 election as president of Iran of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani, who campaigned as an advocate of ending Iran's international isolation. Subsequent multilateral talks with Iran produced an interim agreement ('Joint Plan of Action,' JPA) that halted the expansion of Iran's nuclear program in exchange for modest sanctions relief. The United States and its partners negotiated intensively to reach a comprehensive agreement on the nuclear issue by the November 24, 2014, deadline for the JPA expiration,but agreement was not reached and the parties extended the JPA until June 30, 2015. The parties stated intent to reach a political outline of the agreement by March 1, 2015. The main outstanding issue continues to be the size and scope of Iran's program to enrich uranium. […] Rouhani's unexpected election win--a result of a large turnout of reform-minded voters such as those who protested the 2009 election results--demonstrated strong support not only for reducing Iran's isolation but for domestic reform. Rouhani has sought to satisfy this constituency, in part by orchestrating the release of some political prisoners and easing some media restrictions. But, Iran's judiciary remains in the hands of hardliners who continue to restrict social freedoms and prosecute regime critics and dissenters."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2014-12-17
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [January 26, 2015]"Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, a priority of U.S. policy has been to reduce the perceived threat posed by Iran to a broad range of U.S. interests. In 2014, a common enemy emerged in the form of the Islamic State organization, reducing gaps in U.S. and Iranian interests, although the two countries have somewhat differing approaches over how to try to defeat the Islamic State. […] The international pressure might have contributed to the June 2013 election as president of Iran of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani, who campaigned as an advocate of ending Iran's international isolation. Subsequent multilateral talks with Iran produced an interim agreement ('Joint Plan of Action,' JPA) that halted the expansion of Iran's nuclear program in exchange for modest sanctions relief. The United States and its partners negotiated intensively to reach a comprehensive agreement on the nuclear issue by the November 24, 2014, deadline for the JPA expiration, but agreement was not reached and the parties have extended the JPA until July 6, 2015. […] Rouhani has sought to satisfy this constituency, in part by orchestrating the release of some political prisoners and easing some media restrictions. But, Iran's judiciary remains in the hands of hardliners who continue to restrict social freedoms and prosecute regime critics and dissenters. For further information, see CRS [Congressional Research Service] Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman; and CRS Report R43333, Iran: Interim Nuclear Agreement and Talks on a Comprehensive Accord, by Kenneth Katzman, Paul K. Kerr, and Mary Beth D. Nikitin."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2015-01-26
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Iran Sanctions [May 12, 2015]"International sanctions on Iran's key energy and financial sectors harmed Iran's economy and contributed to Iran's acceptance of agreements that exchange constraints on its nuclear program for sanctions relief. The economic pressure caused: [1] Iran's crude oil exports to fall from about 2.5 million barrels per day in 2011 to about 1.1 million barrels per day (mbd) by late 2013. The effect of the export volume reduction on Iran's budget has been further compounded by the fall in oil prices since June 2014. [2] Iran's economy to shrink by about 5% in 2013 as Iran's private sector reduced operations. The economy has rebounded only modestly since the JPA sanctions relief went into effect. Sanctions have constricted Iran's ability to procure equipment for its nuclear and missile programs and to import advanced conventional weaponry, but have not halted Iran's provision of arms to the Assad government in Syria, the Iraqi government, and to pro-Iranian factions such as Lebanese Hezbollah or Houthi rebels in Yemen. Sanctions have not altered Iran's repression of domestic dissent. An interim nuclear agreement (Joint Plan of Action, JPA) that provides modest sanctions relief has been in effect since January 20, 2014, and extended twice (until June 30, 2015) to allow time to negotiate a comprehensive accord. The JPA provides the sanctions relief through U.S. presidential waivers of several U.S. sanctions laws and Administration suspension of some sanctions imposed by Executive Order. The core of the relief is $700 million per month in access to hard currency from oil sales, plus about $65 million per month in additional hard currency provided to educational institutions for Iranians studying abroad."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2015-05-12
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Iran, Gulf Security, and U.S. Policy [August 14, 2015]"In 2014, a common adversary emerged in the form of the Islamic State organization, reducing gaps in U.S. and Iranian regional interests, although the two countries have often differing approaches over how to try to defeat the group. The finalization on July 14, 2015, of a 'Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action' (JCPOA) between Iran and six negotiating powers could enhance Iran's ability to counter the United States and its allies in the region, but could also pave the way for cooperation to resolve some of the region's several conflicts. […] The JCPOA could significantly improve U.S.-Iran relations, but the agreement comes in the context of U.S. and allied concerns about Iranian actions in the region. U.S. allies, particularly Israel and the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman) express concern that a lifting of sanctions will furnish Iran with additional resources with which to expand its influence further. The Persian Gulf states express concern that Iran has made substantial gains in recent years, for example in supporting the rebel Houthi movement in Yemen and in organizing Shiite forces to defend the embattled government of Bashar Al Assad of Syria. The war against the Islamic State organization has also given Iran additional influence over the government of Iraq as well as common interests with the United States in Iraq. On Syria, Iran has supported Assad, whereas the United States has asserted that his departure is key to a political solution."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2015-08-14
