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• Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990 [February 10, 2011]

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  "This report, updated as warranted, discusses U.S. security assistance to Taiwan, or Republic of China (ROC), including policy issues for Congress and legislation. Congress has oversight of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8, which has governed arms sales to Taiwan since 1979, when the United States recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC) instead of the ROC. Two other relevant parts of the 'one China' policy are the August 17, 1982, U.S.-PRC Joint Communique and the 'Six Assurances' to Taiwan. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have been significant. The United States also expanded military ties with Taiwan after the PRC's missile firings in 1995-1996. However, the U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty terminated in 1979. At the last U.S.-Taiwan annual arms sales talks on April 24, 2001, President George W. Bush approved for possible sale diesel-electric submarines, P-3 anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft (linked to the submarine sale), four decommissioned U.S. Kidd-class destroyers, and other items. Bush also deferred decisions on Aegis-equipped destroyers and other items, while denying other requests. Afterward, attention turned to Taiwan, where the military, civilian officials, and legislators from competing political parties debated contentious issues about how much to spend on defense and which U.S. weapons to acquire, despite the increasing threat (including a missile buildup) from the People's Liberation Army (PLA). In 2003, the Bush Administration pointed Taiwan to three priorities for defense: command and control, missile defense, and ASW. The Pentagon also has broadened its concern from Taiwan's arms purchases to its defense spending, seriousness in self-defense and protection of secrets, joint capabilities, operational readiness, critical infrastructure protection, and asymmetrical advantages."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kan, Shirley

  2011-02-10
• China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues [February 7, 2011]

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  "Congress has long been concerned about whether U.S. policy advances the national interest in reducing the role of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles that could deliver them. Recipients of China's technology reportedly include Pakistan and countries said by the State Department to have supported terrorism, such as Iran. This CRS Report, updated as warranted, discusses the security problem of China's role in weapons proliferation and issues related to the U.S. policy response since the mid- 1990s. China has taken some steps to mollify U.S. and other foreign concerns about its role in weapons proliferation. Nonetheless, supplies from China have aggravated trends that result in ambiguous technical aid, more indigenous capabilities, longer-range missiles, and secondary (retransferred) proliferation. According to unclassified intelligence reports submitted as required to Congress, China has been a 'key supplier' of technology, particularly PRC entities providing nuclear and missile-related technology to Pakistan and missile-related technology to Iran. Policy approaches in seeking PRC cooperation have concerned summits, sanctions, and satellite exports. On November 21, 2000, the Clinton Administration agreed to waive missile proliferation sanctions, resume processing licenses to export satellites to China, and discuss an extension of the bilateral space launch agreement, in return for another PRC promise on missile nonproliferation."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kan, Shirley

  2011-02-07
• China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues [February 3, 2011]

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  "Congress has long been concerned about whether U.S. policy advances the national interest in reducing the role of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles that could deliver them. Recipients of China's technology reportedly include Pakistan and countries said by the State Department to have supported terrorism, such as Iran. This CRS Report, updated as warranted, discusses the security problem of China's role in weapons proliferation and issues related to the U.S. policy response since the mid- 1990s. China has taken some steps to mollify U.S. and other foreign concerns about its role in weapons proliferation. Nonetheless, supplies from China have aggravated trends that result in ambiguous technical aid, more indigenous capabilities, longer-range missiles, and secondary (retransferred) proliferation. According to unclassified intelligence reports submitted as required to Congress, China has been a 'key supplier' of technology, particularly PRC entities providing nuclear and missile-related technology to Pakistan and missile-related technology to Iran. Policy approaches in seeking PRC cooperation have concerned summits, sanctions, and satellite exports. On November 21, 2000, the Clinton Administration agreed to waive missile proliferation sanctions, resume processing licenses to export satellites to China, and discuss an extension of the bilateral space launch agreement, in return for another PRC promise on missile nonproliferation. However, PRC proliferation activities have continued to raise questions about China's commitment to nonproliferation and the need for U.S. sanctions. The Bush Administration imposed sanctions on 20 occasions on various PRC 'entities' (including state-owned entities) for troublesome transfers related to missiles and chemical weapons to Pakistan, Iran, or perhaps another country, including repeated sanctions on some 'serial proliferators.'"

