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Arming Pilots against Terrorism: Implementation Issues for the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program [Updated January 9, 2004]
"The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135) contains provisions to arm pilots of passenger aircraft and gives deputized pilots the authority to use force, including lethal force, to defend the flight deck against criminal and terrorist threats. Participation in the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program, established under the Arming Pilots Against Terrorism Act contained in P.L. 107- 296, was initially limited to pilots of passenger aircraft. However, a provision in the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] reauthorization act (Vision 100; P.L. 108-176, 117 Stat. 2490) expanded the program to include flight engineers as well as flight crews of all-cargo aircraft. During debate over legislation to arm pilots, proponents argued that the potential benefits of deterring or thwarting terrorist and criminal acts against passenger aircraft outweighed the inherent risks associated with arming pilots. However, opponents of policy allowing pilots to be armed with lethal weapons argued that such a program's safety risks and monetary costs significantly outweighed these potential benefits. Risks cited included potential distraction to the flight crew, dangers that a weapon discharge could pose to the aircraft or its occupants, and security concerns associated with carrying firearms in secured areas of the aviation system. Proponents countered that these risks could be effectively mitigated, but recognized that these are important issues to be addressed for successful implementation of the policy to arm pilots."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Elias, Bartholomew
2004-01-09
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Transportation Security: Issues for the 112th Congress [February 1, 2011]
"The nation's air, land, and marine transportation systems are designed for accessibility and efficiency, two characteristics that make them highly vulnerable to terrorist attack. While hardening the transportation sector from terrorist attack is difficult, measures can be taken to deter terrorists. The dilemma facing Congress is how best to construct and finance a system of deterrence, protection, and response that effectively reduces the possibility and consequences of another terrorist attack without unduly interfering with travel, commerce, and civil liberties. Aviation security has been a major focus of transportation security policy following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. […] Reauthorization of TSA [Transportation Security Administration] functions may be considered in the broader context of a Department of Homeland Security reauthorization bill during the 112th Congress. Issues likely to arise include deployment of new checkpoint screening technologies; passenger screening procedures; implementation of the Secure Flight system to check passenger data against the consolidated terrorist database; air cargo security measures; and strengthening security of general aviation aircraft and airports. [...] If the 112th Congress revisits the issue, it may consider the effectiveness of rail and transit security efforts to date, the potential for meaningful security improvement in this area, and its importance relative to other federal priorities. Existing law mandates the scanning of all U.S.-bound maritime containers with non-intrusive inspection equipment at overseas ports of loading by July 2012. This deadline is unlikely to be met, as foreign countries object to the costs of this screening and are dubious of the benefits. If Congress considers maritime security, it may examine the usefulness of this mandate, as well as the threat posed by the many small craft that populate commercial port areas and progress toward establishing harbor interagency operational centers."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Elias, Bartholomew; Peterman, David Randall; Frittelli, John
2011-02-01
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Changes in Airport Passenger Screening Technologies and Procedures: Frequently Asked Questions [January 26, 2011]
"In the autumn of 2010, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) began deploying new technologies and procedures for screening passengers at airport checkpoints. Reports of negative public reaction to some of these changes have prompted intense congressional interest in TSA passenger screening. This report addresses some of these concerns." Questions covered include: What Changes Have Been Made? What Prompted These Changes? What Is Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) and How Is It Being Used? What Is the Funding for AIT? How and Where Is AIT Being Deployed? Where Else Is AIT Being Deployed? Is AIT Effective? Is AIT Efficient? What Specific Changes Have Been Made to Pat-Down Procedures? Why Do the New Screening Procedures Raise Privacy Concerns? What Has Been Done to Allay Privacy Concerns? What Concerns Have Been Raised Regarding Religious or Cultural Sensitivities? Does WBI (Whole Body Imaging) Have Potential Human Health Effects? What Screening Options Do Passengers Have? What If Passengers Have a Specific Complaint About Screening? What Alternative Screening Techniques Are Available? Have These Issues Been Addressed in Legislation?
