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Idaho National Laboratory [website]
"INL is part of the U.S. Department of Energy's complex of national laboratories. The laboratory performs work in each of the strategic goal areas of DOE: energy, national security, science and environment. INL is the nation's leading center for nuclear energy research and development. INL is managed by Battelle Energy Alliance for the Department of Energy's Office of Nuclear Energy. INL is the nation's lead laboratory for nuclear energy research, development, demonstration and deployment and we are engaged in the mission of ensuring the nation's energy security with safe, competitive and sustainable energy systems and unique national and homeland security capabilities."
Idaho National Laboratory
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CCE Case Study: Baltavia Substation Power Outage
From the Introduction: "In this case study, we will examine a fictional event broadly inspired by the real power outages in Ukraine that took place in December 2015 and December 2016--both the result of cyber-enabled sabotage. The adversaries in these well-documented attacks gained access to a few power companies' corporate networks, pivoted to industrial control system (ICS) networks, and created widespread physical effects in the form of power outages. [...] The December 2015 power outages in Ukraine were the result of a coordinated cyber-attack on three power distribution companies involving roughly 53 substations within their associated service areas. The attack focused on supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) and distribution management system (DMS) platforms and leveraged the unverified trust of established remote access capabilities. [...] The December 2016 events in Ukraine were quite different from those in the previous year. For example, the 2016 attack impacted a single transmission-level substation and 200 MW [megawatt] of customer load. [...] Investigation by private cybersecurity firms following this outage uncovered malware capable of mapping networks and executing commands within an ICS environment. [...] With the 2015 and 2016 attacks in mind, we [...] explore how to apply the CCE [Consequence-driven Cyber-informed Engineering] methodology to identify worst-case functional impacts and determine High Consequence Events (HCEs) in a fictional case study."
Idaho National Laboratory
2020-05-12
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Distributed Wind Resilience Metrics for Electric Energy Delivery Systems
From the Summary: "While most people have a general concept of what it means to be 'resilient,' an examination of definitions from different sources reveals that there are key commonalities, but key differences as well. The lack of a generally accepted definition and application of resilience extends to electric energy delivery systems. Without an accepted definition, it is difficult to implement programs or processes to improve resiliency. In this paper, existing work from industry, regulatory bodies, and national laboratories to define and apply resilience to electric energy delivery systems is studied to understand the key components to define resilience and better understand associated metrics. This understanding is then applied to distributed wind for a specific example of how resilience of a system is affected by the technologies and generation sources used to support it."
Idaho National Laboratory
Bukowski, Steve A.; Culler, Megan J.; Gentle, Jake P. . . .
2021-05
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Resilience Framework for Electric Energy Delivery Systems
From the Summary: "The intent of this document is to introduce a framework that will enable more thoughtful and deliberate consideration of resilience as it relates to electrical energy delivery systems (EEDS), with specific application to distributed wind systems. The need for this framework was established in a previous report from Idaho National Laboratory (INL), 'Distributed Wind Resilience Metrics for Electric Energy Delivery Systems', where definitions of resilience and resilience of EEDS were developed and a critical characteristic of resilience for EEDS, the distinctiveness quality, was identified. This distinctiveness quality reflects the difficulty in applying resilience metrics broadly to the widely varied risk perception of stakeholders and stakeholder groups, the varied range of potential consequences to a system based upon events, and the large set of potential mitigation strategies. Development of resilience metrics, and more specifically distributed wind resilience metrics, must come from a resilience process that addresses this distinctiveness quality and is separate from well-established reliability processes. These two factors are the primary drivers demonstrating the need to establish a resilience methodology that can be applied to any electrical energy delivery system, any set of stakeholders, and any set of events."
Idaho National Laboratory
Culler, Megan J.; Bukowski, Steve A.; Hovland, Katherine A. . . .
2021-07
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Cybersecurity Guide for Distributed Wind
From the Summary: "Distributed wind sits at the intersection of grid-connected, off-grid, and behind-the-meter cyber-physical electric energy systems. The physical properties and communications requirements for distributed wind systems mean that there are unique cybersecurity considerations, but there is little to no existing guidance on best practices for cybersecurity. This document is intended to be a starting point for distributed wind stakeholders including manufacturers, installers and integrators, and operators (facility, aggregator, or utility). We discuss common distributed wind architectures and describe their role in the larger power system, pointing out some of the key connections to be aware of. Cybersecurity cannot exist in a vacuum, but rather must consider the entire system and all its connections holistically. The role of distributed wind and the functions it can serve are described to gain understanding of the full range of capabilities. The purpose and application of relevant standards that may apply to certain distributed wind systems are presented. These standards may not apply to all installations, but even for systems that are not required to meet these standards, they can be a good reference for best practices."
Idaho National Laboratory
Culler, Megan J.; Smith, Brian; Cleveland, Frances . . .
2021-08
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Cybersecurity for Distributed Wind: What Manufacturers Need to Know
From the Document: "As a manufacturer of a distributed wind turbine or a component that is ultimately used in distributed wind applications, you are familiar with the basics of the equipment and its role in the context of a 'distributed energy resources (DER) transition.' You are also likely familiar with basic concepts of cybersecurity, either through work or everyday life, but you may not realize how it applies to your products. Until INL [Idaho National Laboratory] published the 'Cybersecurity Guide for Distributed Wind' [hyperlink] in 2021, few resources addressed the growing need to secure distributed wind systems. The Guide is a richly detailed resource outlining a distributed wind system's possible architectures, relevant standards, risk management strategies, and key recommendations for stakeholders. This document highlights the key actionable insights from the Guide that manufacturers can use to quickly develop their cybersecurity strategy."
Idaho National Laboratory
Culler, Megan J.; Morash, Sean; Cleveland, Frances . . .
2021-11-02?
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DOE Office of Nuclear Energy Cybersecurity Research, Development and Demonstration Program Plan
From the Executive Summary: "This document describes the Cybersecurity Research Development and Demonstration (RD&D) Program, established by the Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) to provide science-based methods and technologies necessary for cost-effective, cyber-secure digital instrumentation, control and communication in collaboration with nuclear energy stakeholders. It provides an overview of program goals, objectives, linkages to organizational strategies, management structure, and stakeholder and cross-program interfaces. The nuclear industry must modernize to remain competitive. Current nuclear power plants will be upgraded, and new advanced reactors will be designed using digital systems and novel control concepts. This nuclear sector digital modernization, including novel control concepts, will introduce cybersecurity risks that will need to be managed. Concern with cybersecurity is ubiquitous across critical infrastructure. However, successful cybersecurity in the nuclear energy industry requires an understanding of the technical, regulatory, and business constraints placed upon it. Like other programs in the NE Crosscutting Technology Development portfolio, this program was established to address challenges across the existing and future nuclear fleet by identifying common critical research needs and then translating the gaps into actionable RD&D activities. The program is organized into four cybersecurity RD&D focus areas: risk-management methods, secure architectures, supply-chain risk management, and modeling and simulation. For each focus area, this plan provides the main challenges and opportunities, goals, approach, benefits, and key three- to five-year milestones."
Sandia National Laboratories; Idaho National Laboratory; United States. National Nuclear Security Administration
2021-08
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