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Importance of Turkish and US Relations: Contributing for Joint Objectives of a Secure Middle East
"For decades, Turkey has stood as the bastion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on the alliance's south-eastern flank and guarded a long shared border with the former Soviet Union. Currently, Turkish support remains critical to US global and regional strategy in a confrontation with a near peer competitor, such as Russia or China. Today, Turkey is allowing US forces to operate from Turkish air bases, which have served as the crucial staging ground for the US-led strikes against ISIS in both Syria and Iraq, but in 2003 it denied the US use of its territory to invade Iraq. As a Muslim-majority country that is transitioning from being a secular democratic state toward its Islamic roots, a member of NATO, and a long-standing US ally, Turkey is pivotal to the US strategy to shape the Middle Eastern security environment. Turkey could also be a key test for the role of Islam in current politics and its influence on external policy. Since the foundation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, Turkey's Islamic parties were unable to win the broad appeal and were frequently alienated or intimidated by the secular government. However, the success of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in multiple elections since 2002 demonstrates the growing strength of Turkish President Erdogan's Islamist movement. Today Turkey faces numerous challenges within its region. The US and Turkey must build and retain a positive and productive relationship that spouses NATO membership to maintain stability for a key region."
Joint Forces Staff College (U.S.). Joint Advanced Warfighting School
Rivas, Raul
2017-03-31
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Regaining the High Ground: The Challenges of Perception Management in National Strategy and Military Operations
"The informational element of power may be the most elusive for the U.S. Government to wield, but its importance is proportional to its difficulty. With the rise in global terrorist networks and a precipitous decline in world opinion of America's foreign policy, Perception Management is more critical now than at any time in America's history. This paper attempts to answer the question of why, in this time of conflict, it is so difficult for the U.S. Government to effectively leverage the informational element of power. It explores three friction-inducing elements that afflict the U.S. Government, including the military. The U.S. Government's politics & personalities, bureaucracy, and aversion to the use of mass media, even in time of war, have precluded an integrated Perception Management campaign. A historical review of Perception Management strategies since World War I reveals that this difficulty is based largely on individual personalities, an ever-growing bureaucracy, and an historical American concern about the perceived manipulation of the media by its government. To solve this problem, the President must clearly define lines of authority regarding the Government's Perception Management strategy. He must also give that authority to a strong leader capable of coordinating the disparate efforts of numerous Government agencies. Finally, the U.S. Government must take a more proactive approach to media engagement as part of an integrated strategic Perception Management campaign."
Joint Forces Staff College (U.S.). Joint Advanced Warfighting School
Martemucci, Matteo G.
2007-06-17
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D.I.M.E.F.I.L.: A Worldwide Campaign for Life
"Countering the trend of suicide bombings requires not only changing the mindset of the potential bomber, but ensuring terrorist organizations which use such methods will incur painful costs. In order to understand what could deter the suicide bomber it was necessary to conduct a study on the profile and the motivating factors of the bomber. What motivates the bomber to kill him or herself? The research conducted showed the motivating factors of a suicide bomber are the organization which recruits the bomber, religion, societal influences, politics and nationalism. The motivating factors for a female are very similar to the male, but most commonly women want to avenge an injustice such as the death or injury of a family member or friend or a rape or assault inflicted upon them. Whatever the motivating factor, women, more so than men, generate much more media coverage. Research indicates that some suicide bombers can be deterred through diplomacy, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence and law enforcement (D.I.M.E.F.I.L.) means, but these elements cannot stop suicide attacks. If these means of national power are not used as an ongoing method of deterrence, another 9/11 on U.S soil is a strong possibility."
Joint Forces Staff College (U.S.). Joint Advanced Warfighting School
Grice, Lisa
2007-05-17
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Impact of Organizational Culture on the Sharing of Homeland Security Information
"This thesis identifies problems that have impacted the implementation of the Homeland Security Information Network. These problems have ranged from programmatic to legal to cultural issues. The Department of Homeland Security has addressed several of the problems impacting the Homeland Security Information Network. The Department of Homeland Security established a program management office and a privacy office to resolve some of the challenges to the Homeland Security Information Network program. The clash of cultures is often discussed in relation to mergers and acquisitions in the business world. This phenomenon has been exhibited by participants in homeland security information sharing during the deployment of the Homeland Security Information Network. Solving these cultural problems requires cooperation and buy-in from the senior leadership of the Department of Homeland Security to the end users of the Homeland Security Information Network in the federal, state, and local governments. Finding a technique to effect meaningful culture change in the homeland security community is the key to making the Homeland Security Information Network a viable information sharing tool. "
Joint Forces Staff College (U.S.). Joint Advanced Warfighting School
Bradey, Jeffery E.