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Elias, Bartholomew
2011-01-26
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Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Reauthorization: An Overview of Legislative Action in the 111th Congress [May 7, 2010]
"Funding authorization for aviation programs set forth in Vision 100--Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act (P.L. 108-176) and authorization for taxes and fees that provide revenue for the aviation trust fund expired at the end of FY2007. [...] On July 14, 2009, Senator Rockefeller introduced the FAA Air Transportation Modernization and Safety Improvement Act (S. 1451), containing a two-year FAA reauthorization proposal. The bill would authorize $34.56 billion over a two-year span covering FY2010 and FY2011. Unlike the Aviation Investment and Modernization Act of 2007 (S. 1300, 110th Congress), S. 1451 does not contain any proposal for aviation system user fees. Rather, it focuses on accelerating the deployment of NextGen air traffic technologies and a number of safety issues, including the safety of air ambulance operations, unmanned aircraft, commuter airlines, and FAA oversight of airlines and aircraft repair stations. The bill seeks to streamline the PFC approval process, but does not seek any increase to maximum PFC levels. The bill also seeks to improve airline consumer service through enhanced disclosure requirements and contingencies for flights that are substantially delayed, and it seeks an increase in funding for Essential Air Service (EAS) subsidies and small community air service grants. On March 22, 2010, the Senate passed H.R. 1586 as amended, which is similar to S. 1451 and includes an aviation trust fund revenue title. Subsequently, on March 25, 2010, the House passed its amended version of H.R. 1586, titling it the Aviation Safety and Investment Act of 2010, which incorporates the text of H.R. 915 and H.R. 3371."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Elias, Bartholomew
2010-05-07
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Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Reauthorization: An Overview of Legislative Action in the 111th Congress [March 30, 2010]
From the Document: "On July 14, 2009, Senator Rockefeller introduced the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] Air Transportation Modernization and Safety Improvement Act (S. 1451), containing a two-year FAA reauthorization proposal. The bill would authorize $34.56 billion over a two-year span covering FY2010 and FY2011. Unlike the Aviation Investment and Modernization Act of 2007 (S. 1300, 110th Congress), S. 1451 does not contain any proposal for aviation system user fees. Rather, it focuses on accelerating the deployment of NextGen air traffic technologies and a number of safety issues, including the safety of air ambulance operations, unmanned aircraft, commuter airlines, and FAA oversight of airlines and aircraft repair stations. The bill seeks to streamline the PFC [Passenger Facility Charges] approval process, but does not seek any increase to maximum PFC levels. The bill also seeks to improve airline consumer service through enhanced disclosure requirements and contingencies for flights that are substantially delayed, and it seeks an increase in funding for Essential Air Service (EAS) subsidies and small community air service grants. On March 22, 2010, the Senate passed H.R. 1586 as amended, which is similar to S. 1451 and includes an aviation trust fund revenue title. Subsequently, on March 25, 2010, the House passed its amended version of H.R. 1586, titling it the Aviation Safety and Investment Act of 2010, which incorporates the text of H.R. 915 and H.R. 3371."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Elias, Bartholomew
2010-03-30
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Transportation Security: Issues for the 111th Congress [May 15, 2009]
"The nation's air, land, and marine transportation systems are designed for accessibility and efficiency, two characteristics that make them highly vulnerable to terrorist attack. While hardening the transportation sector from terrorist attack is difficult, measures can be taken to deter terrorists. The dilemma facing Congress is how best to construct and finance a system of deterrence, protection, and response that effectively reduces the possibility and consequences of another terrorist attack without unduly interfering with travel, commerce, and civil liberties. In the 110th Congress, aviation, rail, and transit security were a major focus of congressional activity. At the end of July 2007, the House and Senate passed a conference agreement on H.R. 1 (H.Rept. 110-259) that was signed into law on August 3, 2007 as the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53). The act contains numerous provisions related to air, rail, and cargo security."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Elias, Bartholomew; Peterman, David Randall; Frittelli, John
2009-05-15
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Securing General Aviation [March 3, 2009]
"General aviation (GA)--a catch-all category that includes about 54% of all civilian aviation activity within the United States--encompasses a wide range of airports, aircraft, and flight operations. Because GA plays a small but important role in the U.S. economy, improving upon GA security without unduly impeding air commerce or limiting the freedom of movement by air remains a significant challenge. However, policymakers have received mixed signals about the relative security risk posed by GA, due to its diversity and a general lack of detailed information regarding the threat and vulnerability of various GA operations. [...]. GA security has been a topic of continued interest to Congress. The FY2006 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-90) required the DHS to examine the vulnerability of high-risk sites to possible terrorist attacks using GA aircraft. The Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53), enacted in August 2007, requires the development and implementation of a standardized risk assessment program at GA airports; establishes a grant program for enhancing security at GA airports, if such a program is deemed feasible; and requires operators of GA aircraft to provide notification and passenger information to the United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) prior to entering U.S. airspace. Also, in the 110th Congress, various Members have urged the TSA to step up its surveillance of GA operations, particularly operations of corporate and private jets. This report will be updated as needed."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Elias, Bartholomew
