Advanced search Help
Searching for terms: EXACT: "Cumming, Alfred" in: author
Clear all search criteria
Only 2/3! You are seeing results from the Public Collection, not the complete Full Collection. Sign in to search everything (see eligibility).
-
Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible Policy Questions [April 6, 2011]
"Published reports have suggested that in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Pentagon has expanded its counterterrorism intelligence activities as part of what the Bush Administration termed the global war on terror. Some observers have asserted that the Department of Defense (DOD) may have been conducting certain kinds of counterterrorism intelligence activities that would statutorily qualify as 'covert actions,' and thus require a presidential finding and the notification of the congressional intelligence committees. Defense officials have asserted that none of DOD's current counterterrorism intelligence activities constitute covert action as defined under the law, and therefore, do not require a presidential finding and the notification of the intelligence committees. Rather, they contend that DOD conducts only 'clandestine activities.' Although the term is not defined by statute, these officials characterize such activities as constituting actions that are conducted in secret but which constitute 'passive' intelligence information gathering. By comparison, covert action, they contend, is 'active,' in that its aim is to elicit change in the political, economic, military, or diplomatic behavior of a target."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2011-04-06
-
Sensitive Covert Action Notifications: Oversight Options for Congress [April 6, 2011]
"Legislation enacted in 1980 gave the executive branch authority to limit advance notification of especially sensitive covert actions to eight Members of Congress--the 'Gang of Eight'--when the President determines that it is essential to limit prior notice in order to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting U.S. vital interests. In such cases, the executive branch is permitted by statute to limit notification to the chairmen and ranking minority members of the two congressional intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the House, and Senate majority and minority leaders, rather than to notify the full intelligence committees, as is required in cases involving covert actions determined to be less sensitive. Congress, in approving this new procedure in 1980, during the Iran hostage crisis, said it intended to preserve operational secrecy in those 'rare' cases involving especially sensitive covert actions while providing the President with advance consultation with the leaders in Congress and the leadership of the intelligence committees who have special expertise and responsibility in intelligence matters. The intent appeared to some to be to provide the President, on a short-term basis, a greater degree of operational security as long as sensitive operations were underway. In 1991, in a further elaboration of congressional intent following the Iran-Contra Affair, congressional report language stated that limiting notification to the Gang of Eight should occur only in situations involving covert actions of such extraordinary sensitivity or risk to life that knowledge of such activity should be restricted to as few individuals as possible."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2011-04-06
-
'Gang of Four' Congressional Intelligence Notifications [March 18, 2011]
"'Gang of Four' intelligence notifications generally are oral briefings of certain particularly sensitive non-covert action intelligence activities, including principally, but not exclusively, intelligence collection programs, that the Intelligence Community typically limits to the chairmen and ranking Members of the two congressional intelligence committees. Gang of Four notifications are not based in statute but have constituted a practice generally accepted by the leadership of the intelligence committees and that is employed when the Intelligence Community believes a particular intelligence activity to be of such sensitivity that a restricted notification is warranted in order to reduce the risk of disclosure, inadvertent or otherwise. Intelligence activities viewed as being less sensitive typically are briefed to the full membership of each committee. [...] This report reviews the history of Gang of Four notification process and compares this procedure with that of the 'Gang of Eight' notification procedure. The 'Gang of Eight' procedure is statutorily based and provides that that the chairmen and ranking Members of the intelligence committee, along with the Speaker and minority leader of the House, and Senate majority and minority leaders--rather than the full membership of the intelligence committees--are to receive prior notice of particularly sensitive covert action programs, if the President determines that limited access to such programs is essential to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital U.S. interests."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2011-03-18
-
Director of National Intelligence Statutory Authorities: Status and Proposals [January 12, 2011]
"In passing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) in 2004, Congress approved the most comprehensive reform of the U.S. intelligence community since it was created over 50 years ago. Principal among enacted changes was the establishment of a new position of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to serve as head of the intelligence community (IC) and principal adviser to the President on intelligence matters related to the national security and to oversee and direct the implementation of the National Intelligence Program. Some observers have questioned whether the act provides the DNI the authority necessary to effectively carry out these responsibilities. Others assert that the DNI's authorities are significantly stronger than those of the former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), but suggest that DNIs have failed to aggressively assert the authorities they have been provided. During his Senate confirmation proceeding in January 2009, DNI Dennis C. Blair said that he would withhold judgment as to whether his authorities were sufficient but over time would advise the President and Congress if he concluded they were not. He also assured Senators that he would exercise his authorities to the fullest. The abrupt announcement of his resignation in May 2010 suggested to some that he had been unable to exercise his authorities to meet his responsibilities and, for some, raised questions about the viability of the DNI position."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Best, Richard A.; Cumming, Alfred
