Advanced search Help
Searching for terms: EXACT: "Cumming, Alfred" in: author
Clear all search criteria
Only 2/3! You are seeing results from the Public Collection, not the complete Full Collection. Sign in to search everything (see eligibility).
-
Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible Policy Questions [July 6, 2009]
"Published reports have suggested that in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Pentagon has expanded its counter-terrorism intelligence activities as part of what the Bush Administration termed the global war on terror. Some observers have asserted that the Department of Defense (DOD) may have been conducting certain kinds of counterterrorism intelligence activities that would statutorily qualify as 'covert actions,' and thus require a presidential finding and the notification of the congressional intelligence committees. […]. Some of DOD's activities have been variously described publicly as efforts to collect intelligence on terrorists that will aid in planning counter-terrorism missions; to prepare for potential missions to disrupt, capture or kill them; and to help local militaries conduct counter-terrorism missions of their own. […]. In committee report language accompanying H.R. 2701, the FY2010 Intelligence Authorization Act, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) expressed its concern that the distinction between the CIA's intelligence-gathering activities and DOD's clandestine operations is becoming blurred and called on the Defense Department to meet its obligations to inform the Committee of such activities. This report examines the statutory procedures governing covert action and associated questions to consider."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2009-07-06
-
Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible Policy Questions [April 6, 2011]
"Published reports have suggested that in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Pentagon has expanded its counterterrorism intelligence activities as part of what the Bush Administration termed the global war on terror. Some observers have asserted that the Department of Defense (DOD) may have been conducting certain kinds of counterterrorism intelligence activities that would statutorily qualify as 'covert actions,' and thus require a presidential finding and the notification of the congressional intelligence committees. Defense officials have asserted that none of DOD's current counterterrorism intelligence activities constitute covert action as defined under the law, and therefore, do not require a presidential finding and the notification of the intelligence committees. Rather, they contend that DOD conducts only 'clandestine activities.' Although the term is not defined by statute, these officials characterize such activities as constituting actions that are conducted in secret but which constitute 'passive' intelligence information gathering. By comparison, covert action, they contend, is 'active,' in that its aim is to elicit change in the political, economic, military, or diplomatic behavior of a target."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2011-04-06
-
Director of National Intelligence Statutory Authorities: Status and Proposals [January 12, 2011]
"In passing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) in 2004, Congress approved the most comprehensive reform of the U.S. intelligence community since it was created over 50 years ago. Principal among enacted changes was the establishment of a new position of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to serve as head of the intelligence community (IC) and principal adviser to the President on intelligence matters related to the national security and to oversee and direct the implementation of the National Intelligence Program. Some observers have questioned whether the act provides the DNI the authority necessary to effectively carry out these responsibilities. Others assert that the DNI's authorities are significantly stronger than those of the former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), but suggest that DNIs have failed to aggressively assert the authorities they have been provided. During his Senate confirmation proceeding in January 2009, DNI Dennis C. Blair said that he would withhold judgment as to whether his authorities were sufficient but over time would advise the President and Congress if he concluded they were not. He also assured Senators that he would exercise his authorities to the fullest. The abrupt announcement of his resignation in May 2010 suggested to some that he had been unable to exercise his authorities to meet his responsibilities and, for some, raised questions about the viability of the DNI position."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Best, Richard A.; Cumming, Alfred
2011-01-12
-
Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible Policy Questions [October 11, 2007]
"Published reports have suggested that in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Pentagon has expanded its counter-terrorism intelligence activities as part of what the Bush Administration terms the global war on terror. Some observers have asserted that the Department of Defense (DOD) may be conducting certain kinds of counterterrorism intelligence activities that would statutorily qualify as 'covert actions,' and thus require a presidential finding and the notification of the congressional intelligence committees. Defense officials assert that none of DOD's current counter-terrorist intelligence activities constitute covert action as defined under the law, and therefore, do not require a presidential finding and the notification of the intelligence committees. Rather, they contend that DOD conducts only 'clandestine activities.' Although the term is not defined by statute, these officials characterize such activities as constituting actions that are conducted in secret, but which constitute 'passive' intelligence information gathering. By comparison, covert action, they contend, is 'active,' in that its aim is to elicit change in the political, economic, military, or diplomatic behavior of a target. Some of DOD's activities have been variously described publicly as efforts to collect intelligence on terrorists that will aid in planning counter-terrorism missions; to prepare for potential missions to disrupt, capture or kill them; and to help local militaries conduct counter-terrorism missions of their own. Senior U.S. intelligence community officials have conceded that the line separating Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and DOD intelligence activities has blurred, making it more difficult to distinguish between the traditional secret intelligence missions carried out by each. They also have acknowledged that the U.S. Intelligence Community confronts a major challenge in clarifying the roles and responsibilities of various intelligence agencies with regard to clandestine activities. This report examines the statutory procedures governing covert action and associated questions to consider."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2007-10-11