2009-03-03
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Airport Passenger Screening: Background and Issues for Congress [April 23, 2009]
"Over the next several years, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) will likely face continuing challenges to address projected growth in passenger airline travel while maintaining and improving upon the efficiency and effectiveness of passenger screening operations. New initiatives to expand the role of TSA personnel beyond screening operations, as well as initiatives to improve screening efficiency and effectiveness through the deployment of new technologies, will likely require additional investment. […]. However, policymakers and aviation security planners have not yet agreed upon a well-defined strategy and plan for evolving airline passenger and baggage screening functions to incorporate new technologies, capabilities, and procedures to more effectively and efficiently detect potential threats to aviation security. Ongoing challenges to maintaining and improving upon screening functions include: addressing the potential impacts of projected airline passenger traffic growth on screening operations; optimizing screening efficiency and minimizing passenger wait times; addressing potential airport space constraints for screening checkpoints and equipment; improving the capability to detect explosives at passenger checkpoints; optimizing inline explosives detection systems for checked baggage; developing strategic plans for addressing screening technology and human factors needs; and defining the funding requirements to implement these strategic plans. A number of initiatives related to passenger and baggage screening are currently being evaluated by the TSA. These include tests of new passenger checkpoint layouts and field testing of next-generation checkpoint technologies for detecting explosives, including explosives chemical trace detection devices, whole body imaging systems, and advanced technology (AT) X-ray capabilities."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Elias, Bartholomew
2009-04-23
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Homeland Security: Air Passenger Prescreening and Counterterrorism [March 4, 2005]
"The adequacy of existing systems to screen air passengers against terrorist watch lists has been questioned, most notably by the 9/11 Commission. Yet, considerable controversy surrounds air passenger prescreening systems, such as the 'No Fly' or 'Automatic Selectee' lists, underscoring that screening passengers for more intensive searches of their persons or baggage, or to prevent them from boarding an aircraft in the event of a terrorist watch list hit, is likely to be a difficult proposition for the federal agencies tasked with aviation security. Today, those agencies principally include the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)-administered Terrorist Screening Center (TSC)."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Krouse, William J.; Rappaport, Edward B.; Elias, Bartholomew
2005-03-04
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Aviation Security-Related Findings and Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission [Updated March 30, 2005]
"The 9/11 Commission found that al Qaeda operatives exploited known weaknesses in U.S. aviation security to carry out the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. While legislation and administration actions after September 11, 2001 were implemented to strengthen aviation security, the 9/11 Commission concluded that several weaknesses continue to exist. These include perceived vulnerabilities in cargo and general aviation security as well as inadequate screening and access controls at airports. In response to the 9/11 Commission's aviation security-related recommendations, two bills - H.R. 5121 and H.R. 10 - introduced in the House contain several provisions to enhance aviation security. Additionally, floor amendments to S. 2845, the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, contain numerous aviation security provisions, many of which address 9/11 Commission recommendations related to aviation safety. S. 2845 was passed (96-2) by the Senate on October 6, 2004. The House passed H.R. 10 on October 8 by a vote of 282-134. A conference has been requested to resolve numerous differences between H.R. 10 and and S. 2845. This report will be updated as needed."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Elias, Bartholomew
2005-03-30
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Transportation Security: Issues for the 111th Congress [January 28, 2009]
The nation's air, land, and marine transportation systems are designed for accessibility and efficiency, two characteristics that make them highly vulnerable to terrorist attack. While hardening the transportation sector from terrorist attack is difficult, measures can be taken to deter terrorists. The dilemma facing Congress is how best to construct and finance a system of deterrence, protection, and response that effectively reduces the possibility and consequences of another terrorist attack without unduly interfering with travel, commerce, and civil liberties. In the 110th Congress, aviation, rail, and transit security were a major focus of congressional activity. At the end of July 2007, the House and Senate passed a conference agreement on H.R. 1 (H.Rept. 110-259) that was signed into law on August 3, 2007 as the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53). The act contains numerous provisions related to air, rail, and cargo security.
