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U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress [June 12, 2014]
"This CRS [Congressional Research Service] report, updated as warranted, discusses policy issues regarding military-to-military (mil-to-mil) contacts with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and provides a record of major contacts and crises since 1993. The United States suspended military contacts with China and imposed sanctions on arms sales in response to the Tiananmen Crackdown in 1989. In 1993, the Clinton Administration reengaged with the top PRC leadership, including China's military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Renewed military exchanges with the PLA have not regained the closeness reached in the 1980s, when U.S.-PRC strategic cooperation against the Soviet Union included U.S. arms sales to China. Improvements and deteriorations in overall bilateral relations have affected military contacts, which were close in 1997-1998 and 2000, but marred by the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, mistaken NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] bombing of a PRC embassy in 1999, the EP- 3 aircraft collision crisis in 2001, and aggressive maritime confrontations (including in 2009). Issues for Congress include whether the Administration complies with legislation overseeing dealings with the PLA and pursues contacts with the PLA that advance a prioritized set of U.S. security interests, especially the operational safety of U.S. military personnel. […]Some have argued about whether the value that U.S. officials place on the contacts overly extends leverage to the PLA. Some believe talks can serve U.S. interests that include conflict avoidance/crisis management; military-civilian coordination; transparency and reciprocity; tension reduction over Taiwan; weapons nonproliferation; talks on nuclear, missile, space, and/or cyber domains; counterterrorism; and POW/MIA [Prisoner of War/Missing in Action] accounting."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kan, Shirley
2014-06-12
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Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments [June 9, 2014]
"Since 2000, the U.S. military has been building up forward-deployed forces on the westernmost U.S. territory of Guam (west of Hawaii) to increase U.S. operational presence, deterrence, and power projection for potential responses to crises, disasters, or other contingencies to support Japan, Republic of Korea (ROK), the Philippines, Taiwan, or others in Asia. Since 2006, joint exercises based at Guam called 'Valiant Shield' have boosted U.S. military readiness in the Pacific. The defense buildup on Guam has been moderate. China has concerns, suspecting Guam's buildup to be directed against China. There has been concern that China and North Korea could target Guam with missiles. China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy has increased activities in waters around Guam. Still, Guam's role expanded in engaging with the PLA. In 2006, the United States and Japan had agreed on a Realignment Roadmap to strengthen their alliance, including a buildup on Guam to cost $10.3 billion, with Japan contributing 60%. Goals were to start the related construction on Guam by 2010 and to complete relocation of about 8,000 marines from Okinawa to Guam by 2014."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kan, Shirley
2014-06-09
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U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress [June 10, 2014]
"This CRS report, updated as warranted, discusses policy issues regarding military-to-military (mil-to-mil) contacts with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and provides a record of major contacts and crises since 1993. The United States suspended military contacts with China and imposed sanctions on arms sales in response to the Tiananmen Crackdown in 1989. In 1993, the Clinton Administration reengaged with the top PRC leadership, including China's military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Renewed military exchanges with the PLA have not regained the closeness reached in the 1980s, when U.S.-PRC strategic cooperation against the Soviet Union included U.S. arms sales to China. Improvements and deteriorations in overall bilateral relations have affected military contacts, which were close in 1997-1998 and 2000, but marred by the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, mistaken NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] bombing of a PRC embassy in 1999, the EP- 3 aircraft collision crisis in 2001, and aggressive maritime confrontations (including in 2009). Issues for Congress include whether the Administration complies with legislation overseeing dealings with the PLA and pursues contacts with the PLA that advance a prioritized set of U.S. security interests, especially the operational safety of U.S. military personnel. […] Some have argued about whether the value that U.S. officials place on the contacts overly extends leverage to the PLA. Some believe talks can serve U.S. interests that include conflict avoidance/crisis management; military-civilian coordination; transparency and reciprocity; tension reduction over Taiwan; weapons nonproliferation; talks on nuclear, missile, space, and/or cyber domains; counterterrorism; and POW/MIA [Prisoner of War/Missing in Action] accounting."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kan, Shirley
2014-06-10
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Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990 [August 29, 2014]
