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Overview of U.S. Domestic Response to Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) [Updated March 2, 2020]
From the Background: "This report discusses selected actions taken by the U.S. federal government to quell the introduction and spread of COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] in the United States. The President, the HHS [Health and Human Services] Secretary, and other federal officials have taken several specific actions to address this threat. While some of these actions are based in generally applicable authorities, others may be contingent upon the Secretary or another federal official making a determination or declaration, specific to that action, regarding the existence of a public health emergency or threat. Key actions and their legal basis are discussed in this report."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Lister, Sarah A.; Sekar, Kavya; Dabrowska, Agata . . .
2020-03-02
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Overview of U.S. Domestic Response to the 2019 Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV) [February 10, 2020]
From the Background: "This report discusses selected actions taken by the federal government to quell the introduction and spread of 2019-nCoV [2019 Novel Coronavirus] in the United States. The HHS [U.S. Department of Health and Human Services] Secretary has taken several specific actions to address the 2019-nCoV threat. While some of these actions are based in generally applicable authorities of the Secretary, other authorities may be contingent upon the Secretary or another federal official making a determination or declaration, specific to that authority, regarding the existence of a public health emergency or threat. Each of the actions taken by the Secretary, its statutory basis, and any distinct declarations and determinations supporting the action is presented in this report."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Lister, Sarah A.; Sekar, Kavya; Dabrowska, Agata . . .
2020-02-10
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COVID-19: Global Implications and Responses [Updated March 5, 2020]
From the Overview: "As of March 4, 2020, the novel coronavirus that began sickening patients in Wuhan, China, in early December 2019 had spread to over 75 countries, including the United States. Daily new cases and deaths related to the virus outside China now exceed those reported in China, where the epidemic appears to be coming under control. The World Health Organization (WHO) has named the new virus 'severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2' (SARS-CoV-2) and the disease that it causes 'coronavirus disease 2019' (COVID-19). WHO has declared the outbreak a Public Health Emergency of International Concern and raised its global risk assessment to 'Very High.' It has refrained from labeling the outbreak a 'pandemic,' however. Doing so, WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus has said, could 'signal that we can no longer contain the virus, which is not true.' On March 5, Tedros told countries, 'This is not the time to give up.' Rather, 'This is a time for pulling out all the stops.'"
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Tharakan, Sara M.; Gottron, Frank; Lawrence, Susan V. . . .
2020-03-05
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Federal Research and Development Funding: FY2017 [June 24, 2016]
"President Obama's budget request for FY2017 includes $152.333 billion for research and development (R&D), an increase of $6.195 billion (4.2%) over the estimated FY2016 enacted R&D funding level of $146.138 billion. The request represents the President's R&D priorities; Congress may opt to agree with part or all of the request, or it may express different priorities through the appropriations process. In particular, Congress will play a central role in determining the growth rate and allocation of the federal R&D investment in a period of intense pressure on discretionary spending. Budget caps may limit overall R&D funding and may require movement of resources across disciplines, programs, or agencies to address priorities. Funding for R&D is concentrated in a few departments and agencies. Under President Obama's FY2017 budget request, seven federal agencies would receive 95.6% of total federal R&D funding, with the Department of Defense (47.8%) and the Department of Health and Human Services (21.5%) accounting for nearly 70% of all federal R&D funding. In dollars, the largest increases in agency R&D funding in the President's request would go to the Department of Energy (up $2.755 billion, 19.1%), the Department of Defense (up $1.953 billion, 2.8%), and the Department of Health and Human Services (up $772 million, 2.4%). The President's FY2017 request continues support for a number of multiagency R&D initiatives: the National Nanotechnology Initiative, Networking and Information Technology Research and Development program, U.S. Global Change Research Program, Brain Research through Advancing Innovative Neurotechnologies (BRAIN) initiative, Precision Medicine Initiative, Cancer Moonshot, Materials Genome Initiative, National Robotics Initiative, and National Network for Manufacturing Innovation."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Sargent, John F.; Esworthy, Robert; Gottron, Frank . . .