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Elias, Bartholomew; Peterman, David Randall; Frittelli, John
2009-01-28
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Homeland Security: Protecting Airliners from Terrorist Missiles [Updated November 3, 2003]
"Recent events have focused attention on the threat that terrorists with shoulder fired surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) pose to commercial airliners. Most believe that no single solution exists to effectively mitigate this threat. Instead, a menu of options may be considered, including installing infrared (IR) countermeasures on aircraft; modifying flight operations and air traffic control procedures; improving airport and regional security; and strengthening missile non-proliferation efforts. Equipping aircraft with missile countermeasure systems can protect the aircraft even when operating in areas where ground-based security measures are unavailable or infeasible to implement. However, this option has a relatively high cost, between $1 million and $3 million per aircraft, and the time needed for implementation does not allow for immediate response to the existing terrorist threat. Procedural improvements such as specific flight crew training, altering air traffic procedures to minimize exposure to the threat, and improved security near airports may be less costly than countermeasures and could more immediately help deter domestic terrorist attacks. However, these techniques by themselves cannot completely mitigate the risk of domestic attacks and would not protect U.S. airliners flying to and from foreign airports."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Bolkcom, Christopher C.; Feickert, Andrew; Elias, Bartholomew
2003-11-03
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Homeland Security: Protecting Airspace in the National Capital Region [September 1, 2005]
"Since September 11, 2001, several actions have been taken to monitor and protect the airspace around Washington, DC. However, many general aviation (GA) interests have protested that extensive airspace restrictions and complex procedures exceed what is necessary to protect critical assets from possible terrorist attacks using aircraft. Policymakers have struggled to address airspace protection needs without unduly impeding air commerce or compromising safety. While the administration is currently seeking to make the airspace restrictions in the National Capital Region permanent, Congress has pushed for an easing of restrictions on GA aircraft at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA) and nearby GA airports through legislation and oversight. However, a few high profile airspace breaches have prompted some in Congress to seek stiffer penalties for violators and mandatory training for pilots (see H.R. 3465). Better pilot training and technologies to improve pilot situational awareness may help curtail inadvertent airspace violations that complicate surveillance and protection efforts. Further assessment of airspace design and special flight procedures around Washington, DC, may be undertaken to determine whether an appropriate balance exists between homeland security and defense requirements and air commerce and safety. This report will be updated as needed."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Elias, Bartholomew
2005-09-01
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Reauthorizing and Restructuring the Transportation Security Administrations Aviation Security Functions: Legislative Issues and Approaches [February 8, 2006]
"Authorization for aviation security functions carried out by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) are set to expire at the end of FY2006. In the Senate, a reauthorization bill (S. 1052) has been introduced that would set authorized amounts for aviation security near current appropriated levels, but would increase funding for maritime and land security functions, which make up a relatively small component of the TSA's overall budget. In the House, a reauthorization bill has not yet been introduced, but a proposal to restructure the TSA's aviation security functions (H.R. 4439) has been offered. Under the proposed restructuring plan, a performance-based Aviation Screening Organization (ASO) would be established within the TSA to carry out day-to-day federal screening operations. The bill also seeks to improve the Screening Partnership Program (SPP) under which airports can elect to use private screeners instead of federal TSA screeners in an effort to increase participation in this program. By separating out TSA's regulatory oversight functions from screening operations and promoting the use of private screening partners, the bill seeks to address, in part, a concern expressed by some over the TSA's dual role as both the policymaker and regulator of aviation security at airports and the provider of screening services for airline passengers and their baggage."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Elias, Bartholomew
2006-02-08
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Homeland Security: Protecting Airliners from Terrorist Missiles [Updated February 16, 2006]
"Recent events have focused attention on the threat that terrorists with shoulder fired surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), referred to as Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS), pose to commercial airliners. Most believe that no single solution exists to effectively mitigate this threat. Instead, a menu of options may be considered, including installing infrared (IR) countermeasures on aircraft; modifying flight operations and air traffic control procedures; improving airport and regional security; and strengthening missile non-proliferation efforts. Equipping aircraft with missile countermeasure systems can protect the aircraft even when operating in areas where ground-based security measures are unavailable or infeasible to implement. However, this option has a relatively high cost, between $1 million and $3 million per aircraft, and the time needed for implementation does not allow for immediate response to the existing terrorist threat. Procedural improvements such as specific flight crew training, altering air traffic procedures to minimize exposure to the threat, and improved security near airports may be less costly than countermeasures and could more immediately help deter domestic terrorist attacks. However, these techniques by themselves cannot completely mitigate the risk of domestic attacks and would not protect U.S. airliners flying to and from foreign airports."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Bolkcom, Christopher C.; Elias, Bartholomew
