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Director of National Intelligence: Statutory Authorities [Updated January 30, 2007]
From the Summary: "In passing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) in late 2004, Congress approved the most comprehensive reform of the U.S. Intelligence Community since its establishment over 50 years ago. Principal among enacted changes was the establishment of a new position of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to manage the Intelligence Community. Some observers have questioned whether the new statute provides the DNI the necessary authorities to effectively manage the Community. In examining the DNI's authorities, it is clear that they are substantially stronger than those held by the former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), but whether the DNI has sufficient management authority to implement mandated reforms will depend on several factors. They include the DNI's determination to assert his new powers, the extent to which the DNI receives presidential and congressional support, and the DNI's ability to successfully establish a transparent intelligence budget process that will permit him to make and effectively enforce informed budget decisions. This suggests close and continuous congressional oversight of the reform process. This Report will be updated as new information becomes available."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Best, Richard A.; Masse, Todd; Cumming, Alfred
2007-01-30
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Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible Policy Questions [November 02, 2006]
"Published reports have suggested that in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Pentagon has expanded its counter-terrorism intelligence activities as part of the global war on terror. Some observers have asserted that the Department of Defense (DOD) may be conducting certain kinds of counterterrorism intelligence activities that would statutorily qualify as 'covert actions,' and thus require a presidential finding and the notification of the congressional intelligence committees. Defense officials assert that none of DOD's current counter-terrorist intelligence activities constitute covert action as defined under the law, and therefore, do not require a presidential finding and the notification of the intelligence committees. Some of these DOD's activities have been variously described publicly as efforts to collect intelligence on terrorists that will aid in planning counter-terrorism missions; to prepare for potential missions to disrupt, capture or kill them; and to help local militaries conduct counter-terrorism missions of their own. Senior U.S. intelligence community officials have conceded that the line separating CIA and DOD intelligence activities has blurred, making it more difficult to distinguish between the traditional secret intelligence missions carried out by each. In some of their public comments, however, these officials have not specifically addressed the issue of whether Pentagon counter-terrorist activities meet the legal definition of covert actions. This report examines the statutory procedures governing covert action and associated questions to consider."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2006-11-02
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Intelligence Reform at the Department of Energy: Policy Issues and Organizational Alternatives [July 19, 2006]
"Concerned by reported security and counterintelligence (CI) lapses at the Department of Energy (DOE), Congress in 1999 established a semi-autonomous agency -- the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) -- to oversee DOE's national security-related programs. Within NNSA, Congress established the Office of Defense Nuclear Counterintelligence to implement NNSA's counterintelligence program. Although DOE's existing Office of Counterintelligence develops CI policy for both agencies, it implements policy only at non-NNSA facilities. Some studies have questioned the effectiveness of a dual office structure in combating foreign espionage and have urged the adoption of an alternative structure. Several alternative organizational approaches have been discussed, including the following. One approach, which DOE has initiated, merges under the control of a new DOE Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence DOE's Office of Intelligence, which assesses foreign nuclear weapons programs, and DOE's CI office. […]. Under a second approach, the DOE and NNSA CI programs could be consolidated under the control of the NNSA administrator. […]. Under a third approach, DOE could integrate its Office of Intelligence and CI office under a new DOE intelligence agency, but allow NNSA's CI office to remain as a separate entity. […]. A fourth approach would be to completely separate the DOE and NNSA counterintelligence programs. Proponents suggest that such an approach would clarify the chain of command. Opponents assert that separation could further undermine coordination and communication. A final approach would be to maintain the status quo. […]. This report will be updated as warranted."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2006-07-19
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Intelligence Reform at the Department of Energy: Policy Issues and Organizational Alternatives [April 10, 2006]