2016-06-24
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Project BioShield: Legislative History and Side-by-Side Comparison of H.R. 2122, S. 15, and S. 1504 [August 27, 2004]
From the Summary: "Few effective countermeasures currently exist to deal with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear terror agents. In early 2003, the Bush administration proposed Project BioShield to stimulate the development of such countermeasures and to procure them for the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Congress considered three bills that incorporated much of the administration's proposal: S. 15 (Gregg), H.R. 2122 (Tauzin), and S. 1504 (Gregg). H.R. 2122 passed the House on July 16, 2003. S. 15 passed the Senate on May 25, 2004 in an amended form similar to H.R. 2122. This version of S. 15 passed the House on July 14, 2004. President Bush signed S. 15 into law as the Project BioShield Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-276) on July 21, 2004. Although many of the details of Project BioShield changed during Congressional consideration, all the proposals shared similar key provisions. Each bill would have provided expedited hiring, procurement, and grant awarding procedures for bioterrorism-related products and services. Each bill would have provided a market guarantee for countermeasure producers by allowing the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to contract to procure countermeasures still in development. Thus, several years before a company plans to be able to deliver a countermeasure, the company would have been assured that if they successfully develop the countermeasure the government is obligated to purchase a set amount of it at a set price. Each bill would have authorized the HHS Secretary to allow the emergency use of countermeasures that lack Food and Drug Administration approval. Congress changed many important aspects of the Administration's proposal."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Gottron, Frank
2004-08-27
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U.S. Postal Service Response to the Threat of Bioterrorism through the Mail [February 11, 2002]
"The deliberate mailing of 'Bacillus anthracis' spores through the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) has caused five deaths, twenty-two cases of anthrax, and massive disruptions to Congress and the USPS. Both the public and private sector are examining an array of methods to limit the risk of future attacks. Potential solutions include improving mail handling procedures, changing the USPS anonymous mailing policy, installing bio/chem agent detectors, and sterilizing the mail. For the USPS these decisions are complicated by its precarious financial state. Some proposed solutions may require an increase in postage rates and/or decreased levels of service. Each of these may further depress postal revenues and threaten the continued existence of the USPS as an independent, self-supporting entity. Policymakers will need to decide if the USPS must ensure the safety of mail recipients. At this point it is not clear if this is practical or even possible with existing technology. It may be that it is practical to protect only the mail addressed to the most likely targets of future attacks. Some of the measures that the USPS has taken or is planning to take to protect postal workers and mail recipients are common sense alterations to the mail processing procedures. Additionally, the USPS is making gloves, masks, and educational materials available to all postal workers. More controversial and potentially more costly are plans to sterilize the mail. To implement irradiation procedures nationwide could cost between three and five billion dollars with up to another billion dollars each year in operating costs. Policymakers will need to balance concerns for safety, cost, and practicality while to deciding how to alter the practices of the USPS."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Gottron, Frank
2002-02-11
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Science and Technology Issues in the 117th Congress [May 5, 2021]
From the Summary: "The federal government supports scientific and technological advancement directly by funding and performing research and development, and indirectly by creating and maintaining policies that encourage private sector efforts. Additionally, the federal government regulates many aspects of S&T [science and technology] activities. This report briefly outlines a key set of science and technology policy issues that may come before the 117th Congress. Many of these issues carry over from previous Congresses, and represent areas of continuing Member interest. [...] S&T-related issues that may come before the 117th Congress are grouped into 10 categories. [1] Overarching S&T Policy Issues, [2] Agriculture, [3] Biotechnology and Biomedical Research and Development, [4] Climate Change and Water, [5] Defense, [6] Energy, [7] Homeland Security, [8] Information Technology, [9] Physical and Material Sciences, and [10] Space. Each of these categories includes concise analysis of multiple policy issues. The material presented in this report should be viewed as illustrative rather than comprehensive. Each section identifies CRS [Congressional Research Service] reports, when available, and the appropriate CRS experts to contact for further information and analysis."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Gottron, Frank; Humphreys, Brian E.; Bodie, Agata . . .