2008-04-04
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U.S. Organization and Strategy for Combating Terrorism: Lessons Observed and Future Possibilities
"This paper analyzes and compares the strategy and organizational composition of Al Qaeda (AQ) and networked Islamic terrorist organizations against the U.S. organization and strategy for combating terrorism. AQ and affiliates is a network operating in at least 60 countries with the goal of a revived caliphate. Despite U.S. efforts, AQ continues to masterfully recruit, train, finance, and provide logistics for their entire network. As a networked non-state actor, AQ poses challenges that the U.S. national security apparatus is not well designed to handle. The institutionalized and stove-piped U.S. interagency architecture has created a cumbersome process through which the elements of national power are wielded, and the structure through which the U.S. combats terrorism is a subset. As such, the operational seams created by stove-piped organizational construct avert the requisite agility, speed and synchronization needed to execute effective actions in combating terror. The agility and speed needed to produce broad spectrum solutions to combat terror will require updated authorities, capabilities, and responsibilities. The U.S. national security apparatus will benefit from an information age National Security Act. As a result, the U.S. organization for combating terror will be more effective."
Joint Forces Staff College (U.S.). Joint Advanced Warfighting School
Baudoin, David L.
2007-04
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Understanding the Enemy
From the thesis abstract: "This study defines the nature of the war on terrorism by assessing the definition of terrorism itself; why terrorism exists, and develops an analytical framework within which to assess United States political strategies towards terrorist actors and organizations. It seeks to define terrorism and terrorists; to provide an understanding of Islamic reasons leading to current-day jihad; the concept of nationalism in majority Muslim states; and give visibility to a new way ahead in Iraq, potentially leading to regional stability. This new strategy requires aggressive implementation by the United States, the west and key state actors in the Middle East to ensure victory in the Global War on Terrorism."
Joint Forces Staff College (U.S.). Joint Advanced Warfighting School
Neal, Suzanne T.
2007-05-17
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Decisive Point in the War on Terrorism
"Joint doctrine can better frame the critical factor of human dimension and the element of time in the joint operation planning process. Both are central in the War on Terrorism. To frame the discussion, the study examines the strategic aspect of culture and then considers the human terrain in military planning. The research reviews various narratives for the current strategic environment. The paper then examines the current transnational terrorist threat, its ideology, its goals, and its operational reach. The study then reviews current joint doctrine with a specific focus on how it frames the operational environment and how it employs time in the operational design process. It examines the Air-Land Battle doctrine for its applicability to the War on Terrorism. Changes to the joint operational environment and operational design models are recommended. This paper considers a decisive point the United States must control or influence in the War on Terrorism."
Joint Forces Staff College (U.S.). Joint Advanced Warfighting School
Warburg, Robert A.
2007-04-05
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Eyes to See: The Foothold of Jihadi Underpinnings
"The magnitude of the Jihadi threat confronting the West goes largely unrecognized because of Western civilization's unwillingness to explore the underpinnings of Jihadi conduct. These underpinnings are well-established and rigorously authenticated precepts that serve as a foothold for Jihadi conduct, making Islam a ready-made ideology that suits the Jihadis' insatiable goals for territorial conquest and a religious-based totalitarian government. The West's disinclination towards exploring these underpinnings is partly due to its entrapment within a self-referencing inward spiral of cognition that blinds it to the genuine intentions of its Jihadi foes. Likewise, the Jihadis are trapped within an expanding outward spiral of cognition based upon a system of unyielding and self-legitimizing expansionist concepts. Preventing the eclipse of Western civilization is dependent upon the West's timely recognition of the revolutionary Jihadi vanguard as a peril to its existence. This paper first demonstrates how the West is unwilling to recognize the threat it faces because of political correctness and an uncontested intellectual emasculation. These elements forge a mirror-image perception of the enemy that has created a self-referencing lexicon in the war on terrorism. As the West's lead agent in the war on terrorism, the United States Government has failed to accurately define the threat it faces, thereby creating disparate efforts in quelling Jihadi exertions. The second part of this paper discusses the underpinnings of Jihadi conduct, their fixed nature, and how they are being used as a foothold to carry out a long-term campaign for world domination. Lastly, this paper highlights the magnitude of the Jihadi threat and how the West must fully awaken in order to posture for survival."