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kan, Shirley

  2011-02-03
• China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues [March 3, 2011]

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  "Congress has long been concerned about whether U.S. policy advances the national interest in reducing the role of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles that could deliver them. Recipients of China's technology reportedly include Pakistan and countries said by the State Department to have supported terrorism, such as Iran. This CRS Report, updated as warranted, discusses the security problem of China's role in weapons proliferation and issues related to the U.S. policy response since the mid- 1990s. China has taken some steps to mollify U.S. and other foreign concerns about its role in weapons proliferation. Nonetheless, supplies from China have aggravated trends that result in ambiguous technical aid, more indigenous capabilities, longer-range missiles, and secondary (retransferred) proliferation. According to unclassified intelligence reports submitted as required to Congress, China has been a 'key supplier' of technology, particularly PRC entities providing nuclear and missile-related technology to Pakistan and missile-related technology to Iran."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kan, Shirley

  2011-03-03
• China/Taiwan: Evolution of the 'One China' Policy-Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei [June 24, 2011]

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  "Despite apparently consistent statements in four decades, the U.S. 'one China' policy concerning Taiwan remains somewhat ambiguous and subject to different interpretations. Apart from questions about what the 'one China' policy entails, issues have arisen about whether U.S. Presidents have stated clear positions and have changed or should change policy, affecting U.S. interests in security and democracy. In Part I, this Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report, updated as warranted, discusses the 'one China' policy since the United States began in 1971 to reach presidential understandings with the People's Republic of China (PRC) government in Beijing. Part II records the evolution of policy as affected by legislation and key statements by Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. Taiwan formally calls itself the Republic of China (ROC), celebrating in 2011 the 100th anniversary of its founding. Policy covers three major issue areas: sovereignty over Taiwan; PRC use of force or coercion against Taiwan; and cross-strait dialogue. The United States recognized the ROC until the end of 1978 and has maintained an official, non-diplomatic relationship with Taiwan after recognition of the PRC in 1979. The United States did not explicitly state the sovereign status of Taiwan in the U.S.-PRC Joint Communiques of 1972, 1979, and 1982. The United States 'acknowledged' the 'one China' position of both sides of the Taiwan Strait. […]Based on open sources and interviews, this report also reviews comprehensively the evolution of the 'one China' issue, as it has been articulated in key statements by Washington, Beijing, and Taipei."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kan, Shirley

  2011-06-24
• Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990 [June 3, 2011]

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  "This report, updated as warranted, discusses U.S. security assistance to Taiwan, or Republic of China (ROC), including policy issues for Congress and legislation. Congress has oversight of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8, which has governed arms sales to Taiwan since 1979, when the United States recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC) instead of the ROC. Two other relevant parts of the 'one China' policy are the August 17, 1982, U.S.-PRC Joint Communique and the 'Six Assurances' to Taiwan. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have been significant. The United States also expanded military ties with Taiwan after the PRC's missile firings in 1995-1996. However, the U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty terminated in 1979."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kan, Shirley

  2011-06-03
• China/Taiwan: Evolution of the 'One China' Policy-Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei [January 10, 2011]

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  "Despite apparently consistent statements in four decades, the U.S. 'one China' policy concerning Taiwan remains somewhat ambiguous and subject to different interpretations. Apart from questions about what the 'one China' policy entails, issues have arisen about whether U.S. Presidents have stated clear positions and have changed or should change policy, affecting U.S. interests in security and democracy. In Part I, this CRS Report, updated as warranted, discusses the 'one China' policy since the United States began in 1971 to reach presidential understandings with the People's Republic of China (PRC) government in Beijing. Part II documents the evolution of policy as affected by legislation and articulated in key statements by Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. Taiwan formally calls itself the Republic of China (ROC), celebrating in 2011 the 100th anniversary of its founding. The policy covers three major issue areas: sovereignty over Taiwan; PRC use of force or coercion against Taiwan; and cross-strait dialogue. The United States recognized the ROC until the end of 1978 and has maintained an official relationship with Taiwan after recognition of the PRC government in 1979. The United States did not explicitly state the sovereign status of Taiwan in the three U.S.-PRC Joint Communiques of 1972, 1979, and 1982. The United States 'acknowledged' the 'one China' position of both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Since 1971, U.S. Presidents--both secretly and publicly--have articulated a 'one China' policy in understandings with the PRC. Congressional oversight has watched for any new agreements and any shift in the U.S. stance closer to that of Beijing's 'one China' principle--on questions of sovereignty, arms sales, or dialogue. Not recognizing the PRC's claim over Taiwan or Taiwan as a sovereign state, U.S. policy has considered Taiwan's status as unsettled. With added conditions, U.S. policy leaves the Taiwan question to be resolved by the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait: peacefully, with the assent of Taiwan's people, and without unilateral changes. In short, U.S. policy focuses on the process of resolution of the Taiwan question, not its outcome."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kan, Shirley