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The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy [September 14, 2015]"The UAE has been a significant U.S. partner in Gulf security for more than two decades, and the alliance has deepened further in recent years in order to address multiple regional threats. The two countries sometimes have differed on regional priorities and the optimal means to utilize to counter the perceived threats. The UAE has a long-standing territorial dispute with Iran and has implemented economic sanctions against it, even though doing so has adversely affected some of the UAE's large and politically influential trading community. Suggesting continued wariness of Iranian ambitions in the Gulf, the UAE has sought--and received--U.S. assurances that the United States will maintain its commitment to Gulf security despite the United States'agreeing to a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran. Under a 1994 U.S.-UAE defense cooperation agreement (DCA), about 5,000 U.S. military personnel are stationed at UAE military facilities, particularly the large Al Dhafra air base. The UAE was the first Gulf state to order the most sophisticated missile defense system sold by the United States (the THAAD), demonstrating support for U.S. efforts to assemble a coordinated regional missile defense network against Iran."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2015-09-14
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Iran, Gulf Security, and U.S. Policy [May 19, 2015]"Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, a priority of U.S. policy has been to reduce the perceived threat posed by Iran to a broad range of U.S. interests, including the security of the Persian Gulf region. In 2014, a common adversary emerged in the form of the Islamic State organization, reducing gaps in U.S. and Iranian regional interests, although the two countries have somewhat differing approaches over how to try to defeat the group. […] A final nuclear agreement could significantly improve U.S.-Iran relations, but the framework agreement comes in the context of U.S. and allied concerns about Iranian actions in the region. The Persian Gulf states express concern that Iran has made substantial gains in recent years, for example in supporting the rebel Houthi movement in Yemen and in organizing Shiite forces to defend the embattled government of Bashar Al Assad of Syria. The war against the Islamic State organization has also given Iran additional influence over the government of Iraq as well as common interests with the United States in Iraq. On Syria, Iran supports Assad, whereas the United States asserts his departure is key to a political solution. The January 2015 fall of the government of Yemen under pressure from the Houthis has aggravated Saudi-Iranian tensions as Saudi Arabia has undertaken military action against the Houthis there. U.S. allies, particularly Israel and the Gulf states, express concern that a lifting of sanctions will furnish Iran with additional resources with which to expand its influence further. The Gulf states express fears that a nuclear deal could cause the United States to tilt toward Iran or forfeit its role as the final guarantor of Gulf security."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2015-05-19
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Iran, Gulf Security, and U.S. Policy [May 28, 2015]"Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, a priority of U.S. policy has been to reduce the perceived threat posed by Iran to a broad range of U.S. interests, including the security of the Persian Gulf region. In 2014, a common adversary emerged in the form of the Islamic State organization, reducing gaps in U.S. and Iranian regional interests, although the two countries have somewhat differing approaches over how to try to defeat the group. […] The Persian Gulf states express concern that Iran has made substantial gains in recent years, for example in supporting the rebel Houthi movement in Yemen and in organizing Shiite forces to defend the embattled government of Bashar Al Assad of Syria. The war against the Islamic State organization has also given Iran additional influence over the government of Iraq as well as common interests with the United States in Iraq. On Syria, Iran supports Assad, whereas the United States has asserted that his departure is key to a political solution. The January 2015 fall of the government of Yemen under pressure from the Houthis has aggravated Saudi-Iranian tensions as Saudi Arabia has undertaken military action against the Houthis there. U.S. allies, particularly Israel and the Gulf states, express concern that a lifting of sanctions would furnish Iran with additional resources with which to expand its influence further. The Gulf states express fears that a nuclear deal could cause the United States to tilt toward Iran or forfeit its role as the final guarantor of Gulf security."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2015-05-28
