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Federal Efforts to Address the Threat of Bioterrorism: Selected Issues and Options for Congress [February 8, 2011]
From the Document: "Reports by congressional commissions, the mention of bioterrorism in President Obama's 2010 State of the Union address, and issuance of executive orders have increased congressional attention to the threat of bioterrorism. Federal efforts to combat the threat of bioterrorism predate the anthrax attacks of 2001 but have significantly increased since then. The U.S. government has developed these efforts as part of and in parallel with other defenses against conventional terrorism. Continued attempts by terrorist groups to launch attacks targeted at U.S. citizens have increased concerns that federal counterterrorism activities insufficiently address the threat. […] Congressional oversight of bioterrorism crosses the jurisdiction of many congressional committees. As a result, congressional oversight is often issue-based. Because of the diversity of federal biodefense efforts, this report does not provide a complete view of the federal bioterrorism effort. Instead, this report focuses on four areas under congressional consideration deemed critical to the success of the biodefense enterprise: strategic planning; risk assessment; surveillance; and the development, procurement, and distribution of medical countermeasures. Congress, through authorizing and appropriations legislation and oversight activities, continues to influence the federal response to the bioterrorism threat. Congressional policymakers may face many difficult choices about the priority of maintaining, shrinking, or expanding existing programs or creating new programs to address identified deficiencies. Augmenting or creating programs may result in additional costs in a time of fiscal challenges. Maintaining or shrinking programs may pose unacceptable risks, given the potential for significant casualties and economic effects from a large-scale bioterror attack."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank
2011-02-08
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Project BioShield: Legislative History and Side-by-Side Comparison of H.R. 2122, S. 15, and S. 1504 [August 27, 2004]
"Few effective countermeasures currently exist to deal with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear terror agents. In early 2003, the Bush administration proposed Project BioShield to stimulate the development of such countermeasures and to procure them for the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Congress considered three bills that incorporated much of the administration's proposal: S. 15 (Gregg), H.R. 2122 (Tauzin), and S. 1504 (Gregg). H.R. 2122 passed the House on July 16, 2003. S. 15 passed the Senate on May 25, 2004 in an amended form similar to H.R. 2122. This version of S. 15 passed the House on July 14, 2004. President Bush signed S. 15 into law as the Project BioShield Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-276) on July 21, 2004. Although many of the details of Project BioShield changed during Congressional consideration, all the proposals shared similar key provisions. Each bill would have provided expedited hiring, procurement, and grant awarding procedures for bioterrorism-related products and services. Each bill would have provided a market guarantee for countermeasure producers by allowing the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to contract to procure countermeasures still in development. Thus, several years before a company plans to be able to deliver a countermeasure, the company would have been assured that if they successfully develop the countermeasure the government is obligated to purchase a set amount of it at a set price. Each bill would have authorized the HHS Secretary to allow the emergency use of countermeasures that lack Food and Drug Administration approval. Congress changed many important aspects of the Administration's proposal."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Gottron, Frank
2004-08-27
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Project BioShield: Purposes and Authorities [July 6, 2009]
"Many potential chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism agents lack available countermeasures. In 2003, President Bush proposed Project BioShield to address this need. The Project BioShield Act became law in July 2004 (P.L. 108-276). This law has three main provisions: (1) relaxing procedures for some CBRN terrorism-related spending, including hiring and awarding research grants; (2) guaranteeing a federal government market for new CBRN medical countermeasures; and (3) permitting emergency use of unapproved countermeasures. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has used each of these authorities. The HHS used expedited review authorities to approve grants relating to developing treatments for radiation exposure and used the authority to guarantee a government market to obligate approximately $2.3 billion to acquire countermeasures against anthrax, botulism, radiation, and smallpox. The HHS has also employed the emergency use authority several times including allowing young children with H1N1 'swine flu' to receive specific antiviral drugs. The Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2004 (P.L. 108-90) advanceappropriated $5.593 billion for FY2004 to FY2013 for Project BioShield. In addition to the approximately $2.3 billion used for countermeasure procurement, Congress has decreased the available amount in the BioShield account. In FY2004 and FY2005, Congress removed approximately a total of $25 million through rescissions. In the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-8), Congress transferred $412 million to other programs to support countermeasure advanced research and development and pandemic influenza preparedness and response. President Obama has proposed transferring an additional $305 million in FY2010 to support countermeasure advanced research and development."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Gottron, Frank
2009-07-06
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Research and Development (R&D) to Enhance Homeland Security: CRS Experts [January 15, 2010]