  2011-01-10
• U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress [December 14, 2010]

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  "This CRS [Congressional Research Service] report, updated as warranted, discusses policy issues regarding military-to-military (mil-to-mil) contacts with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and provides a record of major contacts and crises since 1993. The United States suspended military contacts with China and imposed sanctions on arms sales in response to the Tiananmen Crackdown in 1989. In 1993, the Clinton Administration re-engaged with the top PRC leadership, including China's military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Renewed military exchanges with the PLA have not regained the closeness reached in the 1980s, when U.S.-PRC strategic cooperation against the Soviet Union included U.S. arms sales to China. Improvements and deteriorations in overall bilateral relations have affected military contacts, which were close in 1997-1998 and 2000, but marred by the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, mistaken NATO bombing of a PRC embassy in 1999, the EP- 3 aircraft collision crisis in 2001, and aggressive naval confrontations (including in 2009). [...] Policymakers could review the approach to mil-to-mil contacts, given concerns about crises. U.S. officials have reported inadequate cooperation from the PLA, including denials of port visits at Hong Kong and aid to U.S. Navy ships in distress (Thanksgiving 2007). The PLA has tried to use its suspensions of exchanges while blaming U.S. 'obstacles' (including arms sales to Taiwan, legal restrictions on contacts, and the Pentagon's reports to Congress on the PLA). The PRC's harassment of U.S. surveillance ships (in 2009) and increasing assertiveness in maritime areas have shown the limits to mil-to-mil talks and PLA restraint. Still, at the Strategic and Economic Dialogue in July 2009, President Obama called for military contacts to diminish disputes with China. The NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] for FY2010 (P.L. 111-84) amended P.L. 106-65 for the report on PRC military power to expand the focus to security developments involving the PRC, add cooperative elements, and fold in another report on mil-to-mil contacts. The two sides held a round of the DCT in December 2010, and the PLA belatedly invited Secretary Gates to visit in January 2011."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kan, Shirley

  2010-12-14
• Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990 [September 28, 2010]

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  "This report, updated as warranted, discusses U.S. security assistance to Taiwan, or Republic of China (ROC), including policy issues for Congress and legislation. Congress has oversight of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8, which has governed arms sales to Taiwan since 1979, when the United States recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC) instead of the ROC. Two other relevant parts of the 'one China' policy are the August 17, 1982, U.S.-PRC Joint Communique and the 'Six Assurances' to Taiwan. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have been significant. The United States also expanded military ties with Taiwan after the PRC's missile firings in 1995-1996. However, the U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty terminated in 1979."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kan, Shirley

  2010-09-28
• Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990 [August 31, 2010]

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  "This report, updated as warranted, discusses U.S. security assistance to Taiwan, or Republic of China (ROC), including policy issues for Congress and legislation. Congress has oversight of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8, which has governed arms sales to Taiwan since 1979, when the United States recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC) instead of the ROC. Two other relevant parts of the 'one China' policy are the August 17, 1982, U.S.-PRC Joint Communique and the 'Six Assurances' to Taiwan. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have been significant. The United States also expanded military ties with Taiwan after the PRC's missile firings in 1995-1996. However, the U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty terminated in 1979. At the last U.S.-Taiwan annual arms sales talks on April 24, 2001, President George W. Bush approved for possible sale diesel-electric submarines, P-3 anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft (linked to the submarine sale), four decommissioned U.S. Kidd-class destroyers, and other items. Bush also deferred decisions on Aegis-equipped destroyers and other items, while denying other requests. Afterward, attention turned to Taiwan, where the military, civilian officials, and legislators from competing political parties debated contentious issues about how much to spend on defense and which U.S. weapons to acquire, despite the increasing threat (including a missile buildup) from the People's Liberation Army (PLA). In 2003, the Bush Administration pointed Taiwan to three priorities for defense: command and control, missile defense, and ASW. The Pentagon also has broadened its concern from Taiwan's arms purchases to its defense spending, seriousness in self-defense and protection of secrets, joint capabilities, operational readiness, critical infrastructure protection, and asymmetrical advantages."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kan, Shirley