"Concerned by reported security and counterintelligence (CI) lapses at the Department of Energy (DOE), Congress in 1999 established a semi-autonomous agency - the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) - to oversee DOE's national security-related programs. Within NNSA, Congress established the Office of Defense Nuclear Counterintelligence to implement NNSA's counterintelligence program. Although DOE's existing Office of Counterintelligence develops CI policy for both agencies, it implements policy only at non-NNSA facilities. Some studies have questioned the effectiveness of a dual office structure in combating foreign espionage and have urged the adoption of an alternative structure. Several alternative organizational approaches have been discussed, including the following. One approach, reportedly approved but not yet initiated, would merge under the control of a new DOE intelligence agency DOE's Office of Intelligence, which assesses foreign nuclear weapons programs, and DOE's CI office. As part of an anticipated second phase, NNSA's CI office would be consolidated under the DOE's intelligence agency. Proponents assert that such a consolidation would improve command, control, and communication. Opponents argue that consolidation would dilute the counterintelligence attention DOE's weapons labs now receive."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2006-04-10
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Polygraph Use by the Department of Energy: Issues for Congress [Updated April 7, 2006]
"On January 7, 2005, the DOE proposed a new regulation that would institute a polygraph screening program, but only for individuals with regular access to the most sensitive information. The result would be to reduce from more than 20,000 to approximately 4,500 the number of DOE and contractor personnel potentially subject to mandatory polygraph tests. DOE's new proposal came after some Members of Congress urged that the Department adopt a more focused polygraph program in the wake of a 2002 study by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) that questioned the validity of polygraph testing, particularly when it is used for screening purposes. In the wake of the Wen Ho Lee case, DOE in March 1999 initiated and later announced its first-ever use of the polygraph to screen approximately 800 DOE federal and contractor employees in certain high-risk programs.2 Congress in October 1999 formally mandated that DOE employ the polygraph as a screening tool (P.L. 106-65, Sec. 3154) and expanded the program to cover 13,000 DOE employees. The following year, Congress further expanded polygraph screening to cover approximately 20,000 DOE employees (P.L. 106-398, Sec. 3135). In part because of continuing opposition by some DOE nuclear weapons laboratory employees, Congress in 2001 requested that NAS review the scientific evidence regarding the validity and reliability of the polygraph, particularly when used for personnel security screening. Congress directed DOE to institute a new polygraph program that took into account the NAS findings (P.L. 107-107, Sec. 3152)."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2006-04-07
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Statutory Procedures Under Which Congress Is To Be Informed of U.S. Intelligence Activities, Including Covert Actions [January 18, 2006]
"This memorandum examines certain existing statutory procedures that govern how the executive branch is to keep Congress informed of U.S. intelligence activities, reviews pertinent legislative history underpinning the development of those procedures, and looks at the notification process that reportedly was followed in informing certain Members of Congress of the Presidents decision to authorize the National Security Agency (NSA) to collect signals intelligence within the United States. According to U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, the program involved 'intercepts of contents of communications where...one party to the communication is outside the United States' and the government has 'a reasonable basis to conclude that one party to the communication is a member of al Qaeda, affiliated with al Qaeda, or a member of an organization affiliated with al Qaeda, or working in support of al Qaeda.' Under current statute, the President is to ensure that the congressional intelligence committees are kept 'fully and currently informed' of U.S. intelligence activities, including any 'significant anticipated intelligence activity.' According to legislative history, the term 'fully and currently informed,' is intended to mean that complete and timely notice of actions and policies is provided, and that the committees will be informed of intelligence activities in such detail as the committees may require. Further, the Senate in report language said it expected the executive branch not to limit itself to providing full and complete information upon request from the committees, but to affirmatively keep the committees fully and currently informed."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2006-01-18
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Congress as a Consumer of Intelligence Information [December 14, 2005]