"The following table provides access to names and contact information for CRS experts on policy concerns relating to research and development (R&D) to enhance homeland security. Policy areas identified include: 1)Mission: scope, magnitude, relationship to other federal homeland security goals; 2)Conducting and coordinating homeland security R&D; 3)Catastrophic threats--science and technology; 4)Countermeasures--science and technology; 5)and Encouraging private development of countermeasures."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Gottron, Frank
2010-01-15
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Federal Efforts to Address the Threat of Bioterrorism: Selected Issues for Congress [March 18, 2010]
"The continued attempts by terrorist groups to launch attacks targeted at U.S. citizens have increased concerns that federal counterterrorism activities are insufficient to face the threat. The federal government's efforts to address the perceived threat of bioterrorism span many different agencies and are organized and directed through several strategy and planning documents. These agencies have implemented numerous disparate actions and programs in their statutory areas to address the threat. Despite these efforts, many experts, including congressional commissions, non-governmental organizations, and industry representatives, have highlighted weaknesses or flaws in the federal government's biodefense activities. Recent reports by congressional commissions have stated that the federal government's efforts to address the bioterrorism threat could be significantly improved. Key questions face congressional policymakers in these areas: Are the efforts already underway sufficient to face the threat of bioterrorism? Have the federal investments to date met the expectations of Congress or other stakeholders? Should these existing programs be altered, augmented, or terminated in the current environment of fiscal challenge? What is the appropriate federal role in response to the threat of bioterrorism, and what mechanisms are most appropriate for involving other stakeholders, including state and local jurisdictions, industry, and others? [...] Congress, through authorizing and appropriations legislation and its oversight activities, continues to influence the federal response to the bioterrorism threat. Congressional policymakers will likely be faced with many difficult choices about the priority of maintaining, shrinking, or expanding existing programs versus creating new programs to address identified deficiencies. Augmenting such programs may incur additional costs in a time of fiscal challenges while maintaining or shrinking such programs may be deemed as incurring unacceptable risks, given the potential for significant casualties and economic effects from a large-scale bioterror attack."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank
2010-03-18
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Oversight of High-Containment Biological Laboratories: Issues for Congress [May 4, 2009]
"The federal government responded to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the subsequent anthrax attacks with increased focus on and funding for biodefense. A key consideration in this response was addressing shortages in diagnostic, clinical, and research laboratory capacity. […]. Policymakers have become increasingly interested in the oversight of these facilities following reports of accidents, regulatory noncompliance, and community resistance. The increase in high-containment laboratory capacity has raised new policy questions and emphasized existing ones. How much laboratory capacity is enough? What is the necessary federal investment? Should laboratories be consolidated or dispersed? What plans exist to coordinate multiple agency efforts to expand high-containment laboratory capacity? Does increasing laboratory capacity increase the risk of accidents and the opportunity for purposeful misuse? What is an acceptable balance between the benefits these laboratories provide and the risks they pose? […]. A key task for policymakers is to define their goals for enhancing oversight of high-containment laboratories. The focus of the oversight effort may affect which policy issues are addressed. For example, focusing on a registry of existing high-containment laboratory capacity may improve planning, coordination, and efficiency of use but provide relatively limited security benefits. […]. When weighing options to address these complex policy issues, policymakers may have to reconcile many competing and potentially conflicting national needs."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank
2009-05-04
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Oversight of High-Containment Biological Laboratories: Issues for Congress [March 5, 2009]
"The federal government responded to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the subsequent anthrax attacks with increased focus on and funding for biodefense. A key consideration in this response was addressing shortages in diagnostic, clinical, and research laboratory capacity. Several departments and agencies have increased or are in the process of increasing their laboratory capacity. High-containment laboratories play a critical role in the biodefense effort, offering the hope of better responses to an attack and a better understanding of the threat posed by bioterrorism. However, they also could increase the risk of a biological attack by serving as a potential source of materials or training. Indeed, the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism recommends tightening government oversight of high-containment laboratories. Policymakers have become increasingly interested in the oversight of these facilities following reports of accidents, regulatory noncompliance, and community resistance. The increase in high-containment laboratory capacity has raised new policy questions and emphasized existing ones. How much laboratory capacity is enough? What is the necessary federal investment? Should laboratories be consolidated or dispersed? What plans exist to coordinate multiple agency efforts to expand high-containment laboratory capacity? Does increasing laboratory capacity increase the risk of accidents and the opportunity for purposeful misuse? What is an acceptable balance between the benefits these laboratories provide and the risks they pose?"
