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Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): Background and Issues for Congress [February 27, 2018]
"The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) is being developed by the Army and the Marine Corps as a successor to the High Mobility, Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), which has been in service since 1985. On October 28, 2008, awards were made for the JLTV Technology Development (TD) Phase to three industry teams: (1) BAE Systems, (2) the team of Lockheed Martin and General Tactical Vehicle, and (3) AM General and General Dynamics Land Systems. On January 26, 2012, the Army issued the Request for Proposal (RFP) for the JLTV's Engineering Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase. Up to three EMD contracts scheduled for June could have been awarded. The period of performance for EMD contracts was 27 months, and the overall EMD phase was scheduled to last 33 months. Vendors were required to provide 22 JLTV prototypes for testing 12 months after contract award. The target cost for the base vehicle was $250,000, excluding add-on armor and other kits."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Feickert, Andrew
2018-02-17
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Marine Corps Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV): Background and Issues for Congress [September 26, 2018]
"On January 6, 2011, after spending approximately $3 billion in developmental funding, the Marine Corps cancelled the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) program due to poor reliability demonstrated during operational testing and excessive cost growth. Because the EFV was intended to replace the 40-year-old Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV), the Pentagon pledged to move quickly to develop a 'more affordable and sustainable' vehicle to replace the EFV. The Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) is intended to replace the AAV, incorporating some EFV capabilities but in a more practical and cost-efficient manner. In concert with the ACV, the Marines were developing the Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC) to serve as a survivable and mobile platform to transport Marines when ashore. The MPC was not intended to be amphibious like an AAV, EFV, or the ACV but instead would be required to have a swim capability for inland waterways such as rivers, lakes, and other water obstacles such as shore-to-shore operations in the littorals. Both vehicles were intended to play central roles in future Marine amphibious operations. On June 14, 2013, Marine leadership put the MPC program 'on ice' due to budgetary pressures but suggested the program might be resurrected some 10 years down the road when budgetary resources might be more favorable."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Feickert, Andrew
2018-09-26
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Marine Corps Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV): Background and Issues for Congress [Updated April 11, 2019]
From the Document: "On January 6, 2011, after spending approximately $3 billion in developmental funding, the Marine Corps cancelled the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) program due to poor reliability demonstrated during operational testing and excessive cost growth. Because the EFV was intended to replace the 40-year-old Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV), the Pentagon pledged to move quickly to develop a 'more affordable and sustainable' vehicle to replace the EFV. The Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) is intended to replace the AAV, incorporating some EFV capabilities but in a more practical and cost-efficient manner. [...] Potential issues for Congress include the potential ramifications of the consolidation of the ACV 1.1 and ACV 1.2 programs and how the possible adoption of the Expeditionary Advance Base Operations (EABO) operational concept could affect the ACV program."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Feickert, Andrew
2019-04-11
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Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): Background and Issues for Congress [Updated March 19, 2019]
From the Document: "The JLTV [Joint Light Tactical Vehicle] is an Army-led, multiservice initiative to develop a family of future light tactical vehicles to replace many of the High Mobility, Multi-Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) used by the armed services today. HMMWVs, which first entered service in 1985, were developed during the Cold War when improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and other antivehicle explosive devices were not a major factor in military planning. The HMMWVs' demonstrated vulnerability to IEDs and the difficulties and costs experienced in 'up-armoring' HMMWVs already in the inventory have led to renewed emphasis on vehicle survivability. DOD officials have emphasized that JLTVs are not intended to replace HMMWVs 'one for one.'"