"This report, updated through the 113th Congress, discusses U.S. security assistance to Taiwan (calling itself Republic of China (ROC)), including policy issues for Congress and legislation. Congress has oversight of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8, which has governed arms sales to Taiwan since 1979, when the United States recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC) instead of the ROC. The U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty terminated in 1979. Two other relevant parts of the 'one China' policy are the August 17, 1982, U.S.-PRC Joint Communique and the 'Six Assurances' to Taiwan. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have been significant. The United States also expanded military ties with Taiwan after the PRC's missile firings in 1995-1996."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kan, Shirley
2014-08-29
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China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues [August 29, 2014]
"Congress has long been concerned about whether policy advances the U.S. interest in reducing the role of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles that could deliver them. Recipients of PRC technology included Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran. This CRS [Congressional Research Service] Report, updated through the 113th Congress, discusses the security problem of China's role in weapons proliferation and issues related to the U.S. policy response since the mid-1990s. China has taken some steps to mollify U.S. and other foreign concerns about its role in weapons proliferation. Nonetheless, supplies from China have aggravated trends that result in ambiguous technical aid, more indigenous capabilities, longer-range missiles, and secondary (retransferred) proliferation. Unclassified intelligence reports told Congress that China was a 'key supplier' of technology, particularly with PRC entities providing nuclear and missile-related technology to Pakistan and missile-related technology to Iran. Policy approaches in seeking PRC cooperation have concerned summits, sanctions, and satellite exports. PRC proliferation activities have continued to raise questions about China's commitment to nonproliferation and the need for U.S. sanctions. The United States has imposed sanctions on various PRC 'entities' (including state-owned entities) for troublesome transfers related to missiles and chemical weapons to Pakistan, Iran, or perhaps another country, including repeated sanctions on some 'serial proliferators.' Since 2009, the Obama Administration has imposed sanctions on 17 occasions on numerous entities in China for weapons proliferation."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kan, Shirley
2014-08-29
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Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990 [July 23, 2013]
"This report, updated as warranted, discusses U.S. security assistance to Taiwan, or Republic of China (ROC), including policy issues for Congress and legislation. Congress has oversight of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. [Public Law] 96-8, which has governed arms sales to Taiwan since 1979, when the United States recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC) instead of the ROC. Two other relevant parts of the 'one China' policy are the August 17, 1982, U.S.-PRC Joint Communique and the 'Six Assurances' to Taiwan. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have been significant. The United States also expanded military ties with Taiwan after the PRC's missile firings in 1995-1996. However, the U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty terminated in 1979."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kan, Shirley
2013-07-23
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U.S.-Taiwan Relationship: Overview of Policy Issues [September 13, 2013]
"The purpose and scope of this Congressional Research Service report is to provide a succinct overview with analysis of the major issues in the U.S. policy on Taiwan. This report will be updated as warranted. Taiwan formally calls itself the sovereign Republic of China (ROC), tracing its political lineage to the ROC set up after the revolution in 1911 in China. The ROC government retreated to Taipei in 1949. The United States recognized the ROC until the end of 1978 and has maintained a non-diplomatic relationship with Taiwan after recognition of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in Beijing in 1979. The State Department claims an 'unofficial' U.S. relationship with Taiwan, despite official contacts that include arms sales. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979, P.L. 96-8, has governed policy in the absence of a diplomatic relationship or a defense treaty. Other key statements that guide policy are the three U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqués of 1972, 1979, and 1982; as well as the 'Six Assurances' of 1982. […] Taiwan's President Ma Ying-jeou has sought U.S. support for his policies, including Taiwan's inclusion in the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (VWP) (in 2012), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and talks on maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas. On August 7, Taiwan and the Philippines reported on their parallel investigations into the incident on May 9, when the Coast Guard of the Philippines (a U.S. treaty ally) shot at a Taiwan fishing boat, resulting in the death of a Taiwan fisherman, Taiwan's sanctions, and bilateral tension."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kan, Shirley; Morrison, Wayne M.