2011-01-12
-
Director of National Intelligence Statutory Authorities: Status and Proposals [May 26, 2010]
From the Summary: "In passing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) in 2004, Congress approved the most comprehensive reform of the U.S. intelligence community since it was created over 50 years ago. Principal among enacted changes was the establishment of a new position of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to serve as head of the intelligence community (IC) and principal adviser to the President on intelligence matters related to the national security and to oversee and direct the implementation of the National Intelligence Program. Some observers have questioned whether the act provides the DNI the authority necessary to effectively carry out these responsibilities. Others assert that the DNI's authorities are significantly stronger than those of the former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), but suggest that DNIs have failed to aggressively assert the authorities they have been provided. During his Senate confirmation proceeding in January 2009, DNI Dennis C. Blair said that he would withhold judgment as to whether his authorities were sufficient but over time would advise the President and Congress if he concluded they were not. He also assured Senators that he would exercise his authorities to the fullest. The abrupt announcement of his resignation in May 2010 suggested to some that he had been unable to exercise his authorities to meet his responsibilities and, for some, raised questions about the viability of the DNI position."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Best, Richard A.; Cumming, Alfred
2010-05-26
-
Sensitive Covert Action Notifications: Oversight Options for Congress [January 29, 2010]
"Legislation enacted in 1980 gave the executive branch authority to limit advance notification of especially sensitive covert actions to eight Members of Congress--the 'Gang of Eight'--when the President determines that it is essential to limit prior notice in order to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting U.S. vital interests. In such cases, the executive branch is permitted by statute to limit notification to the chairmen and ranking minority members of the two congressional intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the House, and Senate majority and minority leaders, rather than to notify the full intelligence committees, as is required in cases involving covert actions determined to be less sensitive. [...]. The Senate Intelligence Committee, in its version of the FY2010 Intelligence Authorization Act, left unchanged the Gang of Eight statutory structure, but approved several changes that would tighten certain aspects of current covert action reporting requirements. Although the executive branch has not issued a Statement of Administration Policy with regard to the Senate's bill, Director of National Intelligence Admiral Dennis Blair has indicated that he would recommend that the President veto the bill if the covert action notification changes contained in the bill remained in final legislation. Congress has not acted on the FY2010 Intelligence Authorization bill. With Congress considering possible changes in covert action congressional notifications, this report describes the statutory provision authorizing Gang of Eight notifications, reviews the legislative history of the provision, and examines both the impact of such notifications on congressional oversight as well as options that Congress might consider to possibly improve oversight."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2010-01-29
-
'Gang of Four' Congressional Intelligence Notifications [January 29, 2010]
"'Gang of Four' intelligence notifications generally are oral briefings of certain particularly sensitive non-covert action intelligence activities, including principally, but not exclusively, intelligence collection programs, that the Intelligence Community typically limits to the chairmen and ranking members of the two congressional intelligence committees, and at times, but not always, to their respective staff directors. […]. This report reviews the history of Gang of Four notification process and compares this procedure with that of the 'Gang of Eight' notification procedure. The 'Gang of Eight' procedure is statutorily based and provides that that the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the intelligence committee, along with the Speaker and minority leader of the House, and Senate majority and minority leaders--rather than the full membership of the intelligence committees--are to receive prior notice of particularly sensitive covert action programs, if the President determines that limited access to such programs is essential to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital U.S. interests. Although the FY2010 Intelligence Authorization bills approved by the two congressional intelligence committees address Gang of Eight covert action notifications, neither of the two bills reference Gang of Four notifications. Congress has not acted on the FY2010 Intelligence Authorization bill."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2010-01-29
-
Congress as a Consumer of Intelligence Information [January 28, 2010]