-
Director of National Intelligence Statutory Authorities: Status and Proposals [November 2, 2007]
"In passing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) in 2004, Congress approved the most comprehensive reform of the U.S. Intelligence Community since its establishment over 50 years ago. Principal among enacted changes was the establishment of a new position of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to manage the Intelligence Community. Some observers have questioned whether the statute gives the DNI sufficient authority to implement the 2004 intelligence reforms enacted by Congress. Others believe that the DNI's existing authorities are substantially stronger than those of the former Director of Central Intelligence (CIA), but that the DNI must more effectively assert those authorities. While acknowledging his strengthened authorities under the 2004 Act, and conceding that he had not issued certain guidance to the Intelligence Community clarifying those authorities, DNI Michael McConnell asked Congress to further enhance his authority -- new authority which he says he needs if he is to effectively lead the Community. The Senate Intelligence Committee responded to the DNI's request by approving an FY2008 Intelligence Authorization Bill (S. 1538; S.Rept. 110-75) that contains several new DNI authorities, including the authority to: conduct accountability reviews of significant Intelligence Community failures and deficiencies; address information sharing deficiencies; and, approve interagency financing of national intelligence centers. The House Intelligence Committee in its bill approved a more limited number of new authorities, noting its disappointment that the DNI had not taken a more directive role in coordinating the Intelligence Community and thereby suggesting that the DNI is ineffectively asserting his existing authorities."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Best, Richard A.; Masse, Todd; Cumming, Alfred
2007-11-02
-
Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible Policy Questions [November 02, 2006]
"Published reports have suggested that in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Pentagon has expanded its counter-terrorism intelligence activities as part of the global war on terror. Some observers have asserted that the Department of Defense (DOD) may be conducting certain kinds of counterterrorism intelligence activities that would statutorily qualify as 'covert actions,' and thus require a presidential finding and the notification of the congressional intelligence committees. Defense officials assert that none of DOD's current counter-terrorist intelligence activities constitute covert action as defined under the law, and therefore, do not require a presidential finding and the notification of the intelligence committees. Some of these DOD's activities have been variously described publicly as efforts to collect intelligence on terrorists that will aid in planning counter-terrorism missions; to prepare for potential missions to disrupt, capture or kill them; and to help local militaries conduct counter-terrorism missions of their own. Senior U.S. intelligence community officials have conceded that the line separating CIA and DOD intelligence activities has blurred, making it more difficult to distinguish between the traditional secret intelligence missions carried out by each. In some of their public comments, however, these officials have not specifically addressed the issue of whether Pentagon counter-terrorist activities meet the legal definition of covert actions. This report examines the statutory procedures governing covert action and associated questions to consider."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2006-11-02
-
Sensitive Covert Action Notifications: Oversight Options for Congress [September 25,2009]
"Legislation enacted in 1980 gave the executive branch authority to limit advance notification of especially sensitive covert actions to eight Members of Congress--the 'Gang of Eight'--when the President determines that it is essential to limit prior notice in order to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting U.S. vital interests. In such cases, the executive branch is permitted by statute to limit notification to the chairmen and ranking minority members of the two congressional intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the House, and Senate majority and minority leaders, rather than to notify the full intelligence committees, as is required in cases involving covert actions determined to be less sensitive. [...]. In its mark-up of H.R. 2701, the FY2010 Intelligence Authorization Act, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) replaced the Gang of Eight statutory provision, adopting in its place a statutory requirement that each of the intelligence committees establish written procedures as may be necessary to govern such notifications. According to Committee report language, the adopted provision vests the authority to limit such briefings with the committees, rather than the President. [...]. With Congress considering possible changes in covert action congressional notifications, this report describes the statutory provision authorizing Gang of Eight notifications, reviews the legislative history of the provision, and examines both the impact of such notifications on congressional oversight as well as options that Congress might consider to possibly improve oversight."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2009-09-25
-
Sensitive Covert Action Notifications: Oversight Options for Congress [April 6, 2011]