Joint Forces Staff College (U.S.). Joint Advanced Warfighting School
Klein, John M., Jr.
2007-04-05
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Engaging North Korea: An Element of the Global War on Terrorism
"The North Korean nuclear weapons issue has culminated in a climactic standoff between the ill-equipped and undernourished nation and the rest of the world. Kim Jong Il has continued to defy the world community regarding missile testing and the desire to possess nuclear weapons. With North Korea becoming a confirmed nuclear power, the potential for radical instability in the Northeast Asian region exists to a greater degree than ever seen before in the post-Cold War era. The challenge for the United States and the world community is exactly how to handle this possibly disastrous turn of events. The Bush Administration policy of preemption when required, and the aggressive nature of its rhetoric regarding rogue states, may have caused North Korea to feel as if it may be the next battlefield enemy for the United States, and hence continue its missile and nuclear weapons testing. With the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and continued operations in Iraq, it is imperative that the United States avoid another military crisis. A diplomatic solution must be seriously explored and would be in concert with American published strategic documents from the highest levels. Beginning a line of bilateral negotiations with North Korea outside of the Six-Party Talks will allow the United States to meet its strategic goals related to the GWOT that apply to the Korean peninsula, including the elimination of the North Korean nuclear threat."
Joint Forces Staff College (U.S.). Joint Advanced Warfighting School
Cheeseman, Richard J., Jr.
2007-04-05
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Pursuing Strategic Goals: Resources, Technology, Political Will, and the Global War on Terrorism
"Strategic goals are developed and approved by the President of the United States with the input from his close advisors, staff and administration officials. These strategic goals form the foundation that subordinate agencies, departments and military planners use to develop strategic objectives that will support the overarching desired national goals. A clear understanding of desired goals and endstate is imperative at the strategic level to ensure that all elements of national power are applied effectively. For the military, clear delineation of strategic goals are essential to ensure that military force can be effectively and efficiently applied when necessary to support strategic success. The importance of national strategic goals and their significance to military campaign planners will be examined. Critical factors required for the development of strategic goals and the importance of the need for continual assessment and revision of strategic goals over time will also be examined. Proper development and continual assessment will directly impact the military campaign planner and can ultimately determine the success or failure of the military mission. The success or failure of the military mission will ultimately impact the success or failure of the overarching national strategy."
Joint Forces Staff College (U.S.). Joint Advanced Warfighting School
Mahaney, Michael P.
2007-04-05
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Is America on the Road to Victory in the Global War on Terrorism
"The United States entered into war on 11 September 2001. Four and a half years have passed and it has become increasingly more difficult to determine if success is being achieved. The United States must fight this war to defend the lives and liberties of its citizens. It is critical that the nation?nation's leaders define victory for this war, that they re-address their view of the capacity and the identity of the enemy and therefore the length of time required to attain victory, and that they re-evaluate their strategy in fighting this war. This war will not end with a V-T (Victory against Terrorism) Day. The U.S., for the time being, has taken the battle to the enemy but further success in defeating terrorists is not guaranteed. The current strategy of labeling the campaign a war on terrorism is fundamentally flawed. It now needs improvement in order to attain final victory. The new strategy of the United States must begin by specifically defining the enemy vice calling it terrorism in general. Second, an attainable and decisive end-state must clearly be stated. Finally, the new strategy must guide improvements in the diplomatic, military and social/political elements of national power in order to synchronize all national efforts toward this desired end-state."
Joint Forces Staff College (U.S.). Joint Advanced Warfighting School
Cunningham, Donald S.
2006-04-14
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Good Governance Matters: Optimizing U.S. PRTs in Afghanistan to Advance Good Governance
From the thesis abstract: "Success in overcoming the unique challenges of nation building in Afghanistan-- the Taliban, narco-trafficking, corruption, tribalism, thirty years of civil strife and an associated 'brain drain' require proper organization and resourcing of the U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). This paper traces the origins of the U.S. Afghanistan PRT Model from its inception in 2002 to today. The paper will take a critical look at all the three lines of PRT operation--security, governance and economic development--to determine the effectiveness of the American PRT model in the current Afghan operating environment. Proper balance and focus of effort of the PRT lines of operation will contribute greatly in massing the effects of the PRT in pursuit of a lasting peace and stabilization in Afghanistan. While not a primary PRT line of operation, this paper will examine the role of information operations in connecting the Afghan government to the Afghan people. Besides analyzing empirical data, this paper includes anecdotal data from current and former PRT members. This paper draws conclusions and recommendations from this analysis as well as historical lessons from past counterinsurgencies, demonstrated strengths from other current Coalition PRT Models, and the author's personal experience commanding a PRT in Afghanistan."