"This report examines the role of Congress as a consumer of national intelligence and examines several issues that Congress might address during the second session of the 111th Congress. The President, by virtue of his role as commander-in-chief and head of the executive branch, has access to all national intelligence collected, analyzed and produced by the Intelligence Community. By definition, the President, the Vice President, and certain Cabinet-level officials, have access to a greater overall volume of intelligence and to sensitive intelligence information than do members of the congressional intelligence committees. Moreover, since the intelligence agencies are part of the executive branch, the President has the authority to restrict the flow of intelligence information to Congress and its two intelligence committees. The Fort Hood Army base shootings in November 2009, followed later that year by the Christmas Day airline bombing plot and the Afghanistan suicide bombing that killed seven Central Intelligence Agency employees refocused congressional attention on a number of intelligence issues, including the role Congress plays as a consumer of intelligence. Each of these cases serves to underscore the sensitivity with which Congress views the executive branch's statutory obligation to keep the legislative branch fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2010-01-28
-
Sensitive Covert Action Notifications: Oversight Options for Congress [September 25,2009]
"Legislation enacted in 1980 gave the executive branch authority to limit advance notification of especially sensitive covert actions to eight Members of Congress--the 'Gang of Eight'--when the President determines that it is essential to limit prior notice in order to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting U.S. vital interests. In such cases, the executive branch is permitted by statute to limit notification to the chairmen and ranking minority members of the two congressional intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the House, and Senate majority and minority leaders, rather than to notify the full intelligence committees, as is required in cases involving covert actions determined to be less sensitive. [...]. In its mark-up of H.R. 2701, the FY2010 Intelligence Authorization Act, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) replaced the Gang of Eight statutory provision, adopting in its place a statutory requirement that each of the intelligence committees establish written procedures as may be necessary to govern such notifications. According to Committee report language, the adopted provision vests the authority to limit such briefings with the committees, rather than the President. [...]. With Congress considering possible changes in covert action congressional notifications, this report describes the statutory provision authorizing Gang of Eight notifications, reviews the legislative history of the provision, and examines both the impact of such notifications on congressional oversight as well as options that Congress might consider to possibly improve oversight."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2009-09-25
-
'Gang of Four' Congressional Intelligence Notifications [September 25,2009]
This Report to Congress contains information regarding, "'Gang of Four' intelligence notifications generally are oral briefings of certain particularly sensitive non-covert action intelligence activities, including principally, but not exclusively, intelligence collection programs, that the Intelligence Community typically limits to the chairmen and ranking members of the two congressional intelligence committees, and at times, but not always, to their respective staff directors. Gang of Four notifications are not based in statute but have constituted a practice generally accepted by the leadership of the intelligence committees and that is employed when the Intelligence Community believes a particular intelligence activity to be of such sensitivity that a restricted notification is warranted in order to reduce the risk of disclosure, inadvertent or otherwise. Intelligence activities viewed as being less sensitive typically are briefed to the full membership of each committee. [...] This report reviews the history of Gang of Four notification process and compares this procedure with that of the 'Gang of Eight' notification procedure. The 'Gang of Eight' procedure is statutorily based and provides that that the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the intelligence committee, along with the Speaker and minority leader of the House, and Senate majority and minority leaders--rather than the full membership of the intelligence committees--are to receive prior notice of particularly sensitive covert action programs, if the President determines that limited access to such programs is essential to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital U.S. interests."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2009-09-25
-
'Gang of Four' Congressional Intelligence Notifications [July 14, 2009]
"'Gang of Four' intelligence notifications generally are oral briefings of certain particularly sensitive non-covert action intelligence activities, including principally, but not exclusively, intelligence collection programs, that the Intelligence Community typically limits to the chairmen and ranking members of the two congressional intelligence committees, and at times, but not always, to their respective staff directors. [...]. Congress has said that its intent in this regard is that in extremely rare circumstances a need to preserve essential secrecy may result in a decision not to impart certain sensitive aspects of operations or collection programs to the intelligence oversight committees in order to protect extremely sensitive intelligence sources and methods. With regard to the phrase 'other exceptionally sensitive matters,' Congress has said its intent in using this phrase is to refer to other extremely sensitive categories of classified information such as information concerning the operational details of military deployment and extraordinarily sensitive diplomatic contacts, which the intelligence committees do not routinely require to satisfy their responsibilities. This report reviews the history of Gang of Four notification process and compares this procedure with that of the 'Gang of Eight' notification procedure. The 'Gang of Eight' procedure is statutorily based and provides that that the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the intelligence committee, along with the Speaker and minority leader of the House, and Senate majority and minority leaders--rather than the full membership of the intelligence committees--are to receive prior notice of particularly sensitive covert action programs, if the President determines that limited access to such programs is essential to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital U.S. interests."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2009-07-14
-