"Legislation enacted in 1980 gave the executive branch authority to limit advance notification of especially sensitive covert actions to eight Members of Congress--the 'Gang of Eight'--when the President determines that it is essential to limit prior notice in order to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting U.S. vital interests. In such cases, the executive branch is permitted by statute to limit notification to the chairmen and ranking minority members of the two congressional intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the House, and Senate majority and minority leaders, rather than to notify the full intelligence committees, as is required in cases involving covert actions determined to be less sensitive. Congress, in approving this new procedure in 1980, during the Iran hostage crisis, said it intended to preserve operational secrecy in those 'rare' cases involving especially sensitive covert actions while providing the President with advance consultation with the leaders in Congress and the leadership of the intelligence committees who have special expertise and responsibility in intelligence matters. The intent appeared to some to be to provide the President, on a short-term basis, a greater degree of operational security as long as sensitive operations were underway. In 1991, in a further elaboration of congressional intent following the Iran-Contra Affair, congressional report language stated that limiting notification to the Gang of Eight should occur only in situations involving covert actions of such extraordinary sensitivity or risk to life that knowledge of such activity should be restricted to as few individuals as possible."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2011-04-06
-
Sensitive Covert Action Notifications: Oversight Options for Congress [January 29, 2010]
"Legislation enacted in 1980 gave the executive branch authority to limit advance notification of especially sensitive covert actions to eight Members of Congress--the 'Gang of Eight'--when the President determines that it is essential to limit prior notice in order to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting U.S. vital interests. In such cases, the executive branch is permitted by statute to limit notification to the chairmen and ranking minority members of the two congressional intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the House, and Senate majority and minority leaders, rather than to notify the full intelligence committees, as is required in cases involving covert actions determined to be less sensitive. [...]. The Senate Intelligence Committee, in its version of the FY2010 Intelligence Authorization Act, left unchanged the Gang of Eight statutory structure, but approved several changes that would tighten certain aspects of current covert action reporting requirements. Although the executive branch has not issued a Statement of Administration Policy with regard to the Senate's bill, Director of National Intelligence Admiral Dennis Blair has indicated that he would recommend that the President veto the bill if the covert action notification changes contained in the bill remained in final legislation. Congress has not acted on the FY2010 Intelligence Authorization bill. With Congress considering possible changes in covert action congressional notifications, this report describes the statutory provision authorizing Gang of Eight notifications, reviews the legislative history of the provision, and examines both the impact of such notifications on congressional oversight as well as options that Congress might consider to possibly improve oversight."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2010-01-29
-
'Gang of Four' Congressional Intelligence Notifications [March 18, 2011]
"'Gang of Four' intelligence notifications generally are oral briefings of certain particularly sensitive non-covert action intelligence activities, including principally, but not exclusively, intelligence collection programs, that the Intelligence Community typically limits to the chairmen and ranking Members of the two congressional intelligence committees. Gang of Four notifications are not based in statute but have constituted a practice generally accepted by the leadership of the intelligence committees and that is employed when the Intelligence Community believes a particular intelligence activity to be of such sensitivity that a restricted notification is warranted in order to reduce the risk of disclosure, inadvertent or otherwise. Intelligence activities viewed as being less sensitive typically are briefed to the full membership of each committee. [...] This report reviews the history of Gang of Four notification process and compares this procedure with that of the 'Gang of Eight' notification procedure. The 'Gang of Eight' procedure is statutorily based and provides that that the chairmen and ranking Members of the intelligence committee, along with the Speaker and minority leader of the House, and Senate majority and minority leaders--rather than the full membership of the intelligence committees--are to receive prior notice of particularly sensitive covert action programs, if the President determines that limited access to such programs is essential to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital U.S. interests."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2011-03-18
-
Comparison of 9/11 Commission Recommended Intelligence Reforms, S. 2845, S. 2774, H.R. 5024, Administration Proposal, H.R. 10, Current Law [Updated September 28, 2004]
"On July 22, 2004, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also known as the 9/11 Commission) released its bipartisan, unanimous final report containing recommendations for far-reaching and fundamental changes to the United States Intelligence Community (IC). Almost 20 months after its creation by P.L. 107-306, the commission, as mandated by its founding legislation, attempted to present a full and complete accounting of the facts and circumstances surrounding the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, as well as recommendations for corrective measures that can be taken to help prevent acts of terrorism. Several Members of Congress also have proposed legislation to reform the IC. Senators Feinstein (S. 190), Bob Graham (S. 1520), Daschle (S. 6) and Roberts (S. draft bill of August 23, 2004) have introduced or proposed legislation that either directly, or as part of broader security proposals, contain a variety of IC reforms. Representative Harman (H.R. 4104) has introduced comprehensive intelligence reform legislation as did Representative Goss (H.R. 4584), before he was confirmed by the U.S. Senate as Director of Central Intelligence. This report, the second of two reports, presents side-by-side comparisons of the 9/11 Commission recommendations and current law and legislation proposed by Senators Collins and Lieberman (S. 2845) and unanimously approved by the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on September 22, 2004, as amended; House Speaker Dennis Hastert (H.R. 10); Senators McCain and Lieberman (S. 2774); Representative Pelosi (H.R. 5024); and President Bush."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2004-09-28