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank
2009-03-05
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Small-scale Terrorist Attacks Using Chemical and Biological Agents: An Assessment Framework and Preliminary Comparisons [May 20, 2004]
"This report, which will be updated as necessary, presents a means of assessing the relative threat from terrorist-use of individual chemical, biological, and toxin agents. It focuses on small-scale, targeted chemical and biological attacks, rather than mass-casualty attacks. The framework considers the elements of access, public health impact, medical treatment, prophylaxis, and dissemination. Other factors that may affect potential use by terrorists include the range of lethality, covert employment of an agent, and the availability of dual-use technologies. The results of this framework may be useful in addressing the threat these agents pose, for example by indicating priorities for countermeasure funding. Other uses include weighing the potential effectiveness of policy options, assessing threat reduction approaches to specific agents, and serving as a resource for developing other specialized frameworks."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank
2004-05-20
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U.S. Postal Service Response to the Threat of Bioterrorism through the Mail [February 11, 2002]
"The deliberate mailing of 'Bacillus anthracis' spores through the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) has caused five deaths, twenty-two cases of anthrax, and massive disruptions to Congress and the USPS. Both the public and private sector are examining an array of methods to limit the risk of future attacks. Potential solutions include improving mail handling procedures, changing the USPS anonymous mailing policy, installing bio/chem agent detectors, and sterilizing the mail. For the USPS these decisions are complicated by its precarious financial state. Some proposed solutions may require an increase in postage rates and/or decreased levels of service. Each of these may further depress postal revenues and threaten the continued existence of the USPS as an independent, self-supporting entity. Policymakers will need to decide if the USPS must ensure the safety of mail recipients. At this point it is not clear if this is practical or even possible with existing technology. It may be that it is practical to protect only the mail addressed to the most likely targets of future attacks. Some of the measures that the USPS has taken or is planning to take to protect postal workers and mail recipients are common sense alterations to the mail processing procedures. Additionally, the USPS is making gloves, masks, and educational materials available to all postal workers. More controversial and potentially more costly are plans to sterilize the mail. To implement irradiation procedures nationwide could cost between three and five billion dollars with up to another billion dollars each year in operating costs. Policymakers will need to balance concerns for safety, cost, and practicality while to deciding how to alter the practices of the USPS."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Gottron, Frank
2002-02-11
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Small-scale Terrorist Attacks Using Chemical and Biological Agents: An Assessment Framework and Preliminary Comparisons [Updated June 23, 2004]
This report, which will be updated as necessary, presents a means of assessing the relative threat from terrorist-use of individual chemical, biological, and toxin agents. It focuses on small-scale, targeted chemical and biological attacks, rather than mass-casualty attacks. The framework considers the elements of access, public health impact, medical treatment, prophylaxis, and dissemination. Other factors that may affect potential use by terrorists include the range of lethality, covert employment of an agent, and the availability of dual-use technologies. The results of this framework may be useful in addressing the threat these agents pose, for example by indicating priorities for countermeasure funding. Other uses include weighing the potential effectiveness of policy options, assessing threat reduction approaches to specific agents, and serving as a resource for developing other specialized frameworks.
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank
2004-06-23
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Smallpox: Technical Background on the Disease and Its Potential Role in Terrorism [Updated January 10, 2003]
"Smallpox, which kills approximately 30% of its victims, is estimated to have killed between 300 and 500 million people in the twentieth century before the World Health Organization's successful eradication program. The smallpox vaccine is effective at preventing smallpox but has a higher complication rate than any other currently used vaccine. The terrorist attacks of 2001 have increased fears that smallpox might be used as a weapon of terror. Smallpox has several properties that might make it desirable by terrorists, such as contagiousness and high lethality. These factors and its limited availability also make it difficult for a terrorist to use. Most experts agree that it is very unlikely that smallpox will be used as a weapon, but the high consequences of a successful attack have prompted exploration of methods to counter this threat. Also see CRS Report RL31694 Smallpox Vaccine Stockpile and Vaccination Policy and CRS Report RL31368, Preventing Proliferation of Biological Weapons: U.S. Assistance to the Former Soviet States. This report will be updated as warranted."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Gottron, Frank
2003-01-10
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Federal Efforts to Address the Threat of Bioterrorism: Selected Issues for Congress [August 6, 2010]
"Recent reports by congressional commissions and others, the inclusion of bioterrorism issues in President Obama's State of the Union address, and issuance of executive orders have increased congressional attention to the threat of bioterrorism. Federal efforts to combat the threat of bioterrorism predate the anthrax attacks of 2001 but have significantly increased since then. The U.S. government has developed these efforts as part of and in parallel with other defenses against conventional terrorism. The continued attempts by terrorist groups to launch attacks targeted at U.S. citizens have increased concerns that federal counterterrorism activities insufficiently address the threat. Several strategy and planning documents direct the federal government's biodefense efforts. Many different agencies have a role. These agencies have implemented numerous disparate actions and programs in their statutory areas to address the threat. Despite these efforts, many experts, including congressional commissions, non-governmental organizations, and industry representatives, have highlighted weaknesses or flaws in the federal government's biodefense activities. Recent reports by congressional commissions have stated that the federal government could significantly improve its efforts to address the bioterrorism threat. Key questions face congressional policymakers: How sufficiently do the efforts already underway address the threat of bioterrorism? Have the federal investments to date met the expectations of Congress or other stakeholders? Should Congress alter, augment, or terminate these existing programs in the current environment of fiscal challenge? What is the appropriate federal role in response to the threat of bioterrorism, and what mechanisms are most appropriate for involving other stakeholders, including state and local jurisdictions, industry, and others?"