Sensitive Covert Action Notifications: Oversight Options For Congress [July 7, 2009]
"Legislation enacted in 1980 gave the executive branch authority to limit advance notification of especially sensitive covert actions to eight Members of Congress--the 'Gang of Eight'--when the President determines that it is essential to limit prior notice in order to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting U.S. vital interests. In such cases, the executive branch is permitted by statute to limit notification to the chairmen and ranking minority members of the two congressional intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the House, and Senate majority and minority leaders, rather than to notify the full intelligence committees, as is required in cases involving covert actions determined to be less sensitive. [...] In its mark-up of the FY2010 Intelligence Authorization Act, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) eliminated the Gang of Eight statutory provision, adopting instead a statutory requirement that each of the intelligence committees establish written procedures to govern such notifications. According to Committee report language, the adopted provision vests the authority to limit such briefings with the committees, rather than the President. [...] With Congress considering a possible change, this memorandum describes the statutory provision authorizing Gang of Eight notifications, reviews the legislative history of the provision, and examines both the impact of such notifications on congressional oversight as well as options that Congress might consider to possibly improve oversight."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2009-07-07
-
Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible Policy Questions [July 6, 2009]
"Published reports have suggested that in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Pentagon has expanded its counter-terrorism intelligence activities as part of what the Bush Administration termed the global war on terror. Some observers have asserted that the Department of Defense (DOD) may have been conducting certain kinds of counterterrorism intelligence activities that would statutorily qualify as 'covert actions,' and thus require a presidential finding and the notification of the congressional intelligence committees. […]. Some of DOD's activities have been variously described publicly as efforts to collect intelligence on terrorists that will aid in planning counter-terrorism missions; to prepare for potential missions to disrupt, capture or kill them; and to help local militaries conduct counter-terrorism missions of their own. […]. In committee report language accompanying H.R. 2701, the FY2010 Intelligence Authorization Act, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) expressed its concern that the distinction between the CIA's intelligence-gathering activities and DOD's clandestine operations is becoming blurred and called on the Defense Department to meet its obligations to inform the Committee of such activities. This report examines the statutory procedures governing covert action and associated questions to consider."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2009-07-06
-
Intelligence Reform at the Department of Energy: Policy Issues and Organizational Alternatives [February 10, 2009]
"After the repeated urging of the Department of Energy (DOE), Congress in 2006 agreed to temporarily consolidate separate counterintelligence (CI) offices at the Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) into a single CI office under DOE control. DOE had complained that the dual office structure was ineffective. [...]. At the same time, in 2006, DOE combined its separate Offices of Intelligence, and Counterintelligence into a new DOE office called the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. [...]. This report analyzes both consolidations--the first authorized by Congress at DOE's request; the second initiated by DOE--and examines the impact of each on the effectiveness of the Department's CI program. A major oversight issue for Congress is whether either, or both, organizational changes will strengthen the Department's CI program as intended. Some observers are concerned that the two consolidations may have undercut CI capabilities. Congress could maintain the status quo or choose from several alternative organizational approaches, some of which continue to be discussed despite the most recent organizational changes to the Department's CI program. Such alternatives range from maintaining the consolidated DOE/NNSA CI office but reversing DOE's decision to combine its formerly independent offices of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence, to eliminating both consolidations. Congress also could exercise several oversight options, ranging from conducting classified CI briefings to commissioning a formal assessment of DOE's current CI reorganization. This report will be updated as warranted."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2009-02-10
-
Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible Policy Questions [February 9, 2009]
This CRS report describes the statutory procedures governing covert action, with special attention on implications for the military in a post 9/11 world. "Some observers have asserted that the Department of Defense (DOD) may have been conducting certain kinds of counterterrorism intelligence activities that would statutorily qualify as 'covert actions,' and thus require a presidential finding and the notification of the congressional intelligence committees. Defense officials have asserted that none of DOD's current counter-terrorist intelligence activities constitute covert action as defined under the law, and therefore, do not require a presidential finding and the notification of the intelligence committees. Rather, they contend that DOD conducts only 'clandestine activities.' Although the term is not defined by statute, these officials characterize such activities as constituting actions that are conducted in secret, but which constitute 'passive' intelligence information gathering. By comparison, covert action, they contend, is 'active,' in that its aim is to elicit change in the political, economic, military, or diplomatic behavior of a target. [...]. Senior U.S. intelligence community officials have conceded that the line separating Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and DOD intelligence activities has blurred, making it more difficult to distinguish between the traditional secret intelligence missions carried out by each. They also have acknowledged that the U.S. Intelligence Community confronts a major challenge in clarifying the roles and responsibilities of various intelligence agencies with regard to clandestine activities."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2009-02-09