  2010-08-31
• China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues [August 16, 2010]

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  "Congress has long been concerned about whether U.S. policy advances the national interest in reducing the role of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles that could deliver them. Recipients of China's technology reportedly include Pakistan and countries that the State Department says support terrorism, such as Iran and North Korea. This CRS Report, updated as warranted, discusses the security problem of China's role in weapons proliferation and issues related to the U.S. policy response since the mid-1990s. China has taken some steps to mollify U.S. and other foreign concerns about its role in weapons proliferation. Nonetheless, supplies from China have aggravated trends that result in ambiguous technical aid, more indigenous capabilities, longer-range missiles, and secondary (retransferred) proliferation. According to unclassified intelligence reports submitted as required to Congress, China has been a 'key supplier' of technology, particularly PRC entities providing nuclear and missile-related technology to Pakistan and missile-related technology to Iran."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kan, Shirley

  2010-08-16
• Democratic Reforms in Taiwan: Issues for Congress [May 26, 2010]

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  "Taiwan, which its government formally calls the Republic of China (ROC), is a success story for U.S. interests in the promotion of universal freedoms and democracy. Taiwan's people and their leaders transformed politics from rule imposed from the outside with authoritarian abuses to the relatively peaceful achievement of self-government, human rights, and democracy. The purpose of this CRS report is to succinctly discuss Taiwan's transformation and current concerns, paying particular attention to the role of Congress and implications and options for U.S. policy. Taiwan's people did not fully enjoy democratic self-government until the first direct presidential election in 1996. The opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), formed in 1986, and its candidate Chen Shui-bian won the presidential election in 2000, ending Taiwan's 55 years of rule by the Kuomintang (KMT), or Nationalist Party of China. Taiwan enjoyed a second democratic transfer of power in 2008, when the KMT's Ma Ying-jeou won the election for president. After two democratic transfers of power, Taiwan has an unfinished story in promoting rule of law and maintaining a strong multi-party system, with implications for U.S. security, economic, and political interests. U.S. policy has played important roles in Taiwan's transition to democracy, by decreasing Taiwan's sense of insecurity through continued arms sales and other contacts after the end of the mutual defense treaty with and diplomatic recognition of the ROC in 1979, by continuing business ties that have provided for prosperity, and by pressing the KMT to end authoritarian abuses of power in favor of freedoms for all Taiwan's people, including the majority Taiwanese."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kan, Shirley

  2010-05-26
• Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales since 1990 [July 2, 2010]

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  "This report, updated as warranted, discusses U.S. security assistance to Taiwan, or Republic of China (ROC), including policy issues for Congress and legislation. Congress has oversight of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8, which has governed arms sales to Taiwan since 1979, when the United States recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC) instead of the ROC. Two other relevant parts of the 'one China' policy are the August 17, 1982, U.S.-PRC Joint Communique and the 'Six Assurances' to Taiwan. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have been significant. The United States also has expanded military ties with Taiwan after the PRC's missile firings in 1995-1996. However, the U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty terminated in 1979."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kan, Shirley

  2010-07-02
• U.S.-China Counterterrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy [July 8, 2010]

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  "After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States faced a challenge in enlisting the full support of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the counterterrorism fight against Al Qaeda. This effort raised short-term policy issues about how to elicit cooperation and how to address PRC concerns about the U.S.-led war (Operation Enduring Freedom). Longer-term issues have concerned whether counterterrorism has strategically transformed bilateral ties and whether China's support was valuable and not obtained at the expense of other U.S. interests. [...] Since 2005, however, U.S. concerns about China's extent of cooperation in counterterrorism have increased. In September 2005, Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick acknowledged that 'China and the United States can do more together in the global fight against terrorism' after 'a good start,' in his policy speech that called on China to be a 'responsible stakeholder' in the world. The summits of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2005 and 2006 raised U.S. concerns. Since the summer of 2007, U.S. officials have expressed more concern about China-origin arms that have been found in the conflict involving U.S. forces in Afghanistan, as part of the broader threat posed by Iran and its arms transfers."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kan, Shirley

  2010-07-08
• U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress [July 6, 2010]