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank
2010-08-06
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Publishing Scientific Papers with Potential Security Risks: Issues for Congress [March 18, 2013]
"The federal government generally supports the publication of federally funded research results because wide dissemination may drive innovation, job creation, technology development, and the advance of science. However, some research results could also be used for malicious purposes. Congress, the Administration, and other stakeholders, are considering whether current policies concerning publishing such research results sufficiently balances the potential benefits with the potential harms. The current issues under debate cut across traditional policy areas, involving simultaneous consideration of security, scientific, health, export, and international policy. Because of the complexity of these issues, analysis according to one set of policy priorities may adversely affect other policy priorities. For example, maximizing security may lead to detriments in public health and scientific advancement, while maximizing scientific advancement may lead to security risks. Accounting for such trade-offs may allow policymakers to establish regulatory frameworks that more effectively maximize the benefits from dual-use research while mitigating its potential risks. […] This report describes the underlying controversy, the potential benefits and harms of publishing these manuscripts, the actions taken by domestic and international stakeholders, and options to improve the way research is handled to minimize security concerns."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank
2013-03-18
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Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act (P.L. 109-417): Provisions and Changes (P.L. 109-417): Provisions and Changes [Updated March 12, 2007]
"The 109th Congress passed P.L. 109-417, the Pandemic and All-Hazards
Preparedness Act. The act reauthorized a number of expiring preparedness and
response programs in the PHS Act, and established some new authorities, including the creation of a Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA), a new office in HHS to support, coordinate, and provide oversight of advanced development of vaccines and biodefense countermeasures. The act's provisions reflected the concerns of Members of the 109th Congress and others regarding the flawed response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and the threat of a possible influenza pandemic. A comparison of provisions in P.L. 109-417 with preexisting law is provided in Table 1 later in this report.
The 110th Congress will likely be interested in the implementation of provisions
in P.L. 109-417, and in the continued evolution of relationships between HHS, DHS, the states, and others among whom coordination is essential in a time of heightened concern about national security. Members of the 110th Congress may wish to consider legislation to address additional expiring public health authorities, such as the Select Agent program to control access to pathogens that could be used for bioterrorism, which expires at the end of FY2007. Congress may also wish to examine the adequacy of certain permanent emergency response and funding authorities of the Secretary of HHS."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Gottron, Frank; Lister, Sarah A.
