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• Cybercrime: A Sketch of 18 U.S.C. 1030 and Related Federal Criminal Laws [October 15, 2014]

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  From the Summary: "The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), 18 U.S.C. 1030, outlaws conduct that victimizes computer systems. It is a cyber security law. It protects federal computers, bank computers, and computers connected to the Internet. It shields them from trespassing, threats, damage, espionage, and from being corruptly used as instruments of fraud. It is not a comprehensive provision, but instead it fills cracks and gaps in the protection afforded by other federal criminal laws. This is a brief sketch of CFAA and some of its federal statutory companions, including the amendments found in the Identity Theft Enforcement and Restitution Act, P.L. 110-326, 122 Stat. 3560 (2008)."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Doyle, Charles

  2014-10-15
• Mail and Wire Fraud: A Brief Overview of Federal Criminal Law [August 6, 2014]

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  "It is a federal crime to devise a scheme to defraud another of property, when either mail or wire communications are used in furtherance of the scheme, 18 U.S.C. 1341, 1343. Mail or wire fraud includes schemes to defraud another of honest services, when the scheme involves bribery or a kick back, 18 U.S.C. 1346; 'Skilling v. United States', 561 U.S. 358 (2010). In order to convict, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant (1) used either mail or wire communications in the foreseeable furtherance, (2) of a scheme to defraud, (3) involving a material deception, (4) with the intent to deprive another of, (5) either property or honest services. Offenders face the prospect of imprisonment for not more than 20 years, a fine of not more than $250,000 (not more than $500,000 for organizations), an order to pay victim restitution, and the confiscation of any property realized from the offense. Misconduct that constitutes mail or wire fraud may also constitute a violation of one or more other federal crimes. Principal among these are predicate offense crimes, frauds based on jurisdictional factors other than use of mail or wire communications, and other honest services frauds in the form of bribery or kickbacks. The other federal bribery and kickback offenses include bribery of public officials, federal program bribery, extortion under color of official right, and Medicare/Medicaid kickbacks. Mail and wire fraud are money laundering and racketeering predicate offenses. Numbered among the fraud offenses based on other jurisdiction grounds are the false claims and false statement offenses, bank fraud, health care fraud, securities fraud, and foreign labor contracting fraud. This report is available in an abridged version as CRS [Congressional Research Service] Report R41931, Mail and Wire Fraud: An Abridged Overview of Federal Criminal Law, by Charles Doyle, without the footnotes, appendix, quotation marks, or citations to authority found here. Related CRS reports include CRS Report R40852, Deprivation of Honest Services as a Basis for Federal Mail and Wire Fraud Convictions, by Charles Doyle."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Doyle, Charles

  2014-08-06
• Mail and Wire Fraud: An Abridged Overview of Federal Criminal Law [August 6, 2014]

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  "It is a federal crime to devise a scheme to defraud another of property, when either mail or wire communications are used in furtherance of the scheme, 18 U.S.C. 1341, 1343. Mail or wire fraud includes schemes to defraud another of honest services, when the scheme involves bribery or a kick back, 18 U.S.C. 1346; 'Skilling v. United States', 130 S.Ct. 2896 (2010). In order to convict, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant (1) used either mail or wire communications in the foreseeable furtherance, (2) of a scheme to defraud, (3) involving a material deception, (4) with the intent to deprive another of, (5) either property or honest services. Offenders face the prospect of imprisonment for not more than 20 years, a fine of not more than $250,000 (not more than $500,000 for organizations), an order to pay victim restitution, and the confiscation of any property realized from the offense. Misconduct that constitutes mail or wire fraud may also constitute a violation of one or more other federal crimes. Principal among these are predicate offense crimes, frauds based on jurisdictional factors other than use of mail or wire communications, and other honest services frauds in the form of bribery or kickbacks. The other federal bribery and kickback offenses include bribery of public officials, federal program bribery, extortion under color of official right, and Medicare/Medicaid kickbacks. Mail and wire fraud are money laundering and racketeering predicate offenses. Numbered among the fraud offenses based on other jurisdiction grounds are the false claims and false statement offenses, bank fraud, health care fraud, securities fraud, and foreign labor contracting fraud. This is an abridged version of CRS [Congressional Research Service] Report R41930, 'Mail and Wire Fraud: A Brief Overview of Federal Criminal Law', by Charles Doyle, without the footnotes, appendix, quotation marks, or citations to authority found in the longer version. Related CRS reports include CRS Report R40852, 'Deprivation of Honest Services as a Basis for Federal Mail and Wire Fraud Convictions', by Charles Doyle."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Doyle, Charles

  2014-08-06
• Stealing Trade Secrets and Economic Espionage: An Overview of 18 U.S.C. 1831 and 1832 [July 25, 2014]