2021-05-05
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National Bio-and Agro-Defense Facility: Issues for Congress [Updated May 19, 2008]
This CRS report talks about "The National Bio-and Agro-Defense Facility [NABF]," this is a facility being built by the Department of Homeland Security [DHS] and it would be a place where "scientific and medical research on plant and animal diseases" could be done. Also, this research "may lead to the discovery and development of new diagnostic and countermeasures, reducing the risk of a successful terrorist attack." More specifically, "this report outlines current progress towards establishment of the NBAF, presents current and projected funding levels and timelines, and describes policy issues of potential interest to Congress, such as agency coordination, possession of viruses, construction timelines, disposition of PIADC [Plum Island Animal Disease Center], and community safety concerns." The report also provides the following background information in regards to the program: "the agricultural and food infrastructure of the United States is potentially susceptible to terrorist attack using biological pathogens. In addition to the impacts of such an attack on the economy, some animal diseases could potentially be transmitted to humans. These diseases are known as zoonotic diseases […] To safeguard the United States against animal disease, Congress has appropriated funds to the U.S. Department of Agriculture [USDA] to engage in research at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center [PIADC], off the coast of New York, on animal diseases not native to the United States. When creating the Department of Homeland Security [DHS] in 2003, Congress transferred the PIADC facility from USDA to DHS. Both USDA and DHS, in cooperation with USDA, conduct foreign animal disease research at PIADC, but PIADC has been identified as outdated and too limited to continue as the primary facility for this research."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank; Monke, James
2008-05-19
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National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility: Issues for Congress [Updated June 30, 2008]
This Congressional Research Service (CRS) report discusses the directive for the development of agricultural "biocontainment laboratories for research and development of diagnostic capabilities and medical countermeasures for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases. [Further,] To safeguard the United States against the impacts of naturally occurring and intentional animal disease outbreaks, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) engages in animal disease research, including research into highly contagious animal pathogens and animal diseases not native to the United States. Such research activities have historically been performed at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC), located on an island near Long Island, NY. When creating the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003, Congress transferred the operation of the PIADC facility from USDA to DHS, though USDA still maintains an active research program at PIADC. The DHS, in cooperation with USDA, has established its own research and development program at PIADC. As the federal government undertakes new efforts in human biodefense and defense against agroterrorism, DHS has identified the PIADC facility as "reaching the end of its life cycle" and lacking critical capabilities to continue as the primary facility performing this research. The Department of Homeland Security has announced that, to meet the obligations of HSPD-9, it will establish a new facility, the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF). This facility would have high-containment laboratories able to hold the pathogens currently under investigation at PIADC as well as other pathogens of interest. The plans announced by DHS to establish the NBAF have raised congressional and public concerns regarding its safety and security and policy questions about coordination between DHS and USDA regarding the research to be conducted at NBAF. This report outlines current progress towards establishment of the NBAF, presents current and projected funding levels and timelines, and describes policy issues of potential interest to Congress, such as agency coordination, possession of viruses, construction timelines, disposition of PIADC, and community safety concerns."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank; Monke, James
2008-06-30
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National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility: Issues for Congress [Updated April 3, 2008]
"The agricultural and food infrastructure of the United States is potentially susceptible to terrorist attack using biological pathogens. In addition to the impacts of such an attack on the economy, some animal diseases could potentially be transmitted to humans. (These diseases are known as zoonotic diseases.) Scientific and medical research on plant and animal diseases may lead to the discovery and development of new diagnostics and countermeasures, reducing the risk and impact of a successful terrorist attack. The plans announced by DHS to establish the NBAF have raised several issues. Community concerns about safety and security, previously raised about PIADC and other laboratories being built to study dangerous pathogens, are also being raised about the NBAF. Coordination between DHS and USDA, as well as prioritization and investment in agricultural biodefense may be reassessed once more high containment laboratory space becomes available. By law, research on live foot and mouth disease (FMD) virus is not permitted on the U.S. mainland. This policy would need to be changed before DHS could conduct FMD research at NBAF if it were sited on the U.S. mainland. Bills (H.R. 1717, H.R. 2419, and the Senate amendment to H.R. 2419) modifying this policy are being considered by in the 110th Congress."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank; Monke, James
2008-04-03
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National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility: Issues for Congress [Updated November 15, 2007]
