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Intelligence Authorization Legislation: Status and Challenges [March 25, 2013]
"Over the years Congress has devised complex procedures for appropriations and authorization, but the pattern has been to separate the authorization and appropriation process and to establish separate committees to address the separate functions. Although intelligence spending has historically been shrouded in secrecy, the Constitution, statutory law, and legislative branch procedures apply to intelligence agencies as they do for all government departments and agencies. It is the purpose of this report to discuss the effects of the absence of intelligence authorization legislation subsequent to FY2005 and comment on the substantial but limited effects of recent intelligence authorization acts. It is recognized that the statutory requirements have been met by the catchall provisions in appropriations acts. The report will not focus on the reasons why Congress did not pass intelligence authorization; it is sufficient to note that Members did not choose to compromise either among themselves or with the White House on issues they considered important. In the absence of authorization legislation, intelligence activities continue to be carried out, and expensive and complex intelligence systems continue to be approved; but the process is somewhat different from that intended when the intelligence committees were established in the late 1970s and there are significant implications for congressional oversight of intelligence activities and, arguably, for the nation's intelligence effort as a whole."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Erwin, Marshall Curtis
2013-03-25
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Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Acquisition: Issues for Congress [April 16, 2013]
"Increasing calls for intelligence support and continuing innovations in intelligence technologies combine to create significant challenges for both the executive and legislative branches. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems are integral components of both national policymaking and military operations, including counterterrorism operations, but they are costly and complicated and they must be linked in order to provide users with a comprehensive understanding of issues based on information from all sources. Relationships among organizations responsible for designing, acquiring, and operating these systems are also complicated, as are oversight arrangements in Congress. These complications have meant that even though many effective systems have been fielded, there have also been lengthy delays and massive cost overruns. Uncertainties about the long-term acquisition plans for ISR systems persist even as pressures continue for increasing the availability of ISR systems in current and future military operations and for national policymaking."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Erwin, Marshall Curtis
2013-04-16
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Intelligence Spending and Appropriations: Issues for Congress [September 18, 2013]
"Appropriations for intelligence activities represent a significant part of both the federal and defense budget at a time of growing fiscal austerity. In the past, spending levels for intelligence activities were shrouded in secrecy. Today, overall totals of intelligence spending are made public, but the process for appropriating funds for intelligence activities remains complicated and not well understood. Steady, yearly increases in intelligence funding in the past decade helped create an intelligence apparatus that, many experts agree, has been effective at accomplishing its ultimate goal of preventing another terrorist attack on the scale of 9/11. But in the new era of fiscal limits, intelligence officials and Members of Congress are addressing ways to reduce intelligence spending while ensuring continued effectiveness against al-Qaeda and while adapting to new priorities other than counterterrorism. Director of National Intelligence (DNI) James R. Clapper Jr. recently stated that sequestration would require a 7% cut, or roughly $4 billion, to the National Intelligence Program (NIP) budget and warned of reduced global coverage and decreased human and technical intelligence collection. Mr. Clapper also warned of repercussions similar to those that occurred in the 1990s when, in concert with a one-third decrease in active duty military personnel, the intelligence community saw a 23% cut in its budget, resulting in what he characterized as a 'damaging downward spiral.' […] This report discusses the historic trend in intelligence spending, as well as broader issues concerning the intelligence budgeting process, and may help Members of Congress contextualize information concerning the FY2013 budget."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Erwin, Marshall Curtis; Belasco, Amy
2013-09-18
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Intelligence Spending and Appropriations: Issues for Congress [September 5, 2013]
"Appropriations for intelligence activities represent a significant part of both the federal and defense budget at a time of growing fiscal austerity. In the past, spending levels for intelligence activities were shrouded in secrecy. Today, overall totals of intelligence spending are made public, but the process for appropriating funds for intelligence activities remains complicated and not well understood. Steady, yearly increases in intelligence funding in last decade helped create an intelligence apparatus that, many experts agree, has been effective at accomplishing its ultimate goal of preventing another terrorist attack on the scale of 9/11. But in the new era of fiscal limits, intelligence officials and Members of Congress are addressing ways to reduce intelligence spending while ensuring continued effectiveness against al-Qaeda and while adapting to new priorities other than counterterrorism. Director of National Intelligence (DNI) James R. Clapper Jr. recently stated that sequestration would require a 7% cut, or roughly $4 billion, to the National Intelligence Program (NIP) budget and warned of reduced global coverage and decreased human and technical intelligence collection. Mr. Clapper also warned of repercussions similar to those that occurred in the 1990s when, in concert with a one-third decrease in active duty military personnel, the intelligence community saw a 23% cut in its budget, resulting in what he characterized as a 'damaging downward spiral.' 'The Washington Post' on August 29, 2013, published details about the Administration's FY2013 NIP budget request, based on a document provided by former NSA [National Security Agency] contractor Edward Snowden. Because the document leaked to the news media is classified, CRS [Congressional Research Service] is unable to provide a discussion of the specific detail of that budget submission. Nonetheless, the disclosure may drive further public debate about the size of the intelligence budget and about the effectiveness of intelligence spending. This report discusses the historic trend in intelligence spending, as well as broader issues concerning the intelligence budgeting process, and may help Members of Congress contextualize information concerning the FY2013 budget."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Erwin, Marshall Curtis; Belasco, Amy
2013-09-05
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Intelligence Issues for Congress [April 23, 2013]