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  "Stealing a trade secret is a federal crime when the information relates to a product in interstate or foreign commerce, 18 U.S.C. 1832 (theft of trade secrets), or when the intended beneficiary is a foreign power, 18 U.S.C. 1831 (economic espionage). Section 1832 requires that the thief be aware that the misappropriation will injure the secret's owner to the benefit of someone else. Section 1831 requires only that the thief intend to benefit a foreign government or one of its instrumentalities. Section 1832 (theft) violations are punishable by imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or a fine of not more than $250,000 (not more than $5 million for organizations), or both. Section 1831 (espionage) violations by individuals are punishable by imprisonment for not more than 15 years, or a fine of the greater of not more than $5 million, or both. Section 1831 violations by organizations are punishable by a fine of not more than the greater of $10 million or three times the value of the stolen trade secret. Maximum fines for both individuals and organizations may be higher when the amount of the gain or loss associated with the offense is substantial. Any attempt or conspiracy to commit either offense carries the same penalties as the underlying crime."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Doyle, Charles

  2014-07-25
• Bond v. United States: Validity and Construction of the Federal Chemical Weapons Statute [June 20, 2014]

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  "The Chemical Weapons Convention obligates the United States to outlaw the use, production, and retention of weapons consisting of toxic chemicals. The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act outlaws the possession or use of toxic chemicals, except for peaceful purposes. In 'Bond v. United States', the Supreme Court concluded that Congress had not intended the Act to reach a 'run of the mill' assault case using a skin irritating chemical. Carol Anne Bond, upon discovering that her husband had impregnated another woman, repeatedly dusted the woman's mail box, front door knob, and car door handles with a toxic chemical. Mrs. Bond was indicted in federal court and pled guilty to possessing a chemical weapon in violation of Section 229 of the Act, but reserved the right to appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected her constitutional challenge. A concurring member of the panel, however, urged the Supreme Court to clarify the nearly century-old pronouncement in 'Missouri v. Holland', 'if the treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute ... as a necessary and proper means to execute the powers of the Government.' The concurring judge observed that, 'since 'Holland', Congress has largely resisted testing the outer bounds of its treaty-implementing authority. But if ever there was a statute that did test those limits, it would be Section 229. With its shockingly broad definitions, Section 229 federalizes purely local, run-of-the mill criminal conduct.... Sweeping statutes like Section 229 are in deep tension with an important structural feature of our Government: The States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law.'"

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Doyle, Charles

  2014-06-20
• Obstruction of Justice: An Overview of Some of the Federal Statutes that Prohibit Interference with Judicial, Executive, or Legislative Activities [April 17, 2014]

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  "Obstruction of justice is the impediment of governmental activities. There are a host of federal criminal laws that prohibit obstructions of justice. The six most general outlaw obstruction of judicial proceedings (18 U.S.C. 1503), witness tampering (18 U.S.C. 1512), witness retaliation (18 U.S.C. 1513), obstruction of congressional or administrative proceedings (18 U.S.C. 1505), conspiracy to defraud the United States (18 U.S.C. 371), and contempt (a creature of statute, rule and common law). The laws that supplement, and sometimes mirror, the basic six tend to proscribe a particular means of obstruction. Some, like the perjury and false statement statutes, condemn obstruction by lies and deception. Others, like the bribery, mail fraud, and wire fraud statutes, prohibit obstruction by corruption of public employees or officials. Some outlaw the use of violence as a means of obstruction. Still others ban the destruction of evidence. [...] Moreover, regardless of the offense for which an individual is convicted, his sentence may be enhanced as a consequence of any obstruction of justice for which he is responsible, if committed during the course of the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing for the offense of his conviction. The enhancement may result in an increase in his term of imprisonment by as much as four years. This report is available in abbreviated form--without footnotes, quotations, or citations--as CRS Report RS22783, 'Obstruction of Justice: An Abridged Overview of Related Federal Criminal Laws' by Charles Doyle."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Doyle, Charles

  2014-04-17
• Obstruction of Justice: An Abridged Overview of Related Federal Criminal Laws [April 17, 2014]