"The agricultural and food infrastructure of the United States is potentially susceptible to terrorist attack using biological pathogens. In addition to the effects of such an attack on the economy, some animal diseases could potentially be transmitted to humans. These diseases are known as zoonotic diseases. Scientific and medical research on plant and animal diseases may lead to the discovery and development of new diagnostics and countermeasures, reducing the risk and effects of a successful terrorist attack. [...]. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 tasks the Secretaries of Agriculture and Homeland Security to develop a plan to provide safe, secure, and state-of-the-art agriculture biocontainment laboratories for research and development of diagnostic capabilities and medical countermeasures for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases. To partially meet these obligations, DHS has requested Congress to appropriate funds to construct a new facility, the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF). This facility would house high-containment laboratories able to handle the pathogens currently under investigation at PIADC, as well as other pathogens of interest. Six candidate sites have been identified, one of which is Plum Island. The DHS plans to select the site in 2009 and open NBAF in 2015. The final construction cost will depend on the site location and has been estimated to range between $648 million and $939 million, significantly exceeding 2005 baseline projections. Additional expenses, such as equipping the new facility, relocating existing personnel and programs, and preparing the PIADC facility for disposition, may exceed an additional $100 million."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Gottron, Frank; Shea, Dana A.; Monke, James
2007-11-15
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National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility: Issues for Congress [Updated September 10, 2007]
"The agricultural and food infrastructure of the United States is potentially susceptible to terrorist attack using biological pathogens. In addition to the impacts of such an attack on the economy, some animal diseases could potentially be transmitted to humans. (These diseases are known as zoonotic diseases.) Scientific and medical research on plant and animal diseases may lead to the discovery and development of new diagnostics and countermeasures, reducing the risk and impact of a successful terrorist attack. To safeguard the United States against animal disease, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) engages in foreign animal disease research at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC). With the formation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003, the PIADC facility was transferred from USDA to DHS, though USDA continues its research program at the facility. The DHS has identified the PIADC facility as too old and limited to continue to be the primary facility performing this research. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 tasks the Secretaries of Agriculture and Homeland Security to develop a plan to provide safe, secure, and state-of-the-art agriculture biocontainment laboratories for research and development of diagnostic capabilities and medical countermeasures for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases. To meet these obligations, DHS has announced plans to construct a new facility, the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF). […] The final construction costs would depend on the site location and actual construction time lines, but are projected to exceed $460 million."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank; Monke, James
2007-09-10
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National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility: Issues for Congress [September 4, 2007]
"The agricultural and food infrastructure of the United States is potentially susceptible to terrorist attack using biological pathogens. In addition to the impacts of such an attack on the economy, some animal diseases could potentially be transmitted to humans. (These diseases are known as zoonotic diseases.) Scientific and medical research on plant and animal diseases may lead to the discovery and development of new diagnostics and countermeasures, reducing the risk and impact of a successful terrorist attack."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank; Monke, James
2007-09-04
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National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility: Issues for Congress [December 14, 2009]
"The agricultural and food infrastructure of the United States may be susceptible to terrorist attack using biological pathogens. In addition to the economic effects of such an attack, some animal pathogens could cause illness in humans. Diseases that can spread from animals to people are known as zoonotic diseases. Scientific and medical research on plant and animal diseases may lead to the discovery and development of new diagnostics and countermeasures, reducing the risk and effects of a successful terrorist attack. To safeguard the United States against the introduction of non-native animal disease, Congress has appropriated funds to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Some of this work is performed at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC), located off the coast of New York. Congress created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003 and transferred ownership and operation of PIADC from USDA to DHS. The USDA and DHS cooperate to conduct foreign animal disease research at PIADC, but they have identified PIADC as outdated and too limited to continue as the primary facility for this research."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Gottron, Frank; Shea, Dana A.; Monke, James
2009-12-14
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National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility: Issues for Congress [Updated November 25, 2008]