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  "This CRS Report, updated as warranted, discusses policy issues regarding military-to-military (mil-to-mil) contacts with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and provides a record of major contacts and crises since 1993. The United States suspended military contacts with China and imposed sanctions on arms sales in response to the Tiananmen Crackdown in 1989. In 1993, the Clinton Administration re-engaged with the top PRC leadership, including China's military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Renewed military exchanges with the PLA have not regained the closeness reached in the 1980s, when U.S.-PRC strategic cooperation against the Soviet Union included U.S. arms sales to China. Improvements and deteriorations in overall bilateral relations have affected military contacts, which were close in 1997-1998 and 2000, but marred by the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, mistaken NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] bombing of a PRC embassy in 1999, the EP- 3 aircraft collision crisis in 2001, and aggressive naval confrontations (including in March 2009). [...] Issues for the 111th Congress include whether the Obama Administration has complied with legislation overseeing dealings with the PLA and has pursued a program of contacts with the PLA that advances a prioritized list of U.S. security interests. [...] Some have argued about whether the value that U.S. officials have placed on the contacts overly extends leverage to the PLA. Officials believe talks can serve U.S. interests that include conflict prevention and crisis management; transparency and reciprocity; tension reduction over Taiwan; weapons nonproliferation; strategic nuclear/space talks; counterterrorism; and accounting for POW/MIAs [Prisoners of War/Missing in Action]."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kan, Shirley

  2010-07-06
• China/Taiwan: Evolution of the 'One China' Policy-Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei [Updated August 17, 2009]

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  "President Bush did not support Taiwan's independence or membership in the U.N. and opposed referendums on membership in the U.N. for Taiwan during its presidential election on March 22, 2008. For that election, President Bush positioned two aircraft carriers near Taiwan, whose largely symbolic referendums were targets of the PRC's belligerent condemnation. The referendums failed to be valid, and KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou won. After May 2008, President Ma resumed the cross-strait dialogue (after a decade)--beyond seeking detente. Still, Taiwan's security is challenged by the build-up of missiles and other forces by the PRC's military. Congress has oversight of President Obama's policy, covering arms sales, bilateral contacts, Taiwan in international organizations, and implications of the changing crossstrait ties for a possible policy review. On March 24, 2009, to commemorate the TRA's 30th anniversary, the House passed H.Con.Res. 55 and 30 Senators sent a letter to Obama."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kan, Shirley

  2009-08-17
• U.S.-China Counterterrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy [May 7, 2009]

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  This document is a CRS report on the U.S. and China's cooperation on counterterrorism issues. "After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States faced a challenge in enlisting the full support of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the counterterrorism fight against Al Qaeda. This effort raised short-term policy issues about how to elicit cooperation and how to address PRC concerns about the U.S.-led war (Operation Enduring Freedom). Longer-term issues have concerned whether counterterrorism has strategically transformed bilateral ties and whether China's support was valuable and not obtained at the expense of other U.S. interests. The extent of U.S.-China counterterrorism cooperation has been limited, but the tone and context of counterterrorism helped to stabilize--even if it did not transform--the closer bilateral relationship pursued by President George Bush since late 2001. […]. Since the summer of 2007, U.S. officials have expressed more concern about China-origin arms that have been found in the conflict involving U.S. forces in Afghanistan, as part of the broader threat posed by Iran and its arms transfers. Congress has oversight over the closer ties with China and a number of policy options. U.S. policy has addressed: law-enforcement ties; oppressed Uighur (Uyghur) people in western Xinjiang whom China claims to be linked to 'terrorists'; detained Uighurs at Guantanamo Bay prison; Olympic security in August 2008; sanctions that ban exports of arms and security equipment; weapons nonproliferation; port security; military-to-military contacts; China's influence in Central Asia through the SCO; and China's arms transfers to Iran."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kan, Shirley

  2009-05-07
• U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress [April 15, 2009]

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  "This CRS Report, updated as warranted, discusses policy issues regarding military-to-military (mil-to-mil) contacts with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and provides a record of major contacts and crises since 1993. The United States suspended military contacts with China and imposed sanctions on arms sales in response to the Tiananmen Crackdown in 1989. In 1993, the Clinton Administration re-engaged with the top PRC leadership, including China's military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Renewed military exchanges with the PLA have not regained the closeness reached in the 1980s, when U.S.-PRC strategic cooperation against the Soviet Union included U.S. arms sales to China. Improvements and deteriorations in overall bilateral relations have affected military contacts, which were close in 1997-1998 and 2000, but marred by the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, mistaken NATO bombing of a PRC embassy in 1999, the EP- 3 aircraft collision crisis in 2001, and aggressive naval confrontations (including in March 2009). […]. Issues for the 111th Congress include whether the Obama Administration has complied with legislation overseeing dealings with the PLA and has pursued a program of contacts with the PLA that advances a prioritized list of U.S. security interests. […]. U.S. interests in military contacts with China include communication, conflict prevention, and crisis management; transparency and reciprocity; tension reduction over Taiwan; weapons nonproliferation; strategic nuclear and space talks; counterterrorism; and accounting for POW/MIAs."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kan, Shirley