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  "Obstruction of justice is the frustration of governmental purposes by violence, corruption, destruction of evidence, or deceit. It is a federal crime. In fact, it is several crimes. Obstruction prosecutions regularly involve charges under several statutory provisions. Federal obstruction of justice laws are legion; too many for even passing reference to all of them in a single report. The general obstruction of justice provisions are six: 18 U.S.C. 1512 (tampering with federal witnesses), 1513 (retaliating against federal witnesses), 1503 (obstruction of pending federal court proceedings), 1505 (obstruction of pending congressional or federal administrative proceedings), 371 (conspiracy), and contempt. In addition to these, there are a host of other statutes that penalize obstruction by violence, corruption, destruction of evidence, or deceit. Moreover, regardless of the offense for which an individual is convicted, his sentence may be enhanced as a consequence of any obstruction of justice for which he is responsible, if committed during the course of the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing for the offense of his conviction. The enhancement may result in an increase in his term of imprisonment by as much as four years. This is an abridged version of CRS [Congressional Research Service] Report RL34303, 'Obstruction of Justice: An Overview of Some of the Federal Statutes That Prohibit Interference with Judicial, Executive, or Legislative Activities,' without the footnotes, quotations, or citations to authority found in the longer report."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Doyle, Charles

  2014-04-17
• Marijuana: Medical and Retail - An Abbreviated View of Selected Legal Issues [March 25, 2014]

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  "The federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA) outlaws the possession, cultivation, or distribution of marijuana except for authorized research. Twenty states have regulatory schemes that allow possession, cultivation, or distribution of marijuana for medicinal purposes. Two have revenue regimes that allow possession, cultivation, or sale generally. The U.S. Constitution's Supremacy Clause preempts any state law that conflicts with federal law. Although there is some division, the majority of state courts have concluded that the federal-state marijuana law conflict does not require preemption of state medical marijuana laws. The legal consequences of a CSA violation, however, remain in place. Nevertheless, current federal criminal enforcement guidelines counsel confining investigations and prosecutions to the most egregious affront to federal interests. Legal and ethical considerations limit the extent to which an attorney may advise and assist a client intent on participating in his or her state's medical or recreational marijuana system. Bar associations differ on the precise boundaries of those limitations. State medical marijuana laws grant registered patients, their doctors, and providers immunity from the consequences of state law. The Washington and Colorado retail marijuana regimes authorize the commercial exploitation of the marijuana market in small taxable doses."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Garvey, Todd; Doyle, Charles

  2014-03-25
• Marijuana: Medical and Retail- Selected Legal Issues [March 25, 2014]

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  "Federal law classifies marijuana as a Schedule I Controlled Substance. As a result, it is a federal crime to grow, sell, or merely possess the drug. In addition to facing the prospect of a federal criminal prosecution, those who violate the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA) may suffer a number of additional adverse consequences under federal law. For example, federal authorities may confiscate any property used to grow marijuana or facilitate its sale or use; marijuana users may lose their jobs, their homes, or their right to possess a firearm or ammunition; and sellers of marijuana may lose the tax benefits and banking services that other merchants enjoy, and ultimately their businesses. Nevertheless, without federal statutory sanction, 20 states have established medical marijuana regulatory regimes. Two have gone further and 'legalized' marijuana under state recreational marijuana laws. State officials lack the constitutional authority necessary to trump conflicting federal law. Federal officials, however, lack the unlimited resources necessary to trump the impact of conflicting state law. The following is an analysis of some of the legal issues the situation has generated and some of the proposals to resolve them."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Garvey, Todd; Doyle, Charles

  2014-03-25
• Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Legislation in the 113th Congress [February 7, 2014]

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  "Defendants convicted of violating certain federal criminal laws face the prospect of mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment. Bills offered during the 113th Congress would supplement, enhance, or eliminate some of these. In the most all-encompassing, H.R. 1695 (Representative Scott (VA)) and S. 619 (Senator Paul) would permit federal courts to impose a sentence below an otherwise applicable mandatory minimum when necessary to avoid violating certain statutory directives. Federal drug statutes feature a series of mandatory minimums. S. 1410 (Senator Durbin)/H.R. 3382 (Representative Labrador) and S. 1410 (Judiciary), as voted by the Judiciary Committee, would reduce several of the most severe of these. H.R. 3088 (Representative Waters) would eliminate virtually all of them. The Durbin bill would also enlarge the safety valve exception. The safety valve provision allows a federal court to sentence qualified defendants below the statutory mandatory minimum in drug cases, if the defendant has a virtually spotless criminal record, that is, not more than one criminal history point. S. 1410 would expand safety valve eligibility to defendants with a slightly more extensive criminal record. Elsewhere, H.R. 2372 (Representative Scott (VA)) would drop the sentencing distinction between powder and crack cocaine by striking the cocaine base specific references. Two proposals address the Fair Sentencing Act's retroactive application. One, H.R. 2369 (Representative Scott (VA)) would permit a court to reduce, consistent with the act, a previously imposed sentence for crack cocaine possession or trafficking. The second, S. 1410 (Senator Durbin), would also permit a court to reduce such sentences, but would limit the authority to instances in which the defendant had not been previously granted or denied a similar reduction."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Doyle, Charles

  2014-02-07
• Perjury Under Federal Law: A Brief Overview [January 28, 2014]

