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Success, Lethality, and Cell Structure Across the Dimensions of Al Qaeda
"The death of Osama bin Laden on May 1, 2011 represents the culmination of a decade long fight to bring the perpetrators of the September 11 attacks to justice. Sustaining the effort needed to arrive at this point is a testament to the resilience of the counterterrorism community and nation, but it subsequently raises a series of questions regarding the future of al-Qa'ida and the violent social movement spawned by bin Laden and fellow entrepreneurial jihadis. It is tempting to view his death as the end of a long struggle, but the violent extremists radicalized and mobilized by al-Qa'ida's global jihadi narrative regard this as the end of the opening act. The terrorist threat that the United States and its allies face today has evolved in the years since September 11. Over that time, experts have engaged in heated debates over al-Qa'ida's strategic center of gravity, with some stressing the importance of central leadership while others emphasize the threat from radicalized individuals unconnected with any formal organization."
Combating Terrorism Center (U.S.)
Helfstein, Scott; Wright, Dominick
2011-05
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Self-inflicted Wounds: Debates and Divisions within Al-Qa'ida and Its Periphery
"Self‐Inflicted Wounds: Debates and Divisions within al‐Qa'ida and its Periphery examines the internal, or endogenous, reasons that have hastened the decline of the jihadi movement. In doing so, it exposes the jihadi movement, with al‐Qa'ida at its helm, as one that lacks coherence and unity, despite its claims to the contrary. The report divides the jihadis' endogenous problems into two categories: internal divisions plaguing al‐Qa'ida and the jihadi movement proper; and fault lines dividing the jihadi movement from other Muslim and Islamist actors. The internal jihadi divisions examined in this report include tactical disagreements over takfir (excommunication of Muslims) and the killing of Muslims; strategic disagreements over whether the jihadi struggle should focus on the near enemy (i.e., nominally Muslim regimes) or the far enemy (the United States and its Western allies); friction between jihadi pragmatists and jihadi doctrinarians; rifts between al‐Qa'ida Central and local affiliates; as well as the sometimes tense relations between Arab and non‐Arab members of the jihadi movement. The competition between the jihadis and their Muslim counterparts scrutinizes the jihadis' relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and the Shi'a community."
Combating Terrorism Center (U.S.)
Moghadam, Assaf, 1974-; Fishman, Brian
2010-12-16
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Remotely Piloted Innovation: Terrorism, Drones and Supportive Technology
From the executive summary: "In mid-August 2016, the Shiite militant group Hezbollah reportedly dropped two small bombs from what is believed to have been a modified, commercially available drone that it was flying over rebel positions in Syria. While terrorist groups have long had a fascination with drones and experimented with their use, the incident was a first for a terror group, and it potentially represents the leading edge of a wave of similar incidents that could follow in the months, years and decades ahead. Much has been made of the threat of terror use of drones (also known as 'uninhabited aircraft systems,' or UASs), but little empirical and historical work has been done to support our understanding of this phenomenon and its evolution. This report seeks to address this gap by providing a review of, and framework to situate, cases in which terrorist entities have either shown a substantive interest in drones or have used them. It evaluates both individual use cases and the activity of groups that have used drones frequently enough to constitute their having a 'program.' These cases are then complemented by a review of the creative ways that private citizens have used drones, in order to provide decision makers with a firmer baseline of both demonstrated terror capability and what lies within the immediate realm of possibility, given what has already been achieved by others. This report also includes an overview of new technologies that are likely to further complicate the scope of this developing threat."
Combating Terrorism Center (U.S.)
Rassler, Don
2016-10
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Risky Business: The Global Threat Network and the Politics of Contraband
"This study looks at the interrelationship between illicit activity in the economic and political arenas. It offers a different perspective on the global illicit marketplace and the connectivity between crime and terror through examining the relationships of those who produce and profit from fear for financial or political purposes. Looking across a range of illicit activities that include terrorism, the illegal narcotics trade, organized crime, human smuggling and political corruption, the network analysis includes 2,700 individuals linked by 15,000 relationships spanning 122 countries. Conventional wisdom suggests that criminal-terrorist connectivity is a phenomenon found in failed and economically poor states. This argument relies on four assumptions: (1) poor economic conditions drive people into the illicit sectors; (2) criminal and terrorist actors are more likely to thrive in environments with weak governments and poverty; (3) because it is easy for terrorist and criminals to cooperate, they will; (4) governmental and illicit actors are adversaries. The results of this study suggest that there is good reason to question each of these assumptions and in turn to revisit the fundamental empirical data relating to and explanations of crime-terror connectivity."
Combating Terrorism Center (U.S.)
Helfstein, Scott; Solomon, John
2014-05
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Caliphate's Global Workforce: An Inside Look at the Islamic State's Foreign Fighter Paper Trail
"The purpose of this report is to provide an analysis of over 4,600 unique Islamic State personnel records that were produced by the group primarily between early 2013 and late 2014. The importance of this data for understanding the Islamic State and, in particular, the foreign fighter flow, cannot be overstated. To put it simply, it is the largest cache of primary source documents produced by the Islamic State available in the open-source as of this date. These particular documents were acquired by NBC [National Broadcasting Company] News from an Islamic State defector and subsequently provided to the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point (and other entities). This report provides a window into the organization's global workforce, revealing information about foreign fighters' countries of origin, citizenship, points of entry into Syria, marital status, skills and previous occupations, education levels, religious knowledge, fighting role preferences in the group, and previous jihadist experience. In addition to analyzing the data at the macro-level, the report also highlights numerous anecdotes of individual fighters. Taken together, the analysis in this report reveals an organization that is attempting to vet new members, manage talent efectively within the organization, and deal with a diverse pool of recruits."