  2009-04-15
• China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues [May 26, 2009]

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  "Congress has long been concerned about whether U.S. policy advances the national interest in reducing the role of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles that could deliver them. Recipients of China's technology reportedly include Pakistan and countries that the State Department says support terrorism, such as Iran and North Korea. This CRS Report, updated as warranted, discusses the security problem of China's role in weapons proliferation and issues related to the U.S. policy response since the mid-1990s. China has taken some steps to mollify U.S. and other foreign concerns about its role in weapons proliferation. Nonetheless, supplies from China have aggravated trends that result in ambiguous technical aid, more indigenous capabilities, longer-range missiles, and secondary (retransferred) proliferation. According to unclassified intelligence reports submitted as required to Congress, China has been a 'key supplier' of technology to North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan for use in programs to develop ballistic missiles, chemical weapons, or nuclear weapons."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kan, Shirley

  2009-05-26
• Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments [May 22. 2009]

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  "The U.S. military has been building up forces on the U.S. territory of Guam to increase deterrence and power projection for possible responses to crises and disasters, counter-terrorism, and contingencies in support of South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, or elsewhere in Asia. But the defense buildup on Guam is moderate. China has concerns about the defense buildup. Guam's role has increased with plans to withdraw some U.S. forces from Japan and South Korea. In 2006, the United States and Japan agreed on a 'Roadmap' to strengthen their alliance, including a buildup on Guam to cost $10.3 billion, with Japan contributing 60%. The goals are to start the related construction on Guam by 2010 and to complete relocation of 8,000 Marines and their 9,000 dependents from Okinawa to Guam by 2014. On February 17, 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Tokyo and signed the bilateral 'Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of the III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents From Okinawa to Guam' that reaffirmed the 'Roadmap' of May 1, 2006. […]. On May 7, 2009, days before Japan's Diet ratified the relocation agreement with the United States, Defense Secretary Gates submitted to Congress the proposed defense budget for FY2010. As part of the realignment of the Global Defense Posture, he requested $378 million to start construction in Guam to support the relocation of 8,000 Marines from Japan in order to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance. This amount would contribute to the total U.S. cost of $4.18 billion for the relocation."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Niksch, Larry A.; Kan, Shirley

  2009-05-22
• China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues [July 27, 2009]

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  "Congress has long been concerned about whether U.S. policy advances the national interest in reducing the role of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles that could deliver them. Recipients of China's technology reportedly include Pakistan and countries that the State Department says support terrorism, such as Iran and North Korea. This CRS Report, updated as warranted, discusses the security problem of China's role in weapons proliferation and issues related to the U.S. policy response since the mid-1990s. China has taken some steps to mollify U.S. and other foreign concerns about its role in weapons proliferation. Nonetheless, supplies from China have aggravated trends that result in ambiguous technical aid, more indigenous capabilities, longer-range missiles, and secondary (retransferred) proliferation. According to unclassified intelligence reports submitted as required to Congress, China has been a 'key supplier' of technology to North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan for use in programs to develop ballistic missiles, chemical weapons, or nuclear weapons."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kan, Shirley

  2009-07-27
• Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales since 1990 [February 16, 2010]

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  "This report, updated as warranted, discusses U.S. security assistance to Taiwan, or Republic of China (ROC), including policy issues for Congress and legislation. Congress has oversight of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8, which has governed arms sales to Taiwan since 1979, when the United States recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC) instead of the ROC. Two other relevant parts of the 'one China' policy are the August 17, 1982, U.S.-PRC Joint Communique and the 'Six Assurances' to Taiwan. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have been significant. The United States also has expanded military ties with Taiwan after the PRC's missile firings in 1995-1996. However, there is no defense treaty with Taiwan."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kan, Shirley

  2010-02-16
• U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress [March 19, 2009]