-
Polygraph Use by the Department of Energy: Issues for Congress [February 9, 2009]
"Four years after Congress directed the Department of Energy (DOE) to revamp its polygraph program, taking into account a 2003 National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report that questioned the scientific basis for the accuracy of polygraph testing, particularly when used to 'screen' employees, DOE promulgated a regulation on October 30, 2006, that eliminated polygraph screening tests without specific cause. DOE said its counterintelligence evaluation policies were now consistent with existing Intelligence Community practices and the NAS 2003 report's recommendations, particularly for cases when polygraph tests were used for screening purposes rather than for investigating specific events. Under its 2006 regulation, DOE requires that an applicant or employee be polygraph tested only if one of the following five causes is triggered: (1) a counterintelligence evaluation of an applicant or employee reveals that the individual may be engaged in certain activities, including clandestine or unreported relationships with foreign powers, organizations, or persons; (2) an employee is to be assigned to certain activities within DOE which involve another agency, and that agency requires a polygraph examination; (3) an agency to which a DOE employee will be assigned requests that DOE administer a polygraph examination as a condition of the assignment; (4) an employee is selected for a random counterintelligence evaluation, including a polygraph test; or (5) an employee is required to take a specific-incident polygraph examination."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2009-02-09
-
Congress as a Consumer of Intelligence Information [January 15, 2009]
"This report examines the role of Congress as a consumer of national intelligence and examines several issues that Congress might address in the 111th Congress. [...]. Congress generally has routine access to 'finished intelligence,' or to those intelligence products that are published for general circulation within the executive branch. A finished intelligence product is one in which an analyst evaluates, interprets, integrates and places into context raw intelligence. Congress receives the preponderance of its intelligence information through briefings, which generally are initiated at the request of congressional committees, individual members or staff. Congress does not routinely have access to the identities of intelligence sources, methods employed by the Intelligence Community in collecting analyzing intelligence, 'raw' intelligence, or unevaluated intelligence, or certain written intelligence products tailored to the specific needs of the President and other high-level executive branch policymakers. Among the issues the 111th Congress may choose to examine are ongoing efforts by the Director of National Intelligence to strike a balance between protecting intelligence sources while providing intelligence analysts and consumers--including those in Congress--more information about the reliability of those sources. This report will be updated as warranted."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2009-01-15
-
Director of National Intelligence Statutory Authorities: Status and Proposals [Updated January 15, 2009]
From the Summary: "In passing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) in 2004, Congress approved the most comprehensive reform of the U.S. Intelligence Community since it was created over 50 years ago. Principal among enacted changes was the establishment of a new position of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to manage the Intelligence Community (IC). [...] In examining the DNI's current authorities, it is clear that they are stronger than those that were available to the DCI, but whether they are sufficient to implement the 2004 intelligence reforms mandated by Congress will continue to depend on several factors, including the degree to which the authorities themselves are adequate, the DNI's willingness to assert those authorities, and the extent to which the DNI receives presidential and congressional support. This implies an important oversight role for the 111th Congress. This report will be updated as new information becomes available."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Best, Richard A.; Cumming, Alfred
2009-01-15
-
Intelligence Reform at the Department of Energy: Policy Issues and Organizational Alternatives [December 5, 2008]
This CRS report discusses intelligence consolidations and reforms at the Department of Energy. "After the repeated urging of the Department of Energy (DOE), Congress in 2006 agreed to temporarily consolidate separate counterintelligence (CI) offices at the Department of Energy and the National Security Administration (NNSA) into a single CI office under DOE control. DOE had complained that the dual office structure was ineffective. In permitting DOE to consolidate the two offices, Congress reversed its 1999 authorization to establish a separate NNSA CI office--a decision that at the time was prompted by congressional concerns over repeated departmental security and counterintelligence lapses. At the same time, in 2006, DOE combined its separate Offices of Intelligence, and Counterintelligence into a new DOE office called the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. The Department reasoned that combining the disciplines of counterintelligence and foreign intelligence under one integrated office would foster synergistic cooperation that would lead to a more strategic and ultimately more effective counterintelligence program. This report analyzes both consolidations--the first authorized by Congress at DOE's request; the second initiated by DOE--and examines the impact of each on the effectiveness of the Department's CI program. A major oversight issue for Congress is whether either, or both, organizational changes will strengthen the Department's CI program as intended. Some observers are concerned that the two consolidations may have undercut CI capabilities."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2008-12-05
