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Defense Primer: Ballistic Missile Defense [Updated December 19, 2018]
From the Document: "The United States has been developing and deploying ballistic missile defenses (BMD) to defend against enemy missiles continuously since the late 1940s. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the United States deployed a limited nuclear-tipped BMD system to protect a portion of its U.S. land-based nuclear ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) force in order to preserve a strategic deterrent against a Soviet nuclear attack on the Homeland. That system became active in 1975 but shut down in 1976 because of concerns over cost and effectiveness. In the FY1975 budget, the Army began funding research into hit-to-kill or kinetic energy interceptors as an alternative--the type of interceptor technology dominates U.S. BMD systems today."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Hildreth, Steven A.
2018-12-19
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Iran-North Korea-Syria Ballistic Missile and Nuclear Cooperation [July 14, 2016]
From the Summary: "Congress has at times expressed concern regarding ballistic missile and nuclear programs in Iran, North Korea, and Syria. This report focuses primarily on unclassified and declassified U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) assessments over the past two decades. These assessments indicate that [1] there is no evidence that Iran and North Korea have engaged in nuclear-related trade or cooperation with each other, although ballistic missile technology cooperation between the two is significant and meaningful, and [2] Syria has received ballistic missiles and related technology from North Korea and Iran and also engaged in nuclear technology cooperation with North Korea."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.; Hildreth, Steven A.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2016-07-14
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North Korea's Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs [September 6, 2017]
From the Overview: "North Korea is making rapid advancements in its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. Since Kim Jong-un came to power in 2012, North Korea has conducted over 80 ballistic missile test launches. In 2016, North Korea conducted two nuclear weapons tests and 26 ballistic missile flight tests on a variety of platforms. To date in 2017 North Korea has test launched 18 ballistic missiles (with five failures), including two launches in July that many ascribe as ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles). It then conducted a nuclear test on September 3. These tests and official North Korean statements suggest that North Korea is striving to build a credible regional nuclear warfighting capability that might evade regional ballistic missile defenses. Such an approach likely reinforces their deterrent and coercive diplomacy strategy--lending more credibility as it demonstrates capability--but it also raises serious questions about crisis stability and escalation control. Congress may further examine these advances' possible effects on U.S. policy."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Hildreth, Steven A.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2017-09-06
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Iran's Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Programs [August 1, 2018]
"Iran has been acquiring, developing, and testing its ballistic missile capabilities for decades. The United Nations Security Council in 2015 adopted resolution 2231, calling on, but not requiring, Iran to not develop nuclear-capable ballistic missiles and to halt other ballistic missile activity. Nevertheless, Iran continues to invest in developing ballistic missiles and in building an extensive network of facilities, although missile inventory information is scarce. Iran's short- and medium-range ballistic missile tests indicate that Iran is focused on increasing the accuracy of its missiles. Once forecasted to have an intercontinental range ballistic missile before now, Iran has not yet demonstrated this capacity. Furthermore, Iran's space launch program continues to experience significant delays, and may be slowing."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Hildreth, Steven A.; Jabbari, Cyrus A.
2018-08-01
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Missile Defense: The Current Debate [Updated March 23, 2005]
"The United States has pursued missile defenses since the dawn of the missile age shortly after World War II. The development and deployment of missile defenses has not only been elusive, but has proven to be one of the most divisive issues of the past generation. The Bush Administration substantially altered the debate over missile defenses. The Administration requested significant funding increases for missile defense programs, eliminated the distinction between national and theater missile defense, restructured the missile defense program to focus more directly on developing deployment options for a 'layered' capability to intercept missiles aimed at U.S. territory across the whole spectrum of their flight path, adopted a new, untried development and acquisition strategy, announced U.S. withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty, and is deploying an initial national missile defense capability... Critics, however, take issue with assertions that the threat is increasing, citing evidence that the number of nations seeking or possessing nuclear weapons has actually declined over the past twenty years. Moreover, they argue that the technology for effective missile defense remains immature, that deployment is provocative to allies, friends, and adversaries, and it is a budget-buster that reduces the availability of funds to modernize and operate U.S. conventional military forces. They argue especially that some major powers view U.S. missile defense as an attempt at strategic domination and that other, such as China, will expand their missile capabilities in response."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Hildreth, Steven A.