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  "There are three general federal perjury laws. One, 18 U.S.C. 1621, outlaws presenting material false statements under oath in federal official proceedings. A second, 18 U.S.C. 1623, bars presenting material false statements under oath before or ancillary to federal court or grand jury proceedings. A third, 18 U.S.C. 1622 (subornation of perjury), prohibits inducing or procuring another to commit perjury in violation of either Section 1621 or Section 1623. In most cases, the courts abbreviate their description of the elements and state that to prove perjury in a judicial context under Section 1623 the government must establish that the defendant '(1) knowingly made a (2) false (3) material declaration (4) under oath (5) in a proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United States.' […] This report is available in abbreviated form--without footnotes, quotations, or citations--as CRS [Congressional Research Service] Report 98-807, 'Perjury Under Federal Law: A Sketch of the Elements.' Both versions have been largely excerpted from CRS Report RL34303, 'Obstruction of Justice: An Overview of Some of the Federal Statutes That Prohibit Interference with Judicial, Executive, or Legislative Activities.' […] All are by Charles Doyle."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Doyle, Charles

  2014-01-28
• Perjury Under Federal Law: A Sketch of the Elements [January 28, 2014]

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  "There are three general federal perjury laws. One, 18 U.S.C. 1621, outlaws presenting material false statements under oath in federal official proceedings. A second, 18 U.S.C. 1623, bars presenting material false statements under oath before or ancillary to federal court or grand jury proceedings. A third, 18 U.S.C. 1622 (subornation of perjury), prohibits inducing or procuring another to commit perjury in violation of either Section 1621 or Section 1623. In most cases, the courts abbreviate their description of the elements and state that to prove perjury in a judicial context under Section 1623 the government must establish that the defendant '(1) knowingly made a (2) false (3) material declaration (4) under oath (5) in a proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United States.' […] This report is an abbreviated version of CRS Report 98-808, 'Perjury Under Federal Law: A Brief Overview,' by Charles Doyle, stripped of most footnotes, quotations, citations, and bibliography."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Doyle, Charles

  2014-01-28
• Venue: A Brief Look at Federal Law Governing Where a Federal Crime May Be Tried [January 24, 2014]

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  "The United States Constitution assures those charged with a serious federal crime that they are entitled to jury trial in the state and district in which the crime occurred. A crime occurs in any district in which any of its 'conduct' elements are committed. Some offenses are committed entirely within a single district; there they must be tried. Other crimes have elements that have occurred in more than one district. Still other crimes have been committed overseas and so have occurred outside any district. Statutory provisions dictate where a multi-district crime or overseas crime may be tried. Section 3237 of Title 18 of the 'U.S. Code' supplies three general rules for venue in multi-district cases. Tax cases may be tried where the taxpayer resides. Mail and interstate commerce offenses may be tried in any district traversed during the course of a particular crime. Continuous or overlapping offenses may be tried in any district in which they begin, continue, or are completed. For example, conspiracy, perhaps the most common continuous offense, may be tried where the scheme is joined or where any overt act in its furtherance is committed. These general rules aside, a few crimes, like murder or immigration offenses, have individual venue provisions."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Doyle, Charles

  2014-01-24
• National Security Letters in Foreign Intelligence Investigations: Legal Background [January 3, 2014]

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  "Five federal statutes authorize intelligence officials to request certain business record information in connection with national security investigations. The authority to issue these national security letters (NSLs) is comparable to the authority to issue administrative subpoenas. The USA PATRIOT Act […] expanded the authority under four of the NSL statutes and created the fifth. Thereafter, the authority has been reported to have been widely used. Prospects of its continued use dimmed, however, after two lower federal courts held that the lack of judicial review and the absolute confidentiality requirements in one of the statutes rendered it constitutionally suspect. A report by the Department of Justice's Inspector General (IG) found that in its pre-amendment use of expanded USA PATRIOT Act authority the FBI had 'used NSLs in violation of applicable NSL statutes, Attorney General Guidelines, and internal FBI policies,' but that no criminal laws had been broken. A year later, a second IG report confirmed the findings of the first, and noted the corrective measures taken in response. A third IG report, critical of the FBI's use of exigent letters and informal NSL alternatives, noted that the practice had been stopped and related problems addressed."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Doyle, Charles

  2014-01-03
• National Security Letters in Foreign Intelligence Investigations: A Glimpse at the Legal Background [January 3, 2014]