2006-02-16
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Air Cargo Security [Updated January 26, 2006]
"The air cargo system is a complex, multi-faceted network that handles a vast amount of freight, packages, and mail carried aboard passenger and all-cargo aircraft. The air cargo system is vulnerable to several security threats including potential plots to place explosives aboard aircraft; illegal shipments of hazardous materials; criminal activities such as smuggling and theft; and potential hijackings and sabotage by persons with access to aircraft. While it is generally agreed that full screening of all cargo placed on aircraft is not currently feasible, several procedural and technology initiatives have been proposed to enhance air cargo security and deter terrorist and criminal threats. Procedural initiatives include proposals to: expand the 'known shipper' program; increase cargo inspections; increase physical security of air cargo facilities; increase oversight of air cargo operations; provide security training for cargo workers; and tighten controls over access to aircraft during cargo operations. Technology being considered to improve air cargo security includes tamper-resistant and tamper-evident packaging and containers; explosive detection systems and other cargo screening technologies; blast-resistant cargo containers; and biometric systems for worker identification and access control."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Elias, Bartholomew
2006-01-26
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Lasers Aimed at Aircraft Cockpits: Background and Possible Options to Address the Threat to Aviation Safety and Security [Updated December 21, 2005]
From the Document: "Incidents involving lasers aimed at aircraft cockpits has raised concerns over the potential threat to aviation safety and security. While none of these events has been linked to terrorism, security officials have expressed concern that terrorists may seek to acquire and use higher powered lasers to, among other things, incapacitate pilots. There is also concern among aviation safety experts that the ubiquity and low cost of handheld laser devices could increase the number of incidents where pilots are distracted or temporarily incapacitated during critical phases of flight. Possible options to mitigate the threat of lasers include restricting the sale or use of certain laser devices; amending criminal statutes; providing pilots with laser eye protection; expanding and enforcing laser free zones around airports; and educating the public regarding the risks of lasers to aviation safety. On December 12, 2005, the House passed H.R. 1400, a bill that would establish criminal penalties for aiming a laser pointer at an aircraft or its flight path."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Elias, Bartholomew
2005-12-21
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Securing General Aviation [December 15, 2005]
"General aviation (GA)--a catch-all category that includes about 57% of all civilian aviation activity within the United States--encompasses a wide range of airports, aircraft, and flight operations. Because GA plays a small but important role in the U.S. economy, improving upon GA security without unduly impeding air commerce or limiting the freedom of movement by air remains a significant challenge. However, policymakers have received mixed signals about the relative security risk posed by GA, due to its diversity and a general lack of detailed information regarding the threat and vulnerability of various GA operations. While some recent high-profile breaches of GA security point to persisting vulnerabilities and limited intelligence information suggests a continued terrorist interest in using GA aircraft, it is evident that GA airports, aircraft, and operations vary significantly with regard to security risk. While the small size and slow speed of most GA aircraft significantly limits the risk they pose, some experts still fear that they could be used as a platform for a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attack. Certain sectors of GA such as crop dusters and larger business aircraft present more specific risks because of their unique capabilities and aircraft characteristics."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Elias, Bartholomew
2005-12-15
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Arming Pilots against Terrorism: Implementation Issues for the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program [Updated March 25, 2003]