2005-03-23
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Missile Defense: The Current Debate [Updated December 7, 2004]
"The Bush Administration substantially altered the debate over missile defenses.
The Administration requested significant funding increases for missile defense
programs, eliminated the distinction between national and theater missile defense,
restructured the missile defense program to focus more directly on developing
deployment options for a "layered" capability to intercept missiles aimed at U.S.
territory across the whole spectrum of their flight path, adopted a new, untried
development and acquisition strategy, announced U.S. withdrawal from the 1972
Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty, and is deploying an initial national missile defense
capability.
The Administration argued these steps were necessary in response to growing
concerns over the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery,
especially on the part of a handful of potentially hostile states and terrorists. In
addition, they asserted that U.S. deterrence theory has outlived its usefulness and that
conventional or nuclear deterrence could not be relied upon to dissuade unstable
leaders in rogue states."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Hildreth, Steven A.
2004-12-07
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Missile Defense: The Current Debate [Updated July 19, 2005]
"The United States has pursued missile defenses since the dawn of the missile age shortly after World War II. The development and deployment of missile defenses has not only been elusive, but has proven to be one of the most divisive issues of the past generation. The Bush Administration substantially altered the debate over missile defenses. The Administration requested significant funding increases for missile defense programs, eliminated the distinction between national and theater missile defense, restructured the missile defense program to focus more directly on developing deployment options for a 'layered' capability to intercept missiles aimed at U.S. territory across the whole spectrum of their flight path, adopted a new, untried development and acquisition strategy, announced U.S. withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty, and is now deploying an initial national missile defense capability."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Hildreth, Steven A.
2005-07-19
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Missile Defense: The Current Debate [Updated August 21, 2003]
"The development and deployment of missile defenses has not only been elusive, but has proven to be one of the most divisive issues of the past generation. The Bush administration requested significant funding increases for missile defense programs, eliminated the distinction between national and theater missile defense, restructured the missile defense program to focus more directly on developing deployment options for a 'layered' capability to intercept missiles aimed at U.S. territory across the whole spectrum of their flight path, adopted a new, untried development and acquisition strategy, announced U.S. withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty, and is planning to deploy an initial missile defense capability by 2004-2005. The Administration argued these steps were necessary in response to growing concerns over the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Critics argue that the technology for effective missile defense remains immature, that deployment is provocative to allies, friends, and adversaries, and it is a budget-buster that reduces the availability of funds to modernize and operate U.S. conventional military forces. They argue especially that major powers will view U.S. missile defense as an attempt at strategic domination and that some, such as China, will expand its missile capabilities in response. The Bush Administration's plans raise a number of issues, many of which are examined in this report. The issues that will continue to receive attention are 1) ballistic missile proliferation; 2) a new acquisition concept for developing missile defense that does not lend itself readily to oversight, system definition, or cost and effectiveness analysis; and, 3) the deployment of a mid-course missile defense system in Alaska and California."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Hildreth, Steven A.
2003-08-21
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North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States [July 6, 2006]
"This report updates recent information concerning, specifically, North Korea's long-range ballistic missile program. On July 4-5, 2006, North Korea test-launched seven ballistic missiles, including a new Taepo Dong 2 that failed soon after launch. The apparently successful shorter-range missile tests included some combination of SCUDs and No Dongs. As of this update, North Korea is reporting that additional test launches of the shorter-range missiles may be forthcoming. This report will be updated as events warrant. Additional information is provided by CRS Report RL30427, 'Missile Survey: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of Foreign Countries' and CRS Report RL30699, 'Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Missiles: Status and Trends', both by Andrew Feickert, and CRS Issue Brief IB91141, 'North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program', by Larry A. Niksch."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Hildreth, Steven A.