-
Comparison of 9/11 Commission Recommended Intelligence Reforms, Roberts Draft Bill, H.R. 4104, S. 190, S. 1520, S. 6, H.R. 4584, and Current Law [Updated October 6, 2004]
"On July 22, 2004, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also known as the 9/11 Commission) released its bipartisan, unanimous final report containing recommendations for far-reaching and fundamental changes to the United States Intelligence Community (IC). Almost 20 months after its creation by P.L. 107-306, the commission, as mandated by its founding legislation, attempted to present a full and complete accounting of the facts and circumstances surrounding the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, as well as recommendations for corrective measures that can be taken to help prevent acts of terrorism. Several Members of Congress also have proposed legislation to reform the IC. Senators Feinstein (S. 190), Bob Graham (S. 1520), Daschle (S. 6) and Roberts (draft bill of August 23, 2004) have introduced or proposed legislation that either directly, or as part of broader security proposals, contain a variety of IC reforms. Representative Harman (H.R. 4104) has introduced comprehensive intelligence reform legislation as did Representative Goss (H.R. 4584), before he was confirmed by the U.S. Senate as Director of Central Intelligence. This report, the first of two reports, presents side-by-side comparisons of the 9/11 Commission recommendations and legislation proposed by Senators Feinstein, Bob Graham, Daschle, and Roberts; and Representatives Harman and Goss, and relevant provisions of current law. A second report (CRS Report RL32601) presents a side-by-side comparison of the 9/11 Commission recommendations and legislation proposed by Senators Collins, Lieberman, and McCain; President Bush; and relevant provisions of current law."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2004-10-06
-
'Gang of Four' Congressional Intelligence Notifications [September 25,2009]
This Report to Congress contains information regarding, "'Gang of Four' intelligence notifications generally are oral briefings of certain particularly sensitive non-covert action intelligence activities, including principally, but not exclusively, intelligence collection programs, that the Intelligence Community typically limits to the chairmen and ranking members of the two congressional intelligence committees, and at times, but not always, to their respective staff directors. Gang of Four notifications are not based in statute but have constituted a practice generally accepted by the leadership of the intelligence committees and that is employed when the Intelligence Community believes a particular intelligence activity to be of such sensitivity that a restricted notification is warranted in order to reduce the risk of disclosure, inadvertent or otherwise. Intelligence activities viewed as being less sensitive typically are briefed to the full membership of each committee. [...] This report reviews the history of Gang of Four notification process and compares this procedure with that of the 'Gang of Eight' notification procedure. The 'Gang of Eight' procedure is statutorily based and provides that that the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the intelligence committee, along with the Speaker and minority leader of the House, and Senate majority and minority leaders--rather than the full membership of the intelligence committees--are to receive prior notice of particularly sensitive covert action programs, if the President determines that limited access to such programs is essential to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital U.S. interests."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2009-09-25
-
'Gang of Four' Congressional Intelligence Notifications [July 14, 2009]
"'Gang of Four' intelligence notifications generally are oral briefings of certain particularly sensitive non-covert action intelligence activities, including principally, but not exclusively, intelligence collection programs, that the Intelligence Community typically limits to the chairmen and ranking members of the two congressional intelligence committees, and at times, but not always, to their respective staff directors. [...]. Congress has said that its intent in this regard is that in extremely rare circumstances a need to preserve essential secrecy may result in a decision not to impart certain sensitive aspects of operations or collection programs to the intelligence oversight committees in order to protect extremely sensitive intelligence sources and methods. With regard to the phrase 'other exceptionally sensitive matters,' Congress has said its intent in using this phrase is to refer to other extremely sensitive categories of classified information such as information concerning the operational details of military deployment and extraordinarily sensitive diplomatic contacts, which the intelligence committees do not routinely require to satisfy their responsibilities. This report reviews the history of Gang of Four notification process and compares this procedure with that of the 'Gang of Eight' notification procedure. The 'Gang of Eight' procedure is statutorily based and provides that that the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the intelligence committee, along with the Speaker and minority leader of the House, and Senate majority and minority leaders--rather than the full membership of the intelligence committees--are to receive prior notice of particularly sensitive covert action programs, if the President determines that limited access to such programs is essential to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital U.S. interests."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2009-07-14