"The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296, H.R. 5005) contains provisions to arm pilots of passenger aircraft and gives deputized pilots the authority to use force, including lethal force, to defend the flight deck against criminal and terrorist threats. Participation in the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program, established under the Arming Pilots against Terrorism Act contained in P.L. 107-296, is limited to pilots of air carriers providing passenger air transportation or intrastate passenger air transportation. Pilots of cargo air carriers may not participate in the program. However, legislation (H.R. 765; S. 516; amendment to S. 165 by Sen. Boxer) seeks to include all-cargo air carrier pilots in the program. During debate over legislation to arm pilots, proponents argued that the potential benefits of deterring or thwarting terrorist and criminal acts against passenger aircraft outweighed the inherent risks associated with arming pilots. However, opponents of policy allowing pilots to be armed with lethal weapons argued that such a program's safety risks and monetary costs significantly outweighed these potential benefits. Risks cited included potential distraction to the flight crew, dangers that a weapon discharge could pose to the aircraft or its occupants, and security concerns associated with carrying firearms in secured areas of the aviation system. Proponents countered that these risks could be effectively mitigated, but recognized that these are important issues to be addressed for successful implementation of the policy to arm pilots."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Elias, Bartholomew
2003-03-25
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Homeland Security: Protecting Airliners from Terrorist Missiles [Updated March 25, 2003]
"The Congressional Research Service addresses the recent terrorist threats against commercial airliners by way of shoulder fired surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). As a result of CRS's investigation, various recommendations are made to Congress in an effort to curtail these attacks. CRS presents a menu of options including installing infrared (IR) countermeasures on aircraft; modifying flight operations and air traffic control procedures; improving airport and regional security; and strengthening missile non-proliferation efforts. CRS asserts that equipping aircraft with missile countermeasure systems can protect the aircraft even when operating in areas where ground-based security measures are unavailable or infeasible to implement. However, this option has a relatively high cost, between $1 million and $3 million per aircraft, and the time needed for implementation does allow for immediate response to the existing terrorist threat. Procedural improvements such as specific flight crew training, altering air traffic procedures to minimize exposure to the threat, and improved security near airports may be less costly than countermeasures and could more immediately help deter domestic terrorist attacks. However, these techniques by themselves cannot completely mitigate the risk of domestic attacks and would not protect U.S. airliners flying to and from foreign airports."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Bolkcom, Christopher C.; Elias, Bartholomew
2003-03-25
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Homeland Security: Protecting Airliners from Terrorist Missiles [Updated October 22, 2004]
"Recent events have focused attention on the threat that terrorists with shoulder fired surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), referred to as Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS), pose to commercial airliners. Most believe that no single solution exists to effectively mitigate this threat. Instead, a menu of options may be considered, including installing infrared (IR) countermeasures on aircraft; modifying flight operations and air traffic control procedures; improving airport and regional security; and strengthening missile non-proliferation efforts. Equipping aircraft with missile countermeasure systems can protect the aircraft even when operating in areas where ground-based security measures are unavailable or infeasible to implement. However, this option has a relatively high cost, between $1 million and $3 million per aircraft, and the time needed for implementation does not allow for immediate response to the existing terrorist threat. Procedural improvements such as specific flight crew training, altering air traffic procedures to minimize exposure to the threat, and improved security near airports may be less costly than countermeasures and could more immediately help deter domestic terrorist attacks. However, these techniques by themselves cannot completely mitigate the risk of domestic attacks and would not protect U.S. airliners flying to and from foreign airports. This report will be updated as needed. This report will be updated as needed."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Bolkcom, Christopher C.; Feickert, Andrew; Elias, Bartholomew
2004-10-22
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Aviation Security-Related Findings and Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission [August 24, 2004]
The 9/11 Commission found that al Qaeda operatives exploited known weaknesses in U.S. aviation security to carry out the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. While legislation and administration actions after September 11, 2001 were implemented to strengthen aviation security, the 9/11 Commission concluded that several weaknesses continue to exist. These include perceived vulnerabilities in cargo and general aviation security as well as inadequate screening and access controls at airports. The 9/11 Commission issued several recommendations designed to strengthen aviation security by: enhancing passenger pre-screening; improving measures to detect explosives on passengers; addressing human factors issues at screening checkpoints; expediting deployment of in-line baggage screening systems; intensifying efforts to identify, track, and screen potentially dangerous cargo; and deploying hardened cargo containers on passenger aircraft. In addition to these specific recommendations, an overarching recommendation for transportation security policy asserts that priorities should be set based on risk, and the most practical and cost effective deterrents should be implemented assigning appropriate roles and missions to federal, state, and local authorities, as well as private stakeholders.