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  "Five federal statutes authorize intelligence officials to request certain business record information in connection with national security investigations. The authority to issue these national security letters (NSLs) is comparable to the authority to issue administrative subpoenas. The USA PATRIOT Act (107-56) expanded the authority under four of the NSL statutes and created the fifth. Thereafter, the authority has been reported to have been widely used. Prospects of its continued use dimmed, however, after two lower federal courts held that the lack of judicial review and the absolute confidentiality requirements in one of the statutes rendered it constitutionally suspect. A report by the Department of Justice's Inspector General (IG) found that in its pre-amendment use of expanded USA PATRIOT Act authority the FBI had 'used NSLs in violation of applicable NSL statutes, Attorney General Guidelines, and internal FBI policies,' but that no criminal laws had been broken. A year later, a second IG report confirmed the findings of the first, and noted the corrective measures taken in response. A third IG report, critical of the FBI's use of exigent letters and informal NSL alternatives, noted that the practice had been stopped and related problems addressed."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Doyle, Charles

  2014-01-03
• National Security Letters: Proposal in the 113th Congress [November 22, 2013]

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  "National Security Letters (NSLs) are roughly comparable to administrative subpoenas. They need no prior judicial approval. Intelligence agencies issue them for intelligence gathering purposes to telephone companies, Internet service providers, consumer credit reporting agencies, banks, and other financial institutions, directing the recipients to turn over certain customer records and similar information. The 111th and 112th Congresses saw a number of proposals to amend NSL authority. None were enacted. In the 112th Congress, they were closely associated with the scheduled expiration of various provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). In the 113th Congress, they have often been grouped with legislation that addresses the exercise of FISA authority."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Doyle, Charles

  2013-11-22
• National Security Letters in Foreign Intelligence Investigations: Legal Background [November 22, 2013]

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  "Five statutory provisions vest government agencies responsible for certain foreign intelligence investigations (principally the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)) with authority to issue written commands comparable to administrative subpoenas. A National Security Letter (NSL) seeks customer and consumer transaction information in national security investigations from communications providers, financial institutions and credit agencies. Section 505 of the USA PATRIOT Act expanded the circumstances under which an NSL could be used. Subsequent press accounts suggested that their use had become widespread. Two lower federal courts, however, found the uncertainties, practices, and policies associated with the use of NSL authority contrary to the First Amendment right of freedom of speech, and thus brought into question the extent to which NSL authority could be used in the future. The USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act and P.L. 109-178 (S. 2271) amended the NSL statutes and related law to address some of the concerns raised by critics and the courts. As a consequence, the Second Circuit dismissed one of the lower court cases as moot and remanded the other for reconsideration in light of the amendments. On reconsideration, the district court opinion continued to be troubled by the First Amendment implications of the nondisclosure features of 18 U.S.C. 2709, even as amended. The appellate court was comparably concerned, but concluded that the government might invoke the authority of 18 U.S.C. 2709 and 18 U.S.C. 3511 in a limited but constitutionally acceptable manner. On remand under the procedure envisioned by the Second Circuit panel, the district court found a continuing need to maintain the original secrecy order, but ordered the government to provide the plaintiffs with an unclassified, redacted summary of the declaration upon which the court's decision was based. The result was somewhat different in the Ninth Circuit. There, too, a district court found that Section 2709(c)'s nondisclosure requirements violated the First Amendment and that Section 3511(b)(2)'s and (3)'s judicial review provisions violated the First Amendment and separation of powers principles. It could not agree to the narrow construction favored by the Second Circuit, however, given the clear statutory language and equally clear congressional intent to afford the government broad, review-proof authority to issue NSL secrecy orders. Nevertheless, pending appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the district court stayed its order barring issuance of further NSLs and enforcement of any related nondisclosure requirements."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Doyle, Charles

  2013-11-22
• Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Legislation in the 113th Congress [November 5, 2013]

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  "Defendants convicted of violating any certain federal criminal laws face the prospect of mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment. Bills offered during the 113th Congress would supplement, enhance, or eliminate some of these. In the most all-encompassing, H.R. 1695 (Representative Scott (Va.)) and S. 619 (Senator Paul) would permit federal courts to impose a sentence below an otherwise applicable mandatory minimum when necessary to avoid violating certain statutory directives. […] Several proposals add or enhance the mandatory minimums associated with individual offenses. For instance, H.R. 1468 (Representative Blackburn) would create a separate crime for anyone who, during and in relation to a computer fraud or abuse violation, substantially impaired or attempted to impair the operation of a critical infrastructure computer system or an associated critical infrastructure. H.R. 457 (Representative Issa) would establish mandatory minimum penalties for an alien previously removed from the U.S. for his criminal activities. H.R. 1577 (Representative Poe) and S. 698 (Senator Cornyn) would expand the class of protected public servants; increase the penalties associated with homicides committed against them; establish mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment for killing or assaulting them; and create a new flight-to-avoid-prosecution offense for fugitives accused of such crimes, punishable by a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Doyle, Charles

  2013-11-05
• Corporate Criminal Liability: An Overview of Federal Law [October 30, 2013]