-
Intelligence Reform at the Department of Energy: Policy Issues and Organizational Alternatives [February 10, 2009]
"After the repeated urging of the Department of Energy (DOE), Congress in 2006 agreed to temporarily consolidate separate counterintelligence (CI) offices at the Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) into a single CI office under DOE control. DOE had complained that the dual office structure was ineffective. [...]. At the same time, in 2006, DOE combined its separate Offices of Intelligence, and Counterintelligence into a new DOE office called the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. [...]. This report analyzes both consolidations--the first authorized by Congress at DOE's request; the second initiated by DOE--and examines the impact of each on the effectiveness of the Department's CI program. A major oversight issue for Congress is whether either, or both, organizational changes will strengthen the Department's CI program as intended. Some observers are concerned that the two consolidations may have undercut CI capabilities. Congress could maintain the status quo or choose from several alternative organizational approaches, some of which continue to be discussed despite the most recent organizational changes to the Department's CI program. Such alternatives range from maintaining the consolidated DOE/NNSA CI office but reversing DOE's decision to combine its formerly independent offices of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence, to eliminating both consolidations. Congress also could exercise several oversight options, ranging from conducting classified CI briefings to commissioning a formal assessment of DOE's current CI reorganization. This report will be updated as warranted."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2009-02-10
-
Congress as a Consumer of Intelligence Information [January 15, 2009]
"This report examines the role of Congress as a consumer of national intelligence and examines several issues that Congress might address in the 111th Congress. [...]. Congress generally has routine access to 'finished intelligence,' or to those intelligence products that are published for general circulation within the executive branch. A finished intelligence product is one in which an analyst evaluates, interprets, integrates and places into context raw intelligence. Congress receives the preponderance of its intelligence information through briefings, which generally are initiated at the request of congressional committees, individual members or staff. Congress does not routinely have access to the identities of intelligence sources, methods employed by the Intelligence Community in collecting analyzing intelligence, 'raw' intelligence, or unevaluated intelligence, or certain written intelligence products tailored to the specific needs of the President and other high-level executive branch policymakers. Among the issues the 111th Congress may choose to examine are ongoing efforts by the Director of National Intelligence to strike a balance between protecting intelligence sources while providing intelligence analysts and consumers--including those in Congress--more information about the reliability of those sources. This report will be updated as warranted."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2009-01-15
-
Intelligence Reform at the Department of Energy: Policy Issues and Organizational Alternatives [December 5, 2008]
This CRS report discusses intelligence consolidations and reforms at the Department of Energy. "After the repeated urging of the Department of Energy (DOE), Congress in 2006 agreed to temporarily consolidate separate counterintelligence (CI) offices at the Department of Energy and the National Security Administration (NNSA) into a single CI office under DOE control. DOE had complained that the dual office structure was ineffective. In permitting DOE to consolidate the two offices, Congress reversed its 1999 authorization to establish a separate NNSA CI office--a decision that at the time was prompted by congressional concerns over repeated departmental security and counterintelligence lapses. At the same time, in 2006, DOE combined its separate Offices of Intelligence, and Counterintelligence into a new DOE office called the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. The Department reasoned that combining the disciplines of counterintelligence and foreign intelligence under one integrated office would foster synergistic cooperation that would lead to a more strategic and ultimately more effective counterintelligence program. This report analyzes both consolidations--the first authorized by Congress at DOE's request; the second initiated by DOE--and examines the impact of each on the effectiveness of the Department's CI program. A major oversight issue for Congress is whether either, or both, organizational changes will strengthen the Department's CI program as intended. Some observers are concerned that the two consolidations may have undercut CI capabilities."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2008-12-05
-
Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible Policy Questions [Updated December 1, 2008]
"Published reports have suggested that in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Pentagon has expanded its counter-terrorism intelligence activities as part of what the Bush Administration terms the global war on terror. Some observers have asserted that the Department of Defense (DOD) may be conducting certain kinds of counterterrorism intelligence activities that would statutorily qualify as 'covert actions,' and thus require a presidential finding and the notification of the congressional intelligence committees. Defense officials assert that none of DOD's current counter-terrorist intelligence activities constitute covert action as defined under the law, and therefore, do not require a presidential finding and the notification of the intelligence committees. Rather, they contend that DOD conducts only 'clandestine activities.' Although the term is not defined by statute, these officials characterize such activities as constituting actions that are conducted in secret, but which constitute 'passive' intelligence information gathering. By comparison, covert action, they contend, is 'active,' in that its aim is to elicit change in the political, economic, military, or diplomatic behavior of a target. Some of DOD's activities have been variously described publicly as efforts to collect intelligence on terrorists that will aid in planning counter-terrorism missions; to prepare for potential missions to disrupt, capture or kill them; and to help local militaries conduct counter-terrorism missions of their own. [...] This report examines the statutory procedures governing covert action and associated questions to consider. This report will be updated as warranted."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2008-12-01