2007-03-12
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Project BioShield [September 27, 2006]
"Many potential biological terrorism agents lack available countermeasures. President Bush proposed Project BioShield to address this need. The 108th Congress considered this proposal in S. 15, S. 1504, and H.R. 2122. President Bush signed S. 15 into law on July 21, 2004 (The Project BioShield Act of 2004, P.L. 108-276). The main provisions of this law include (1) relaxing procedures for bioterrorism-related procurement, hiring, and awarding of research grants; (2) guaranteeing a federal government market for new biomedical countermeasures; and (3) permitting emergency use of unapproved countermeasures. Project BioShield countermeasure procurement is funded by the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2004 (P.L. 108- 90) which advance-appropriated $5.593 billion for FY2004-FY2013. Additional measures to encourage countermeasure development are being considered by the 109th Congress in S. 3 (Gregg), S. 975 (Lieberman), S. 1873 (Burr), S. 1880 (Kennedy), S. 2564 (Burr), and H.R. 5533 (Rogers). This report will be updated in response to legislative developments."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Gottron, Frank
2006-09-27
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Publishing Scientific Papers with Potential Security Risks: Issues for Congress [July 12, 2012]
"The federal government generally supports the publication of federally funded research results because wide dissemination may drive innovation, job creation, technology development, and the advance of science. However, some research results could also be used for malicious purposes. Congress, the Administration, and other stakeholders, are considering whether current policies concerning publishing such research results sufficiently balances the potential benefits with the potential harms. The current issues under debate cut across traditional policy areas, involving simultaneous consideration of security, scientific, health, export, and international policy. Because of the complexity of these issues, analysis according to one set of policy priorities may adversely affect other policy priorities. For example, maximizing security may lead to detriments in public health and scientific advancement, while maximizing scientific advancement may lead to security risks. Accounting for such trade-offs may allow policymakers to establish regulatory frameworks that more effectively maximize the benefits from dual-use research while mitigating its potential risks. […] This report describes the underlying controversy, the potential benefits and harms of publishing these manuscripts, the actions taken by domestic and international stakeholders, and options to improve the way research is handled to minimize security concerns."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Gottron, Frank; Shea, Dana A.
2012-07-12
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Project BioShield [April 28, 2003]
"Many potential biological terrorism agents lack available countermeasures. President Bush proposed Project BioShield to encourage companies to develop new bioterror countermeasures. The main provisions of that proposal include: (1) relaxing procedures for bioterrorism-related procurement and peer review; (2) guaranteeing a market through contract authority granted to the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to buy countermeasures following Presidential approval, funded by a permanent, indefinite appropriation; and (3) allowing the Secretary of HHS to permit the emergency use of countermeasures that have not been approved. S. 15, introduced by Senator Gregg incorporates these proposals. Some of these provisions are controversial. Some critics suggest that biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies will require even more incentives than contained in Project BioShield. Additional incentives being considered by the 108th Congress include protection from litigation because of adverse reactions to the countermeasures, and tax and intellectual property incentives (S. 666, Lieberman). Other options include directly funding development or increasing the scope of existing federal programs designed to encourage technology commercialization. This report will be updated in response to legislative developments."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Gottron, Frank
2003-04-28
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Project BioShield [June 05, 2006]
"Many potential biological terrorism agents lack available countermeasures. President Bush proposed Project BioShield to address this need. The 108th Congress considered this proposal in S. 15, S. 1504, and H.R. 2122. President Bush signed S. 15 into law on July 21, 2004 (The Project BioShield Act of 2004, P.L. 108-276). The main provisions of this law include (1) relaxing procedures for bioterrorism-related procurement, hiring, and awarding of research grants; (2) guaranteeing a federal government market for new biomedical countermeasures; and (3) permitting emergency use of unapproved countermeasures. Project BioShield countermeasure procurement is funded by the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2004 (P.L. 108- 90) which advance-appropriated $5.593 billion for FY2004-FY2013. Additional measures to encourage the development of countermeasures are being considered by the 109th Congress in S. 3 (Gregg), S. 975 (Lieberman), S. 1873 (Burr), S. 1880 (Kennedy), and S. 2564 (Burr). This report will be updated in response to legislative developments."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Gottron, Frank
2006-06-05
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Federal Research and Development Funding: FY2017 [June 24, 2016]
"President Obama's budget request for FY2017 includes $152.333 billion for research and development (R&D), an increase of $6.195 billion (4.2%) over the estimated FY2016 enacted R&D funding level of $146.138 billion. The request represents the President's R&D priorities; Congress may opt to agree with part or all of the request, or it may express different priorities through the appropriations process. In particular, Congress will play a central role in determining the growth rate and allocation of the federal R&D investment in a period of intense pressure on discretionary spending. Budget caps may limit overall R&D funding and may require movement of resources across disciplines, programs, or agencies to address priorities. Funding for R&D is concentrated in a few departments and agencies. Under President Obama's FY2017 budget request, seven federal agencies would receive 95.6% of total federal R&D funding, with the Department of Defense (47.8%) and the Department of Health and Human Services (21.5%) accounting for nearly 70% of all federal R&D funding. In dollars, the largest increases in agency R&D funding in the President's request would go to the Department of Energy (up $2.755 billion, 19.1%), the Department of Defense (up $1.953 billion, 2.8%), and the Department of Health and Human Services (up $772 million, 2.4%). The President's FY2017 request continues support for a number of multiagency R&D initiatives: the National Nanotechnology Initiative, Networking and Information Technology Research and Development program, U.S. Global Change Research Program, Brain Research through Advancing Innovative Neurotechnologies (BRAIN) initiative, Precision Medicine Initiative, Cancer Moonshot, Materials Genome Initiative, National Robotics Initiative, and National Network for Manufacturing Innovation."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Sargent, John F.; Esworthy, Robert; Gottron, Frank . . .