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  "A corporation is criminally liable for the federal crimes its employees or agents commit in its interest. Corporate officers, employees, and agents are individually liable for the crimes they commit, for the crimes they conspire to commit, for the foreseeable crimes their coconspirators commit, for the crimes whose commission they aid and abet, and for the crimes whose perpetrators they assist after the fact. The decision whether to prosecute a corporation rests with the Justice Department. Internal guidelines identify the factors that are to be weighed. [...] As in the case of individual defendants, corporation prosecutions rarely result in a criminal trial. More often, the corporation pleads guilty or enters into a deferred or delayed prosecution agreement. During a criminal investigation and throughout the course of criminal proceedings, corporations enjoy many, but not all, of the constitutional rights implicated in the criminal investigation or prosecution of an individual. Corporations have no Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. On the other hand, the courts have recognized or have assumed that corporations have a First Amendment right to free speech; a Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures; a Fifth Amendment right to due process and protection against double jeopardy; Sixth Amendment rights to counsel, jury trial, speedy trial, and to confront accusers, and to subpoena witnesses; and Eighth Amendment protection against excessive fines. Corporations cannot be jailed. Otherwise, corporations and individuals face many of the same consequences following conviction. The federal Sentencing Guidelines influence the sentencing consequences of conviction in many instances. Corporations can be fined. They can be placed on probation. They can be ordered to pay restitution. Their property can be confiscated. They can be barred from engaging in various types of commercial activity. The Guidelines speak to all of these."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Doyle, Charles

  2013-10-30
• Corporate Criminal Liability: An Abbreviated Overview of Federal Law [October 30, 2013]

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  "A corporation is criminally liable for the federal crimes its employees or agents commit in its interest. Corporate officers, employees, and agents are individually liable for the crimes they commit, for the crimes they conspire to commit, for the foreseeable crimes their coconspirators commit, for the crimes whose commission they aid and abet, and for the crimes whose perpetrators they assist after the fact. The decision whether to prosecute a corporation rests with the Justice Department. Internal guidelines identify the factors that are to be weighed: the strength of the case against the corporation; the extent and history of misconduct; the existence of a compliance program; the corporation's cooperation with the investigation; the collateral consequences; whether the corporation has made restitution or taken other remedial measures; and the alternatives to federal prosecution. As in the case of individual defendants, corporation prosecutions rarely result in a criminal trial. More often, the corporation pleads guilty or enters into a deferred or delayed prosecution agreement. During a criminal investigation and throughout the course of criminal proceedings, corporations enjoy many, but not all, of the constitutional rights implicated in the criminal investigation or prosecution of an individual. Corporations have no Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. On the other hand, the courts have recognized or have assumed that corporations have a First Amendment right to free speech; a Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures; a Fifth Amendment right to due process and protection against double jeopardy; Sixth Amendment rights to counsel, jury trial, speedy trial, and to confront accusers, and to subpoena witnesses; and Eighth Amendment protection against excessive fines."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Doyle, Charles

  2013-10-30
• Mandatory Minimum Sentencing: Federal Aggravated Identity Theft [October 22, 2013]

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  "Aggravated identity theft is punishable by a mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment for two years or by imprisonment for five years if it relates to a terrorism offense. At least thus far, the government has rarely prosecuted the five-year terrorism form of the offense. The two-year offense occurs when an individual knowingly possesses, uses, or transfers the means of identification of another person, without lawful authority to do so, during and in relation to one of more than 60 predicate federal felony offenses (18 U.S.C. 1028A). Section 1028A has the effect of establishing a mandatory minimum sentence for those predicate felony offenses, when they involve identity theft. A sentencing court has the discretion not to 'stack' or pancake multiple aggravated identity theft counts and, as with other mandatory minimums, may impose a sentence of less than the mandatory minimum at the request of the prosecution based on the defendant's substantial assistance. More than half of the judges responding to a United States Sentence Commission survey felt the two-year mandatory minimum penalty was generally appropriate. The Commission's report on mandatory minimum sentencing statutes is mildly complimentary of the provision."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Doyle, Charles

  2013-10-22
• Federal Mandatory Minimum Sentencing: The 18 U.S.C. 924(c) Tack-On in Cases Involving Drugs or Violence [October 21, 2013]