Joint Forces Staff College (U.S.). Joint Advanced Warfighting School
Hughlett, Frank E.
2009-06-12
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Afghanistan: A War That Can Only Be Won via the Concentration of United States Elements of National Power
From the thesis abstract: "September 11, 2001 marked the deadliest single day attacks on American soil in United States' history. Out of the dust, smoke, and carnage arose a change in American policy towards terrorism and a proclaimed commitment to wage war in Afghanistan against a determined adversary whose Islamic revolutionary ideology presents a grave threat to United States national interests. In relatively short order, a small United States military and CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] footprint, in concert with the Northern Alliance, toppled the ruling Taliban regime and degraded al-Qaeda command and control. Consequentially, this rapid success created a window of opportunity to employ decisive United States diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) elements of national power to achieve strategic success. Strategic success is defined as the creation of a viable Afghanistan representative government and a professional military establishment that can provide fundamental human needs to its people and security within its borders -- thereby denying al-Qaeda sanctuary from which to attack the U.S. once again. Six years later, the U.S. has yet to concentrate these elements resulting in indecisive operations, a fragile Afghanistan government, and the continuance of a protracted counterinsurgency fight. This paper first demonstrates the moral and legal legitimacy of the United States' decision to wage war in Afghanistan using the Just War Theory (JWT), and how critical it is in light of the pillars of its National Security Strategy. Next, the paper addresses the grave threat posed by the Islamic Revolutionary Movement (IRM). JWT, coupled with the severity of the IRM, require the concentration of U.S. elements of national power to achieve victory. The remainder of the paper addresses current DIME initiatives and offers a way ahead to better set conditions for success."
Joint Forces Staff College (U.S.). Joint Advanced Warfighting School
Kraft, James E.
2008-04-04
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Updating the National Strategy in Iraq: the Ideological Element
"This paper explores the current United States Strategy in the ongoing Iraqi insurgency. Its thesis is that the current U.S. strategy does not adequately address the ideological element of this conflict. This paper reviews and analyzes the Iraqi environment, the current trends in the insurgency, and the currently stated U.S. strategies to include the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, and the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. Following these explorations, the paper reviews and compares the fundamentals of Islam with the radical ideology that Abu Mus' ab Al Zarqawi and others use as their touchstones to support their insurgency. Lastly, this paper provides some recommendations for an updated U.S. strategy that will incorporate and address the ideological dimension of the war in Iraq."
Joint Forces Staff College (U.S.). Joint Advanced Warfighting School
DuBinok, Jefferson L.
2006-05-25
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America's Holy War
"This paper examines America's strategic policy to combat terrorism. The author contends that the current national strategy on counterterrorism is strategically flawed because it misidentifies the true enemy the nation faces. He also contends that the Global War On Terrorism (GWOT) is intrinsically a strategy to combat a 'tactic' used by Islamic Extremists versus focusing on the true enemy, the Muslim people who support this Holy War in the name of Islam. In this paper, the author identifies the strategic flaw of the GWOT as a national strategy, provides an indepth review of the GWOT, reviews the goals and strategy of Islam and Islamic extremism and contrasts them with U.S. goals and strategy, discusses shortfalls in the current U.S. GWOT policy to combat the Holy War, and proposes a new strategy to combat the ideology of Islam and the Muslim support base. A short case study to demonstrate the ramifications of appeasement and misidentification of the enemy is incorporated for historical reference."