2006-07-06
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North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States [July 25, 2007]
"This report reviews North Korea's ballistic missile program. In May and June 2007, North Korea tested modern, short-range missiles. In July 2007, a Pentagon official said North Korea was about to deploy a new, advanced short-range missile, designated the KN-02, or Toksa (said to be a derivative of the former Soviet SS-21 missile). This report will be updated periodically. Additional information is provided by CRS Report RL33590, 'North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program', by Larry A. Niksch."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Hildreth, Steven A.
2007-07-25
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North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States [February 24, 2009]
"This report reviews North Korea's ballistic missile program. On July 4-5, 2006, North Korea test-launched seven ballistic missiles, including a new Taepo Dong 2 that failed soon after launch. Apparently successful shorter-range missile tests at the time included some combination of SCUDs and No Dongs. In October 2006, North Korea conducted an underground low-yield nuclear test and said it would deploy nuclear weapons on its ballistic missiles, although there is no evidence they are doing so. The Administration will ask the 110th Congress to fund a National Missile Defense (NMD) site in Europe, which some analysts argue is needed because of the threat of North Korean ballistic missiles to Europe. This report will be updated as events warrant. Additional information is provided by CRS Report RL33590, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program, by Larry A. Niksch."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Hildreth, Steven A.
2009-02-24
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North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States [September 20, 2006]
"This report updates recent information concerning, specifically, North Korea's long-range ballistic missile program. On July 4-5, 2006, North Korea test-launched seven ballistic missiles, including a new Taepo Dong 2 that failed soon after launch. The apparently successful shorter-range missile tests included some combination of SCUDs and No Dongs. As of this update, North Korea is reporting that additional test launches of the shorter-range missiles may be forthcoming. This report will be updated as events warrant. Additional information is provided by CRS [Congressional Research Service] Report RL30427, Missile Survey: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of Foreign Countries' and CRS Report RL30699, 'Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Missiles: Status and Trends', both by Andrew Feickert, and CRS Report RL33590, 'North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program', by Larry A. Niksch."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Hildreth, Steven A.
2006-09-20
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North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States [Updated October 18, 2006]
"This report updates recent information concerning, specifically, North Korea's long-range ballistic missile program. On July 4-5, 2006, North Korea test-launched seven ballistic missiles, including a new Taepo Dong 2 that failed soon after launch. Apparently successful shorter-range missile tests included some combination of SCUDs [Soviet-made surface-to-surface missiles] and No Dongs. More recently, North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test and said it would deploy nuclear weapons on their ballistic missiles, although there is no evidence they are doing so. This report will be updated as events warrant."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Hildreth, Steven A.
2006-10-18
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North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States [January 24, 2008]
"This report reviews North Korea's ballistic missile program. In summer 2007, North Korea tested modern, short-range missiles. In July 2007, a Pentagon official said North Korea was about to deploy a new, advanced short-range missile, designated the KN-02, or Toksa (said to be a derivative of the former Soviet SS-21 missile). This report will be updated periodically. Additional information is provided by CRS [Congressional Research Service] Report RL33590, 'North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program', by Larry A. Niksch."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Hildreth, Steven A.
2008-01-24
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Proliferation Control Regimes: Background and Status [October 25, 2012]
"The United States has historically led the international community in establishing regimes intended to limit the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and missiles. The regimes and their member countries use cooperative and coercive measures to achieve nonproliferation and counterproliferation objectives. Multilateral agreements and organizations are supplemented by strong bilateral cooperation among key allies, unilateral political and economic actions, and recourse to military operations should they become necessary. Congress supports the nonproliferation regimes primarily by providing statutory authority and funding for U.S. participation, establishing policy, and mandating punitive actions to help enforce the international standards set by the regimes. The term 'regime' often refers to the entire array of international agreements, multilateral organizations, national laws, regulations, and policies to prevent the spread of dangerous weapons and technologies. The nuclear nonproliferation regime is presently the most extensive, followed by those dealing with chemical and biological weapons, and then by the missile regime. The difficulty of producing nuclear weapons material (highly enriched uranium or plutonium) and the great awareness of nuclear weapons' destructiveness together have been conducive to creating a complex regime with widespread agreement on the priority of nuclear nonproliferation. Chemical weapons are easier to make and rely on readily available precursors, and they are far less destructive. Biological weapons also rely on dual-use technology, and as technology has spread, efforts to build a more extensive control regime have intensified. Finally, there is no international consensus on the danger of missile proliferation to support a nonproliferation treaty or a binding regime with enforcement mechanisms."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Hildreth, Steven A.; Kerr, Paul K.