2016-06-24
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DHS Appropriations FY2017: Research and Development, Training, and Services [October 20, 2016]
"This report is part of a suite of reports that discuss appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for FY2017. It specifically discusses appropriations for the components of DHS included in the fourth title of the homeland security appropriations bill--in past years, this has comprised U.S. Citizenship and Naturalization Services, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, the Science and Technology Directorate, and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). In FY2017, the Administration proposed moving the Domestic Nuclear Detection office into a new Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives Office, along with several other parts of DHS. Congress has labeled this title of the bill in recent years as 'Research and Development, Training, and Services.' The report provides an overview of the Administration's FY2017 request for these components, and the appropriations proposed by the Senate and House appropriations committees in response. Rather than limiting the scope of its review to the fourth title of the bills, the report includes information on provisions throughout the bills and report that directly affect these components. [...] On September 29, 2016, the President signed into law P.L. 114-223, which contained a continuing resolution that funds the government at the same rate of operations as FY2016, minus 0.496% through December 9, 2017. For details on the continuing resolution and its impact on DHS, see CRS [Congressional Research Service] Report R44621, Department of Homeland Security Appropriations: FY2017, which also includes additional information on the broader subject of FY2017 funding for DHS as well as links to analytical overviews and details regarding components in other titles."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Painter, William L.; Kandel, William; Morgan, Daniel (Daniel L.) . . .
2016-10-20
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Project BioShield: Purposes and Authorities [May 4, 2009]
"Following the terrorist attacks of 2001, the federal government determined that it would need additional medical countermeasures (e.g., diagnostic tests, drugs, vaccines, and other treatments) to respond to an attack using chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) agents. The paucity of CBRN agent countermeasures is attributed to the lack of a significant commercial market. Because these diseases and conditions occur infrequently, little economic incentive exists to invest the millions of dollars required to bring treatments to market.[…] To encourage the development of new CBRN countermeasures, President Bush proposed Project BioShield in his 2003 State of the Union address. The 108th Congress considered this proposal and passed the Project BioShield Act of 2004 (P.L. [Public Law] 108-276, signed into law July 21, 2004). This act has three main provisions. It provides the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) expedited procedures for CBRN terrorism-related spending including procuring products, hiring experts, and awarding research grants. The act creates a government-market guarantee by allowing the HHS Secretary to obligate funds to purchase countermeasures while they still have several more years of development. However, companies only receive payment when development is complete and the product is delivered. The act also authorizes the HHS Secretary to temporarily allow the emergency use of countermeasures that lack Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Gottron, Frank
2009-05-04
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National Bio-and Agro-Defense Facility: Issues for Congress [Updated May 19, 2008]
This CRS report talks about "The National Bio-and Agro-Defense Facility [NABF]," this is a facility being built by the Department of Homeland Security [DHS] and it would be a place where "scientific and medical research on plant and animal diseases" could be done. Also, this research "may lead to the discovery and development of new diagnostic and countermeasures, reducing the risk of a successful terrorist attack." More specifically, "this report outlines current progress towards establishment of the NBAF, presents current and projected funding levels and timelines, and describes policy issues of potential interest to Congress, such as agency coordination, possession of viruses, construction timelines, disposition of PIADC [Plum Island Animal Disease Center], and community safety concerns." The report also provides the following background information in regards to the program: "the agricultural and food infrastructure of the United States is potentially susceptible to terrorist attack using biological pathogens. In addition to the impacts of such an attack on the economy, some animal diseases could potentially be transmitted to humans. These diseases are known as zoonotic diseases […] To safeguard the United States against animal disease, Congress has appropriated funds to the U.S. Department of Agriculture [USDA] to engage in research at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center [PIADC], off the coast of New York, on animal diseases not native to the United States. When creating the Department of Homeland Security [DHS] in 2003, Congress transferred the PIADC facility from USDA to DHS. Both USDA and DHS, in cooperation with USDA, conduct foreign animal disease research at PIADC, but PIADC has been identified as outdated and too limited to continue as the primary facility for this research."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank; Monke, James
2008-05-19
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National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility: Issues for Congress [Updated June 30, 2008]
