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Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012
This article discusses the origins of a fictionalized essay which tells the story, looking back from 20 years in the future, of how trends led to a military coup in the United States in the year 2012. The author proposes advice within his fictional scenario that could have prevented the situation from occurring: "Clearly, the curious tapestry of military authoritarianism and combat ineffectiveness that we see today was not yet woven in 1992. But the threads were there. Knowing what I know now, here's the advice I would have given the War College Class of 1992 had I been their graduation speaker: Demand that the armed forces focus exclusively on indisputably military duties; acknowledge that national security does have economic, social, educational, and environmental dimensions, but insist that this doesn't necessarily mean the problems in those areas are the responsibility of the military to correct; readily cede the budgetary resources to those agencies whose business it is to address the non-military issues the armed forces are presently asked to fix; divest the defense budget of perception-skewing expenses; continue to press for the elimination of superfluous, resource-draining Guard and Reserve unites; educate the public to the sophisticated training requirements occasioned by the complexities of modern warfare; resist unification of the services not only on operational grounds, but also because unification would be inimical to the checks and balances that underpin democratic government; assure that officer accessions from the service academies correspond with overall force reductions (but maintain separate service academies) and keep ROTC on a wide diversity of campuses; orient recruiting resources and campaigns toward ensuring that all echelons of society are represented in the military, without compromising standards. Accept that this kind of recruiting may increase costs. It's worth it; [and] work to moderate the base-as-an-island syndrome by providing improved incentives for military members and families to assimilate into civilian communities."
Army War College (U.S.)
Dunlap, Charles J., 1950-
1992
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Melancholy Reunion: A Report from the Future on the Collapse of Civil-Military Relations in the United States
"Melancholy Reunion" picks up where "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012" left off. The year is now 2017, and two years have elapsed since the countercoup that returned the U.S. government to civilian control. The United States has suffered not only defeats in the High-Tech War of 2007 and the Second Gulf War of 2010, but also a military coup in 2012. That coup, engineered by a highly politicized officer corps that blamed these bloody losses on "incompetent" civilian leaders, was initially welcomed by a public exasperated with elected government. Only a few years of repressive military rule had passed, however, before the countercoup in 2015. The chastened electorate placed the thoroughly disgraced armed forces under draconian civilian control. The speaker in this essay addresses the twentieth reunion of the Air University classes of 1997, a rather melancholy event under the circumstances. He examines civil-military relations issues emerging in the 1996-1997 time frame that, with the benefit of twenty-first century hindsight, foretold the coming catastrophes.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Dunlap, Charles J., 1950-
1996-10
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Where Domestic Security and Civil Liberties Collide
Mr. Dunlap examines budget matters concerning domestic security and civil liberties in this report. The report discusses the amount of money spent on anti-terrorism programs when the threats are unknown and non-specific. The data used was the latest available, 1993-1998. Mr. Dunlap poses that the threat of terrorism cannot be combated by the US government or the armed forces, but it should be taken up by the law enforcement personnel of the US because the problem rests with the civilian population (law enforcement agencies, courts, etc.). He also notes that the failing educational system, economics, and social unrest in the nation cause problems for national security yet those problems do not fall to the armed forces to defend or repair. It is also argued that for the US government to accomplish anything, the job must be surrendered to the US armed forces that way it is perceived as a threat and garners more interest by the general population.
Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute
Dunlap, Charles J., 1950-
2000-10
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Shortchanging the Joint Fight? An Airman's Assessment of FM 3-24 and the Case for Developing Truly Joint COIN Doctrine
"Is America's counterinsurgency (COIN) effort being shortchanged? Does a one-dimensional doctrine fail to exploit America's full COIN potential? Would a genuinely joint approach provide better options to decisionmakers confronted with the harsh realities of twenty-first century insurgencies? This study insists the answers are unequivocally 'yes.' It analyzes the pitfalls of accepting Army/Marine tactical doctrine as the joint solution. It also offers insights and ideas from an Airman's perspective for strengthening joint COIN doctrine development in order to deliver fresh alternatives to our national decision-makers and combatant commanders. Of central importance to this assessment is the Army's December 2006 Field Manual (FM) 3-24, 'Counterinsurgency' (designated by the Marine Corps as Warfighting Publication 3-33.5). This impressive and influential 282-page document skillfully addresses many difficult COIN issues, but regrettably reflects a one-dimensional, ground-centric perspective almost exclusively, as evidenced by the fact that considerations of airpower are confined to a short, five-page annex. By failing to reconcile the full potential of today's airpower capabilities and by focusing almost exclusively on the surface dimension, FM 3-24-- despite its many virtues and remarkable insights--nevertheless falls short of offering US decision-makers a pragmatic, 'overall' solution for the challenge of counterinsurgency. Yet, despite FM 3-24's limitations, it has become viewed as the overall plan for COIN operations in Iraq. Of further concern are reports that FM 3-24 appears poised to become the centerpiece of new 'joint' COIN doctrine whose development has just begun. This paper argues that winning COIN fights requires exploiting the potential of the entire joint team."