Joint Forces Staff College (U.S.). Joint Advanced Warfighting School
Parker, John
2006-04-14
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Fuzzy Deterrence
From the thesis abstract: "Since the end of the Cold War and the September 11, 2001 attacks, the United States has wrestled with how rational deterrence applies to non-state actors in today's complex security environment. Fuzzy logic can serve as a framework for modeling deterrence theory as it applies to non-state actors. The fuzzy logic themes of flexibility, adaptability, and ambiguity lay the foundation for applying fuzzy logic to non-state actor deterrence. Fuzzy logic is a valid approach in 21st century deterrence because it represents real-world human interactions--whether nation-state versus nation-state or nation-state versus non-state actor. Applying fuzzy logic and fuzzy cognitive map concepts to non-state actor deterrence presents strategists with an effective approach to enhance homeland security and establishes a new model for non-state actor deterrence."
Joint Forces Staff College (U.S.). Joint Advanced Warfighting School
Hanovich, Robert L.
2010-06-16
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AFRICOM: Combatant Command for the 21st Century
From the thesis abstract: "In February 2007, President Bush announced the formation of United States Africa Command or AFRICOM. When it reaches full operational capability in October 2008, it will join the other five combatant commands: European Command, Southern Command, Northern Command, Central Command, and Pacific Command, as the Department of Defense's unified command structure responsible for specific geographical regions of the world. From the beginning it has been made clear that AFRICOM will be organized differently and have a different mission priority than the current geographic combatant commands. Most apparent is the high ratio of assigned interagency personnel as compared to the other commands. This thesis examines U.S. interests and operating environment in Africa to determine AFRICOM mission focus. It also proposes organization structure to facilitate interagency integration and maximize mission effectiveness."
Joint Forces Staff College (U.S.). Joint Advanced Warfighting School
Juergens, Rich (Richard A.)
2008-06-13
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Response to a Chemical Incident or Accident: Who Is In Charge?
"This paper explores and recommends a new strategy in the response to a chemical accident. The thesis of the paper is as follows: Combatant Commanders and the Services must have specific guidance and appropriate authorities to be able to effectively manage a Chemical Accident and Incident Response and Assistance (CAIRA) at a chemical stockpile site. To support this assertion, the paper will explore three separate organizations: the Department of the Army, the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP), and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In each one of these organizations, background, authority, current policy and procedures, and other relevant topics are discussed and analyzed. Following the research and analysis, the paper provides some recommendations, a 'way' to possibly improve the preparedness and response to an event at a chemical stockpile site."
Joint Forces Staff College (U.S.). Joint Advanced Warfighting School
Briggs, Darryl J.
2007-04-07
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Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JEIDDO): Tactical Successes Mired in Organization Chaos: Roadblock in the Counter-IED Fight
"The United States Department of Defense (DoD) estimates that Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) are responsible for almost 50% of the casualties (both mortal and injured) sustained in Iraq and nearly 30% in Afghanistan since the start of combat operations. Furthermore, in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Iraqi Enduring Freedom (OEF), deaths from IEDs have steadily increased since the cessation of major combat operations in 2003. As a result of the staggering losses inflicted by these devices, defeating this terrorist tactic has become a top priority for the DoD. The American public is swayed by many things, but none more convincingly than nightly news reports of U.S. casualties from IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan. In order to win the Global War On Terror (GWOT), bureaucrats and warriors alike must harness the nation's ingenuity and resources to defeat this terrorist weapon, which threatens to diminish national will in the fight for freedom. Given the magnitude of the IED threat, the Secretary of Defense created the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to address this problem in February, 2006. JIEDDO is chartered to 'focus (lead, advocate, coordinate) all DoD actions in support of the Combatant Commanders' and their respective Joint Task Forces' efforts to defeat IEDs as weapons of strategic influence.' However, JIEDDO, as an organization, possesses neither the structure nor the authority to effectively prosecute the war against IEDs. As a large, bureaucratic organization rooted in the technological approach to defeating IEDs, JIEDDO lacks the agility to quickly react to a changing enemy and has no legal authority to compel other DoD entities to act. This paper analyzes JIEDDO by reviewing its origins, examining its current structure and authority, and identifying recommendations that may improve its ability to defeat IEDs."
Joint Forces Staff College (U.S.). Joint Advanced Warfighting School
Ellis, Richard F.; Rogers, Richard D.; Cochran, Bryan M.