2013-09-13
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Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments [September 12, 2013]
"Since 2000, the U.S. military has been building up forward-deployed forces on the westernmost U.S. territory of Guam to increase U.S. operational presence, deterrence, and power projection for potential responses to crises and disasters, counterterrorism, and contingencies in support of South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, or elsewhere in Asia. Since 2006, joint exercises based at Guam called 'Valiant Shield' have boosted U.S. military readiness in the Pacific. The defense buildup on Guam has been moderate. China has concerns about Guam's buildup, suspecting it to be directed against China. There has been concern that China and North Korea could target Guam with missiles. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy has increased activities in waters around Guam. Still, Guam's role increased in engaging with the PLA. In 2006, the United States and Japan agreed on a Realignment Roadmap to strengthen their alliance, including a buildup on Guam to cost $10.3 billion, with Japan contributing 60%. Goals were to start the related construction on Guam by 2010 and to complete relocation of about 8,000 marines from Okinawa to Guam by 2014. In Tokyo on February 17, 2009, the Secretary of State signed the bilateral 'Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of the III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents From Okinawa to Guam' that reaffirmed the 'Roadmap' of May 1, 2006. […] Facing North Korea's announced missile threats against Guam in March 2013, the Defense Department announced on April 3 that it would deploy to Guam within weeks a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) ballistic missile defense system as a precautionary measure to improve defenses against North Korea's missile threat. Legislation includes the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2014, H.R. 1960 and S. 1197. For further discussion, see the section on legislation. Updated as warranted, this CRS Report discusses major developments and policy issues related to the defense buildup."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kan, Shirley
2013-09-12
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Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments [April 11, 2014]
"Since 2000, the U.S. military has been building up forward-deployed forces on the westernmost U.S. territory of Guam to increase U.S. operational presence, deterrence, and power projection for potential responses to crises and disasters, counterterrorism, and contingencies in support of South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, or elsewhere in Asia. Since 2006, joint exercises based at Guam called 'Valiant Shield' have boosted U.S. military readiness in the Pacific. The defense buildup on Guam has been moderate. China has concerns about Guam's buildup, suspecting it to be directed against China. There has been concern that China and North Korea could target Guam with missiles. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy has increased activities in waters around Guam. Still, Guam's role increased in engaging with the PLA."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kan, Shirley
2014-04-11
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U.S.-Taiwan Relationship: Overview of Policy Issues [April 1, 2014]
"The purpose and scope of this CRS [Congressional Research Service] report is to provide a succinct overview with analysis of the major issues in the U.S. policy on Taiwan. This report will be updated as warranted. Taiwan formally calls itself the sovereign Republic of China (ROC), tracing its political lineage to the ROC set up after the revolution in 1911 in China. The ROC government retreated to Taipei in 1949. The United States recognized the ROC until the end of 1978 and has maintained a nondiplomatic relationship with Taiwan after recognition of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1979. The State Department claims an 'unofficial' U.S. relationship with Taiwan, despite official contacts that include arms sales. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979, P.L. 96-8, has governed policy in the absence of a diplomatic relationship or a defense treaty. Other key statements that guide policy are the three U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqués of 1972, 1979, and 1982; as well as the 'Six Assurances' of 1982. (See also CRS Report RL30341, 'China/Taiwan: Evolution of the 'One China' Policy--Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei.') For decades, Taiwan has been of significant security, economic, and political interest to the United States. In 2013, Taiwan was the 12th-largest U.S. trading partner. Taiwan is a major innovator and producer of information technology (IT) products, many of which are assembled in the PRC by Taiwan-invested firms there. Ties or tension across the Taiwan Strait affect international security (with potential U.S. intervention)."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kan, Shirley; Morrison, Wayne M.