This Congressional Research Service (CRS) report discusses the directive for the development of agricultural "biocontainment laboratories for research and development of diagnostic capabilities and medical countermeasures for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases. [Further,] To safeguard the United States against the impacts of naturally occurring and intentional animal disease outbreaks, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) engages in animal disease research, including research into highly contagious animal pathogens and animal diseases not native to the United States. Such research activities have historically been performed at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC), located on an island near Long Island, NY. When creating the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003, Congress transferred the operation of the PIADC facility from USDA to DHS, though USDA still maintains an active research program at PIADC. The DHS, in cooperation with USDA, has established its own research and development program at PIADC. As the federal government undertakes new efforts in human biodefense and defense against agroterrorism, DHS has identified the PIADC facility as "reaching the end of its life cycle" and lacking critical capabilities to continue as the primary facility performing this research. The Department of Homeland Security has announced that, to meet the obligations of HSPD-9, it will establish a new facility, the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF). This facility would have high-containment laboratories able to hold the pathogens currently under investigation at PIADC as well as other pathogens of interest. The plans announced by DHS to establish the NBAF have raised congressional and public concerns regarding its safety and security and policy questions about coordination between DHS and USDA regarding the research to be conducted at NBAF. This report outlines current progress towards establishment of the NBAF, presents current and projected funding levels and timelines, and describes policy issues of potential interest to Congress, such as agency coordination, possession of viruses, construction timelines, disposition of PIADC, and community safety concerns."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank; Monke, James
2008-06-30
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National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility: Issues for Congress [Updated April 3, 2008]
"The agricultural and food infrastructure of the United States is potentially susceptible to terrorist attack using biological pathogens. In addition to the impacts of such an attack on the economy, some animal diseases could potentially be transmitted to humans. (These diseases are known as zoonotic diseases.) Scientific and medical research on plant and animal diseases may lead to the discovery and development of new diagnostics and countermeasures, reducing the risk and impact of a successful terrorist attack. The plans announced by DHS to establish the NBAF have raised several issues. Community concerns about safety and security, previously raised about PIADC and other laboratories being built to study dangerous pathogens, are also being raised about the NBAF. Coordination between DHS and USDA, as well as prioritization and investment in agricultural biodefense may be reassessed once more high containment laboratory space becomes available. By law, research on live foot and mouth disease (FMD) virus is not permitted on the U.S. mainland. This policy would need to be changed before DHS could conduct FMD research at NBAF if it were sited on the U.S. mainland. Bills (H.R. 1717, H.R. 2419, and the Senate amendment to H.R. 2419) modifying this policy are being considered by in the 110th Congress."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank; Monke, James
2008-04-03
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National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility: Issues for Congress [Updated November 15, 2007]
"The agricultural and food infrastructure of the United States is potentially susceptible to terrorist attack using biological pathogens. In addition to the effects of such an attack on the economy, some animal diseases could potentially be transmitted to humans. These diseases are known as zoonotic diseases. Scientific and medical research on plant and animal diseases may lead to the discovery and development of new diagnostics and countermeasures, reducing the risk and effects of a successful terrorist attack. [...]. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 tasks the Secretaries of Agriculture and Homeland Security to develop a plan to provide safe, secure, and state-of-the-art agriculture biocontainment laboratories for research and development of diagnostic capabilities and medical countermeasures for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases. To partially meet these obligations, DHS has requested Congress to appropriate funds to construct a new facility, the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF). This facility would house high-containment laboratories able to handle the pathogens currently under investigation at PIADC, as well as other pathogens of interest. Six candidate sites have been identified, one of which is Plum Island. The DHS plans to select the site in 2009 and open NBAF in 2015. The final construction cost will depend on the site location and has been estimated to range between $648 million and $939 million, significantly exceeding 2005 baseline projections. Additional expenses, such as equipping the new facility, relocating existing personnel and programs, and preparing the PIADC facility for disposition, may exceed an additional $100 million."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Gottron, Frank; Shea, Dana A.; Monke, James
2007-11-15
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National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility: Issues for Congress [Updated September 10, 2007]