2007-03-13
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Cyber Power for the Joint Force Commander: An Operational Design Framework
From the Abstract: "In modern and future warfare, the Joint Force Commander (JFC) must skillfully and effectively leverage cyber power. Anecdotal evidence suggests, however, that the JFC is unable to assemble, coordinate, and integrate elements of cyber power within an operational design to employ a dominant, full spectrum capability. Significant but not insurmountable barriers to accomplishing this outcome exist in current doctrine, policy, and organizational relationships. JFCs do not have a conceptual and pragmatic mission-focused construct for planning, employing and leveraging available cyber power in concert with other existing capabilities to develop a modern operational warfare approach. At this point, the JFC lacks the integration means to think about and apply cyber power. Cyber capabilities need to be planned for, coordinated, and employed from Phase I to Phase V as part of an integrated operational plan. To do this, a cyber operationalization framework is needed with which to shape JFC operational art and operational design to meet the requirements of modern warfare. To address this deficit, a JFC cyber operationalization framework incorporated within operational design is proposed to empower the JFC to fully leverage cyber power in campaign conception, planning, and employment. The framework provides an integrated cyber operational approach and attempts to improve and rebalance the JFC and USCYBERCOM [U.S. Cyber Command] working dynamic while meeting requirements for a JFC's operationally phased campaigns."
Joint Forces Staff College (U.S.). Joint Advanced Warfighting School
Angerman, William
2014-03-26
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Overcoming the Illusion of Security: Creating a New Spacefaring Security Strategy Paradigm
"America's economic viability and military strength depend on the security of its space systems. However, current U.S. space strategy fails to ensure free access to, and use of, space. The increasingly congested, contested, and competitive space environment require a change in the U.S. strategic approach to secure spacefaring. This paper outlines an approach for a new National Strategy for Spacefaring Security and provides a conceptual framework to help ensure the U.S. maintains the secure, unencumbered, and sustainable use of space."
Joint Forces Staff College (U.S.). Joint Advanced Warfighting School
Githens, Dawn M.
2014-01-03
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21st Century Military-Media Relationships: Improving Relations and the Narrative Through Education
"Although media and information have always influenced international and national security, the impact of information has become a dominant factor in the modern security arena. Today's Joint Force enjoys both a positive narrative and good media relations, and it is critical that the Joint Force maintains and bolsters these positive conditions. Despite this, current trends across all levels of Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) reflect a system that does not sufficiently focus, prioritize, or address sustaining the ability to deliver a timely, accurate, and transparent narrative through cooperative relationships with the media. Because of these shortcomings, military leaders must holistically reexamine the JPME goals and exploit current opportunities in order to provide military leaders career-spanning education focused towards sustaining the military's narrative through positive military-media relations."
Joint Forces Staff College (U.S.). Joint Advanced Warfighting School
Barnes, Sean W.
2014-12-03
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Islamic Radicalization and the Global Islamist Movement: Protecting U.S. National Interests by Understanding and Countering Islamist Grand Strategy with U.S. Policy
From the thesis abstract: "This thesis examines the national security policies and strategies of the United States (U.S.) as they address terrorism and the root causes of terrorism in an information age. It focuses on the root causes of terrorism and the enduring nature of the Global Islamist Movement as manifested by its flagship terrorist organization, al-Qaeda. The thesis summarizes the Global Islamist Movement's historic and theological foundations, its ideology, and its published strategy in order to argue the enduring nature of the movement's threat to U.S. interests globally. The thesis also assesses and identifies shortcomings in various U.S. national security policies with respect to Global Islamist Movement and the terrorism, which it spawns. The thesis is presented in a deductive manner and argues that globalization and modern social media have empowered this most recent Islamist resurgence in ways which makes its asymmetric strategies and decentralized execution effective. The thesis leads the reader to conclude that the Global Islamist Movement is an enduring threat to the United States and that U.S. national-level policies must specifically acknowledge that threat so subsequent strategies can align the elements of U.S. national power against the threat."
Joint Forces Staff College (U.S.). Joint Advanced Warfighting School
Hargus, Coyt D.