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  "Section 924(c) requires the imposition of one of a series of mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment upon conviction for misconduct involving the firearm and the commission of a federal crime of violence or a federal drug trafficking offense. The terms vary according to the type of firearm used, the manner of the firearm's involvement, and whether the conviction involves a single, first-time offense. Liability extends to co-conspirators and to those who aid or abet in the commission of a violation of the section. If a machine gun, silencer, short barreled rifle, short barreled shotgun, or body armor is involved, the offense is punished more severely. If the firearm is brandished or discharged, the offense is punished more severely. Repeat offenders are likewise punished more severely. Twenty-five-year mandatory minimum terms for multiple offenses must be served consecutively. […] The United States Sentencing Commission has suggested that Congress consider amending Section 924(c) to (1) address the 'stacking' of 25-year charges for multiple offenses; (2) require a prior conviction to trigger repeat offender enhancements; (3) provide sentencing courts with discretion over whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences; and (4) clarify the statutory definitions of the terms used in Section 924(c). Section 924(c) has withstood constitutional challenges based on the Second Amendment's right to bear arms; the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishments prohibition; the Sixth Amendment's right to jury trial; the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy proscription; and the Constitution's structural limitations on preservation of the separation of powers and on Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Doyle, Charles

  2013-10-21
• Federal Mandatory Minimum Sentences: The Safety Valve and Substantial Assistance Exceptions [October 21, 2013]

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  "Federal law requires a sentencing judge to impose a minimum sentence of imprisonment following conviction for any of a number of federal offenses. Congress has created two exceptions. One is available in all cases when the prosecutor asserts that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the criminal investigation or prosecution of another, 18 U.S.C. 3553(e). The other, commonly referred to as the safety value, is available, without the government's approval, for a handful of the more commonly prosecuted drug trafficking and unlawful possession offenses that carry minimum sentences, 18 U.S.C. 3553(f). Qualification for the substantial assistance exception is ordinarily only possible upon the motion of the government. In rare cases, the court may compel the government to file such a motion when the defendant can establish that the refusal to do so was based on constitutionally invalid considerations, or was in derogation of a plea bargain obligation or was the product of bad faith. Qualification for the safety valve exception requires a defendant to satisfy five criteria. His past criminal record must be minimal; he must not have been a leader, organizer, or supervisor in the commission of the offense; he must not have used violence in the commission or the offense, and the offense must not have resulted in serious injury; and prior to sentencing, he must tell the government all that he knows of the offense and any related misconduct. Congress has instructed the United States Sentencing Commission to report on the operation of federal mandatory minimum sentencing provisions."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Doyle, Charles

  2013-10-21
• Federal Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Statutes [September 9, 2013]

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  "Federal mandatory minimum sentencing statutes (mandatory minimums) demand that execution or incarceration follow criminal conviction. Among other things, they cover drug dealing, murdering federal officials, and using a gun to commit a federal crime. They have been a feature of federal sentencing since the dawn of the republic. They circumscribe judicial sentencing discretion, although they impose few limitations upon prosecutorial discretion, or upon the President's power to pardon. They have been criticized as unthinkingly harsh and incompatible with a rational sentencing guideline system; yet they have also been embraced as hallmarks of truth in sentencing and a certain means of incapacitating the criminally dangerous. This is a brief overview of federal statutes in the area and a discussion of some of the constitutional challenges they have faced."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Doyle, Charles

  2013-09-09
• Failure to Register as a Sex Offender: A Legal Analysis of 18 U.S.C. 2250 [July 25, 2013]

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  "Section 2250 outlaws an individual's failure to comply with federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) requirements. SORNA demands that an individual--previously convicted of a qualifying federal, state, or foreign sex offense--register with state, territorial, or tribal authorities. Individuals must register in every jurisdiction in which they live, work, or attend school. They must also update the information whenever they move, or change their employment or educational status. Section 2250 applies only under one of several jurisdictional circumstances: the individual was previously convicted of a qualifying federal sex offense; the individual travels in interstate or foreign commerce; or the individual enters, leaves, or resides in Indian country. Individuals charged with a violation of §2250 may be subject to preventive detention or to a series of pre-trial release conditions. If convicted, they face imprisonment for not more than 10 years and/or a fine of not more than $250,000 as well as the prospect of a post-imprisonment term of supervised release of not less than 5 years. An offender guilty of a §2250 offense, who also commits a federal crime of violence, is subject to an additional penalty of imprisonment for up to 30 years and not less than 5 years for the violent crime."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Doyle, Charles

  2013-07-25
• Search and Seizure Cases in the October 2012 Term of the Supreme Court [May 15, 2013]

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  "This term, the Supreme Court considers whether (1) deploying a drug-detecting dog at the front door of a house qualifies as a Fourth Amendment search ('Florida v. Jardines'); (2) the positive reaction of a trained, drug-detecting dog constitutes probable cause per se (Florida v. Harris); and (3) the rationale which permits the warrantless, suspicionless detention of individuals found in a place covered by a search warrant also permits the warrantless, suspicionless off-site apprehension and return of individuals who have recently left a place covered by a search warrant ('Bailey v. United States'). The Supreme Court has said in the past that walking a drug-detecting dog around a car pulled over on the highway or around luggage in an airport is not a Fourth Amendment search. Nevertheless, the Court in 'Jardines' noted that those cases were decided under the 'expectation of privacy' rationale. Under the alternative 'property intrusion' rationale, a Fourth Amendment search occurred when police used a trained dog to test for the smell of marijuana on Jardines's porch."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Doyle, Charles