"The agricultural and food infrastructure of the United States is potentially susceptible to terrorist attack using biological pathogens. In addition to the impacts of such an attack on the economy, some animal diseases could potentially be transmitted to humans. (These diseases are known as zoonotic diseases.) Scientific and medical research on plant and animal diseases may lead to the discovery and development of new diagnostics and countermeasures, reducing the risk and impact of a successful terrorist attack. To safeguard the United States against animal disease, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) engages in foreign animal disease research at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC). With the formation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003, the PIADC facility was transferred from USDA to DHS, though USDA continues its research program at the facility. The DHS has identified the PIADC facility as too old and limited to continue to be the primary facility performing this research. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 tasks the Secretaries of Agriculture and Homeland Security to develop a plan to provide safe, secure, and state-of-the-art agriculture biocontainment laboratories for research and development of diagnostic capabilities and medical countermeasures for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases. To meet these obligations, DHS has announced plans to construct a new facility, the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF). […] The final construction costs would depend on the site location and actual construction time lines, but are projected to exceed $460 million."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank; Monke, James
2007-09-10
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National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility: Issues for Congress [September 4, 2007]
"The agricultural and food infrastructure of the United States is potentially susceptible to terrorist attack using biological pathogens. In addition to the impacts of such an attack on the economy, some animal diseases could potentially be transmitted to humans. (These diseases are known as zoonotic diseases.) Scientific and medical research on plant and animal diseases may lead to the discovery and development of new diagnostics and countermeasures, reducing the risk and impact of a successful terrorist attack."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.; Gottron, Frank; Monke, James
2007-09-04
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National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility: Issues for Congress [December 14, 2009]
"The agricultural and food infrastructure of the United States may be susceptible to terrorist attack using biological pathogens. In addition to the economic effects of such an attack, some animal pathogens could cause illness in humans. Diseases that can spread from animals to people are known as zoonotic diseases. Scientific and medical research on plant and animal diseases may lead to the discovery and development of new diagnostics and countermeasures, reducing the risk and effects of a successful terrorist attack. To safeguard the United States against the introduction of non-native animal disease, Congress has appropriated funds to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Some of this work is performed at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC), located off the coast of New York. Congress created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003 and transferred ownership and operation of PIADC from USDA to DHS. The USDA and DHS cooperate to conduct foreign animal disease research at PIADC, but they have identified PIADC as outdated and too limited to continue as the primary facility for this research."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Gottron, Frank; Shea, Dana A.; Monke, James
2009-12-14
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National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility: Issues for Congress [Updated November 25, 2008]
"The agricultural and food infrastructure of the United States is potentially susceptible to terrorist attack using biological pathogens. In addition to the effects of such an attack on the economy, some animal diseases could potentially be transmitted to humans. These diseases are known as zoonotic diseases. Scientific and medical research on plant and animal diseases may lead to the discovery and development of new diagnostics and countermeasures, reducing the risk and effects of a successful terrorist attack. [...]. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 tasks the Secretaries of Agriculture and Homeland Security to develop a plan to provide safe, secure, and state-of-the-art agriculture biocontainment laboratories for research and development of diagnostic capabilities and medical countermeasures for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases. To partially meet these obligations, DHS has requested Congress to appropriate funds to construct a new facility, the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF). This facility would house high-containment laboratories able to handle the pathogens currently under investigation at PIADC, as well as other pathogens of interest. Six candidate sites have been identified, one of which is Plum Island. The DHS plans to select the site in 2009 and open NBAF in 2015. The final construction cost will depend on the site location and has been estimated to range between $648 million and $939 million, significantly exceeding 2005 baseline projections. Additional expenses, such as equipping the new facility, relocating existing personnel and programs, and preparing the PIADC facility for disposition, may exceed an additional $100 million."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Gottron, Frank; Shea, Dana A.; Monke, James
2008-11-25
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COVID-19: Global Implications and Responses [Updated May 8, 2020]
From the Overview: "Congressional interest in the global implications of pandemics and the novel coronavirus pandemic is high, with over 50 pieces of related legislation introduced in the 116th Congress to date (see CRS Report R46319, 'Novel Coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19): Q&A on Global Implications and Responses').The virus, which is believed to have started in Wuhan, China, in late 2019, is now named 'severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2' (SARSCoV-2) and is known by the disease it causes, 'coronavirus disease 2019' (COVID-19). The virus has spread across the globe and is now concentrated in the United States and Europe. As of May 7, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) estimated that 3.6 million people had contracted the disease, with over 250,000 deaths. WHO declared the outbreak a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) on January 30 and labeled it a 'pandemic' on March 11."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Tharakan, Sara M.; Salaam-Blyther, Tiaji; Gottron, Frank . . .
2020-05-08