-
Statutory Procedures Under Which Congress Is To Be Informed of U.S. Intelligence Activities, Including Covert Actions [January 18, 2006]
"This memorandum examines certain existing statutory procedures that govern how the executive branch is to keep Congress informed of U.S. intelligence activities, reviews pertinent legislative history underpinning the development of those procedures, and looks at the notification process that reportedly was followed in informing certain Members of Congress of the Presidents decision to authorize the National Security Agency (NSA) to collect signals intelligence within the United States. According to U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, the program involved 'intercepts of contents of communications where...one party to the communication is outside the United States' and the government has 'a reasonable basis to conclude that one party to the communication is a member of al Qaeda, affiliated with al Qaeda, or a member of an organization affiliated with al Qaeda, or working in support of al Qaeda.' Under current statute, the President is to ensure that the congressional intelligence committees are kept 'fully and currently informed' of U.S. intelligence activities, including any 'significant anticipated intelligence activity.' According to legislative history, the term 'fully and currently informed,' is intended to mean that complete and timely notice of actions and policies is provided, and that the committees will be informed of intelligence activities in such detail as the committees may require. Further, the Senate in report language said it expected the executive branch not to limit itself to providing full and complete information upon request from the committees, but to affirmatively keep the committees fully and currently informed."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2006-01-18
-
Side-by-Side Comparison of Intelligence Community Reforms Proposed by 9/11
This document provides a side-by-side comparison chart of Intelligence Community reforms proposed by the 9/11 Commission, the Bush Administration, Senators Feinstein, Graham and Daschle, and Representatives Harman and Goss; and current statute. Issues compared pertaining to the position of National Intelligence Director (NID) include the following: general responsibilities, internal security responsibilities, budget responsibilities, budget authorities, funds and personnel transfer, direct appropriation, budget disclosure, hire and fire authority, personnel policy, information sharing and technology policies. Other categories include the Intelligence Community (IC) structure, director of the CIA, paramilitary operations, congressional oversight, and homeland defense.
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2004-08-11
-
FBI Intelligence Reform Since September 11, 2001: Issues and Options for Congress [Updated August 4, 2004]
From the Document: "The Intelligence Community, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), has been criticized for failing to warn of the attacks of September 11, 2001. In a sweeping indictment of the FBI's intelligence activities relating to counterterrorism and September 11, the Congressional Joint Inquiry Into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, singled out the FBI in a significant manner for failing to focus on the domestic terrorist threat; collect useful intelligence; analyze strategic intelligence; and to share intelligence internally and with other members of the Intelligence Community. The major component of this effort is restructuring and upgrading of its various intelligence support units into a formal and integrated intelligence program, which includes the adoption of new operational practices, and the improvement of its information technology. This report identifies five options for Congress to consider, including the creation of a domestic intelligence agency like Great Britain's MI-5. Other options include maintaining the status quo, transferring such responsibilities to the Department of Homeland Security or to the Director of Central Intelligence, or creating a national security intelligence service within the FBI. Meanwhile, for a variety of reasons, the 9/11 Commission has recommended leaving counterterrorism intelligence collection with the FBI, and creating an integrated national security workforce within the bureau."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2004-08-04
-
Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible Policy Questions [February 9, 2009]
This CRS report describes the statutory procedures governing covert action, with special attention on implications for the military in a post 9/11 world. "Some observers have asserted that the Department of Defense (DOD) may have been conducting certain kinds of counterterrorism intelligence activities that would statutorily qualify as 'covert actions,' and thus require a presidential finding and the notification of the congressional intelligence committees. Defense officials have asserted that none of DOD's current counter-terrorist intelligence activities constitute covert action as defined under the law, and therefore, do not require a presidential finding and the notification of the intelligence committees. Rather, they contend that DOD conducts only 'clandestine activities.' Although the term is not defined by statute, these officials characterize such activities as constituting actions that are conducted in secret, but which constitute 'passive' intelligence information gathering. By comparison, covert action, they contend, is 'active,' in that its aim is to elicit change in the political, economic, military, or diplomatic behavior of a target. [...]. Senior U.S. intelligence community officials have conceded that the line separating Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and DOD intelligence activities has blurred, making it more difficult to distinguish between the traditional secret intelligence missions carried out by each. They also have acknowledged that the U.S. Intelligence Community confronts a major challenge in clarifying the roles and responsibilities of various intelligence agencies with regard to clandestine activities."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2009-02-09