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Iran Sanctions [August 4, 2015]"During 2010-2013, broad international sanctions on Iran's key energy and financial sectors harmed Iran's economy and contributed to Iran's acceptance of agreements that exchange constraints on its nuclear program for sanctions relief. The economic pressure caused [1] Iran's crude oil exports to fall from about 2.5 million barrels per day in 2011 to about 1.1 million barrels per day (mbd) by mid-2013. The effect of that volume reduction was further compounded by a fall in oil prices in 2014. [2] Iran's economy shrank by about 10% in the two years that ended in March 2014 and rebounded modestly since the minor sanctions relief provided as part of an interim nuclear agreement that went into effect on January 20, 2014. Sanctions have constricted Iran's ability to procure equipment for its nuclear and missile programs and to import advanced conventional weaponry, but have not prevented Iran from militarily assisting the Assad government in Syria, the Iraqi government and associated Shiite militias, Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas, or Houthi rebels in Yemen. Sanctions do not appear to have altered Iran's repression of domestic dissent, although sanctions undoubtedly contributed to the June 2013 election as president of Hassan Rouhani, who promised some easing of restrictions."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2015-08-04
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Iran Sanctions [June 17, 2015]"International sanctions on Iran's key energy and financial sectors harmed Iran's economy and contributed to Iran's acceptance of agreements that exchange constraints on its nuclear program for sanctions relief. The economic pressure caused: (1) Iran's crude oil exports to fall from about 2.5 million barrels per day in 2011 to about 1.1 million barrels per day (mbd) by late 2013. The effect of that volume reduction has been further compounded by a fall in oil prices. (2) Iran's economy to shrink by about 9% in the two years that ended in March 2014. The economy has rebounded modestly since the minor sanctions relief provided as part of an interim nuclear agreement (Joint Plan of Action, JPA) that went into effect on January 20, 2014. Sanctions have constricted Iran's ability to procure equipment for its nuclear and missile programs and to import advanced conventional weaponry, but have not halted Iran's provision of arms to the Assad government in Syria, the Iraqi government, and to pro-Iranian factions such as Lebanese Hezbollah or Houthi rebels in Yemen. Sanctions do not appear to have altered Iran's repression of domestic dissent, although sanctions undoubtedly contributed to the June 2013 election as president of Hassan Rouhani, who promised some easing of restrictions."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2015-06-17
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Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy [September 7, 2016]"The state of Qatar, a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Oman), has employed its ample financial resources to try to "punch above its weight" on regional and international affairs. Qatar has intervened, directly and indirectly, in several regional conflicts-sometimes in partnership with the United States and sometimes along with other GCC states. It has also sought to establish itself as an indispensable interlocutor on some issues, such as those involving the Palestinian Islamist organization Hamas, the Taliban insurgent group in Afghanistan, some Syrian rebel groups, Lebanon, and Sudan. […]The Qatari government is helping the United States combat Islamist terrorist organizations. However, radical Islamist organizations profess ideologies that are attractive to some Qatari citizens, and there have been repeated accusations by international observers that wealthy Qataris have contributed funds and services to these groups. Members of Congress generally have taken into account these and all the other aspects of Qatar's policies in consideration of U.S. arms sales to Qatar. […] Qatar is wrestling with the downturn in global crude oil prices since 2014, as are the other GCC states, Qatar appeared to be better positioned to weather the downturn than are most of the other GCC states because of its development of a large natural gas export infrastructure and its small population. However, natural gas prices are also down, and Qatar shares with virtually all the other GCC states a lack of economic diversification and reliance on revenues from sales of hydrocarbon products."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2016-09-07
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Iran Sanctions [January 31, 2017]"The comprehensive nuclear accord (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA), finalized on July 14, 2015, provides Iran broad relief from U.S., U.N., and multilateral sanctions on Iran's energy, financial, shipping, automotive, and other sectors. Sanctions were suspended or lifted upon the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) certification on January 16, 2016, that Iran had complied with the stipulated nuclear dismantlement commitments under the agreement ('Implementation Day'). On Implementation Day, Administration waivers of relevant sanctions laws took effect and relevant Executive Orders (E.O.s) were revoked by E.O. 13716."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2017-01-31
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Iran's Foreign and Defense Policies [October 21, 2016]"Iran's national security policy is the product of many, and sometimes competing, factors: the ideology of Iran's Islamic revolution; Iranian leadership's perception of threats to the regime and to the country; long-standing Iranian national interests; and the interaction of the Iranian regime's various factions and constituencies. [...] Iran characterizes its support for Shiite and other Islamist movements as support for the 'oppressed' and asserts that Saudi Arabia, in particular, is instigating sectarian tensions and trying to exclude Iran from regional affairs. Others interpret Iran as primarily attempting to protect itself from U.S. or other efforts to invade or intimidate it or to change its regime. Its strategy might, alternatively or additionally, represent an attempt to enhance Iran's international prestige or restore a sense of 'greatness' reminiscent of the ancient Persian empires. From 2010 until 2016, Iran's foreign policy also focused on attempting to mitigate the effects of international sanctions on Iran. [...] Iran's national security policy (like the U.S. effort to counter Iran strategically) overwhelmingly focuses on the Near East region, including on U.S. operations, allies, and activities in that region. [...] U.S. officials and U.S. reports assert that there has been no observable alteration of Iran's pursuit of its core regional activities, particularly to materially support friendly governments and pro-Iranian factions. However, Iran is using the nuclear agreement to ease its international diplomatic isolation and to try to develop itself as a regional energy and trade hub while at the same time exploring new weapons buys."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2016-10-21