"This responds to your request for a discussion of Congress and its role as a consumer of national intelligence, and for a listing and a description of some of the U.S. Intelligence Community's principal intelligence products, including an identification of those which the executive branch routinely shares with Congress, and those which it does not. Limitations on Congressional Access to Certain National Intelligence By virtue of his constitutional role as commander-and-in-chief and head of the executive branch, the President has access to all national intelligence collected, analyzed and produced by the Intelligence Community. The Presidents position also affords him the authority - which, at certain times, has been aggressively asserted - to restrict the flow of intelligence information to Congress and its two intelligence committees, which are charged with providing legislative oversight of the Intelligence Community. As a result, the President, and a small number of presidentially-designated Cabinet-level officials, including the Vice President " in contrast to Members of Congress " have access to a far greater overall volume of intelligence and to more sensitive intelligence information, including information regarding intelligence sources and methods. They, unlike Members of Congress, also have the authority to more extensively task the Intelligence Community, and its extensive cadre of analysts, for follow-up information. As a result, the President and his most senior advisors arguably are better positioned to assess the quality of the Community's intelligence more accurately than is Congress."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2005-12-14
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Intelligence Reform Implementation at the Federal Bureau of Investigation: Issues and Options for Congress [August 16, 2005]
"This report analyzes the FBIs overall intelligence reform effort, focusing on the implementation of intelligence reform initiatives in the field. Reform policies designed at FBI Headquarters, with field input, may be of marginal utility unless they are fully and effectively implemented across the 56 FBI field offices. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) examined the FBIs reform initiatives with a focus on the implementation of the field intelligence group concept, at five field offices. Allowing for varying levels of progress across field offices, a central tenet of a high-order functioning intelligence organization is its ability to harness collection resources to nationally developed intelligence priorities and gaps. While areas of promise exist, field research indicates that the FBIs ability to formally harness intelligence collection (including systemic accountability mechanisms) to analytically identified intelligence gaps, remains nascent. In addition, this report discusses several overall options for Congress in addressing FBI intelligence reform. Organizationally and structurally, Congress could establish a stand-alone domestic intelligence agency. Alternatively, it could codify the recently announced National Security Service within the FBI. Potential areas are outlined for functional oversight, including the FBI-CIA relationship, and the FBIs efforts to stanch terrorism finance. And finally, the report reviews options for addressing the FBIs intelligence budget, both at the strategic and tactical levels."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Masse, Todd; Cumming, Alfred
2005-08-16
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Counterintelligence Reform at the Department of Energy: Policy Issues and Organizational Alternatives [Updated March 8, 2005]
From the Summary: "Troubled by reported lapses in security and counterintelligence (CI) at the Department of Energy (DOE), the Congress in 1999 established a semi-autonomous agency -- the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) -- to oversee DOE's national security-related programs (P.L. 106-65). Within NNSA, Congress created the Office of Defense Nuclear Counterintelligence to 'implement' CI policy at NNSA facilities. DOE retained a separate Office of Counterintelligence, which 'develops' CI policy for DOE and NNSA, but, implements it only at non-NNSA facilities. Though representing separate organizations, the two CI offices share resources and personnel for some programs. Although DOE has taken steps to strengthen CI practices, some observers have questioned whether the Department's bifurcated CI structure is the most effective in countering continuing efforts by foreign intelligence services, friendly and hostile, to target DOE and NNSA facilities."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2005-03-08
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Polygraph Use by the Department of Energy: Issues for Congress [updated February 3, 2005]
"On January 7, 2005, the DOE proposed a new regulation that would institute a polygraph screening program, but only for individuals with regular access to the most sensitive information. The result would be to reduce from more than 20,000 to approximately 4,500 the number of DOE and contractor personnel potentially subject to mandatory polygraph tests. DOE's new proposal came after some Members of Congress urged that the Department adopt a more focused polygraph program in the wake of a 2002 study by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) that questioned the validity of polygraph testing, particularly when it is used for screening purposes."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2005-02-03
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Comparison of 9/11 Commission Recommended Intelligence Reforms, Roberts Draft Bill, H.R. 4104, S. 190, S. 1520, S. 6, H.R. 4584, and Current Law [Updated October 6, 2004]