2014-04-01
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Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments [November 15, 2013]
"Since 2000, the U.S. military has been building up forward-deployed forces on the westernmost U.S. territory of Guam to increase U.S. operational presence, deterrence, and power projection for potential responses to crises and disasters, counterterrorism, and contingencies in support of South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, or elsewhere in Asia. Since 2006, joint exercises based at Guam called 'Valiant Shield' have boosted U.S. military readiness in the Pacific. The defense buildup on Guam has been moderate. China has concerns about Guam's buildup, suspecting it to be directed against China. There has been concern that China and North Korea could target Guam with missiles. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy has increased activities in waters around Guam. Still, Guam's role increased in engaging with the PLA. […] Facing North Korea's announced missile threats against Guam in March 2013, the Defense Department announced on April 3 that it would deploy to Guam within weeks a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) ballistic missile defense system as a precautionary measure to improve defenses against North Korea's missile threat. Legislation includes the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2014, H.R. 1960 and S. 1197. For further discussion, see the section on legislation. Updated as warranted, this CRS [Congressional Research Service] Report discusses major developments and policy issues related to the defense buildup."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kan, Shirley
2013-11-15
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U.S.-Taiwan Relationship: Overview of Policy Issues [April 22, 2014]
"The purpose and scope of this CRS [Congressional Research Service] report is to provide a succinct overview with analysis of the major issues in the U.S. policy on Taiwan. This report will be updated as warranted. Taiwan formally calls itself the sovereign Republic of China (ROC), tracing its political lineage to the ROC set up after the revolution in 1911 in China. The ROC government retreated to Taipei in 1949. The United States recognized the ROC until the end of 1978 and has maintained a nondiplomatic relationship with Taiwan after recognition of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1979. The State Department claims an 'unofficial' U.S. relationship with Taiwan, despite official contacts that include arms sales. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979, P.L. 96-8, has governed policy in the absence of a diplomatic relationship or a defense treaty. Other key statements that guide policy are the three U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqués of 1972, 1979, and 1982; as well as the 'Six Assurances' of 1982. (See also CRS Report RL30341, 'China/Taiwan: Evolution of the 'One China' Policy--Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei.') For decades, Taiwan has been of significant security, economic, and political interest to the United States. In 2013, Taiwan was the 12th-largest U.S. trading partner. Taiwan is a major innovator and producer of information technology (IT) products, many of which are assembled in the PRC by Taiwan-invested firms there. Ties or tension across the Taiwan Strait affect international security (with potential U.S. intervention)."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kan, Shirley; Morrison, Wayne M.
2014-04-22
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Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990 [June 13, 2014]
"This CRS [Congressional Research Service] Report discusses U.S. security assistance for Taiwan, formally called the Republic of China (ROC), particularly policy issues for Congress. It also lists sales of major defense articles and services to Taiwan, as approved by the President and notified to Congress since 1990. This report uses a variety of unclassified consultations and citations in the United States and Taiwan."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kan, Shirley
2014-06-13
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Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990 [March 3, 2014]
"This CRS [Congressional Research Service] Report discusses U.S. security assistance for Taiwan, formally called the Republic of China (ROC), particularly policy issues for Congress. It also lists sales of major defense articles and services to Taiwan, as approved by the President and notified to Congress since 1990. This report uses a variety of unclassified consultations and citations in the United States and Taiwan."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kan, Shirley
2014-03-03
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U.S.-Taiwan Relationship: Overview of Policy Issues [February 28, 2014]
"The purpose and scope of this CRS [Congressional Research Service] report is to provide a succinct overview with analysis of the major issues in the U.S. policy on Taiwan. This report will be updated as warranted. Taiwan formally calls itself the sovereign Republic of China (ROC), tracing its political lineage to the ROC set up after the revolution in 1911 in China. The ROC government retreated to Taipei in 1949. The United States recognized the ROC until the end of 1978 and has maintained a nondiplomatic relationship with Taiwan after recognition of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in Beijing in 1979. The State Department claims an 'unofficial' U.S. relationship with Taiwan, despite official contacts that include arms sales. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979, P.L. 96-8, has governed policy in the absence of a diplomatic relationship or a defense treaty. Other key statements that guide policy are the three U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqués of 1972, 1979, and 1982; as well as the 'Six Assurances' of 1982. (See also CRS Report RL30341, 'China/Taiwan: Evolution of the 'One China' Policy--Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei.)'"
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kan, Shirley; Morrison, Wayne M.