"The agricultural and food infrastructure of the United States is potentially susceptible to terrorist attack using biological pathogens. In addition to the effects of such an attack on the economy, some animal diseases could potentially be transmitted to humans. These diseases are known as zoonotic diseases. Scientific and medical research on plant and animal diseases may lead to the discovery and development of new diagnostics and countermeasures, reducing the risk and effects of a successful terrorist attack. [...]. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 tasks the Secretaries of Agriculture and Homeland Security to develop a plan to provide safe, secure, and state-of-the-art agriculture biocontainment laboratories for research and development of diagnostic capabilities and medical countermeasures for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases. To partially meet these obligations, DHS has requested Congress to appropriate funds to construct a new facility, the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF). This facility would house high-containment laboratories able to handle the pathogens currently under investigation at PIADC, as well as other pathogens of interest. Six candidate sites have been identified, one of which is Plum Island. The DHS plans to select the site in 2009 and open NBAF in 2015. The final construction cost will depend on the site location and has been estimated to range between $648 million and $939 million, significantly exceeding 2005 baseline projections. Additional expenses, such as equipping the new facility, relocating existing personnel and programs, and preparing the PIADC facility for disposition, may exceed an additional $100 million."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Gottron, Frank; Shea, Dana A.; Monke, James
2008-11-25
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COVID-19: Global Implications and Responses [Updated May 8, 2020]
From the Overview: "Congressional interest in the global implications of pandemics and the novel coronavirus pandemic is high, with over 50 pieces of related legislation introduced in the 116th Congress to date (see CRS Report R46319, 'Novel Coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19): Q&A on Global Implications and Responses').The virus, which is believed to have started in Wuhan, China, in late 2019, is now named 'severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2' (SARSCoV-2) and is known by the disease it causes, 'coronavirus disease 2019' (COVID-19). The virus has spread across the globe and is now concentrated in the United States and Europe. As of May 7, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) estimated that 3.6 million people had contracted the disease, with over 250,000 deaths. WHO declared the outbreak a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) on January 30 and labeled it a 'pandemic' on March 11."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Tharakan, Sara M.; Salaam-Blyther, Tiaji; Gottron, Frank . . .
2020-05-08
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National Stockpiles: Background and Issues for Congress [June 15, 2020]
From the Document: "The United States maintains several distinct stockpiles of supplies, equipment, and raw materials that may be used for a national emergency, military operation, or other natural disaster or manmade event where commercial supply and distribution are unavailable.Some of these stockpiles were established by Congress in law, while others began as policy-driven initiatives of federal departments and agencies.In general, there are two types of stockpiles that the U.S. government owns and manages: (1) those intended to support a subset of the general public in an emergency (i.e., public stockpiles) and (2) those intended to support the national defense during a war or other type of military operation (i.e., defense stockpiles). Typically, a single federal department (including military departments)is responsible for managing each stockpile. Within departments, stockpiles are often supported by one or more logistics organizations that provide procurement, storage, transportation, disposal, and/or other technical services to stockpile managers. The degree to which stockpile managers store certain goods,instead of relying on pre-negotiated or rapidly executed contracts to deliver goods in an emergency, varies. Stockpile managers often consider several factors when making a decision to stockpile, including:statutory requirements, forecasted commercial availability of a product/material, anticipated loss of suppliers in a certain geographic area during an emergency, forecasted demand during peacetime and emergencies, the rareness or criticality of a material, and a department's overall stockpiling strategy."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Herrera, G. James; Gottron, Frank
2020-06-15
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COVID-19 and Domestic PPE Production and Distribution: Issues and Policy Options [December 7, 2020]
From the Summary: "The novel Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) and its rapid emergence as a pandemic have highlighted issues relating to the production and distribution of personal protective equipment (PPE). PPE refers to worn articles or equipment that help minimize exposure to various hazards, including infectious pathogens. Given the role that PPE plays in mitigating the spread and reducing the impacts of COVID-19, PPE demand has spiked both globally and domestically while supply has been undercut by both rapid consumption as well as supply chain disruptions. According to multiple federal agencies, including the Government Accountability Office, the Food and Drug Administration, and various independent organizations, PPE continues to be in short supply, which has led to broad congressional and public interest in PPE production and distribution issues. The availability of effective PPE is critical to the ongoing pandemic response, but also has broader public health, emergency preparedness, and national security implications. This report considers aspects of domestic production and distribution of PPE in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. Specifically, the report considers (1) the availability of PPE supplies, including an assessment of PPE demand related to the COVID-19 pandemic; (2) federal actions and activities undertaken to increase PPE supplies in response to the pandemic, organized by executive agency and program; and (3) other policy options under consideration concerning PPE production and distribution, also organized by executive agency and program."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cecire, Michael H.; Bodie, Agata; Gottron, Frank . . .