"On July 22, 2004, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also known as the 9/11 Commission) released its bipartisan, unanimous final report containing recommendations for far-reaching and fundamental changes to the United States Intelligence Community (IC). Almost 20 months after its creation by P.L. 107-306, the commission, as mandated by its founding legislation, attempted to present a full and complete accounting of the facts and circumstances surrounding the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, as well as recommendations for corrective measures that can be taken to help prevent acts of terrorism. Several Members of Congress also have proposed legislation to reform the IC. Senators Feinstein (S. 190), Bob Graham (S. 1520), Daschle (S. 6) and Roberts (draft bill of August 23, 2004) have introduced or proposed legislation that either directly, or as part of broader security proposals, contain a variety of IC reforms. Representative Harman (H.R. 4104) has introduced comprehensive intelligence reform legislation as did Representative Goss (H.R. 4584), before he was confirmed by the U.S. Senate as Director of Central Intelligence. This report, the first of two reports, presents side-by-side comparisons of the 9/11 Commission recommendations and legislation proposed by Senators Feinstein, Bob Graham, Daschle, and Roberts; and Representatives Harman and Goss, and relevant provisions of current law. A second report (CRS Report RL32601) presents a side-by-side comparison of the 9/11 Commission recommendations and legislation proposed by Senators Collins, Lieberman, and McCain; President Bush; and relevant provisions of current law."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2004-10-06
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Comparison of 9/11 Commission Recommended Intelligence Reforms, S. 2845, S.2774, H.R. 5024, Administration Proposal, H.R. 10, Current Law [Updated October 6, 2004]
"On July 22, 2004, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also known as the 9/11 Commission) released its bipartisan, unanimous final report containing recommendations for far-reaching and fundamental changes to the United States Intelligence Community (IC). Almost 20 months after its creation by P.L. 107-306, the commission, as mandated by its founding legislation, attempted to present a full and complete accounting of the facts and circumstances surrounding the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, as well as recommendations for corrective measures that can be taken to help prevent acts of terrorism. This report, the second of two reports, presents side-by-side comparisons of the 9/11 Commission recommendations and current law and legislation proposed by Senators Collins and Lieberman (S. 2845) and unanimously approved by the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on September 22, 2004, as amended; House Speaker Dennis Hastert (H.R. 10), as reported out be the House Committee on Rules; Senators McCain and Lieberman (S. 2774); Representative Pelosi (H.R. 5024); and President Bush."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2004-10-06
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Proposed Authorities of a National Intelligence Director: Issues for Congress and Side-by-Side Comparison of S. 2845, H.R. 10, and Current Law [Updated October 5, 2004]
"The 9/11 Commission, in its recent report on the attacks of September 11, 2001, criticized the U.S. Intelligence Community's (IC) fragmented management structure and questioned whether the U.S. government, and the IC, in particular, is organized adequately to direct resources and build the intelligence capabilities that the United States will need to counter terrorism, and to address the broader range of national security challenges in the decades ahead. The Commission made a number of recommendations, one of which was to replace the current position of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) with a National Intelligence Director (NID) who would oversee national intelligence centers on specific subjects of interest- including a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)- across the U.S. government, manage the national intelligence program; oversee the agencies that contribute to it; and have hiring, firing, and budgetary authority over the IC's 15 agencies. Although the Commission recommended that the director be located in the Executive Office of the President, the Commission Vice Chairman in testimony before Congress on September 7, 2004, withdrew that portion of the recommendation in light of concerns that the NID would be subject to undue influence. The Commission further recommended that a deputy NID be established to oversee the day-to-day operations of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The Commission's recommendation to strengthen management authority over the IC is the latest contribution to an IC structural reform debate that dates at least to 1955, when arguments for stronger IC authority began to surface. OMB deputy director James Schlesinger in 1971 first broached the NID concept."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2004-10-05
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Comparison of 9/11 Commission Recommended Intelligence Reforms, S. 2845, S. 2774, H.R. 5024, Administration Proposal, H.R. 10, Current Law [Updated September 28, 2004]