2013-04-12
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Paradigm Change: Cybersecurity of Critical Infrastructure
From the thesis abstract: "This study argues that the United States paradigm for the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure is flawed. For nearly two decades, repeated Presidential attempts, along with Congressional efforts, to revise cybersecurity policies result in new policies that contain old and unproven principles. Meanwhile, the cyber vulnerabilities within critical infrastructure information environments and the lethality of the global cyber threats to those national assets continue to grow. This research identifies and examines the foundational policy threads that resurface within consecutive Presidential cybersecurity policy initiatives over the previous twenty years. Collectively, these consistent themes constitute the United States' paradigm for cybersecurity. Although the United States' approach to cybersecurity cumulatively evolved during the past twenty years, its foundational principles remain unchanged, in error, and incapable of solving the nation's cybersecurity challenges. [...] Unfortunately, the traditional paradigm hinders innovative thinking about an evolving problem. The United States faulty cybersecurity paradigm rests upon unproven theories that left unchanged, trend the nation toward a national catastrophe. [...] This thesis adds to the growing cybersecurity policy body of work by thoroughly examining the major cybersecurity policies beginning with the digital explosion of the late nineteen nineties. This thesis also identifies the flawed threads of policy that continually survive successive Presidential administrations. Ultimately, this study analyzes the cybersecurity environment and submits a fundamentally different paradigm for the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure. The new paradigm calls for a revision of commonly accepted cyberspace definitions, revitalizing the United States sensibilities for high risk/high pay-off technological innovations, an increased focus on creating inherently secure software, and the establishment of legislation targeted toward private owners of national critical infrastructures."
Joint Forces Staff College (U.S.). Joint Advanced Warfighting School
Martin, Jr, James E.
2013-06-17
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Strategic Failure of UK Defence Reform and What Still Needs to Be Done
From the thesis abstract: "The ability of a nation to deliver adequate defence for its citizens (Defence) relies on successfully navigating a complex web of interactions between numerous people, nations, and institutions. Debate on how to optimize those interactions has long been of interest to those involved in UK Defence. To help clarify and settle some of those debates, this thesis analyzes the most recent set of UK Defence reforms. The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) directed major cuts to both personnel and equipment within the Ministry of Defence (MoD). SDSR 10 went some way to address the £38Bn deficit in UK Defence procurement, but the UK Secretary of State for Defence charged Lord Levene with rationalizing an unaffordable program to prevent recurrence. [...] The outcome of the SDSR 15 would suggest not all the shortcomings have been addressed. The two most expensive UK equipment programs effectively lock in almost half of the available equipment budget and present considerable risk to a balanced capability. [...] The RAF mantra to be 'agile, adaptable, and capable' is the polar opposite to the procurement process. The ability to prioritize a constrained budget to provide a well-balanced capability points to the need for clear and comprehensive strategy. Based on the shortfalls identified, this thesis offers a set of recommendations to improve Defence Reform through the bolstering of institutional strategic thinking and planning."
Joint Forces Staff College (U.S.). Joint Advanced Warfighting School
Beasant, Andrew S.
2016-04-04
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Deradicalization or Disengagement?: A Framework for Encouraging Jihad Abandonment
From the thesis abstract: "State responses to trans-national terrorism have long included law enforcement, the military, and intelligence services. Only recently have soft power elements been brought to bear to encourage jihad abandonment. Several nations implement a variety of deradicalization or disengagement programs aimed at preventing future attacks, either by convincing a radical to abandon his or her radical ideology (de-radicalize) or merely to abstain from future attacks (disengage). Though individual program results vary, and measuring success for an ideological concept such as de-radicalization is problematic, graduates of these programs have low recidivism rates. This thesis analyzes established de-radicalization/disengagement programs, identifies elements that make them successful, and provides recommendations for a framework for a United States-sponsored de-radicalization/disengagement program, domestically and with partner nations overseas."
Joint Forces Staff College (U.S.). Joint Advanced Warfighting School
Hayter, Christopher N.
2016-06-10
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Bigfoot or Big Mistake: is CBP's Expanding Footprint Helping or Hurting Homeland Security
From the thesis abstract: "Bad actors and transnational criminal organizations have the ability to move illegal goods, drugs, dangerous materials, and people of interest to the 'zero yard line' of the United States. Without a buffer to protect the homeland, limited people, time, and resources exist to identify harmful items and individuals before they enter the U. S. and cause damage. The U. S. has relied on a geographical buffer and a positive relationship with Mexico and Canada in order to maintain our current security. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has expanded their division of International Affairs to build host country capacity, pre-clearance measures, and increased screening in foreign countries before arriving on the zero line. When it comes to securing the nation from those who would do it harm, CBP's global footprint is an efficient and effective strategy not only to keep malevolent actors off the 'zero yard line,' but out of the 'red zone' altogether. However, as with all deployments, these actions incur a fiscal and, unfortunately, human cost as some agents are killed in IED [improvised explosive devise] and Blue on Green attacks, leaving some to ask: are such forward deployments worth their cost? Are they the most effective way to secure the U.S.?"