2012-10-25
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North Korea's Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs [August 2, 2018]
"North Korea has made rapid advancements in its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. Since Kim Jong-un came to power in 2012, North Korea has conducted over 80 ballistic missile test launches. [...] Since the June 2018 Singapore Summit between President Trump and North Korean Leader Kim Jong-Un, reports have surfaced showing the dismantlement of a rocket engine test stand at the Sohae satellite launch complex. Although the test stand could be rebuilt, some observers see this as a positive development toward denuclearization while others have suggested the stand was no longer needed for liquid-fuel engines, as North Korea may be opting instead to test and deploy solid rocket motors for their missiles. There have also been reports that North Korea may now be producing liquid-fueled ICBMs at another facility outside the North Korean capital, but other experts point out developments there are not yet clear. Despite the absence of any missile launch activity or nuclear tests in 2018 to date, previous tests and official North Korean statements suggest that North Korea is striving to build a credible regional nuclear warfighting capability that might evade regional ballistic missile defenses. Such an approach likely reinforces their deterrent and coercive diplomacy strategy--lending more credibility as it demonstrates capability--but it also raises serious questions about crisis stability and escalation control."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Hildreth, Steven A.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2018-08-02
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North Korea's Long-Range Missile Test [July 5, 2017]
From the Document: "On July 4, 2017, North Korea tested a long-range ballistic missile that some observers characterized as having intercontinental range. If so, it represents reaching a milestone years earlier than many analysts predicted. The two-stage missile reportedly flew in a high trajectory for 37 minutes, demonstrating a theoretical range that could include Alaska. It is not known what payload was used, but the actual range using a nuclear warhead would likely be significantly shorter. Although North Korea has not proven the capability to miniaturize a nuclear warhead or develop a reentry vehicle that could survive reentering the atmosphere, the test represented an advance that could threaten the United States. The test was timed to coincide with the July 4th holiday, as well as to respond to last week's summit between President Trump and South Korean President Moon Jae-in. President Trump's tweets following the launch suggested that he would further pressure Beijing to rein in North Korea this week when he meets with China's President Xi Jinping and Russia's President Vladimir Putin at the Group of Twenty (G-20) summit."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Chanlett-Avery, Emma; Rennack, Dianne E.; Hildreth, Steven A.
2017-07-05
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Defense Primer: Ballistic Missile Defense [December 12, 2016]
From the Document: "The United States has been developing and deploying ballistic missile defenses (BMD) to defend against enemy missiles since the late 1940s. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the United States deployed a limited nuclear-tipped BMD system to protect a portion of its U.S. land-based nuclear ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) force in order to preserve a strategic deterrent against a Soviet nuclear attack on the Homeland. That system was dismantled in 1975 because of concerns over cost and effectiveness, and in FY1975 the Army started funding research into hit-to-kill or kinetic energy interceptors as an alternative. In 1983, President Reagan announced an enhanced effort for BMD. Since the start of the Reagan initiative in 1985, BMD has been a key national security interest in Congress. It has appropriated over $200 billion for a broad range of research and development programs and deployment of BMD systems. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is charged with the mission to develop, test, and field an integrated, layered, BMD system (BMDS) to defend the United States, its deployed forces, allies, and friends against all ranges of enemy ballistic missiles in all phases of flight. U.S. statute and BMD policy, however, are not directed at the strategic nuclear deterrent forces of Russia and China."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Hildreth, Steven A.