2014-02-28
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China/Taiwan: Evolution of the 'One China' Policy-Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei [February 12, 2014]
"Despite broadly consistent statements, the U.S. 'one China' policy concerning Taiwan remains somewhat ambiguous and subject to different interpretations. Apart from questions about what the 'one China' policy entails, issues have arisen about whether U.S. Presidents have stated clear positions and have changed or should change policy, affecting U.S. interests in security and democracy. This CRS Report, updated as warranted, discusses the 'one China' policy since U.S. Presidents began in 1971 to reach understandings with the People's Republic of China (PRC). Taiwan calls itself the Republic of China (ROC) and does not recognize the PRC. There are three sets of issues: sovereignty over Taiwan; PRC use of force or coercion against Taiwan; and cross-strait dialogue. The United States recognized the ROC until the end of 1978 and has maintained a non-diplomatic relationship with Taiwan after recognition of the PRC in 1979. The State Department claims an 'unofficial' relationship with Taiwan. The United States did not explicitly state Taiwan's status in the U.S.-PRC Joint Communiques of 1972, 1979, and 1982. The United States 'acknowledged' the 'one China' position of both sides of the Taiwan Strait."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kan, Shirley
2014-02-12
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Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia: Issues for Congress [May 14, 2014]
"Rising tensions stemming from maritime territorial disputes in East Asia have become a pressing challenge for U.S. policy makers, and pose one of the most complicated issues for the Obama Administration's policy of strategic 'rebalancing' towards the Asia-Pacific. Since around 2005-2006, long-disputed waters and land features in the South China Sea and, more recently, the East China Sea have seen increasingly aggressive behavior from nations trying to strengthen claims to disputed areas. Although China is not the only nation that has sought to press its maritime territorial claims, actions taken by People's Republic of China (PRC) actors, including its maritime law enforcement authorities and the People's Liberation Army (PLA), have been a particular concern. Chinese maritime authorities have taken actions include harassing vessels, destroying equipment, and blockading islets and shoals. Observers are concerned that the increasing frequency of such events raises the possibility of miscalculations that could lead to overt conflict at sea. […] The Senate may consider offering its advice and consent on the United States becoming a party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Congress also may choose to examine the economic and security implications of a greater U.S. military presence in disputed areas, or the merits of providing additional resources to Southeast Asian nations to monitor and police their maritime domains. It also may choose to support efforts to lower tensions, including discussions between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on a Code of Conduct for parties in the South China Sea."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Dolven, Ben; Manyin, Mark E.; Kan, Shirley
2014-05-14
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Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments [April 29, 2014]
"Since 2000, the U.S. military has been building up forward-deployed forces on the westernmost U.S. territory of Guam to increase U.S. operational presence, deterrence, and power projection for potential responses to crises and disasters, counterterrorism, and contingencies in support of South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, or elsewhere in Asia. Since 2006, joint exercises based at Guam called 'Valiant Shield' have boosted U.S. military readiness in the Pacific. The defense buildup on Guam has been moderate. China has concerns about Guam's buildup, suspecting it to be directed against China. There has been concern that China and North Korea could target Guam with missiles. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy has increased activities in waters around Guam. Still, Guam's role increased in engaging with the PLA. […] After China announced an 'East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)' in November 2013, the U.S. Air Force flew two B-52 bombers from Guam into the ADIZ in defiance of China's rules for notification. In April 2014, President Obama issued a U.S.-Japan Joint Statement, reaffirming that 'the United States and Japan are also making sustained progress towards realizing a geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable U.S. force posture in the Asia Pacific, including the development of Guam as a strategic hub.'"
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kan, Shirley
2014-04-29
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China/Taiwan: Evolution of the 'One China' Policy-Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei [October 10, 2014]
"Despite broadly consistent statements, the U.S. 'one China' policy concerning Taiwan remains somewhat ambiguous and subject to different interpretations. Apart from questions about what the policy entails, issues have arisen about whether U.S. Presidents have stated clear positions and have changed or should change policy, affecting U.S. interests in security and democracy. This CRS Report, updated through the 113th Congress, analyzes the 'one China' policy since U.S. Presidents began in 1971 to reach understandings with the People's Republic of China (PRC). Taiwan calls itself the Republic of China (ROC) and does not recognize the PRC. There are three sets of issues: sovereignty over Taiwan; PRC use of force or coercion against Taiwan; and cross-strait dialogue. The United States recognized the ROC until the end of 1978 and has maintained non-diplomatic engagement with Taiwan after recognition of the PRC in 1979. The State Department claims an 'unofficial' relationship with Taiwan. The United States did not explicitly state Taiwan's status in the U.S.-PRC Joint Communiques of 1972, 1979, and 1982. The United States 'acknowledged' the 'one China' position of both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Since 1971, U.S. Presidents--both secretly and publicly--have articulated a 'one China' policy in understandings with the PRC. Congressional oversight has watched for any new agreements and any shift in the U.S. stance closer to that of Beijing's 'one China' principle--on questions of sovereignty, arms sales, or dialogue. Not recognizing the PRC's claim over Taiwan or Taiwan as a sovereign state, U.S. policy has considered Taiwan's status as unsettled."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kan, Shirley