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  "This CRS Report discusses policy issues regarding military-to-military (mil-to-mil) contacts with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and provides a record of major contacts since 1993. [...]. Since 2001, the Bush Administration has continued the policy of engagement with China, while the Pentagon has skeptically reviewed and cautiously resumed a program of military-to-military exchanges. [...]. Issues for the 111th Congress include whether the Administration has complied with legislation overseeing dealings with the PLA and has determined a program of contacts with the PLA that advances a prioritized list of U.S. security interests. Oversight legislation includes the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1990-FY1991 (P.L. 101-246); National Defense Authorization Act for FY2000 (P.L. 106-65); and National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006 (P.L. 109- 163). Skeptics and proponents of military exchanges with the PRC have debated whether the contacts have significant value for achieving U.S. objectives and whether the contacts have contributed to the PLA's warfighting capabilities that might harm U.S. security interests. U.S. interests in military contacts with China include: communication, conflict prevention, and crisis management; transparency and reciprocity; tension reduction over Taiwan; weapons nonproliferation; strategic nuclear and space talks; counterterrorism; and accounting for POW/MIAs. U.S. defense officials report inadequate cooperation from the PLA, including denials of port visits at Hong Kong by U.S. Navy ships in November 2007. The PLA suspended military dialogue in October 2008 over U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. PRC ships aggressively harassed U.S. ocean surveillance ships, including the USNS Impeccable, in March 2009."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kan, Shirley

  2009-03-19
• China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues [Updated April 5, 2005]

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  "Congress has long been concerned about whetherU.S. policy advances theU.S.interest in reducing the role of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in theproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles that could deliver them. Recipients of China's technology include Pakistan and countries that the State Department says support terrorism, such as Iran, North Korea, and Libya. This CRS Report discusses the national security problem of China's role in weapons proliferation and issues related to the U.S. policy response, including legislation, since the mid-1990s. A table summarizes the U.S. sanctions imposed on PRC entities for weapons proliferation. This CRS Report will be updated as warranted. Since 1991, China has taken some steps to mollify concerns about its role in weapons proliferation. Nonetheless, supplies fromChina have aggravated trends that result in ambiguous technical aid, more indigenous capabilities, longer range missiles, and secondary (retransferred) proliferation. As the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) has reported, China remains a 'key supplier' of weapons technology -- particularly missile or chemical technology."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kan, Shirley

  2003-04-05
• European Union's Arms Embargo on China: Implications and Options for U.S. Policy [April 15, 2005]

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  From the Document: "The European Union (EU) is considering lifting its arms embargo on China, which was imposed in response to the June 1989 Tiananmen Crackdown. France, Germany, and other EU members claim that the embargo hinders the development of a "strategic partnership" with China. The Bush Administration and Members of Congress strongly oppose an end to the EU's arms embargo and urge stronger arms export controls. The United States contends that engagement with China need not send the wrong signals on China's human rights record and military buildup that threatens a peaceful resolution of Taiwan and other Asian issues."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Grimmett, Richard F.; Kan, Shirley; Archick, Kristin

  2005-04-15
• U.S.-China Counter-Terrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy [Updated May 12, 2005]

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  "After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States faced a challenge in enlisting the full support of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in counter-terrorism. This effort raised short-term policy issues about how to elicit cooperation and how to address China's concerns about military action (Operation Enduring Freedom). Longer-term questions have concerned whether counter-terrorism has strategically transformed bilateral relations and whether China's support has been valuable and not obtained at the expense of other U.S. interests. Congress has oversight over the trend toward closer ties with China as well as a range of policy options. These options cover law-enforcement cooperation; designations of terrorist organizations; release of detained Uighurs; weapons nonproliferation; waivers of sanctions for the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown; the Container Security Initiative (CSI); and military-to-military contacts. This report will be updated as warranted."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kan, Shirley

  2005-05-12
• China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues [January 7, 2009]