Joint Forces Staff College (U.S.). Joint Advanced Warfighting School
Seiler, Christopher M.
2017-03-31
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Protecting the Homeland: The Importance of Counter-Illicit Trafficking to Prevent an Attack with Weapons of Mass Destruction
From the thesis abstract: "Since the mid-1990's, the Al Qaeda Network has expressed the desire to obtain a nuclear or radiological weapon for use against the United States. While international protocols exist that are designed to inhibit acquisition by non-state actors and proliferation to rogue states, it is still possible for Al Qaeda to obtain a nuclear or radiological weapon capability. If they are successful in their pursuit of a weapon, the task facing the United States becomes prevention of a successful attack on the U.S. homeland. As international illicit trafficking efforts have grown more sophisticated, Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations increasingly use criminal networks and criminal-like techniques to fund their efforts. Thus, preventing cooperative efforts between a terrorist organization and a criminal network to smuggle a weapon of mass destruction into the United States has become a part of our national strategy. This paper posits that while current counter illicit trafficking efforts are unable to stop the flow of illicit goods into the United States, they influence trafficking behaviors and introduce interdiction risk. These behavioral changes and risk, when combined with differing organizational goals of traffickers and terrorists, inhibit cooperative efforts between Al Qaeda and international trafficking organizations. As a result, continued pursuit of diverse means to counter illicit trafficking networks should be an essential component in the strategy to prevent the Al Qaeda Network from conducting a weapon of mass destruction attack on the United States homeland."
Joint Forces Staff College (U.S.). Joint Advanced Warfighting School
Kline, Jonathan
2013-06-17
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Using Center of Gravity Analysis to Defeat Violent Extremist Organizations
"The National Security Strategy of 2015 establishes the importance of defeating Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs). Attacking a VEOs Center of Gravity (COG) is key to defeating it. As traditionally conceived by Clausewitz, an enemy's COG is usually its army. However, the ability to generate a physical force is, in the case of certain VEOs, not its sole source of power. The primary source of their power and resistance could be moral and/or ideological. Joe Strange's theory looks at an enemy's COG through its primary abilities which merit it to exist as such. These primary abilities are called critical capabilities (CCs). For a fully operational CC to exist, it needs essential conditions, resources, and means which Strange identifies as critical requirements (CRs). Once the CCs and CRs are identified, the next step is to surmise which CRs are deficient or vulnerable to neutralization, interdiction, or attack in a decisive manner, critical vulnerabilities (CVs). This thesis uses two significant historical case studies to demonstrate Strange's theory retroactively in the defeat of the Medellin and Cali drug cartels and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and then uses that analysis to develop a strategy to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Analysis of the case studies shows several critical vulnerabilities exist within ISIS that are ripe for exploitation using specific instruments of power. This thesis demonstrates the viability of using Strange's Center of Gravity analysis method to achieve the desired objective of defeating ISIS. Currently, however, hegemonic and regional powers are engaged in uncoordinated and often conflicting operations against ISIS. Prior to being able to apply Strange's theory, the competing interests in the region must set aside their strategic and ideological differences and coalesce into a cohesive body with agreed upon goals."
Joint Forces Staff College (U.S.). Joint Advanced Warfighting School
Wood, Lawrence P.
2016-04-04
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Networked Special Operations: Addressing Transnational Threats, Homeland Defense, and Breached Seams in the Western Hemisphere
From the thesis abstract: "This thesis revolves around a central question: Can United States Special Operations Command act as the conduit to network special operations in support of strategies specific to transnational organized crime (TOC) and homeland defense (HD)? An examination of the 2015 National Security Strategy (NSS), the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG), and the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), uncovers some distinctive goals and requirements linked to national security on U.S. frontiers. The U.S. national defense and homeland security industrial complex are in need of a serious forced evolution that mimics the threat posed by transregional threats which do not adhere to geographic borders nor are they subject to the posse comitatus bifurcation inherent to military and law enforcement collaboration. This thesis contends USSOCOM should be the clearing house for a true global approach to global threats. By using the TSOCs [Theatre Special Operations Commands] in a 'supported command' roll then USSOCOM, through direct coordination with the GCC's, could utilize the resident network already in place."
Joint Forces Staff College (U.S.). Joint Advanced Warfighting School
Castro, Alex
2017-04-20