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Elias, Bartholomew
2004-08-24
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Air Cargo Security [Updated August 4, 2004]
"The air cargo system is a complex, multi-faceted network that handles a vast amount of freight, packages, and mail carried aboard passenger and all-cargo aircraft. The air cargo system is vulnerable to several security threats including potential plots to place explosives aboard aircraft; illegal shipments of hazardous materials; criminal activities such as smuggling and theft; and potential hijackings and sabotage by persons with access to aircraft. While it is generally agreed that full screening of all cargo placed on aircraft is not currently feasible, several procedural and technology initiatives have been proposed to enhance air cargo security and deter terrorist and criminal threats. Procedural initiatives include proposals to: expand the 'known shipper' program; increase cargo inspections; increase physical security of air cargo facilities; increase oversight of air cargo operations; provide security training for cargo workers; and tighten controls over access to aircraft during cargo operations. Technology being considered to improve air cargo security includes tamper-resistant and tamper-evident packaging and containers; explosive detection systems and other cargo screening technologies; blast-resistant cargo containers; and biometric systems for worker identification and access control. In addition to these proposals, the 9/11 Commission recommended deploying at least one hardened cargo container in every passenger airliner carrying cargo and enhancing procedures to identify, track, and screen potentially dangerous cargo. This report will be updated as needed."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Elias, Bartholomew
2004-08-04
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Air Cargo Security [Updated September 11, 2003]
"The air cargo system is a complex, multi-faceted network that is vulnerable to several security threats including: potential plots to place explosives aboard aircraft; illegal shipments of hazardous materials; criminal activities such as smuggling and theft; and potential hijackings and sabotage by persons with access to aircraft. Several procedural and technology initiatives have been proposed to enhance air cargo security and deter terrorist and criminal threats which include proposals to: expand the 'known shipper' program; increase cargo inspections; increase physical security of air cargo facilities; increase oversight of air cargo operations; provide security training for cargo workers; and tighten controls over access to aircraft during cargo operations as well as new technologies. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA, P.L. 107-71) contains general provisions for cargo screening, inspection, and security measures. Cargo carried in passenger airplanes must be screened or its security otherwise ensured. ATSA also mandated that a security plan for all-cargo operations was to be put in place as soon as possible, but aviation security initiatives to date have primarily focused on enhancing the security of passenger operations."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Elias, Bartholomew
2003-09-11
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Air Cargo Security [Updated January 13, 2005]
"The air cargo system is a complex, multi-faceted network that handles a vast amount of freight, packages, and mail carried aboard passenger and all-cargo aircraft. The air cargo system is vulnerable to several security threats including potential plots to place explosives aboard aircraft; illegal shipments of hazardous materials; criminal activities such as smuggling and theft; and potential hijackings and sabotage by persons with access to aircraft. While it is generally agreed that full screening of all cargo placed on aircraft is not currently feasible, several procedural and technology initiatives have been proposed to enhance air cargo security and deter terrorist and criminal threats. Procedural initiatives include proposals to: expand the 'known shipper' program; increase cargo inspections; increase physical security of air cargo facilities; increase oversight of air cargo operations; provide security training for cargo workers; and tighten controls over access to aircraft during cargo operations. Technology being considered to improve air cargo security includes tamper-resistant and tamper-evident packaging and containers; explosive detection systems and other cargo screening technologies; blast-resistant cargo containers; and biometric systems for worker identification and access control."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Elias, Bartholomew
2005-01-13
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Air Cargo Security [Updated October 15, 2004]
"The air cargo system is a complex, multi-faceted network that handles a vast amount of freight, packages, and mail carried aboard passenger and all-cargo aircraft. The air cargo system is vulnerable to several security threats including potential plots to place explosives aboard aircraft; illegal shipments of hazardous materials; criminal activities such as smuggling and theft; and potential hijackings and sabotage by persons with access to aircraft. While it is generally agreed that full screening of all cargo placed on aircraft is not currently feasible, several procedural and technology initiatives have been proposed to enhance air cargo security and deter terrorist and criminal threats. Procedural initiatives include proposals to: expand the 'known shipper' program; increase cargo inspections; increase physical security of air cargo facilities; increase oversight of air cargo operations; provide security training for cargo workers; and tighten controls over access to aircraft during cargo operations. Technology being considered to improve air cargo security includes tamper-resistant and tamper-evident packaging and containers; explosive detection systems and other cargo screening technologies; blast-resistant cargo containers; and biometric systems for worker identification and access control. This report will be updated as needed."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Elias, Bartholomew
2004-10-15