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Feickert, Andrew
2019-03-19
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Marine Corps Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV): Background and Issues for Congress [Updated March 15, 2019]
From the Document: "On January 6, 2011, after spending approximately $3 billion in developmental funding, the Marine Corps cancelled the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) program due to poor reliability demonstrated during operational testing and excessive cost growth. Because the EFV was intended to replace the 40-year-old Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV), the Pentagon pledged to move quickly to develop a 'more affordable and sustainable' vehicle to replace the EFV. The Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) is intended to replace the AAV, incorporating some EFV capabilities but in a more practical and cost-efficient manner. In concert with the ACV, the Marines were developing the Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC) to serve as a survivable and mobile platform to transport Marines when ashore."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Feickert, Andrew
2019-03-15
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U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress [Updated March 28, 2019]
From the Document: "Special Operations Forces (SOF) play a significant role in U.S. military operations and, in recent years, have been given greater responsibility for planning and conducting worldwide counterterrorism operations. U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has about 70,000 Active Duty, National Guard, and reserve personnel from all four services and Department of Defense (DOD) civilians assigned to its headquarters, its four service component commands, and eight sub-unified commands."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Feickert, Andrew
2019-03-28
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Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) Mobility, Reconnaissance, and Firepower Programs [Updated March 27, 2019]
From the Document: "Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) constitute the Army's 'light' ground forces and are an important part of the nation's ability to project forces overseas. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as current thinking by Army leadership as to where and how future conflicts would be fought, suggest IBCTs are limited operationally by their lack of assigned transport and reconnaissance vehicles as well as firepower against hardened targets and armored vehicles."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Feickert, Andrew
2019-03-27
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Army's Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress [July 30, 2014]
"The Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) is the Army's proposed replacement for the Vietnam-era M-113 personnel carriers, which are still in service in a variety of support capacities in Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs). While M-113s no longer serve as infantry fighting vehicles, five variants of the M-113 are used as command and control vehicles, general purpose vehicles, mortar carriers, and medical treatment and evacuation vehicles. An estimated 3,000 of these M-113 variants are currently in service with the Army. The AMPV is intended to be a 'vehicle integration' or non-developmental program (candidate vehicles will be either existing vehicles or modified existing vehicles--not vehicles that are specially designed and not currently in service). Some suggest that a non-developmental vehicle might make it easier for the Army to eventually field this system to the force, as most of the Army's most recent developmental programs, such as the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV), the Future Combat System (FCS), the Crusader self-propelled artillery system, and the Comanche helicopter, were cancelled before they could be fully developed and fielded. On November 26, 2013, the Army issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the AMPV. This RFP stipulated that the Army plans to award a five-year EMD contract in May 2014 worth $458 million to a single contractor for 29 prototypes. While the March 2013 RFP established an Average Unit Manufacturing Cost Ceiling for each AMPV at $1.8 million, this was rescinded to permit vendors greater flexibility. The EMD phase is scheduled to run between FY2015 and FY2019, followed by three years of low-rate initial production (LRIP) starting in 2020. The Army currently plans to procure 2,907 AMPVs at an estimated program cost of $10.233 billion."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Feickert, Andrew
2014-07-30
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Army's Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress [July 16, 2014]
"The Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) is the Army's proposed replacement for the Vietnam-era M-113 personnel carriers, which are still in service in a variety of support capacities in Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs). While M-113s no longer serve as infantry fighting vehicles, five variants of the M-113 are used as command and control vehicles, general purpose vehicles, mortar carriers, and medical treatment and evacuation vehicles. An estimated 3,000 of these M-113 variants are currently in service with the Army. The AMPV is intended to be a 'vehicle integration' or non-developmental program (candidate vehicles will be either existing vehicles or modified existing vehicles--not vehicles that are specially designed and not currently in service). Some suggest that a non-developmental vehicle might make it easier for the Army to eventually field this system to the force, as most of the Army's most recent developmental programs, such as the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV), the Future Combat System (FCS), the Crusader self-propelled artillery system, and the Comanche helicopter, were cancelled before they could be fully developed and fielded."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Feickert, Andrew
2014-07-16
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Syria's Chemical Weapons: Issues for Congress [September 30, 2013]
"Syria has produced, stored, and weaponized chemical agents, but it remains dependent on foreign suppliers for chemical precursors. The regime of President Bashar al Asad possesses stocks of nerve (sarin, VX) and blister (mustard gas) agents, possibly weaponized into bombs, shells, and missiles. The government also has associated production facilities. Chemical weapons and their agents can deteriorate depending on age and quality; little is known from open sources about the current condition of the stockpile. Syria continues to attempt to procure new supplies of chemical weapons precursors, which are dual-use, through front companies in third countries. […] A major policy concern of the United States has been the use or loss of control of chemical weapons stocks in Syria, which could have unpredictable consequences for the Syrian population and neighboring countries, as well as U.S. allies and forces in the region. The United States and other countries have assessed that the Syrian government has used chemical weapons against opposition forces in the country. […] On August 31, 2013, President Obama stated that the United States should respond with 'military action against Syrian regime targets' in response to the August 21 attack and added that he would ask Congress to grant authorization for the use of military force. The White House had previously announced on June 13, 2013, that the Syrian government had used chemical weapons 'on a small scale against the opposition multiple times in the last year.'"