  2013-05-15
• Crime and Forfeiture: In Short [May 13, 2013]

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  "Forfeiture has long been an effective law enforcement tool. Congress and state legislatures have authorized its use for over 200 years. Every year, it redirects property worth billions of dollars from criminal to lawful uses. Forfeiture law has always been somewhat unique. Legislative bodies, commentators, and the courts, however, had begun to examine its eccentricities in greater detail because under some circumstances it could be not only harsh but unfair. The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act (CAFRA), P.L. [Public Law] 106-185, 114 Stat. 202 (2000), was a product of that reexamination. Modern forfeiture follows one of two procedural routes. Although crime triggers all forfeitures, they are classified as civil forfeitures or criminal forfeitures according to the nature of the procedure that ends in confiscation. Civil forfeiture is an in rem proceeding. The property is the defendant in the case. Unless the statute provides otherwise, the innocence of the owner is irrelevant--it is enough that the property was involved in a violation to which forfeiture attaches. As a matter of expedience and judicial economy, Congress often allows administrative forfeiture in uncontested civil confiscation cases. Criminal forfeiture is an in personam proceeding, and confiscation is only possible upon the conviction of the owner of the property."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Doyle, Charles

  2013-05-13
• Crime and Forfeiture [May 13, 2013]

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  "Forfeiture has long been an effective law enforcement tool. Congress and state legislatures have authorized its use for over two hundred years. Every year, it redirects property worth billions of dollars from criminal to lawful uses. Forfeiture law has always been somewhat unique. Legislative bodies, commentators and the courts, however, had begun to examine its eccentricities in greater detail because under some circumstances it could be not only harsh but unfair. The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act (CAFRA), P.L. [Public Law] 106-185, 114 Stat. 202 (2000), was a product of that reexamination. Modern forfeiture follows one of two procedural routes. Although crime triggers all forfeitures, they are classified as civil forfeitures or criminal forfeitures according to the nature of the procedure which ends in confiscation. Civil forfeiture is an in rem proceeding. The property is the defendant in the case. Unless the statute provides otherwise, the innocence of the owner is irrelevant--it is enough that the property was involved in a violation to which forfeiture attaches. As a matter of expedience and judicial economy, Congress often allows administrative forfeiture in uncontested civil confiscation cases. Criminal forfeiture is an in personam proceeding, and confiscation is only possible upon the conviction of the owner of the property."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Doyle, Charles

  2013-05-13
• Terrorism, 'Miranda', and Related Matters [April 24, 2013]

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  "The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part that 'No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.' In 'Miranda v. Arizona', the Supreme Court declared that statements of an accused, given during a custodial interrogation, could not be introduced in evidence in criminal proceedings against him, unless he were first advised of his rights and waived them. In 'Dickerson v. United States', the Court held that the Miranda exclusionary rule was constitutionally grounded and could not be replaced by a statutory provision making all voluntary confessions admissible. In 'New York v. Quarles', the Court recognized a 'limited' 'public safety' exception to 'Miranda', but has not defined the exception further. The lower federal courts have construed the exception narrowly in cases involving unwarned statements concerning the location of a weapon possibly at hand at the time of an arrest. The Supreme Court has yet to decide to what extent 'Miranda' applies to custodial interrogations conducted overseas. The lower federal courts have held that the failure of foreign law enforcement officials to provide 'Miranda' warnings prior to interrogation does not preclude use of any resulting statement in a subsequent U.S. criminal trial, unless interrogation was a joint venture of U.S. and foreign officials or unless the circumstances shock the conscience of the court. They suggest that warnings are a prerequisite for admissibility in U.S. courts following overseas interrogation by U.S. officials."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Doyle, Charles

  2013-04-24
• Bond v. United States: Validity and Construction of the Federal Chemical Weapons Statute [February 21, 2013]

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  "On January 18, 2013, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to again consider issues raised by Carol Bond's conviction under a statute enacted to implement the Convention on Chemical Weapons. Mrs. Bond argues that the implementing statute is inapplicable to her case, or alternatively, that the federal principles reflected in the Tenth Amendment render the implementing legislation unconstitutional. The case affords the Court the opportunity to provide guidance, beyond that of Justice Holmes' 'Missouri v. Holland' opinion, on the scope of the President's treaty making power and Congress's authority to enact treaty implementing legislation."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Doyle, Charles

  2013-02-21