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Iran Sanctions [November 16, 2016]"The comprehensive nuclear accord (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA), finalized on July 14, 2015, provides Iran broad relief from U.S., U.N., and multilateral sanctions on Iran's energy, financial, shipping, automotive, and other sectors. Sanctions were suspended or lifted upon the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) certification on January 16, 2016, that Iran had complied with the stipulated nuclear dismantlement commitments under the agreement ('Implementation Day'). On Implementation Day, Administration waivers of relevant sanctions laws took effect and relevant Executive Orders (E.O.s) were revoked by E.O. [Executive Order] 13716. [...] Some pending legislation in the 114th Congress, such as that which seeks to sanction certain Iranian regional behavior and institutions, as well as to extend the Iran Sanctions Act, might not be inconsistent with the JCPOA. Other legislation, such as that to prevent finalization of a major U.S. sale of passenger aircraft to Iran Air, would appear to be inconsistent with the JCPOA. Amid conflicting statements during the 2016 U.S. presidential election campaign, the position of the incoming Trump Administration on the JCPOA and on legislation that might conflict with U.S. commitments in the JCPOA, are unclear."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2016-11-16
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Iran Sanctions [September 21, 2016]"The comprehensive nuclear accord (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA), finalized on July 14, 2015, provides Iran broad relief from U.S., U.N., and multilateral sanctions on Iran's energy, financial, shipping, automotive, and other sectors. Sanctions were suspended or lifted upon the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) certification on January 16, 2016, that Iran had complied with the stipulated nuclear dismantlement commitments under the agreement ('Implementation Day'). On Implementation Day, Administration waivers of relevant sanctions laws took effect and relevant Executive Orders (E.O.s) were revoked by E.O. 13716. [...] Sanctions relief gives Iran the option of resurrecting its civilian economy as well as expanding its regional influence [...] Iran's ability to procure equipment for its nuclear and missile programs and to import advanced conventional weaponry remains constricted by sanctions, but Iran has been able to develop its nuclear and missile programs and to assist pro-Iranian movements and governments in the region even when sanctions had maximum effect. [...] Some in Congress have proposed legislation to sanction Iran's continued missile development and Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which supports pro-Iranian movements and governments as well as helps secure the regime, as well as to extend the Iran Sanctions Act, which expires on December 31, 2016. Other legislation seeks to prevent finalization of a major U.S. sale of passenger aircraft to Iran Air."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2016-09-21
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The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy [November 28, 2016]"The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has been a significant U.S. partner in Gulf security for more than two decades, and the alliance has expanded in recent years to address multiple regional threats. As the UAE becomes increasingly capable of projecting force and uncertain of the U.S. commitment to regional security, the UAE is in some cases acting independently or in concert with the United States but rather with some allies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman). [...]As examples of its growing willingness and ability to project power, the UAE is militarily participating in the Saudi-led effort to counter the Iran-backed Zaidi Shiite Houthi rebels in Yemen and its forces, in partnership with U.S. special operations forces, are also combatting Al Qaeda's affiliate there. It is also participating in the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State in Syria, while at the same time supporting Syrian rebel groups in an attempt to oust President Bashar Al Assad. In recent years, UAE forces have been deployed to several bases in East African countries to train allied forces and facilitate the UAE's regional operations. [...] Very few policy changes are anticipated when UAE President Shaykh Khalifa bin Zayid Al Nuhayyan leaves the scene. He suffered an incapacitating stroke in January 2014, and his younger brother, Shaykh Mohammad bin Zayid, has been de-facto leader since."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2016-11-28