2016-12-12
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Missile Defense: The Current Debate [Updated December 21, 2005]
"The United States has pursued missile defenses since the dawn of the missile age shortly after World War II. The development and deployment of missile defenses has not only been elusive, but has been one of the most divisive issues of the past generation until recent years. The Bush Administration substantially altered the debate over missile defenses. The Administration requested significant funding increases for missile defense programs, eliminated the distinction between national and theater missile defense, restructured the missile defense program to focus more directly on developing deployment options for a 'layered' capability to intercept missiles aimed at U.S. territory across the whole spectrum of their flight path, adopted a new, untried development and acquisition strategy, announced U.S. withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty, and has deployed an initial national missile defense capability. The Administration argued these steps were necessary in response to growing concerns over the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, especially on the part of a handful of potentially hostile states and terrorists. In addition, they asserted that U.S. deterrence theory has outlived its usefulness and that conventional or nuclear deterrence could not be relied upon to dissuade unstable leaders in rogue states. Critics, however, take issue with assertions that the threat is increasing, citing evidence that the number of nations seeking or possessing nuclear weapons has actually declined over the past 20 years."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Hildreth, Steven A.
2005-12-21
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Iran-North Korea-Syria Ballistic Missile and Nuclear Cooperation [May 11, 2015]
"All three countries discussed in this report have short-range ballistic missiles. Iran and North Korea also have medium-range ballistic missiles; North Korea has intermediate-range ballistic missiles as well. North Korea has tested nuclear weapons on three occasions; Iran and Syria's nuclear programs have raised suspicions that those countries are pursuing nuclear weapons. However, Iran has, according to the IC [intelligence community], halted its nuclear weapons program, and Syria does not appear to have an active nuclear weapons program. Congress has held numerous hearings regarding these countries' nuclear and missile programs. It has also passed legislation providing for sanctions on countries whose entities assist Iran, North Korea, and Syria to obtain weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile delivery systems. For example, the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA, P.L. 106-178) imposes penalties on countries whose companies' exports assist the efforts of Iran, North Korea, and Syria to acquire WMD and missile delivery systems. Congress has also established reporting requirements concerning these countries' missile and nuclear programs. Congress may wish to consider requiring additional reporting from the executive branch on WMD proliferation because the number of unclassified reports to Congress on WMD-related issues has decreased considerably in recent years. This report describes the key elements of a nuclear weapons program; explains the available information regarding cooperation among Iran, North Korea, and Syria on ballistic missiles and nuclear technology; and discusses some specific issues for Congress."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Hildreth, Steven A.
2015-05-11
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Iran-North Korea-Syria Ballistic Missile and Nuclear Cooperation [April 16, 2014]
"All three countries discussed in this report have short-range ballistic missiles. Iran and North Korea also have medium-range ballistic missiles; North Korea has intermediate-range ballistic missiles as well. North Korea has tested nuclear weapons on three occasions; Iran and Syria's nuclear programs have raised suspicions that those countries are pursuing nuclear weapons. However, Iran has, according to the IC [Intelligence Community], halted its nuclear weapons program, and Syria does not appear to have an active nuclear weapons program. Congress has held numerous hearings regarding these countries' nuclear and missile programs. It has also passed legislation providing for sanctions on countries whose entities assist Iran, North Korea, and Syria to obtain weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile delivery systems. For example, the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA, P.L. [Public Law] 106-178) imposes penalties on countries whose companies' exports assist the efforts of Iran, North Korea, and Syria to acquire WMD and missile delivery systems. Congress has also established reporting requirements concerning these countries' missile and nuclear programs. Congress may wish to consider requiring additional reporting from the executive branch on WMD proliferation because the number of unclassified reports to Congress on WMD-related issues has decreased considerably in recent years. This report describes the key elements of a nuclear weapons program; explains the available information regarding cooperation among Iran, North Korea, and Syria on ballistic missiles and nuclear technology; and discusses some specific issues for Congress."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Hildreth, Steven A.
2014-04-16
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Iran-North Korea-Syria Ballistic Missile and Nuclear Cooperation [February 26, 2016]
"This report describes the key elements of a nuclear weapons program; explains the available information regarding cooperation among Iran, North Korea, and Syria on ballistic missiles and nuclear technology; and discusses some specific issues for Congress."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Hildreth, Steven A.