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Feickert, Andrew; Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2013-09-30
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Syria's Chemical Weapons: Issues for Congress [September 30, 2013]
"Syria has produced, stored, and weaponized chemical agents, but it remains dependent on foreign suppliers for chemical precursors. The regime of President Bashar al Asad possesses stocks of nerve (sarin, VX) and blister (mustard gas) agents, possibly weaponized into bombs, shells, and missiles. The government also has associated production facilities. Chemical weapons and their agents can deteriorate depending on age and quality; little is known from open sources about the current condition of the stockpile. Syria continues to attempt to procure new supplies of chemical weapons precursors, which are dual-use, through front companies in third countries. Most countries that have had chemical weapons arsenals in the past have destroyed, or are in the process of destroying, these weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention. The U.S. intelligence community cites Iran, North Korea, and Syria as having active chemical weapons programs. The Syrian government acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention on September 14, 2013. This convention requires its member states to eliminate all of their chemical weapon stocks, munitions, precursor chemicals, and related production and storage facilities."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Feickert, Andrew; Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2013-09-30
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Army's Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress [September 24, 2013]
"The Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) is the Army's proposed replacement to the
Vietnam-era M-113 personnel carriers, which are still in service in a variety of support capacities in Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs). While M-113s no longer serve as infantry fighting vehicles, five variants of the M-113 are used as command and control vehicles, general purpose vehicles, mortar carriers, and medical treatment and evacuation vehicles. An estimated 3,000 of these M-113 variants are currently in service with the Army. [...] A potential issue for Congress is, should the AMPV be the Army's number one combat vehicle acquisition priority? The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) noted in a report that it might be advisable to make the replacement of M-113s with AMPVs the Army's first acquisition priority as opposed to developing the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV). Other defense officials and analysts suggest, given current and anticipated future defense budgetary constraints, the Army's emphasis on the GCV might be unrealistic. They instead suggest a more appropriate course of action might be for the Army to shift its emphasis to the non-developmental AMPV."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Feickert, Andrew
2013-09-24
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Marine Corps Drawdown, Force Structure Initiatives, and Roles and Missions: Background and Issues for Congress [January 9, 2014]
"The Marine Corps characterizes itself as a crisis response expeditionary force which is task organized and able to conduct operations across the entire spectrum of military operations. The Corps is a 'middleweight force' that is designed to fill the void in our Nation's defense structure between light Special Operations Forces (SOF) and heavier conventional units. […] A number of decisions pertaining to national security strategy, force structure, and declining defense budgets have resulted in a drawdown of the active Marine Corps from 202,000 in 2011 to 174,000 by 2017. […] In the wake of the September 11, 2012, Benghazi attack, Congress authorized 1,000 additional Marine security guards beginning FY 2014. In response, the Marines are in the process of expanding their Marine Corps Embassy Security Group. The Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC) is also regionally aligning its operational units and taking steps to begin deploying small MARSOC teams with MEUs [Marine Expeditionary Units]. […] A potential issue for Congress includes should the Marines be given the leading role in the Pacific and should their primary focus be crisis response? Other possible issues for examination include how much amphibious assault capability does the Marine Corps need; should MEUs be reorganized; and should more of the Marines' major warfighting capability be placed in the Reserves?"