-
Intelligence Reform at the Department of Energy: Policy Issues and Organizational Alternatives [July 28, 2008]
This CRS report discusses intelligence consolidations and reforms at the Department of Energy. "After the repeated urging of the Department of Energy (DOE), Congress in 2006 agreed to temporarily consolidate separate counterintelligence (CI) offices at the Department of Energy and the National Security Administration (NNSA) into a single CI office under DOE control. DOE had complained that the dual office structure was ineffective. In permitting DOE to consolidate the two offices, Congress reversed its 1999 authorization to establish a separate NNSA CI office - a decision that at the time was prompted by congressional concerns over repeated departmental security and counterintelligence lapses. At the same time, in 2006, DOE combined its separate Offices of Intelligence, and Counterintelligence into a new DOE office called the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. The Department reasoned that combining the disciplines of counterintelligence and foreign intelligence under one integrated office would foster synergistic cooperation that would lead to a more strategic and ultimately more effective counterintelligence program. This report analyzes both consolidations - the first authorized by Congress at DOE's request; the second initiated by DOE - and examines the impact of each on the effectiveness of the Department's CI program. A major oversight issue for Congress is whether either, or both, organizational changes will strengthen the Department's CI program as intended. Some observers are concerned that the two consolidations may have undercut CI capabilities."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2008-07-28
-
'Gang of Four' Congressional Intelligence Notifications [January 29, 2010]
"'Gang of Four' intelligence notifications generally are oral briefings of certain particularly sensitive non-covert action intelligence activities, including principally, but not exclusively, intelligence collection programs, that the Intelligence Community typically limits to the chairmen and ranking members of the two congressional intelligence committees, and at times, but not always, to their respective staff directors. […]. This report reviews the history of Gang of Four notification process and compares this procedure with that of the 'Gang of Eight' notification procedure. The 'Gang of Eight' procedure is statutorily based and provides that that the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the intelligence committee, along with the Speaker and minority leader of the House, and Senate majority and minority leaders--rather than the full membership of the intelligence committees--are to receive prior notice of particularly sensitive covert action programs, if the President determines that limited access to such programs is essential to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital U.S. interests. Although the FY2010 Intelligence Authorization bills approved by the two congressional intelligence committees address Gang of Eight covert action notifications, neither of the two bills reference Gang of Four notifications. Congress has not acted on the FY2010 Intelligence Authorization bill."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2010-01-29
-
Position of Director of National Intelligence: Issues for Congress [Updated August 12, 2004]
"Recently some Members of Congress have introduced intelligence community reform legislation that would establish the position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI), or strengthen DCI authorities. Reactions to the concept of a DNI have been mixed since its inception. Supporters argue that the DCI cannot manage the IC, the CIA and serve as the President's chief intelligence advisor, and do justice to any of the jobs. Other than the CIA, the DCI also lacks hiring, firing and budget authority. They argue that the absence of strong, centralized leadership has resulted in divided management of intelligence capabilities; lack of common standards and practices across the foreign domestic intelligence divide; structural barriers that undermine the performance of joint intelligence work; and a weak capacity to set priorities and move resources. Opponents counter that a DNI would lose day-to-day control over the CIA, a natural power base and, as a result, influence. They also contend that placing the intelligence director in the Executive Office of the President, as the 9/11 Commission has proposed, risks the politicization of intelligence, giving the White House more direct control over covert operations, blurring the line between foreign and domestic operations and possibly shifting too much influence over intelligence to the Department of Defense. With regard to DOD influence, other opponents argue that a national director will shift the balance of control away from DOD, risking intelligence support to the warfighter. The congressional role includes deciding whether to establish the position of the DNI and its authority. This report will be updated as events warrant."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2004-08-12
-
Position of Director of National Intelligence: Issues for Congress [July 29, 2004]