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Aviation Security-Related Findings and Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission [Updated October 13, 2004]
"The 9/11 Commission found that al Qaeda operatives exploited known weaknesses in U.S. aviation security to carry out the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. While legislation and administration actions after September 11, 2001 were implemented to strengthen aviation security, the 9/11 Commission concluded that several weaknesses continue to exist. These include perceived vulnerabilities in cargo and general aviation security as well as inadequate screening and access controls at airports. In response to the 9/11 Commission's aviation security-related recommendations, two bills - H.R. 5121 and H.R. 10 - introduced in the House contain several provisions to enhance aviation security. Additionally, floor amendments to S. 2845, the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, contain numerous aviation security provisions, many of which address 9/11 Commission recommendations related to aviation safety. S. 2845 was passed (96-2) by the Senate on October 6, 2004. The House passed H.R. 10 on October 8 by a vote of 282-134. A conference has been requested to resolve numerous differences between H.R. 10 and and S. 2845. This report will be updated as needed."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Elias, Bartholomew
2004-10-13
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Screening and Securing Air Cargo: Background and Issues for Congress [December 2, 2010]
"The October 2010 discovery of two explosive devices being prepared for loading on U.S.-bound all-cargo aircraft overseas has heightened concerns over the potential use of air cargo shipments to bomb passenger and all-cargo aircraft. The incidents have renewed policy debate over air cargo security measures and have prompted some policymakers to call for comprehensive screening of all air cargo, including shipments that travel on all-cargo aircraft. U.S. policies and strategies for protecting air cargo have focused on two main perceived threats: the bombing of a passenger airliner carrying cargo and the hijacking of a large all-cargo aircraft for use as a weapon to attack a ground target such as a major population center, critical infrastructure, or a critical national security asset. […] While 100% of domestic air cargo now undergoes physical screening in compliance with this mandate, not all inbound international cargo shipments carried on passenger airplanes are scrutinized in this manner. TSA is working with international air cargo operators to increase the share of cargo placed on passenger flights that is screened, but 100% screening may not be achieved until August 2013. In the interim, TSA, along with Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and international partners, is relying on risk-based targeting to increase screening of air cargo, particularly shipments deemed to be high risk."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Elias, Bartholomew
2010-12-02
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Return to Private Security Screening at Airports?: Background and Issues Regarding the Opt-Out Provisions of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act [May 14, 2004]
"A provision in the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA, P.L. 107-71 § 108; 115 Stat. 611) permits each airport where federal screeners are currently deployed to request private screeners instead of federal screeners starting in November 2004. A pilot program created by the act was established at five airports to examine the advantages and disadvantages of private airport screening. Concerns have been raised, however, that the pilot program may provide too small a sample and, as currently implemented, is too similar in design to the federal screening function to make a valid comparison of federal and private screening, and that the pilot program airports may not serve as ideal models for future private screening systems. Also, no regulatory framework or guidelines currently exist for evaluating private screening proposals and overseeing private screening firms. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is currently working on these and expects to have preliminary information for airports on the program's implementation by mid-May 2004. […] Implementation of the security screening opt-out provision is likely to be an issue of considerable interest during the remainder of the 108th Congress. While privatization advocates are calling for an expansion of the opt-out provision to allow for greater program flexibility and less federal control of private airport screening, advocates for federal control of aviation security view a return to private screening as a move that could reintroduce deficiencies in aviation security that existed before the federalization of passenger screening under ATSA. This report will be updated as warranted by events."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Elias, Bartholomew
2004-05-14
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Transportation Security: Issues for the 112th Congress
"The nation's air, land, and marine transportation systems are designed for accessibility and efficiency, two characteristics that make them highly vulnerable to terrorist attack. While hardening the transportation sector from terrorist attack is difficult, measures can be taken to deter terrorists. The dilemma facing Congress is how best to construct and finance a system of deterrence, protection, and response that effectively reduces the possibility and consequences of another terrorist attack without unduly interfering with travel, commerce, and civil liberties. […] Existing law mandates the scanning of all U.S.-bound maritime containers with non-intrusive inspection equipment at overseas ports of loading by July 2012. This deadline is unlikely to be met, as foreign countries object to the costs of this screening and are dubious of the benefits. If Congress considers maritime security, it may examine the usefulness of this mandate, as well as the threat posed by the many small craft that populate commercial port areas and progress toward establishing harbor interagency operational centers."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Peterman, David Randall; Elias, Bartholomew; Frittelli, John
2011-02-01