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Feickert, Andrew
2014-01-09
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Marine Corps Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) and Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC): Background and Issues for Congress [January 15, 2014]
"On January 6, 2011, after spending approximately $3 billion in developmental funding, the Marine Corps cancelled the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) program due to poor reliability demonstrated during operational testing and excessive cost growth. Because the EFV was intended to replace the 40-year-old Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV), the Pentagon pledged to move quickly to develop a 'more affordable and sustainable' vehicle to replace the EFV. The Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) is intended to replace the AAV, incorporating some EFV capabilities but in a more practical and cost-efficient manner. In concert with the ACV, the Marines were developing the Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC) to serve as a survivable and mobile platform to transport Marines when ashore. The MPC was not intended to be amphibious like an AAV, EFV, or the ACV but instead would be required to have a swim capability for inland waterways such as rivers, lakes, and other water obstacles such as shore-to-shore operations in the littorals. Both vehicles are intended to play a central role in future Marine amphibious operation. […] Both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees have recommended fully funding the Administration's FY2014 ACV Budget Request of $136.967 million in Research, Development, Test & Evaluation (RDT&E) funding. The House Appropriations Committee recommended a $14 million cut to the Administration's request due to program delay. Potential issues for Congress include the possible operational impact of the deferment of the MPC as well as how feasible will it be to restart the MPC program after an extended delay? Another issue is the possible delay of the ACV program--either due to immature high water speed technology or the effects of sequestration. This report will be updated."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Feickert, Andrew
2014-01-15
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Marine Corps Drawdown, Force Structure Initiatives, and Roles and Missions: Background and Issues for Congress [February 28, 2014]
"The Marine Corps characterizes itself as a crisis response expeditionary force which is task organized and able to conduct operations across the entire spectrum of military operations. The Corps is a 'middleweight force' that is designed to fill the void in our Nation's defense structure between light Special Operations Forces (SOF) and heavier conventional units. The Marines' missions are codified in U.S. Code, Title 10, Section 5063, United States Marine Corps: Composition and Functions, and marines are the nation's primary amphibious force, capable of conducting amphibious assault operations in both permissive and non-permissive environments. Marine operational forces are organized for specific tasks and consist of four elements; a command element; a ground combat element; an aviation element; and a logistics combat element. There are four types of Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs): the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF); the Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB); the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU); and the Special Purpose MAGTF. A number of decisions pertaining to national security strategy, force structure, and declining defense budgets have resulted in a drawdown of the active Marine Corps from 202,000 in 2011 to 174,000 by 2017. On February 24, 2014, Secretary of Defense Hagel announced that the Marines would draw down to a 182,000 Marine active force, but if sequestration-level cuts were reimposed in 2016 and beyond, the Marines would shrink to a 175,000 Marine active force."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Feickert, Andrew
2014-02-28
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Army's Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) Program: Background and Issues for Congress [March 14, 2014]
"In April 2009, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced he intended to significantly restructure the Army's Future Combat System (FCS) program. The FCS was a multiyear, multibillion dollar program that had been underway since 2000 and was at the heart of the Army's transformation efforts. It was to be the Army's major research, development, and acquisition program, consisting of 18 manned and unmanned systems tied together by an extensive communications and information network. Among other things, Secretary Gates recommended cancelling the manned ground vehicle (MGV) component of the FCS program, which was intended to field eight separate tracked combat vehicle variants built on a common chassis that would eventually replace combat vehicles such as the M-1 Abrams tank, the M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, and the M-109 Paladin self-propelled artillery system. As part of this restructuring, the Army was directed to develop a ground combat vehicle (GCV) that would be relevant across the entire spectrum of Army operations and would incorporate combat lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan. Congressional interest in this program has been significant, as the GCV is intended to equip the Army's armored brigade combat teams (ABCT). The GCV also represents the only 'new start' for a ground weapon systems program and, because of the Army's history of failed weapon systems programs, current and future budget constraints, the program has been subject to a great deal of scrutiny."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Feickert, Andrew