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  "Congress has long been concerned about whether U.S. policy advances U.S. security interests in reducing the role of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles as well as obtaining China's cooperation in weapons nonproliferation. This problem refers to the threat of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and missiles that could deliver them. Some have argued that certain PRC transfers violated international treaties or guidelines, and/or have contravened various U.S. laws requiring sanctions to shore up those international standards. Even if no laws or treaties are violated, many view China's transfers as threatening U.S. security interests. Using a variety of unclassified consultations and sources, this CRS Report discusses the national security problem of the PRC's role in weapons proliferation and issues related to the U.S. policy response, including legislation, since the mid-1990s. Table 1, at the end of this report, summarizes the U.S. sanctions imposed or waived on PRC entities or the PRC government for weapons proliferation. For a discussion of the policy problem in the 1980s to 1996, see CRS Report 96-767, Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Background and Analysis, by Shirley A. Kan. See also, by the same author, CRS Report 98-485, China: Possible Missile Technology Transfers Under U.S. Satellite Export Policy--Actions and Chronology."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kan, Shirley

  2009-01-07
• China: Possible Missile Technology Transfers from U.S. Satellite Export Policy - Background and Chronology [Updated August 13, 1998]

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  "Members of Congress are concerned about whether U.S. firms have provided technology or expertise to China for use in its ballistic missile program and whether a series of decisions by the Clinton Administration on satellite exports have facilitated legal or illegal transfers of missile-related technology to China. The New York Times reported in April 1998 that the Justice Department is conducting an ongoing criminal investigation into whether Loral Space and Communications (of New York), and Hughes Electronics (of Los Angeles) violated export control laws. The firms are alleged to have shared their findings with China on the cause of a Chinese rocket's explosion while launching a U.S.-origin satellite in February 1996. In sharing their conclusions, the companies are said to have provided expertise that China could use to improve its ballistic missiles, including their guidance systems. This CRS report provides detailed background information, significant Congressional action, and a comprehensive chronology. The events summarized here, based on various open sources and interviews, pertain to various aspects of U.S. foreign and security policy. This report may be updated if there are significant developments."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kan, Shirley

  1998-08-13
• U.S.-China Counterterrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy [Updated September 11, 2008]

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  This is an updated report from the Congressional Research Service on counterterrorism cooperation efforts, and challenges, between the U.S. and China. "After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States faced a challenge in enlisting the full support of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the counterterrorism fight against Al Qaeda. This effort raised short-term policy issues about how to elicit cooperation and how to address PRC concerns about the U.S.-led war (Operation Enduring Freedom). Longer-term issues have concerned whether counterterrorism has strategically transformed bilateral ties and whether China's support was valuable and not obtained at the expense of other U.S. interests. […] China's military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), has not participated in the counterterrorism coalition. Still, for almost four years after the attacks on September 11, 2001, President Bush and other administration officials tended to praise the PRC's diplomatic and other support for the war against terrorism. Since 2005, however, U.S. concerns about China's extent of cooperation in counterterrorism have increased. […] The summits of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2005 and 2006 raised U.S. concerns. Since the summer of 2007, U.S. officials have expressed more concern about China-origin arms that have been found in the conflict involving U.S. forces in Afghanistan, as part of the broader threat posed by Iran and its arms transfers. […] U.S. policy has addressed: law-enforcement ties; oppressed Uighur (Uyghur) people in western Xinjiang whom China claims to be linked to 'terrorists'; detained Uighurs at Guantanamo Bay prison; weapons nonproliferation; port security; security for the Olympics in Beijing in August 2008; sanctions that ban exports of arms and security equipment; military-to-military contacts; China's influence in Central Asia through the SCO; and China's arms transfers to Iran."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kan, Shirley

  2008-09-11
• U.S.-China Counterterrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy [Updated August 6, 2008]

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  This CRS report analyzes the cooperation between the United States and China on the issue of counterterrorism. "After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States faced a challenge in enlisting the full support of the People's Republic of China [PRC] in counterterrorism. This effort raised short-term policy issues about how to elicit cooperation and how to address China's concerns about military action [Operation Enduring Freedom]. Longer-term issues have concerned whether counterterrorism has strategically transformed bilateral relations and whether China's support has been valuable and not obtained at the expense of other U.S. interests." The report also examines the Congressional oversight and policy options used in order to maintain this cooperation in counterterrorism. "Congress has oversight over the closer ties with China as well as a range of policy options. U.S. policy has addressed law-enforcement; oppressed Uighur [Uyghur] groups that China claims to be 'terrorist organizations'; detained Uighurs at Guantanamo Bay prison; weapons nonproliferation; port security; security for the Olympics in Beijing in August 2008, including oversight of sanctions that ban exports of security equipment; military-to-military contacts; China's influence in Central Asia through the SCO; and China's arms transfers to Iran."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kan, Shirley

  2008-08-06