"To address the challenges facing the U.S. intelligence community in the 21st century, congressional and executive branch initiatives have sought to improve coordination among the different agencies and to encourage better analysis. In December 2004, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (P.L. 108-458) was signed, providing for a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) with authorities to manage the national intelligence effort. The legislation also established a Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Making cooperation effective presents substantial leadership and managerial challenges. The needs of diverse intelligence 'consumers' must all be met, using many of the same systems and personnel. The DNI has substantial statutory authorities to address these issues, but the organizational relationships remain complex, especially for intelligence agencies that are part of the Defense Department. Members of Congress in their oversight role may seek to observe the extent to which effective coordination is accomplished. The intelligence community, which comprises 17 agencies, has experienced a decade of budgetary growth. That era was typified by (1) institution building with embryonic organization such as the Office of the DNI and other new or evolving intelligence components, (2) information sharing and collaboration across those institutions, and (3) a focus on counterterrorism. While those issues will remain areas of congressional interest, Members will likely confronted by a new set of intelligence challenges resulting from budgetary realities and from second-order effects stemming from post-9/11 changes."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Erwin, Marshall Curtis
2013-04-23
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'Gang of Four' Congressional Intelligence Notifications [April 16, 2013]
"'Gang of Four' intelligence notifications generally are oral briefings of certain particularly sensitive 'non-covert action intelligence activities', including principally, but not exclusively, intelligence collection programs, that the intelligence community typically limits to the chairmen and ranking Members of the two congressional intelligence committees. […] This report reviews the history of the Gang of Four notification process and compares this procedure with that of the 'Gang of Eight' notification procedure. The 'Gang of Eight' procedure is statutorily based and provides that the chairmen and ranking Members of the intelligence committee, along with the Speaker and minority leader of the House, and Senate majority and minority leaders--rather than the full membership of the intelligence committees-- are to receive prior notice of particularly sensitive 'covert action' programs, if the President determines that limited access to such programs is essential to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital U.S. interests."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Erwin, Marshall Curtis
2013-04-16
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Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible Policy Questions [April 10, 2013]
"Some observers assert that since 9/11 the Pentagon has begun to conduct certain types of counterterrorism intelligence activities that may meet the statutory definition of a covert action. The Pentagon, while stating that it has attempted to improve the quality of its intelligence program in the wake of 9/11, has contended that it does not conduct covert actions. Congress in 1990 toughened procedures governing intelligence covert actions in the wake of the Iran-Contra affair, after it was discovered that the Reagan Administration had secretly sold arms to Iran, an avowed enemy that had it branded as terrorist, and used the proceeds to fund the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance, also referred to by some as 'Contras.' In response, Congress adopted several statutory changes, including enacting several restrictions on the conduct of covert actions and establishing new procedures by which Congress is notified of covert action programs. In an important change, Congress for the first time statutorily defined covert action to mean 'an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.' The 1991 statutory changes remain in effect today. This report examines the legislative background surrounding covert action and poses several related policy questions."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Erwin, Marshall Curtis
2013-04-10
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NSA Surveillance Leaks: Background and Issues for Congress [July 2, 2013]
"Recent media stories about National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance address unauthorized disclosures of two different intelligence collection programs. These programs arise from provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). However, they rely on separate authorities, collect different types of information, and raise different policy questions. As such, where possible, the information contained in this report distinguishes between the two. For both programs, there is a tension between the speed and convenience with which the government can access data of possible intelligence value and the mechanisms intended to safeguard civil liberties. The first program collects and stores in bulk domestic phone records that some argue could be gathered to equal effect through more focused records requests. The second program targets the electronic communications of non-U.S. citizens but may incidentally collect information about Americans. The following sections address (1) what information is being collected; (2) the legal basis for the collection; (3) existing oversight mechanisms; and (4) arguments for and against the two programs. The last section of this report discusses legislation that has been proposed in response to information disclosed about NSA surveillance. Because documents leaked to the news media may be classified, CRS [Congressional Research Service] is precluded from providing a detailed analysis of the content of those documents. The information in this report is based largely on public comments from intelligence officials and Members of Congress."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Erwin, Marshall Curtis; Liu, Edward C.
2013-07-02
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Sensitive Covert Action Notifications: Oversight Options for Congress [April 10, 2013]
"Legislation enacted in 1980 gave the executive branch authority to limit advance notification of especially sensitive covert actions to eight Members of Congress--the 'Gang of Eight'--when the President determines that it is essential to limit prior notice in order to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting U.S. vital interests. In such cases, the executive branch is permitted by statute to limit notification to the chairmen and ranking minority Members of the two congressional intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the House, and Senate majority and minority leaders, rather than to notify the full intelligence committees, as is required in cases involving covert actions determined to be less sensitive. […] This report describes the statutory provision authorizing Gang of Eight notifications, reviews the legislative history of the provision, and examines the impact of such notifications on congressional oversight."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Erwin, Marshall Curtis
2013-04-10
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