2014-03-14
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Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): Background and Issues for Congress [January 9, 2014]
"The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) is being developed by the Army and the Marine Corps as a successor to the High Mobility, Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) that has been in service since 1985. On October 28, 2008, awards were made for the JLTV Technology Development (TD) Phase to three industry teams: (1) BAE Systems, (2) the team of Lockheed Martin and General Tactical Vehicle, and (3) AM General and General Dynamics Land Systems. […] There will be two JLTV variants--a Combat Tactical Vehicle (CTV) that can transport four passengers and carry 3,500 pounds and a Combat Support Vehicle (CSV) that can transport two passengers and carry 5,100 pounds. […] The target cost for the base vehicle is $250,000 excluding add-on armor and other kits. On August 22, 2012, the Army announced the award of three firm-fixed price JLTV EMD contracts totaling approximately $185 million. […] On September 3, 2013, the Army began JLTV testing, which will occur over a 14-month period at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, MD; Yuma, AZ; and Redstone Arsenal, AL. The Army then plans to select a single vendor by 2015, with the first Army brigade being equipped with JLTVs by 2018. […] Potential issues for Congress include a possible examination of why there is no longer any foreign interest in the JLTV program and how the Army's study to revise overall tactical wheeled vehicle requirements might affect the JLTV program. This report will be updated."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Feickert, Andrew
2014-01-09
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U.S. Military Operations in the Global War on Terrorism: Afghanistan, Africa, the Philippines, and Colombia [January 20, 2006]
"U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, Africa, the Philippines, and Colombia are part of the U.S.-initiated Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). These operations cover a wide variety of combat and non-combat missions ranging from combating insurgents, to civil affairs and reconstruction operations, to training military forces of other nations in counternarcotics, counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency tactics. Numbers of U.S. forces involved in these operations range from 19,000 to just a few hundred. Some have argued that U.S. military operations in these countries are achieving a degree of success and suggest that they may offer some lessons that might be applied in Iraq as well as for future GWOT operations. Potential issues for the second session of the 109th Congress include NATO assumption of responsibility for operations in Afghanistan, counterdrug operations in Afghanistan, a long-term strategy for Africa, and developments in Colombia and the Philippines. This report will not discuss the provision of equipment and weapons to countries where the U.S. military is conducting counterterrorism operations nor will it address Foreign Military Sales (FMS), which are also aspects of the Administration's GWOT military strategy. This report will be updated on a periodic basis."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Feickert, Andrew
2006-01-20
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Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress [October 25, 2013]
"On January 26, 2012, senior DOD leadership unveiled a new defense strategy based on a review of potential future security challenges, current defense strategy, and budgetary constraints. This new strategy envisions a smaller, leaner Army that is agile, flexible, rapidly deployable, and technologically advanced. This strategy will rebalance the Army's global posture and presence, emphasizing where potential problems are likely to arise, such as the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East. As part of the Administration's original proposal, two armored brigade combat teams (ABCTs) in Europe were to be eliminated out of a total of eight BCTs that would be cut from Active Army force structure. The Army had originally stated that it might cut more than eight BCTs from the Army's current 44 Active BCTs. Army endstrength would go from 570,000 in 2010 to 490,000 by the end of 2017. As part of this reduction, the Army would no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, protracted stability operations but would continue to be a full-spectrum force capable of addressing a wide range of national security challenges. The Army National Guard and Army Reserves were not targeted for significant cuts. Army leadership stated the impending decrease in Active Duty Army force structure would place an even greater reliance on the National Guard and Reserves. On June 25, 2013, the Army announced it would cut 12 BCTs from the Active Army as well as a number of unspecified support and headquarters units. As part of this initiative, infantry and armored BCTs would receive a third maneuver battalion plus additional engineering and fires capabilities."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Feickert, Andrew
2013-10-25
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U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress [May 8, 2014]