2014-10-10
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China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues [October 29, 2014]
"This Congressional Research Service [CRS] Report, updated through the 113th Congress, discusses the security problem of China's role in weapons proliferation and issues related to the U.S. policy response since the mid-1990s. China has taken some steps to mollify U.S. and other foreign concerns about its role in weapons proliferation. Nonetheless, supplies from China have aggravated trends that result in ambiguous technical aid, more indigenous capabilities, longerrange missiles, and secondary (retransferred) proliferation. Unclassified intelligence reports told Congress that China was a 'key supplier' of technology, particularly with PRC [People's Republic of China] entities providing nuclear and missile-related technology to Pakistan and missile-related technology to Iran. Policy approaches in seeking PRC cooperation have concerned summits, sanctions, and satellite exports. PRC proliferation activities have continued to raise questions about China's commitment to nonproliferation and the need for U.S. sanctions. The United States has imposed sanctions on various PRC 'entities' (including state-owned entities) for troublesome transfers related to missiles and chemical weapons to Pakistan, Iran, or perhaps another country, including repeated sanctions on some 'serial proliferators.' Since 2009, the Obama Administration has imposed sanctions on 17 occasions on numerous entities in China for weapons proliferation. By 2014, the Administration started to negotiate a renewal of the U.S.-PRC nuclear cooperation agreement. […] Since 2006, China's balanced approach has evolved to vote for some U.N. Security Council (UNSC) sanctions against missile or nuclear proliferation in North Korea and Iran. Some called for engaging more with Beijing to use its leverage against Pyongyang and Tehran. However, North Korea's nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, and 2013 prompted greater debate about how to change China's calculus and the value of its cooperation."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kan, Shirley
2014-10-29
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Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments [October 15, 2014]
"Since 2000, the U.S. military has been building up forward-deployed forces on the westernmost U.S. territory of Guam (west of Hawaii) to increase U.S. operational presence, deterrence, and power projection for potential responses to crises, disasters, or other contingencies to support Japan, Republic of Korea (ROK), the Philippines, Taiwan, or others in Asia. Since 2006, Valiant Shield exercises based at Guam have boosted U.S. military readiness for joint operations in the Pacific. The defense buildup on Guam has been moderate. China has concerns, suspecting Guam's buildup to be directed against China. There has been concern that China and North Korea could target Guam with missiles. China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy has increased activities in waters around Guam. Still, Guam's role expanded in engaging with the PLA. In 2006, the United States and Japan had agreed on a Realignment Roadmap to strengthen their alliance, including a buildup on Guam to cost $10.3 billion, with Japan contributing 60%. Goals were to start the related construction on Guam by 2010 and to complete relocation of about 8,000 marines from Okinawa to Guam by 2014. In Tokyo on February 17, 2009, the Secretary of State signed a U.S.-Japan agreement on the relocation of the III Marine Expeditionary Force personnel from Okinawa to Guam that reaffirmed the 'Roadmap' of May 1, 2006. However, the Marines' relocation will not occur by 2014 and will be more geographically distributed."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kan, Shirley
2014-10-15
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Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments [October 28, 2014]
"Since 2000, the U.S. military has been building up forward-deployed forces on the westernmost U.S. territory of Guam (west of Hawaii) to increase U.S. operational presence, deterrence, and power projection for potential responses to crises, disasters, or other contingencies to support Japan, Republic of Korea (ROK), the Philippines, Taiwan, or others in Asia. Since 2006, Valiant Shield exercises based at Guam have boosted U.S. military readiness for joint operations in the Pacific. The defense buildup on Guam has been moderate. China has concerns, suspecting Guam's buildup to be directed against China. There has been concern that China and North Korea could target Guam with missiles. China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy has increased activities in waters around Guam. Still, Guam's role expanded in engaging with the PLA. In 2006, the United States and Japan had agreed on a Realignment Roadmap to strengthen their alliance, including a buildup on Guam to cost $10.3 billion, with Japan contributing 60%. Goals were to start the related construction on Guam by 2010 and to complete relocation of about 8,000 marines from Okinawa to Guam by 2014. In Tokyo on February 17, 2009, the Secretary of State signed a U.S.-Japan agreement on the relocation of the III Marine Expeditionary Force personnel from Okinawa to Guam that reaffirmed the 'Roadmap' of May 1, 2006. However, the Marines' relocation will not occur by 2014 and will be more geographically distributed."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kan, Shirley