"On July 22, 2004, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also known as the 9/11 Commission) released its bipartisan, unanimous final report containing recommendations for far-reaching and fundamental changes to the United States Intelligence Community (IC). Almost 20 months after its creation by P.L. 107-306, the commission, as mandated by its founding legislation, attempted to present a full and complete accounting of the facts and circumstances surrounding the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, as well as recommendations for corrective measures that can be taken to help prevent acts of terrorism. Several Members of Congress also have proposed legislation to reform the IC. Senators Feinstein (S. 190), Bob Graham (S. 1520), Daschle (S. 6) and Roberts (S. draft bill of August 23, 2004) have introduced or proposed legislation that either directly, or as part of broader security proposals, contain a variety of IC reforms. Representative Harman (H.R. 4104) has introduced comprehensive intelligence reform legislation as did Representative Goss (H.R. 4584), before he was confirmed by the U.S. Senate as Director of Central Intelligence. This report, the second of two reports, presents side-by-side comparisons of the 9/11 Commission recommendations and current law and legislation proposed by Senators Collins and Lieberman (S. 2845) and unanimously approved by the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on September 22, 2004, as amended; House Speaker Dennis Hastert (H.R. 10); Senators McCain and Lieberman (S. 2774); Representative Pelosi (H.R. 5024); and President Bush."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2004-09-28
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Position of Director of National Intelligence: Issues for Congress [Updated August 13, 2004]
"The 9/11 Commission, in its recent report on the attacks of September 11, 2001, criticized the U.S. Intelligence Community's (IC) fragmented management structure and questioned whether the U.S. government, and the IC, in particular, is organized adequately to direct resources and build the intelligence capabilities that the U.S. will need to counter terrorism, and to address the broader range of national security challenges in the decades ahead. The Commission made a number of recommendations, one of which was to replace the current position of Director of Central Intelligence with a National Intelligence Director (NID) who would oversee national intelligence centers on specific subjects of interest - including a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) - across the U.S. government, manage the national intelligence program, oversee the agencies that contribute to it, and have hiring, firing and budgetary authority over the IC's 15 agencies. The Commission recommended that the director, and the NCTC, be located in the Executive Office of the President and that a deputy NID be established to oversee the day-to-day operations of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The Commissions recommendation to strengthen management authority over the IC is the latest contribution to an IC structural reform debate that dates at least to 1955, when arguments for stronger IC authority began to surface. OMB deputy director James Schlesinger in 1971 first broached the DNI concept. Recently some Members of Congress have introduced intelligence community reform legislation that would establish the position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI), or strengthen DCI authorities."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2004-08-13
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Position of Director of National Intelligence: Issues for Congress [Updated August 12, 2004]
"Recently some Members of Congress have introduced intelligence community reform legislation that would establish the position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI), or strengthen DCI authorities. Reactions to the concept of a DNI have been mixed since its inception. Supporters argue that the DCI cannot manage the IC, the CIA and serve as the President's chief intelligence advisor, and do justice to any of the jobs. Other than the CIA, the DCI also lacks hiring, firing and budget authority. They argue that the absence of strong, centralized leadership has resulted in divided management of intelligence capabilities; lack of common standards and practices across the foreign domestic intelligence divide; structural barriers that undermine the performance of joint intelligence work; and a weak capacity to set priorities and move resources. Opponents counter that a DNI would lose day-to-day control over the CIA, a natural power base and, as a result, influence. They also contend that placing the intelligence director in the Executive Office of the President, as the 9/11 Commission has proposed, risks the politicization of intelligence, giving the White House more direct control over covert operations, blurring the line between foreign and domestic operations and possibly shifting too much influence over intelligence to the Department of Defense. With regard to DOD influence, other opponents argue that a national director will shift the balance of control away from DOD, risking intelligence support to the warfighter. The congressional role includes deciding whether to establish the position of the DNI and its authority. This report will be updated as events warrant."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2004-08-12
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Side-by-Side Comparison of Intelligence Community Reforms Proposed by 9/11
This document provides a side-by-side comparison chart of Intelligence Community reforms proposed by the 9/11 Commission, the Bush Administration, Senators Feinstein, Graham and Daschle, and Representatives Harman and Goss; and current statute. Issues compared pertaining to the position of National Intelligence Director (NID) include the following: general responsibilities, internal security responsibilities, budget responsibilities, budget authorities, funds and personnel transfer, direct appropriation, budget disclosure, hire and fire authority, personnel policy, information sharing and technology policies. Other categories include the Intelligence Community (IC) structure, director of the CIA, paramilitary operations, congressional oversight, and homeland defense.