"Special Operations Forces (SOF) play a significant role in U.S. military operations, and the Administration has given U.S. SOF greater responsibility for planning and conducting worldwide counterterrorism operations. U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has about 66,000 active duty, National Guard, and reserve personnel from all four services and Department of Defense (DOD) civilians assigned to its headquarters, its four components, and one sub-unified command. […] In February 2014, DOD issued the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The 2014 QDR calls for 3,700 personnel to be added to USSOCOM's current strength but falls short of the 72,000-person goal set by the 2010 QDR. The 2014 QDR also places heavy emphasis on USSOCOM's role in counterterrorism operations. Beyond this, the QDR offers little detail as to how these additional personnel will be allocated and how the counterterror mandate will be accomplished. USSOCOM's FY2015 budget request was $9.913 billion--a 4% reduction over the $10.409 billion FY2013 budget request. This includes both the Base Budget and Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO) funding. Potential issues for Congress include possible greater clarification of the 2014 QDR's implications for USSOCOM and U.S. SOF and recent events in Crimea and the rest of Ukraine. This report will be updated."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Feickert, Andrew
2014-05-08
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Army Drawdown and Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress [February 28, 2014]
"On January 26, 2012, senior DOD leadership unveiled a new defense strategy based on a review of potential future security challenges, current defense strategy, and budgetary constraints. This new strategy envisions a smaller, leaner Army that is agile, flexible, rapidly deployable, and technologically advanced. This strategy will rebalance the Army's global posture and presence, emphasizing where potential problems are likely to arise, such as the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East. […] The Army drawdown will likely be achieved in large degree by controlling accessions (i.e., the number of people allowed to join the Army). If limiting accessions is not enough to achieve the desired endstrength targets, the Army can employ a variety of involuntary and voluntary drawdown tools authorized by Congress, such as Selective Early Retirement Boards (SERBs) and Reduction-in-Force (RIF). Voluntary tools that the Army might use include the Voluntary Retirement Incentive, the Voluntary Separation Incentive, Special Separation Bonuses, Temporary Early Retirement Authority, the Voluntary Early Release/Retirement Program, and Early Outs. Potential issues for Congress include what is the appropriate size of the active component force and the balance between active and reserve components. This report will be updated."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Feickert, Andrew
2014-02-28
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Army's Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) Program: Background and Issues for Congress [February 28, 2014]
"In April 2009, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced he intended to significantly restructure the Army's Future Combat System (FCS) program. The FCS was a multiyear, multibillion dollar program that had been underway since 2000 and was at the heart of the Army's transformation efforts. It was to be the Army's major research, development, and acquisition program, consisting of 18 manned and unmanned systems tied together by an extensive communications and information network. Among other things, Secretary Gates recommended cancelling the manned ground vehicle (MGV) component of the FCS program, which was intended to field eight separate tracked combat vehicle variants built on a common chassis that would eventually replace combat vehicles such as the M-1 Abrams tank, the M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, and the M-109 Paladin self-propelled artillery system. As part of this restructuring, the Army was directed to develop a ground combat vehicle (GCV) that would be relevant across the entire spectrum of Army operations and would incorporate combat lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan. Congressional interest in this program has been significant, as the GCV is intended to equip the Army's armored brigade combat teams (ABCT). The GCV also represents the only 'new start' for a ground weapon systems program and, because of the Army's history of failed weapon systems programs, current and future budget constraints, the program has been subject to a great deal of scrutiny."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Feickert, Andrew
2014-02-28
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Marine Corps Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) and Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC): Background and Issues for Congress [February 28, 2014]
"On January 6, 2011, after spending approximately $3 billion in developmental funding, the Marine Corps cancelled the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) program due to poor reliability demonstrated during operational testing and excessive cost growth. Because the EFV was intended to replace the 40-year-old Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV), the Pentagon pledged to move quickly to develop a 'more affordable and sustainable' vehicle to replace the EFV. The Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) is intended to replace the AAV, incorporating some EFV capabilities but in a more practical and cost-efficient manner. In concert with the ACV, the Marines were developing the Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC) to serve as a survivable and mobile platform to transport Marines when ashore. The MPC was not intended to be amphibious like an AAV, EFV, or the ACV but instead would be required to have a swim capability for inland waterways such as rivers, lakes, and other water obstacles such as shore-to-shore operations in the littorals. Both vehicles are intended to play a central role in future Marine amphibious operation."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Feickert, Andrew