2014-10-28
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Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990 [October 23, 2014]
"This report, updated through the 113th Congress, discusses U.S. security assistance to Taiwan (calling itself Republic of China (ROC)), including policy issues for Congress and legislation. Congress has oversight of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8, which has governed arms sales to Taiwan since 1979, when the United States recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC) instead of the ROC. The U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty terminated in 1979. Two other relevant parts of the 'one China' policy are the August 17, 1982, U.S.-PRC Joint Communique and the 'Six Assurances' to Taiwan. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have been significant. The United States also expanded military ties with Taiwan after the PRC's missile firings in 1995-1996."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kan, Shirley
2014-10-23
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China/Taiwan: Evolution of the 'One China' Policy-Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei [October 3, 2014]
"This CRS [Congressional Research Service] Report, updated through the 113th Congress, analyzes the 'one China' policy since U.S. Presidents began in 1971 to reach understandings with the People's Republic of China (PRC). Taiwan calls itself the Republic of China (ROC) and does not recognize the PRC. There are three sets of issues: sovereignty over Taiwan; PRC use of force or coercion against Taiwan; and cross-strait dialogue. The United States recognized the ROC until the end of 1978 and has maintained non-diplomatic engagement with Taiwan after recognition of the PRC in 1979. The State Department claims an 'unofficial' relationship with Taiwan. The United States did not explicitly state Taiwan's status in the U.S.-PRC Joint Communiques of 1972, 1979, and 1982. The United States 'acknowledged' the 'one China' position of both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Since 1971, U.S. Presidents--both secretly and publicly--have articulated a 'one China' policy in understandings with the PRC. Congressional oversight has watched for any new agreements and any shift in the U.S. stance closer to that of Beijing's 'one China' principle--on questions of sovereignty, arms sales, or dialogue. Not recognizing the PRC's claim over Taiwan or Taiwan as a sovereign state, U.S. policy has considered Taiwan's status as unsettled. With added conditions, U.S. policy leaves the Taiwan question to be resolved by the people on both sides of the strait: a 'peaceful resolution' with the assent of Taiwan's people and without unilateral changes. In short, U.S. policy focuses on the process of resolution of the Taiwan question, not any set outcome."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kan, Shirley
2014-10-03
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U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress [July 29, 2014]
"This CRS [Congressional Research Service] report, updated as warranted, discusses policy issues regarding military-to-military (mil-to-mil) contacts with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and provides a record of major contacts and crises since 1993. The United States suspended military contacts with China and imposed sanctions on arms sales in response to the Tiananmen Crackdown in 1989. In 1993, the Clinton Administration reengaged with the top PRC leadership, including China's military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Renewed military exchanges with the PLA have not regained the closeness reached in the 1980s, when U.S.-PRC strategic cooperation against the Soviet Union included U.S. arms sales to China. Improvements and deteriorations in overall bilateral relations have affected military contacts, which were close in 1997-1998 and 2000, but marred by the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, mistaken NATO bombing of a PRC embassy in 1999, the EP- 3 aircraft collision crisis in 2001, and aggressive maritime confrontations (including in 2009)."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kan, Shirley
2014-07-29
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U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress [November 4, 2011]
"This CRS [Congressional Research Service] report, updated as warranted, discusses policy issues regarding military-to-military (mil-to-mil) contacts with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and provides a record of major contacts and crises since 1993. The United States suspended military contacts with China and imposed sanctions on arms sales in response to the Tiananmen Crackdown in 1989. In 1993, the Clinton Administration re-engaged with the top PRC leadership, including China's military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Renewed military exchanges with the PLA have not regained the closeness reached in the 1980s, when U.S.-PRC strategic cooperation against the Soviet Union included U.S. arms sales to China. Improvements and deteriorations in overall bilateral relations have affected military contacts, which were close in 1997-1998 and 2000, but marred by the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, mistaken NATO bombing of a PRC embassy in 1999, the EP- 3 aircraft collision crisis in 2001, and aggressive naval confrontations (including in 2009). […] The PRC's harassment of U.S. surveillance ships (in 2009) and increasing assertiveness in maritime areas have shown the limits to mil-to-mil talks and PLA restraint. Still, at the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) in July 2009, President Obama called for military contacts to diminish disputes with China. The NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] for FY2010 (P.L. 111-84) amended P.L. 106-65 for the annual report on PRC military power to expand the focus to security developments involving the PRC, add cooperative elements, and fold in another report on mil-to-mil contacts. However, the Administration was late in submitting this report in 2010 and in 2011 (not until August). On May 26, 2011, the House passed H.R. 1540, the FY2012 NDAA, with sections relevant to this report and defense procurement. On June 22, the Senate Armed Services Committee reported S. 1253, without such language."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kan, Shirley
