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Dismantling the Nuclear Weapons Legacy of the Cold War
Nuclear arms reduction agreements and parallel commitments since 1987 will remove from active deployment about 27,000 former Soviet Union bombs and warheads. When START I and II are fully implemented, Russia will have eliminated 1,000 strategic delivery vehicles and removed from active deployment 4,500 strategic warheads. Ukraine will give up 176 SS-19s and -24s and 1,240 strategic warheads as well as cruise missile warheads. Kazakhstan will relinquish 104 SS-18s and 1,040 strategic warheads. The 81 SS-25 single-warhead missiles placed in Belarus by the Soviet Union will be withdrawn and probably redeployed on Russian territory. The United States will eliminate over 1,300 strategic delivery vehicles under the START agreements, and will remove from active deployment more than 6,000 strategic warheads. These reductions, in terms of systems scheduled for elimination and the destructive potential they represent, amount to the greatest program of disarmament in human history. The process also signals a change in relations between Washington and Moscow, if only by dramatically reversing the trend to increase nuclear weapons targeted against each other's homeland.
National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies
Goodby, James E.
1995-02
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Koreapolitik
"Security agreements between North and South Korea have had a disconcerting tendency to break down within a short time, and the confidence-building that should result from implementation of these agreements has never been achieved. The Basic Agreement between North and South Korea, which took effect in 1992, provided a partial blueprint for achieving broad restructuring of security relations and a more stable order in Northeast Asia. The ROK Government has repeatedly declared its readiness to resume discussions with North Korea to advance the unfinished agenda defined in the Basic Agreement and the Denuclearization Agreement, each of which provides much that could contribute to a peace system in the Korean peninsula. One obstacle to progress has been North Korea's insistence that a peace treaty to replace the 1953 armistice agreement should be negotiated between North Korea and the United States. The South Korean and U.S. governments have insisted that a peace treaty should be negotiated between North and South Korea. A peace system based on agreements codifying certain security arrangements would be the most feasible next step toward lasting peace in the Korean peninsula. Peace and stability could be promoted through a series of interrelated measures that would be the functional equivalent of a peace treaty. Both North and South Koreans have spoken of a "peace system" and both sides share some similar ideas about the contents of such a system. The United States also would be very much engaged in one aspect the regulation of arms and armed forces in the Korean peninsula. Furthermore, a commission similar to the South-North Joint Military Commission established in the Basic Agreement would be authorized to deal with compliance questions. This would require examination of the continued relevance of the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, as well as other arrangements established by the 1953 armistice agreement."
National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies
Goodby, James E.
1995-05
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Cooperative Threat Reduction for a New Era
"The Nunn-Lugar CTR program can rightly be called the Marshall Plan of nuclear nonproliferation. The purpose of this study is to review the techniques developed and used by the Nunn-Lugar program to date, including some closely related activities, and to recommend specific ways in which these techniques could be applied on a global basis to eliminate the various types of nuclear threats faced by the United States. Five categories of nuclear threat reduction will be discussed in this article: 1. Residual nuclear-related security problems in Russia. 2. Nuclear weapons programs in de facto nuclear weapons states. 3. Applying CTR techniques in the cases of former noncooperative states. 4. Nuclear weapons programs in noncooperative states. 5. Insecure storage of fissionable materials in countries around the world."
National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy
Goodby, James E.; Loeb, Cheryl; Burghart, Daniel L.
2004-09
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Deploying Nuclear Detection Systems: A Proposed Strategy for Combating Nuclear Terrorism
"The most likely means of delivering a nuclear bomb on a major city is through a successful smuggling effort by a terrorist organization. The catastrophic damage it would cause demands cooperative action by all responsible governments. Several U.S. Government programs are in place to deal with this threat. These programs focus on the following: (1) Measures to prevent access by terrorist groups to fissile material, particularly enriched uranium and plutonium, the basic fuel for nuclear bombs; (2) Measures to strengthen international institutions to enable governments to deal more effectively with illicit trade in fissile materials and in equipment that can produce such materials; (3) Measures to enhance international cooperation in intelligence sharing and law enforcement; (4) Cooperative international defense activities designed to intercept illegal trafficking in fissile materials and equipment to produce these materials; and (5) Strengthening the capacity to monitor and detect illicit shipments of fissionable materials at entry points into the United States and, in cooperation with other countries, at key transportation nodes overseas. This report focuses on the last of these programs, and primarily on deployment of sensors overseas. This report provides an overview of the threat from nuclear terrorism; discusses the role of intelligence and risk assessments in countering this threat; provides a brief overview of nuclear detection technologies and issues; briefly summarizes key U.S. Government programs involved in nuclear detection; summarizes domestic legislation, which provides the impetus for increasing international collaboration; and discusses the need for a global approach to nuclear nonproliferation in which international institutions assume a leading and sustained leadership role."
National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy
Coffey, Timothy, 1941-; Goodby, James E.; Loeb, Cheryl
2007-07
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