2014-02-28
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Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): Background and Issues for Congress [March 11, 2014]
"The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) is being developed by the Army and the Marine Corps as a successor to the High Mobility, Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) that has been in service since 1985. On October 28, 2008, awards were made for the JLTV Technology Development (TD) Phase to three industry teams: (1) BAE Systems, (2) the team of Lockheed Martin and General Tactical Vehicle, and (3) AM General and General Dynamics Land Systems. Once testing was completed and technology requirements established, a full and open competition was expected to be conducted in the late summer of 2011 for the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) Phase; the Department of Defense (DOD) planned to award two contracts for the EMD phase, which was scheduled to last 24 months. […] The FY2014 Budget Request for JLTVs was $84.2 million for Army Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT T&E) and $50.4 million for Marine Corps RDT&E, for a program total of $134.6 million. The FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 113-66) recommended fully funding the Army and Marines. The Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2014 also recommended fully funding the Army and Marines. The President's FY2015 budget request calls for $229.3 million for Army and Marine RDT&E and Procurement funding for the JLTV. A potential issue for Congress is how decreasing Army and Marine force structure affects the JLTV program. This report will be updated."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Feickert, Andrew
2014-03-11
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Army's Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV): Background and Issues for Congress [March 11, 2014]
"The Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) is the Army's proposed replacement for the Vietnam-era M-113 personnel carriers, which are still in service in a variety of support capacities in Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs). While M-113s no longer serve as infantry fighting vehicles, five variants of the M-113 are used as command and control vehicles, general purpose vehicles, mortar carriers, and medical treatment and evacuation vehicles. An estimated 3,000 of these M-113 variants are currently in service with the Army. The AMPV is intended to be a 'vehicle integration' or non-developmental program (candidate vehicles will be either existing vehicles or modified existing vehicles--not vehicles that are specially designed and not currently in service). Some suggest that a non-developmental vehicle might make it easier for the Army to eventually field this system to the force, as most of the Army's most recent developmental programs, such as the Future Combat System (FCS), the Crusader self-propelled artillery system, and the Comanche helicopter were cancelled before they could be fully developed and fielded."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Feickert, Andrew
2014-03-11
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Cluster Munitions: Background and Issues for Congress [April 29, 2014]
"Cluster munitions are air-dropped or ground-launched weapons that release a number of smaller submunitions intended to kill enemy personnel or destroy vehicles. Cluster munitions were developed in World War II and are part of many nations' weapons stockpiles. Cluster munitions have been used frequently in combat, including the early phases of the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Cluster munitions have been highly criticized internationally for causing a significant number of civilian deaths, and efforts have been undertaken to ban and regulate their use. The Department of Defense (DOD) continues to view cluster munitions as a military necessity but has instituted a policy to reduce the failure rate of cluster munitions to 1% or less after 2018. There are two major international initiatives to address cluster munitions: the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) and negotiations under the U.N. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). The Obama Administration has reiterated U.S. opposition to the CCM, which entered into force August 1, 2010, but participated in negotiations regarding cluster munitions under the CCW."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.; Feickert, Andrew
2014-04-29
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Marine Corps Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) and Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC): Background and Issues for Congress [July 16, 2014]
"On January 6, 2011, after spending approximately $3 billion in developmental funding, the Marine Corps cancelled the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) program due to poor reliability demonstrated during operational testing and excessive cost growth. Because the EFV was intended to replace the 40-year-old Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV), the Pentagon pledged to move quickly to develop a 'more affordable and sustainable' vehicle to replace the EFV. The Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) is intended to replace the AAV, incorporating some EFV capabilities but in a more practical and cost-efficient manner. In concert with the ACV, the Marines were developing the Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC) to serve as a survivable and mobile platform to transport Marines when ashore. The MPC was not intended to be amphibious like an AAV, EFV, or the ACV but instead would be required to have a swim capability for inland waterways such as rivers, lakes, and other water obstacles such as shore-to-shore operations in the littorals. Both vehicles are intended to play a central role in future Marine amphibious operation."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Feickert, Andrew