"The 9/11 Commission, in its recent report on the attacks of September 11, 2001, criticized the U.S. Intelligence Community's (IC) fragmented management structure and questioned whether the U.S. government, and the IC, in particular, is organized adequately to direct resources and build the intelligence capabilities that the U.S. will need to counter terrorism, and to address the broader range of national security challenges in the decades ahead. The Commission made a number of recommendations, one of which was to replace the current position of Director of Central Intelligence with a National Intelligence Director (NID) who would oversee national intelligence centers on specific subjects of interest across the U.S. government, manage the national intelligence program, oversee the agencies that contribute to it, and have hiring, firing and budgetary authority over the IC's 15 agencies. The Commission recommended that the director be located in the Executive Office of the President and that a deputy NID be established to oversee the day-to-day operations of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). This report outlines the congressional proposals concerning the new position, as well as the arguments in favor and in opposition to it. The congressional role includes deciding whether to establish the position of the DNI and its authority. This report will be updated as events warrant."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2004-07-29
-
Polygraph Use by the Department of Energy: Issues for Congress [updated February 3, 2005]
"On January 7, 2005, the DOE proposed a new regulation that would institute a polygraph screening program, but only for individuals with regular access to the most sensitive information. The result would be to reduce from more than 20,000 to approximately 4,500 the number of DOE and contractor personnel potentially subject to mandatory polygraph tests. DOE's new proposal came after some Members of Congress urged that the Department adopt a more focused polygraph program in the wake of a 2002 study by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) that questioned the validity of polygraph testing, particularly when it is used for screening purposes."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2005-02-03
-
Polygraph Use by the Department of Energy: Issues for Congress [Updated October 1, 2003]
Department of Energy (DOE) Deputy Secretary Kyle E. McSlarrow recommended on September 4, 2003, that the DOE issue a proposed regulation by the end of the year that would sharply curtail the use of the polygraph for screening DOE employees with access to classified information. McSlarrow said that he has recommended to Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham a mandatory polygraph screening program only for individuals with regular access to the most sensitive information. The result would be to reduce to approximately 4,500 the number of DOE and contractor personnel potentially subject to mandatory polygraph tests (from an estimated 20,000). In part because of continuing opposition by some DOE nuclear weapons laboratory employees, Congress in 2001 requested that NAS review the scientific evidence regarding the validity and reliability of the polygraph, particularly when used for personnel security screening. The NAS study concluded that while polygraph testing is more effective when used in connection with event-specific investigations, its accuracy is insufficient to justify reliance on its use in screening current and prospective federal agency employees-- DOE's principal purpose in using the polygraph. Congress might assess several possible approaches, including retaining the status quo, establishing a more focused polygraph program of the kind proposed by McSlarrow; researching alternatives to the polygraph; and eliminating the polygraph for screening purposes altogether.
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2003-10-01
-
Polygraph Use by the Department of Energy: Issues for Congress [July 8, 2003]
"In the aftermath of the Wen Ho Lee case and the growing concern over the Department of Energys (DOE) counterintelligence program that followed, DOE in March 1999 began developing its first-ever polygraph screening program affecting an estimated 800 DOE employees with access to sensitive and classified information. Congress in October 1999 mandated DOE polygraph testing (P.L. 106-65, Sec.3154) and expanded the program to cover 13,000 DOE employees with access to sensitive and classified information. The following year, Congress further expanded polygraph testing to cover approximately 20,000 DOE employees (P.L. 106-398, Sec.3135) with the addition of new eligibility categories. In part because of continuing opposition by some DOE nuclear weapons laboratory employees, Congress in 2001 requested that the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) review the scientific evidence regarding the validity and reliability of the polygraph, particularly when used for personnel security screening. Congress directed DOE to institute a new polygraph program based upon the NAS findings."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2003-07-08
-
Polygraph Use by the Department of Energy: Issues for Congress [Updated April 17, 2008]
"Four years after Congress directed the Department of Energy (DOE) to revamp its polygraph program, taking into account a 2003 National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report that questioned the scientific basis for the accuracy of polygraph testing, particularly when used to 'screen' employees, DOE promulgated a regulation on October 30, 2006, that eliminated polygraph screening tests without specific cause. DOE said its counterintelligence evaluation policies were now consistent with existing Intelligence Community practices and the NAS 2003 report's recommendations, particularly for cases when polygraph tests were used for screening purposes rather than for investigating specific events. […] The value of polygraph testing, with its associated uncertainties, has been a part of Congress's continuing oversight interest for DOE. This report examines how DOE's polygraph testing program has evolved and reviews certain scientific findings with regard to the polygraph's scientific validity. Several issues include whether: DOE's new screening program is focused on an appropriate number of individuals occupying only the most sensitive positions; the program should be expanded in order to adequately safeguard certain classified information; further research into the polygraph's scientific validity is needed; there are possible alternatives to the polygraph; and whether DOE should continue polygraph screening. Possible options include a more focused polygraph screening program, an expanded polygraph program, additional research into the polygraph's scientific validity, and eliminating the use of the polygraph to screen applicants and employees."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2008-04-17