-
Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible Policy Questions [Updated December 1, 2008]
"Published reports have suggested that in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Pentagon has expanded its counter-terrorism intelligence activities as part of what the Bush Administration terms the global war on terror. Some observers have asserted that the Department of Defense (DOD) may be conducting certain kinds of counterterrorism intelligence activities that would statutorily qualify as 'covert actions,' and thus require a presidential finding and the notification of the congressional intelligence committees. Defense officials assert that none of DOD's current counter-terrorist intelligence activities constitute covert action as defined under the law, and therefore, do not require a presidential finding and the notification of the intelligence committees. Rather, they contend that DOD conducts only 'clandestine activities.' Although the term is not defined by statute, these officials characterize such activities as constituting actions that are conducted in secret, but which constitute 'passive' intelligence information gathering. By comparison, covert action, they contend, is 'active,' in that its aim is to elicit change in the political, economic, military, or diplomatic behavior of a target. Some of DOD's activities have been variously described publicly as efforts to collect intelligence on terrorists that will aid in planning counter-terrorism missions; to prepare for potential missions to disrupt, capture or kill them; and to help local militaries conduct counter-terrorism missions of their own. [...] This report examines the statutory procedures governing covert action and associated questions to consider. This report will be updated as warranted."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2008-12-01
-
Intelligence Reform at the Department of Energy: Policy Issues and Organizational Alternatives [July 28, 2008]
This CRS report discusses intelligence consolidations and reforms at the Department of Energy. "After the repeated urging of the Department of Energy (DOE), Congress in 2006 agreed to temporarily consolidate separate counterintelligence (CI) offices at the Department of Energy and the National Security Administration (NNSA) into a single CI office under DOE control. DOE had complained that the dual office structure was ineffective. In permitting DOE to consolidate the two offices, Congress reversed its 1999 authorization to establish a separate NNSA CI office - a decision that at the time was prompted by congressional concerns over repeated departmental security and counterintelligence lapses. At the same time, in 2006, DOE combined its separate Offices of Intelligence, and Counterintelligence into a new DOE office called the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. The Department reasoned that combining the disciplines of counterintelligence and foreign intelligence under one integrated office would foster synergistic cooperation that would lead to a more strategic and ultimately more effective counterintelligence program. This report analyzes both consolidations - the first authorized by Congress at DOE's request; the second initiated by DOE - and examines the impact of each on the effectiveness of the Department's CI program. A major oversight issue for Congress is whether either, or both, organizational changes will strengthen the Department's CI program as intended. Some observers are concerned that the two consolidations may have undercut CI capabilities."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2008-07-28
-
Polygraph Use by the Department of Energy: Issues for Congress [Updated April 17, 2008]
"Four years after Congress directed the Department of Energy (DOE) to revamp its polygraph program, taking into account a 2003 National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report that questioned the scientific basis for the accuracy of polygraph testing, particularly when used to 'screen' employees, DOE promulgated a regulation on October 30, 2006, that eliminated polygraph screening tests without specific cause. DOE said its counterintelligence evaluation policies were now consistent with existing Intelligence Community practices and the NAS 2003 report's recommendations, particularly for cases when polygraph tests were used for screening purposes rather than for investigating specific events. […] The value of polygraph testing, with its associated uncertainties, has been a part of Congress's continuing oversight interest for DOE. This report examines how DOE's polygraph testing program has evolved and reviews certain scientific findings with regard to the polygraph's scientific validity. Several issues include whether: DOE's new screening program is focused on an appropriate number of individuals occupying only the most sensitive positions; the program should be expanded in order to adequately safeguard certain classified information; further research into the polygraph's scientific validity is needed; there are possible alternatives to the polygraph; and whether DOE should continue polygraph screening. Possible options include a more focused polygraph screening program, an expanded polygraph program, additional research into the polygraph's scientific validity, and eliminating the use of the polygraph to screen applicants and employees."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2008-04-17
-
Director of National Intelligence Statutory Authorities: Status and Proposals [Updated April 17, 2008]