2020-12-07
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DHS Appropriations FY2017: Research and Development, Training, and Services [October 20, 2016]
"This report is part of a suite of reports that discuss appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for FY2017. It specifically discusses appropriations for the components of DHS included in the fourth title of the homeland security appropriations bill--in past years, this has comprised U.S. Citizenship and Naturalization Services, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, the Science and Technology Directorate, and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). In FY2017, the Administration proposed moving the Domestic Nuclear Detection office into a new Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives Office, along with several other parts of DHS. Congress has labeled this title of the bill in recent years as 'Research and Development, Training, and Services.' The report provides an overview of the Administration's FY2017 request for these components, and the appropriations proposed by the Senate and House appropriations committees in response. Rather than limiting the scope of its review to the fourth title of the bills, the report includes information on provisions throughout the bills and report that directly affect these components. [...] On September 29, 2016, the President signed into law P.L. 114-223, which contained a continuing resolution that funds the government at the same rate of operations as FY2016, minus 0.496% through December 9, 2017. For details on the continuing resolution and its impact on DHS, see CRS [Congressional Research Service] Report R44621, Department of Homeland Security Appropriations: FY2017, which also includes additional information on the broader subject of FY2017 funding for DHS as well as links to analytical overviews and details regarding components in other titles."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Painter, William L.; Kandel, William; Morgan, Daniel (Daniel L.) . . .
2016-10-20
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Project BioShield: Purposes and Authorities [May 4, 2009]
"Following the terrorist attacks of 2001, the federal government determined that it would need additional medical countermeasures (e.g., diagnostic tests, drugs, vaccines, and other treatments) to respond to an attack using chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) agents. The paucity of CBRN agent countermeasures is attributed to the lack of a significant commercial market. Because these diseases and conditions occur infrequently, little economic incentive exists to invest the millions of dollars required to bring treatments to market.[…] To encourage the development of new CBRN countermeasures, President Bush proposed Project BioShield in his 2003 State of the Union address. The 108th Congress considered this proposal and passed the Project BioShield Act of 2004 (P.L. [Public Law] 108-276, signed into law July 21, 2004). This act has three main provisions. It provides the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) expedited procedures for CBRN terrorism-related spending including procuring products, hiring experts, and awarding research grants. The act creates a government-market guarantee by allowing the HHS Secretary to obligate funds to purchase countermeasures while they still have several more years of development. However, companies only receive payment when development is complete and the product is delivered. The act also authorizes the HHS Secretary to temporarily allow the emergency use of countermeasures that lack Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Gottron, Frank
2009-05-04
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Science and Technology Issues in the 115th Congress [March 14, 2017]
"Science and technology (S&T) have a pervasive influence over a wide range of issues confronting the nation. Public and private research and development spur scientific and technological advancement. Such advances can drive economic growth, help address national priorities, and improve health and quality of life. The constantly changing nature and ubiquity of science and technology frequently create public policy issues of congressional interest. The federal government supports scientific and technological advancement directly by funding and performing research and development and indirectly by creating and maintaining policies that encourage private sector efforts. Additionally, the federal government establishes and enforces regulatory frameworks governing many aspects of S&T activities. This report briefly outlines an array of science and technology policy issues that may come before the 115th Congress. Given the rapid pace of S&T advancement and its importance in many diverse public policy issues, S&T-related issues not discussed in this report may come before the 115th Congress."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Gottron, Frank
2017-03-14
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Science and Technology Policy: Issues for the 109th Congress [Updated February 3, 2006]