2016-02-26
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Ballistic Missile Defense in the Asia-Pacific Region: Cooperation and Opposition [April 3, 2015]
"The growing number and modernization of ballistic missiles in the Asia-Pacific region poses a security challenge for the United States and its allies and is thus a concern for many in Congress. The United States has made ballistic missile defense (BMD) a central component of protection for forward-deployed U.S. forces and extended deterrence for allied security. The configuration of sensors, command-and-control centers, and BMD assets in the region has slowly evolved with contributions from treaty allies, primarily Japan, Australia, and South Korea. Observers believe that North Korea has an arsenal of hundreds of short-range ballistic missiles and likely dozens of medium-range Nodong missiles; the extended-range Nodongs are considered capable of reaching Japan and U.S. bases there. Longer-range North Korean missiles appear to be under development but remain unreliable, with only one successful test out of five in the past 15 years. The U.S. intelligence community has not yet concluded that North Korea can build nuclear warheads small enough to put on ballistic missiles, but there is significant debate among experts on this question."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Rinehart, Ian E.; Hildreth, Steven A.; Lawrence, Susan V.
2015-04-03
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National Security Space Launch at a Crossroads [May 13, 2016]
"The United States is in the midst of making significant changes in how best to pursue an acquisition strategy that would ensure continued access to space for national security missions. The current strategy for the EELV (Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle) program dates from the 1990s and has since been revised a few times. The program has been dogged by perennial concerns over cost and competition. Those same concerns are a major impetus for change today." The following report discusses the past, present, and future of the Evolved Expandable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program and the positions of the Department of Defense and the United Sates Air Force in regards to the program.
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Hildreth, Steven A.
2016-05-13
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Ballistic Missile Defense in the Asia-Pacific Region: Cooperation and Opposition [June 24, 2013]
"This report presents background information and discusses potential issues for Congress relating to U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) efforts in the Asia-Pacific region. These efforts pose several potential policy, funding, and oversight issues. Decisions that Congress makes on these issues could affect U.S. defense funding requirements and capabilities, and U.S. relations with countries in the Asia Pacific region, including China, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, and Australia. This report focuses on U.S. BMD efforts specific to the Asia-Pacific area. Other CRS [Congressional Research Service] reports cover U.S. BMD efforts elsewhere and issues other than BMD affecting U.S. relations with countries in the Asia-Pacific region."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Rinehart, Ian E.; Hildreth, Steven A.; Lawrence, Susan V.
2013-06-24
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Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe [January 21, 2009]
"Successive U.S. governments have urged the creation of an anti-missile system to protect against long-range ballistic missile threats from adversary states. The Bush Administration believed that North Korea and Iran represent strategic threats, and questioned whether they could be deterred by conventional means. The Bush Administration's position on this issue remained unchanged, even after the intelligence community assessed that the Iranian nuclear weapons program halted in 2003. The Bush Administration built long-range missile defense bases in Alaska and California to protect against adversary missile threats, especially North Korea. Although the system has been tested, most agree that further testing is necessary. The Bush Administration proposed deploying a ground-based mid-course defense (GMD) element of the larger Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) in Europe to defend against an Iranian missile threat. The system would include 10 interceptors in Poland, a radar in the Czech Republic, and another radar deployed in a country closer to Iran, all to be completed by 2013 at a reported cost of at least $4 billion. The proposed U.S. system has encountered resistance in some European countries and beyond. Critics in Poland and the Czech Republic assert that neither country currently faces a notable threat from Iran, but that if American GMD facilities were installed, both countries might be targeted by missiles from rogue states--and possibly from Russia. The Bush Administration signed agreements with both countries permitting GMD facilities to be stationed on their territory; however, the two countries' parliaments decided to wait to ratify the accords until after the Obama Administration clarified its intentions on missile defense policy. NATO has deliberated long-range missile defense, and has taken actions that many interpreted as an endorsement of the U.S. GMD system."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Hildreth, Steven A.; Ek, Carl
2009-01-21
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Threats to U.S. National Security Interests in Space: Orbital Debris Mitigation and Removal [January 8, 2014]