"In passing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) in 2004, Congress approved the most comprehensive reform of the U.S. Intelligence Community since it was created over 50 years ago. Principal among enacted changes was the establishment of a new position of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to manage the Intelligence Community (IC). Some observers have questioned whether the act provides the DNI the authority necessary to effectively implement Congress's 2004 intelligence reforms. Others assert that the DNI's authorities are significantly stronger than those of the former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), but suggest that the DNI has failed to aggressively assert the authorities he has been provided. In examining the DNI's current authorities, it is clear that they are significantly stronger than those that were available to the DCI, but whether they are sufficient to implement intelligence reforms mandated by Congress will continue to depend on several factors. They include the extent to which the authorities themselves are adequate, the DNI's willingness to assert those authorities, and the extent to which the DNI receives presidential and congressional support. This report will be updated as new information becomes available."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Best, Richard A.; Cumming, Alfred
2008-04-17
-
Open Source Intelligence (OSINT): Issues for Congress [Updated January 28, 2008]
"Open source information (OSINT) is derived from newspapers, journals, radio and television, and the Internet. Intelligence analysts have long used such information to supplement classified data, but systematically collecting open source information has not been a priority of the U.S. Intelligence Community. In recent years, given changes in the international environment, there have been calls, from Congress and the 9/11 Commission among others, for a more intense and focused investment in open source collection and analysis. However, some still emphasize that the primary business of intelligence continues to be obtaining and analyzing secrets. The collection and analysis of OSINT information will be ultimately judged by its contribution to the overall intelligence effort. Collecting information from open sources is generally less expensive and less risky than collection from other intelligence sources. The use of OSINT may result not only in monetary savings but also in less risk than utilizing sensitive technical and human sources. OSINT can also provide insights into the types of developments that may not be on the priority list for other systems or may not be susceptible to collection through other intelligence approaches - innovative applications of new technologies, shifts in popular attitudes, emergence of new political and religious movements, growing popular discontent, disillusionment with leadership, etc. Supporters of OSINT maintain that the future contribution of the Intelligence Community will be enhanced by its ability to provide detailed information and incisive analyses of such developments. This report will be updated as new information becomes available."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Best, Richard A.; Cumming, Alfred
2008-01-28
-
Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible Policy Questions [Updated January 28, 2008]
"This report examines the statutory procedures governing covert action and associated questions to consider. Published reports have suggested that in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Pentagon has expanded its counter-terrorism intelligence activities as part of what the Bush Administration terms the global war on terror. Some observers have asserted that the Department of Defense (DOD) may be conducting certain kinds of counterterrorism intelligence activities that would statutorily qualify as 'covert actions,' and thus require a presidential finding and the notification of the congressional intelligence committees. Defense officials assert that none of DOD's current counter-terrorist intelligence activities constitute covert action as defined under the law, and therefore, do not require a presidential finding and the notification of the intelligence committees. Rather, they contend that DOD conducts only 'clandestine activities.' Although the term is not defined by statute, these officials characterize such activities as constituting actions that are conducted in secret, but which constitute 'passive' intelligence information gathering. By comparison, covert action, they contend, is 'active,' in that its aim is to elicit change in the political, economic, military, or diplomatic behavior of a target."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2008-01-28
-
Director of National Intelligence Statutory Authorities: Status and Proposals [Updated January 25, 2008]
"In passing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) in 2004, Congress approved the most comprehensive reform of the U.S. Intelligence Community since its establishment over 50 years ago. Principal among enacted changes was the establishment of a new position of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to manage the Intelligence Community. Some observers have questioned whether the statute gives the DNI sufficient authority to implement the 2004 intelligence reforms enacted by Congress. Others believe that the DNI's existing authorities are substantially stronger than those of the former Director of Central Intelligence (CIA), but that the DNI must more effectively assert those authorities. […]In examining the DNI's current authorities, it is clear that they are substantially stronger than those held by the former DCI, but whether they are sufficient to implement mandated reforms will depend on several factors. […] This report reviews the congressional debate over authorities that occurred during consideration of the 2004 Act; examines the DNI's request for more authority and the congressional response to date; compares several of the DNI's authorities with those of former DCIs; and, examines some potential Congressional concerns. This report will be updated as new information becomes available."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Best, Richard A.; Masse, Todd; Cumming, Alfred
2008-01-25
-
Polygraph Use by the Department of Energy: Issues for Congress [Updated December 10, 2007]
"Four years after Congress directed the Department of Energy (DOE) to revamp its polygraph program, taking into account a 2003 National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report that questioned the scientific basis for the accuracy of polygraph testing, particularly when used to 'screen' employees, DOE promulgated a regulation on October 30, 2006, that eliminated polygraph screening tests without specific cause. DOE said its counterintelligence evaluation policies were now consistent with existing Intelligence Community practices and the NAS 2003 report's recommendations, particularly for cases when polygraph tests were used for screening purposes rather than for investigating specific events."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2007-12-10