"Science and technology have a pervasive influence over a wide range of issues confronting the nation. Decisions on how much federal funding to invest in research and development (R&D), and determining what programs have the highest priority, for example, may have implications for homeland security, new high technology industries, government/private sector cooperation in R&D, and myriad other areas. This report indicates the sweep of science and technology in many public policy issues, although it cannot provide a comprehensive examination of every science or technology issue which may be of interest to Congress. In some areas, such as global climate change and stem cell research, the importance of science and technology is explicit and in the forefront of the policy debate. In others, such as patent protection and telecommunications reform, science and technology may not be as explicit, but are important drivers affecting how policy makers may make decisions. This report also addresses key issues that directly affect, or are affected by, science and technology. Other mechanisms which may indirectly impact science and technology - such as tax, antitrust, and trade policies - are outside the scope of this report."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Gottron, Frank
2006-02-03
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Science and Technology Issues in the 113th Congress [June 20, 2013]
"Science and technology [S&T] have a pervasive influence over a wide range of issues confronting the nation. Public and private research and development spurs scientific and technological advancement. Such advances can drive economic growth, help address national priorities, and improve health and quality of life. The constantly changing nature and ubiquity of science and technology frequently creates public policy issues of congressional interest. The federal government supports scientific and technological advancement by directly funding research and development and indirectly by creating and maintaining policies that encourage private sector efforts. Additionally, the federal government establishes and enforces regulatory frameworks governing many aspects of S&T activities. This report briefly outlines an array of science and technology policy issues that may come before the 113th Congress. Given the ubiquity of science and technology and its constantly evolving nature, some science and technology related-issues not discussed in this report may come before the 113th Congress."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Gottron, Frank
2013-06-20
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Science and Technology Issues in the 113th Congress [December 27, 2013]
"Science and technology (S&T) have a pervasive influence over a wide range of issues confronting the nation. Public and private research and development spurs scientific and technological advancement. Such advances can drive economic growth, help address national priorities, and improve health and quality of life. The constantly changing nature and ubiquity of science and technology frequently create public policy issues of congressional interest. The federal government supports scientific and technological advancement by directly funding research and development and indirectly by creating and maintaining policies that encourage private sector efforts. Additionally, the federal government establishes and enforces regulatory frameworks governing many aspects of S&T activities. This report briefly outlines an array of science and technology policy issues that may come before the 113th Congress. Given the ubiquity of science and technology and its constantly evolving nature, some science and technology related-issues not discussed in this report may come before the 113th Congress."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Gottron, Frank
2013-12-27
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Science and Technology Issues in the 116th Congress [Updated February 6, 2019]
From the Document, "Science and technology (S&T) play an important role in our society. Advances in science and technology can help drive economic growth and meet national priorities in public health, environmental protection, agricultural productivity, defense, and many other areas.' [...] This report serves as a brief introduction to many of the science and technology policy issues that may come before the 116th Congress. Each issue section provides background information and outlines selected policy issues that may be considered. Each issue includes a heading entitled 'For Further Information' that provides the author's name and the titles of relevant CRS [Congressional Research Service] reports containing more detailed policy analysis and information. Cited reports are current as of their individual publication dates, but may not reflect developments that have occurred since their publication."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Gottron, Frank
2019-02-06
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Ricin: Technical Background and Potential Role in Terrorism [December 20, 2005]
"On February 2, 2004, the deadly toxin ricin was detected in the Dirksen Senate Office Building. Ricin, derived from castor beans, has been identified as a potential bioweapon. Ricin is extremely toxic by ingestion, inhalation, and injection. No treatment or prophylaxis currently exist, though research into new therapies and vaccines against ricin exposure continues. Additionally, research to improve ricin detectors is ongoing. Although the potential of ricin as a military weapon was investigated, it has predominantly been used in small quantities against specific individuals. Most experts believe that ricin would be difficult to use as a weapon of mass destruction, but do not discount its potential as a weapon of terror. Ricin is on the Select Agent list, and its possession, transfer, or use is regulated under domestic and international law. This report will not be updated."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Gottron, Frank; Shea, Dana A.