"After decades of activities in space, Earth's orbit is littered with man-made objects that no longer serve a useful purpose. This includes roughly 22,000 objects larger than the size of a softball and hundreds of thousands of smaller fragments. This population of space debris potentially threatens U.S. national security interests in space, both governmental (military, intelligence, and civil) and commercial. Congress has broadly supported the full-range of these national security interests and has a vested concern in ensuring a strong and continued U.S. presence in space.After decades of activities in space, Earth's orbit is littered with man-made objects that no longer serve a useful purpose. This includes roughly 22,000 objects larger than the size of a softball and
hundreds of thousands of smaller fragments. This population of space debris potentially threatens U.S. national security interests in space, both governmental (military, intelligence, and civil) and commercial. Congress has broadly supported the full-range of these national security interests and has a vested concern in ensuring a strong and continued U.S. presence in space. [...] Congress has an opportunity to explore these issues through hearings, for instance with major stakeholders in the U.S. national security and civil space communities, and the commercial sector. Efforts to find international agreement on mitigation may involve congressional prerogatives on advice and consent, and any program to pursue remediation will likely entail appropriations support from Congress."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Hildreth, Steven A.; Arnold, Allison
2014-01-08
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Current Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Issues [February 21, 2017]
"Little detail is currently available about the Trump Administration's agenda for missile defense and whether current policy or program direction might change. The Administration has thus far said only that it will 'develop a state-of-the-art missile defense system to protect against missile-based system attacks from states like Iran and North Korea.' A detailed defense budget will not be presented until later this spring, so there is uncertainty as to what precisely the BMD [ballistic missile defense] budget and program will look like. Ongoing BMD issues of interest to Congress are summarized [in this report]."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Hildreth, Steven A.
2017-02-21
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Proliferation Control Regimes: Background and Status [October 18, 2010]
"Weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially in the hands of radical states and terrorists, represent a major threat to U.S. national security interests. Multilateral regimes were established to restrict trade in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and missile technologies, and to monitor their civil applications. Congress may consider the efficacy of these regimes in considering the potential renewal of the Export Administration Act, as well as other proliferationspecific legislation in the 111th Congress. This report provides background and current status information on the regimes. The nuclear nonproliferation regime encompasses several treaties, extensive multilateral and bilateral diplomatic agreements, multilateral organizations and domestic agencies, and the domestic laws of participating countries. Since the dawn of the nuclear age, U.S. leadership has been crucial in developing the regime. While there is almost universal international agreement opposing the further spread of nuclear weapons, several challenges to the regime have arisen in recent years: India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in 1998, North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003 and tested a nuclear explosive device in 2006 and 2009, Libya gave up a clandestine nuclear weapons program in 2004, and Iran was found to be in non-compliance with its treaty obligations in 2005. The discovery of the nuclear black market network run by A.Q. Khan spurred new thinking about how to strengthen the regime, including greater restrictions on sensitive technology. However, the extension of civil nuclear cooperation by the United States and other countries to India, a non-party to the NPT with nuclear weapons, has raised questions about what benefits still exist for non-nuclear-weapons states that remain in the treaty regime."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Hildreth, Steven A.
2010-10-18
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Proliferation Control Regimes: Background and Status [Updated January 31, 2008]
"Weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially in the hands of radical states and terrorists, represent a major threat to U.S. national security interests. Multilateral regimes were established to restrict trade in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and missile technologies, and to monitor their civil applications. Congress may consider the efficacy of these regimes in considering the potential renewal of the Export Administration Act, as well as other proliferation-specific legislation in the 110th Congress. This report provides background and current status information on the regimes. The nuclear nonproliferation regime encompasses several treaties, extensive multilateral and bilateral diplomatic agreements, multilateral organizations and domestic agencies, and the domestic laws of participating countries. Since the dawn of the nuclear age, U.S. leadership has been crucial in developing the regime. [...]. This report is updated annually."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Hildreth, Steven A.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Bowman, Steve
2008-01-31