-
Open Source Intelligence (OSINT): Issues for Congress [December 5, 2007]
"Open source information (OSINT) is derived from newspapers, journals, radio and television, and the Internet. Intelligence analysts have long used such information to supplement classified data, but systematically collecting open source information has not been a priority of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). In recent years, given changes in the international environment, there have been calls, from Congress and the 9/11 Commission among others, for a more intense and focused investment in open source collection and analysis. However, some still emphasize that the primary business of intelligence continues to be obtaining and analyzing secrets. A consensus now exists that OSINT must be systematically collected and should constitute an essential component of analytical products. This has been recognized by various commissions and in statutes. Responding to legislative direction, the Intelligence Community has established the position of Assistant Director of National Intelligence for Open Source and created the National Open Source Center. The goal is to perform specialized OSINT acquisition and analysis functions and create a center of excellence that will support and encourage all intelligence agencies. The effort has been only underway since late 2005 but the Center is up and running, and providing support, including training, to OSINT professionals throughout the Intelligence Community. Administrative mechanisms are in place to ensure that there is a comprehensive community-wide open source effort. It appears, however, to some observers that not all agencies have as yet made comprehensive commitments to acquiring and using open source information, nor that the ODNI has taken sufficient steps to ensure that open sources are appropriately exploited."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Best, Richard A.; Cumming, Alfred
2007-12-05
-
Director of National Intelligence Statutory Authorities: Status and Proposals [November 2, 2007]
"In passing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) in 2004, Congress approved the most comprehensive reform of the U.S. Intelligence Community since its establishment over 50 years ago. Principal among enacted changes was the establishment of a new position of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to manage the Intelligence Community. Some observers have questioned whether the statute gives the DNI sufficient authority to implement the 2004 intelligence reforms enacted by Congress. Others believe that the DNI's existing authorities are substantially stronger than those of the former Director of Central Intelligence (CIA), but that the DNI must more effectively assert those authorities. While acknowledging his strengthened authorities under the 2004 Act, and conceding that he had not issued certain guidance to the Intelligence Community clarifying those authorities, DNI Michael McConnell asked Congress to further enhance his authority -- new authority which he says he needs if he is to effectively lead the Community. The Senate Intelligence Committee responded to the DNI's request by approving an FY2008 Intelligence Authorization Bill (S. 1538; S.Rept. 110-75) that contains several new DNI authorities, including the authority to: conduct accountability reviews of significant Intelligence Community failures and deficiencies; address information sharing deficiencies; and, approve interagency financing of national intelligence centers. The House Intelligence Committee in its bill approved a more limited number of new authorities, noting its disappointment that the DNI had not taken a more directive role in coordinating the Intelligence Community and thereby suggesting that the DNI is ineffectively asserting his existing authorities."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Best, Richard A.; Masse, Todd; Cumming, Alfred
2007-11-02
-
Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible Policy Questions [October 11, 2007]
"Published reports have suggested that in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Pentagon has expanded its counter-terrorism intelligence activities as part of what the Bush Administration terms the global war on terror. Some observers have asserted that the Department of Defense (DOD) may be conducting certain kinds of counterterrorism intelligence activities that would statutorily qualify as 'covert actions,' and thus require a presidential finding and the notification of the congressional intelligence committees. Defense officials assert that none of DOD's current counter-terrorist intelligence activities constitute covert action as defined under the law, and therefore, do not require a presidential finding and the notification of the intelligence committees. Rather, they contend that DOD conducts only 'clandestine activities.' Although the term is not defined by statute, these officials characterize such activities as constituting actions that are conducted in secret, but which constitute 'passive' intelligence information gathering. By comparison, covert action, they contend, is 'active,' in that its aim is to elicit change in the political, economic, military, or diplomatic behavior of a target. Some of DOD's activities have been variously described publicly as efforts to collect intelligence on terrorists that will aid in planning counter-terrorism missions; to prepare for potential missions to disrupt, capture or kill them; and to help local militaries conduct counter-terrorism missions of their own. Senior U.S. intelligence community officials have conceded that the line separating Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and DOD intelligence activities has blurred, making it more difficult to distinguish between the traditional secret intelligence missions carried out by each. They also have acknowledged that the U.S. Intelligence Community confronts a major challenge in clarifying the roles and responsibilities of various intelligence agencies with regard to clandestine activities. This report examines the statutory procedures governing covert action and associated questions to consider."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Cumming, Alfred
2007-10-11