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Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy [December 9, 2016]"The state of Qatar, a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Oman), has employed its ample financial resources to try to 'punch above its weight' on regional and international affairs. Qatar has intervened, directly and indirectly, in several regional conflicts, including in Syria and Libya. Qatar also has sought to establish itself as an indispensable interlocutor on some issues, such as those involving the Palestinian Islamist organization Hamas, the Taliban insurgent group in Afghanistan, some Syrian rebel groups, Lebanon, and Sudan. Qatar's efforts to promote what its officials assert are new models of Arab governance and relationships between Islam and the state have sometimes caused disputes with Qatar's GCC allies. […] Qatar is wrestling with the downturn in global crude oil prices since 2014, as are the other GCC states, Qatar appeared to be better positioned to weather the downturn than are most of the other GCC states because of its development of a large natural gas export infrastructure and its small population. However, natural gas prices are also down, and Qatar shares with virtually all the other GCC states a lack of economic diversification and reliance on revenues from sales of hydrocarbon products."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2016-12-09
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Iran's Foreign and Defense Policies [February 6, 2017]"Iran's national security policy is the product of many, and sometimes competing, factors: the ideology of Iran's Islamic revolution; Iranian leadership's perception of threats to the regime and to the country; long-standing Iranian national interests; and the interaction of the Iranian regime's various factions and constituencies. Some experts assert that the goal of Iran's national security strategy is to overturn a power structure in the Middle East that Iran asserts favors the United States and its allies Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other Sunni Muslim Arab regimes. [...] Iran's national security policy focuses most intently on the Near East region, including on U.S. operations, allies, and activities in that region. It is that region where all the various components of Iran's foreign policy interact. Iran's policy also seems to be directed at influencing the policies and actions of big powers, such as those in Europe as well as Russia, that are active in the Near East-either as partners or antagonists of U.S. interests in that region."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2017-02-06
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Iran: Politics, Human Rights, and U.S. Policy [February 17, 2017]"Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, the United States and Iran have been at odds politically and diplomatically, and U.S. policy has been intended to reduce the perceived threat posed by Iran to a broad range of U.S. interests. U.S. officials also express a broad range of concerns about Iran's human rights abuses, including its detentions of U.S.-Iran dual nationals. […] Beginning in 2010, the United States orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to persuade it to agree to strict limits on the program - pressure that contributed to the June 2013 election of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani as president of Iran. His government subsequently negotiated a November 2013 interim nuclear agreement and then the 'Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action' (JCPOA), which was finalized on July 14, 2015. The JCPOA, which began formal implementation on January 16, 2016, exchanged broad sanctions relief for nuclear program limits intended to give the international community confidence that Iran would require at least a year to produce a nuclear weapon if it decided to do so. President Obama asserted that the implementation of the JCPOA presents an opportunity to reduce the long-standing U.S.-Iran enmity and construct a new relationship. However, Iran has continued to test ballistic missiles; maintained support for regional movements and factions such as Syrian President Bashar Al Assad, Lebanese Hezbollah, and Houthi rebels in Yemen; arrested additional U.S.-Iran dual nationals; and conducted high speed intercepts of U.S. naval vessels in the Persian Gulf. The administration of President Donald Trump has characterized Iran as an adversary of the United States and stated a commitment to countering Iran's regional influence -- although without taking steps that would conflict with U.S. commitments under the JCPOA."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2017-02-17
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Iran: Politics, Gulf Security, and U.S. Policy [August 19, 2016]"Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, a priority of U.S. policy has been primarily to reduce the perceived threat posed by Iran to a broad range of U.S. interests, including the security of the Persian Gulf region. U.S. officials also express a broad range of concerns about Iran's human rights abuses. The implementation of a July 14, 2015, 'Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action' (JCPOA) nuclear agreement between Iran and six negotiating powers appeared to represent an opportunity to reduce the long-standing U.S.-Iran enmity and construct a new relationship. During the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. officials identified Iran's support for militant Middle East groups as the primary threat posed by Iran to U.S. interests and allies. Iran's nuclear program took precedence in U.S. policy after 2002 as the program expanded and the chances that Iran could develop a nuclear weapon increased. In 2010, the United States orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to persuade it to agree to strict limits on the program. The pressure might have contributed to the June 2013 election of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani as president of Iran, whose government subsequently negotiated a November 2013 interim nuclear agreement and then the JCPOA. The JCPOA, which began formal implementation on January 16, 2016, exchanged broad sanctions relief for nuclear program limits intended to give the international community confidence that Iran would require at least a year to produce a nuclear weapon if it decided to do so."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2016-08-19