Air University (U.S.). Airpower Research Institute
Dunlap, Charles J., 1950-
2007-12
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DoD Law of War Manual and its Critics: Some Observations
From the Introduction: "When the Department of Defense (DoD) issued its 'Law of War Manual' in June of 2015--an effort decades in the making--it is clear that it anticipated criticism. For an organization not especially disposed to be humble about its accomplishments, it made a surprising invitation in the text for 'comments and suggestions.' Several experts (and other pundits) have taken up that offer, and have done so publically [sic]. […] The purpose of this article is to examine some of those critiques, and to offer, where appropriate, counters to those assessments, as well as suggestions as to how the 'Manual' might be improved. Although this article does not purport to be a comprehensive examination of every aspect of the 'Manual' or, for that matter, a response to every criticism that has been lodged against it, I nevertheless conclude that on balance the 'Manual' provides an excellent, comprehensive and much-needed statement of the U.S. Department of Defense's view of the 'lex lata' of the law of war. Consequently, with a few exceptions, what follows is generally a defense of the 'Manual' pertaining to several issues that have proven to be contentious."
Naval War College (U.S.)
Dunlap, Charles J., 1950-
2016
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Perspectives for Cyber Strategists on Law for Cyberwar
From the article: "This article takes a somewhat different tact concerning the ability of the law of armed conflict (LOAC) to address cyber issues. Specifically, it argues that while there is certainly room for improvement in some areas, the basic tenets of LOAC are sufficient to address the most important issues of cyberwar. Among other things, this article contends that very often the real difficulty with respect to the law and cyberwar is not any lack of 'law,' per se, but rather in the complexities that arise in determining the necessary facts which must be applied to the law to render legal judgments."
Air University (U.S.). Press
Dunlap, Charles J., 1950-
2011
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COVID-19 is Not 'Like a Nuclear Attack' but Another Kind of Virus Might Be
From the Article: "A few weeks ago the 'Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists' headlined an interview with novelist and academic Jeffery Lewis claiming it would explain '[h]ow the coronavirus outbreak is like a nuclear attack.' Indeed, Lewis insists the pandemic is, as he describes it, a 'nuclear war in slow motion.' It isn't, but as life under COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] restrictions highlights the nation's and, really, the 'world's' growing dependence on the web and associated cyber technologies, a virulent computer virus just might prove as dangerous as a nuclear war."
Duke University
Dunlap, Charles J., 1950-
2020-04-18
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Guest Post: 'Using Digital Surveillance to Combat COVID-19: What the 9/11 Era Can (And Cannot) Teach US'
From the Background: "Much has been written [...] about the use of mobile phones for the purpose of achieving faster and more comprehensive contact tracing. The idea has gained traction following the introduction of such measures in South Korea, Singapore, and elsewhere. [...] We still know relatively little about how this virus operates, and we have yet to employ testing at a scale that would help such tech-based solutions succeed. Nor will a mobile app or similar software eliminate the important, painstaking work of traditional contact tracing and other measures like social distancing. In other words, we need to be sober in our expectations.[...] If we are thinking of adopting some form of surveillance, particularly one that might involve government (whether through the limited collection of anonymized data or through more invasive measures like mandating the use of apps or using electronic surveillance for quarantine enforcement), we are not working from a blank slate. We have been learning in real time for the last two decades."
Duke University. Center on Law, Ethics, and National Security
Dunlap, Charles J., 1950-; Stansbury, Shane
2020-05-09
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