2014-07-16
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Marine Corps Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) and Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC): Background and Issues for Congress [July 30, 2014]
"On January 6, 2011, after spending approximately $3 billion in developmental funding, the Marine Corps cancelled the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) program due to poor reliability demonstrated during operational testing and excessive cost growth. Because the EFV was intended to replace the 40-year-old Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV), the Pentagon pledged to move quickly to develop a 'more affordable and sustainable' vehicle to replace the EFV. The Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) is intended to replace the AAV, incorporating some EFV capabilities but in a more practical and cost-efficient manner. In concert with the ACV, the Marines were developing the Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC) to serve as a survivable and mobile platform to transport Marines when ashore. The MPC was not intended to be amphibious like an AAV, EFV, or the ACV but instead would be required to have a swim capability for inland waterways such as rivers, lakes, and other water obstacles such as shore-to-shore operations in the littorals. Both vehicles are intended to play a central role in future Marine amphibious operation."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Feickert, Andrew
2014-07-30
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Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): Background and Issues for Congress [August 6, 2014]
"The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) is being developed by the Army and the Marine Corps as a successor to the High Mobility, Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) that has been in service since 1985. On October 28, 2008, awards were made for the JLTV Technology Development (TD) Phase to three industry teams: (1) BAE Systems, (2) the team of Lockheed Martin and General Tactical Vehicle, and (3) AM General and General Dynamics Land Systems. Once testing was completed and technology requirements established, a full and open competition was expected to be conducted in the late summer of 2011 for the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) Phase; the Department of Defense (DOD) planned to award two contracts for the EMD phase, which was scheduled to last 24 months. […] In June 2014, the Army issued a draft RFP for the JLTV Full-Rate Production Phase and plans to select a contract winner in July 2015. The Office of the Secretary of Defense recently conducted an interim review of the JLTV program and found it is likely to meet all eight key performance parameters. The President's FY2015 budget request calls for $229.3 million for Army and Marine RDT&E [Research Design Testing and Evaluation] and Procurement funding for the JLTV. The House and Senate versions of the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act recommend fully funding the Administration's FY2015 JLTV budget request, as does the FY2015 Department of Defense appropriations bill. A potential issue for Congress is how decreasing Army and Marine force structure affects the JLTV program."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Feickert, Andrew
2014-08-06
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Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): Background and Issues for Congress [July 18, 2011]
"The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) is being developed by the Army and the Marine Corps as a successor to the 11 different versions of the High Mobility, Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) that have been in service since 1985. On October 28, 2008, three awards were made for the JLTV Technology Development (TD) Phase, which is scheduled to conclude in the June 2011 timeframe to three industry teams: (1) BAE Systems, (2) the team of Lockheed Martin and General Tactical Vehicle, and (3) AM General and General Dynamics Land Systems. Once testing is completed and technology requirements established, a full and open competition was expected to be conducted in the late summer, 2011 for the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) Phase and the Department of Defense (DOD) planned to award two contracts for the EMD phase, which was scheduled to last 24 months. […] The House Armed Services Committee has recommended decreased funding levels--$147.1 million for the Army and $46.8 million for the Marine Corps. The House Appropriations also recommended cutting Army and Marine Corps JLTV funding by $25 million for each service and using these funds for HMMWV survivability initiatives. Concerns have been expressed that DOD's Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) All - Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV) effort will clash with the JLTV. There are also concerns about overall JLTV program affordability and the Marine's concerns with its weight and transportability. The Army's decision to change JLTV survivability requirements has resulted in the delay of awarding EMD contracts and the doubling of the EMD phase to 48 months which could increase the program's overall cost."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Feickert, Andrew
2011-07-18