2011-11-04
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Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments [November 7, 2011]
"Since 2000, the U.S. military has been building up forward-deployed forces on the westernmost U.S. territory of Guam to increase U.S. presence, deterrence, and power projection for possible responses to crises and disasters, counterterrorism, and contingencies in support of South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, or elsewhere in Asia. Since 2006, three joint exercises based at Guam called 'Valiant Shield' have boosted U.S. military readiness in the Asian-Pacific region. The defense buildup on Guam has been moderate. China still has concerns about Guam's buildup, suspecting it to be directed against China. There has been concern that China and North Korea could target Guam with missiles. Still, Guam's role increased in engaging with China's military. […] In 2011, some Members, including Senator Jim Webb and Guam's Delegate Madeleine Bordallo, have urged more attention to concerns that include expanded costs and the delay in the realignment as the U.S military presence and readiness remain critical. On May 11, 2011, Senators Carl Levin, John McCain, and Jim Webb called for a re-examination of plans to restructure military forces in South Korea, Japan, and Guam. Major legislation includes the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2012, H.R. 1540 and S. 1253, which contain provisions related to the realignment on Guam. Updated as warranted, this CRS Report discusses major developments and policy issues related to the defense buildup. (Also see CRS [Congressional Research Service] Report R41939, 'Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies: FY2012 Appropriations'.)"
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kan, Shirley
2011-11-07
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China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues [February 26, 2003]
"Congress has long been concerned about whether U.S. policy advances the U.S. interest in reducing the role of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles that could deliver them. Recipients of China's technology include Pakistan and countries that the State Department says support terrorism, such as Iran, North Korea, and Libya. The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, added an urgent U.S. interest in weapons nonproliferation. This CRS [Congressional Research Service] Report (superseding CRS Issue Brief IB92056) discusses the national security problem of China's role in weapons proliferation and issues related to the U.S. policy response, including legislation, since the mid-1990s. The table at the end of this report summarizes the U.S. sanctions imposed on PRC entities for weapons proliferation. This CRS Report will be updated as warranted."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kan, Shirley
2003-02-26
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China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues [December 4, 2002]
"Congress has long been concerned about whether U.S. policy advances the U.S. interest in reducing the role of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles that could deliver them. Recipients of China's technology include Pakistan and countries that the State Department says support terrorism, such as Iran, North Korea, and Libya. The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, added an urgent U.S. interest in weapons nonproliferation. This CRS [Congressional Research Service] Report (superseding CRS Issue Brief IB92056) discusses the national security problem of the PRC's role in weapons proliferation and issues related to the U.S. policy response, including legislation, since the mid-1990s. The table at the end of this report summarizes the U.S. sanctions imposed on PRC entities for weapons proliferation. This CRS Report is updated as warranted."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kan, Shirley
2002-12-04
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China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues [November 27, 2012]
"Congress has long been concerned about whether U.S. policy advances U.S. security interests in reducing the role of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles as well as obtaining China's cooperation in weapons nonproliferation. This problem refers to the threat of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and missiles that could deliver them. Some have argued that certain PRC transfers violated international treaties or guidelines, and/or have contravened various U.S. laws requiring sanctions to shore up those international standards. Even if no laws or treaties are violated, many view China's transfers as threatening U.S. security interests. Using unclassified consultations and citations, this CRS [Congressional Research Service] Report discusses the national security problem of the PRC's role in weapons proliferation and issues related to the U.S. policy response, including legislation, since the mid- 1990s. Table 1, at the end of this report, summarizes the U.S. sanctions imposed or waived on PRC entities or the PRC government for weapons proliferation."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kan, Shirley
2012-11-27