2005-12-20
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Ricin: Technical Background and Potential Role in Terrorism [December 21, 2010]
"On December 20, 2010, CBS News reported that the Department of Homeland Security had uncovered a credible threat of attacks using poisons, such as ricin, in salad bars and buffets. Ricin, a deadly toxin derived from castor beans, has been identified as a potential bioweapon. Ricin is extremely toxic by ingestion, inhalation, and injection. No treatment or prophylaxis currently exists, though research into new therapies and vaccines against ricin exposure continues. Additionally, research to improve ricin detection is ongoing. Although ricin's potential use as a military weapon was investigated, its predominant use has been in small quantities against specific individuals. Most experts believe that ricin would be difficult to use as a weapon of mass destruction, but do not discount its potential as a weapon of terror. Ricin is on the Select Agent list, and its possession, transfer, or use is regulated under domestic and international law. This report will not be updated."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank
2010-12-21
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Ricin: Technical Background and Potential Role in Terrorism [April 18, 2013]
"In April 2013 envelopes sent to President Obama and a U.S. Senator tested preliminarily positive for ricin, a deadly toxin derived from castor beans. Ricin has been identified as a potential bioweapon. Ricin is extremely toxic by ingestion, inhalation, and injection. No treatment or prophylaxis currently exists, though research into new therapies and vaccines against ricin exposure continues. Additionally, research to improve ricin detection is ongoing. Although governments have investigated ricin's potential use as a military weapon, individuals have used ricin in small quantities. Most experts believe that ricin would be difficult to use as a weapon of mass destruction, but do not discount its potential as a weapon of terror. Ricin is a select agent, and its possession, transfer, or use is regulated under domestic and international law. This report will not be updated."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank
2013-04-18
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Ricin: Technical Background and Potential Role in Terrorism [Updated February 4, 2004]
"On February 2, 2004, the deadly toxin ricin was detected in the Dirksen Senate Office Building. Ricin, derived from castor beans, has been identified as a potential bioweapon. Ricin is extremely toxic by ingestion, inhalation and injection, causing organ damage that can lead to death. While research continues on new therapies and vaccines against ricin exposure, no approved treatments or prophylaxis for human use currently exist. Research to develop sensitive, portable detectors capable of detecting the release of ricin is ongoing. Although ricin was investigated as a potential military weapon, it has predominantly been used in small quantities against specific individuals. Most experts believe that ricin would be difficult to use as a weapon of mass destruction, but do not discount its potential as a weapon of terror. Ricin is on the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Select Agent list, and its possession, transfer, or use, is regulated under domestic and international law. This report will be updated as events warrant."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank
2004-02-04
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Federal Efforts to Address the Threat of Bioterrorism: Selected Issues and Options for Congress [February 8, 2011]
From the Document: "Reports by congressional commissions, the mention of bioterrorism in President Obama's 2010 State of the Union address, and issuance of executive orders have increased congressional attention to the threat of bioterrorism. Federal efforts to combat the threat of bioterrorism predate the anthrax attacks of 2001 but have significantly increased since then. The U.S. government has developed these efforts as part of and in parallel with other defenses against conventional terrorism. Continued attempts by terrorist groups to launch attacks targeted at U.S. citizens have increased concerns that federal counterterrorism activities insufficiently address the threat. […] Congressional oversight of bioterrorism crosses the jurisdiction of many congressional committees. As a result, congressional oversight is often issue-based. Because of the diversity of federal biodefense efforts, this report does not provide a complete view of the federal bioterrorism effort. Instead, this report focuses on four areas under congressional consideration deemed critical to the success of the biodefense enterprise: strategic planning; risk assessment; surveillance; and the development, procurement, and distribution of medical countermeasures. Congress, through authorizing and appropriations legislation and oversight activities, continues to influence the federal response to the bioterrorism threat. Congressional policymakers may face many difficult choices about the priority of maintaining, shrinking, or expanding existing programs or creating new programs to address identified deficiencies. Augmenting or creating programs may result in additional costs in a time of fiscal challenges. Maintaining or shrinking programs may pose unacceptable risks, given the potential for significant casualties and economic effects from a large-scale bioterror attack."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank
2011-02-08