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2004-08-11
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FBI Intelligence Reform Since September 11, 2001: Issues and Options for Congress [Updated August 4, 2004]
From the Document: "The Intelligence Community, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), has been criticized for failing to warn of the attacks of September 11, 2001. In a sweeping indictment of the FBI's intelligence activities relating to counterterrorism and September 11, the Congressional Joint Inquiry Into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, singled out the FBI in a significant manner for failing to focus on the domestic terrorist threat; collect useful intelligence; analyze strategic intelligence; and to share intelligence internally and with other members of the Intelligence Community. The major component of this effort is restructuring and upgrading of its various intelligence support units into a formal and integrated intelligence program, which includes the adoption of new operational practices, and the improvement of its information technology. This report identifies five options for Congress to consider, including the creation of a domestic intelligence agency like Great Britain's MI-5. Other options include maintaining the status quo, transferring such responsibilities to the Department of Homeland Security or to the Director of Central Intelligence, or creating a national security intelligence service within the FBI. Meanwhile, for a variety of reasons, the 9/11 Commission has recommended leaving counterterrorism intelligence collection with the FBI, and creating an integrated national security workforce within the bureau."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2004-08-04
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Position of Director of National Intelligence: Issues for Congress [July 29, 2004]
"The 9/11 Commission, in its recent report on the attacks of September 11, 2001, criticized the U.S. Intelligence Community's (IC) fragmented management structure and questioned whether the U.S. government, and the IC, in particular, is organized adequately to direct resources and build the intelligence capabilities that the U.S. will need to counter terrorism, and to address the broader range of national security challenges in the decades ahead. The Commission made a number of recommendations, one of which was to replace the current position of Director of Central Intelligence with a National Intelligence Director (NID) who would oversee national intelligence centers on specific subjects of interest across the U.S. government, manage the national intelligence program, oversee the agencies that contribute to it, and have hiring, firing and budgetary authority over the IC's 15 agencies. The Commission recommended that the director be located in the Executive Office of the President and that a deputy NID be established to oversee the day-to-day operations of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). This report outlines the congressional proposals concerning the new position, as well as the arguments in favor and in opposition to it. The congressional role includes deciding whether to establish the position of the DNI and its authority. This report will be updated as events warrant."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2004-07-29
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Polygraph Use by the Department of Energy: Issues for Congress [Updated October 1, 2003]
Department of Energy (DOE) Deputy Secretary Kyle E. McSlarrow recommended on September 4, 2003, that the DOE issue a proposed regulation by the end of the year that would sharply curtail the use of the polygraph for screening DOE employees with access to classified information. McSlarrow said that he has recommended to Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham a mandatory polygraph screening program only for individuals with regular access to the most sensitive information. The result would be to reduce to approximately 4,500 the number of DOE and contractor personnel potentially subject to mandatory polygraph tests (from an estimated 20,000). In part because of continuing opposition by some DOE nuclear weapons laboratory employees, Congress in 2001 requested that NAS review the scientific evidence regarding the validity and reliability of the polygraph, particularly when used for personnel security screening. The NAS study concluded that while polygraph testing is more effective when used in connection with event-specific investigations, its accuracy is insufficient to justify reliance on its use in screening current and prospective federal agency employees-- DOE's principal purpose in using the polygraph. Congress might assess several possible approaches, including retaining the status quo, establishing a more focused polygraph program of the kind proposed by McSlarrow; researching alternatives to the polygraph; and eliminating the polygraph for screening purposes altogether.
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2003-10-01
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Polygraph Use by the Department of Energy: Issues for Congress [July 8, 2003]
"In the aftermath of the Wen Ho Lee case and the growing concern over the Department of Energys (DOE) counterintelligence program that followed, DOE in March 1999 began developing its first-ever polygraph screening program affecting an estimated 800 DOE employees with access to sensitive and classified information. Congress in October 1999 mandated DOE polygraph testing (P.L. 106-65, Sec.3154) and expanded the program to cover 13,000 DOE employees with access to sensitive and classified information. The following year, Congress further expanded polygraph testing to cover approximately 20,000 DOE employees (P.L. 106-398, Sec.3135) with the addition of new eligibility categories. In part because of continuing opposition by some DOE nuclear weapons laboratory employees, Congress in 2001 requested that the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) review the scientific evidence regarding the validity and reliability of the polygraph, particularly when used for personnel security screening. Congress directed DOE to institute a new polygraph program based upon the NAS findings."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2003-07-08