Combating Terrorism Center (U.S.)
Dodwell, Brian; Hamilton, Daniel S. (Daniel Sheldon), 1955-; Rassler, Don
2016-04
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CTC Perspectives: Militant Rivalries Extend to Female Recruitment in Pakistan
"In an attempt to keep apace with the latest trends in jihadi recruitment, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) released a 45-page, English-language magazine Sunnat-e-Khaula in August 2017, named after a historical Muslim female fighter. Although this is not the first time that TTP has released a glossy propaganda publication in English, making a direct appeal to educated Pakistani women is a novel endeavor for the group. [...] Viewed in the context of an increasingly competitive environment, TTP's women's magazine signals the group's desire to employ women for both supportive and operational roles--extending the turf war between ISK (Islamic State of Khurasan), TTP, and potentially other local militant actors to the female sphere. Left unchecked, operational support of Pakistani women to facilitate extremist groups may generate dangerous consequences for militancy and terrorism in the region. A change in recruitment patterns is an early warning of evolving tactics--and one that requires corresponding changes in counterterrorism efforts."
Combating Terrorism Center (U.S.)
Jadoon, Amira; Mahmood, Sara
2017-09-14
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White Paper on: Terrorism, Deterrence, and Nuclear Weapons
"The Combating Terrorism Center produced this paper at the request of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management. The task Force asked the Combating Terrorism Center and the Department of Social Sciences at United Stated Military Academy to consider the concept of deterrence within the context of two questions: 1) how jihadists and terrorists can be deterred? and 2) what role might nuclear weapons and capabilities play in that particular domain of defense? The first section of the paper addresses the deterrence of terrorism, sorting through the various arguments for and against the applicability of deterrence to terrorism. [...]. The second section of the paper examines the objects of a deterrence strategy: non-state and state-sponsored terrorist organizations possessing global reach. [...]. The final section of the paper addresses the use of nuclear weapons as part of a deterrent strategy. While the report finds that certain types of terrorists can be deterred from certain types of attacks, it is less optimistic about the use of nuclear weapons in a terrorist deterrent strategy."
Combating Terrorism Center (U.S.)
Helfstein, Scott
2008-10-31
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Sunni and Shi'a Terrorism: Differences that Matter
"There are significant and little appreciated differences in the trajectory of Sunni extremist terrorism and that of Shi'a extremism. The differences exist across six key areas that impact American policy considerations [...]. First and foremost, Sunni radicals and Shi'a extremists differ in the overall approach and main objectives for their use of terror. The former tend to operate in a continuous, mid-to-high intensity manner, seeing war against infidels and apostates as a perennial condition featuring overlapping waves. Outside of an ongoing and seemingly open-ended campaign against Israel, terrorist attacks by Shi'a groups have by and large featured discrete terror campaigns tethered to state and organizational objectives. Second, Sunni terrorists and Shi'a extremists manifest different patterns for recruiting terrorist operatives and developing terrorist missions. Shi'a terrorists, unlike their Sunni counterparts, enjoy direct state support and for that reason are far more likely to originate from Iranian embassies, consulates and state-run businesses. Third, despite holding a minority viewpoint within the wider Sunni Islamic community, Sunni extremists, especially Salafi-Jihadis, rely more extensively on the support of their coreligionist expatriate communities in facilitating terrorist activities. Fourth, while employing similar tactics and methods, Shi'a terrorist groups have shown a much greater propensity to kidnap innocents to barter, while Sunni extremists more frequently abduct to kill. Fifth, Shi'a terror groups exhibit a much higher incidence of targeted assassinations for specific political gain, rather than the high-casualty killings featured in Sunni terrorism, and particularly of the Salafi-Jihadist variant. Finally, each sect's extremists manage publicity and propaganda differently."
Combating Terrorism Center (U.S.)
Lynch, Thomas Francis, 1960-
2008-12-29
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Islamic Imagery Project: Visual Motifs in Jihadi Internet Propaganda
This document on jihadi internet propaganda was produced by the Combating Terrorism Center at the United States Military Academy. "The current study on jihadi imagery, the first of its kind, is an important step in this process. Herein, visual propaganda is considered to be more than just a host for textual messages; rather it is treated as an expressive medium unto itself-one which communicates ideas just as effectively, and sometimes as explicitly, as the written word. We regard jihadi imagery to be a primary vehicle for the communication and diffusion of jihadi ideas, and an essential tool utilized by radical ideologues, terrorist organizations, and sympathetic propagandists, which plays to the particular religious and cultural experiences of their audience. Therefore, understanding how these images work, what ideas they convey, why they are employed, and what responses they may elicit, is vital to our struggle against the influence of jihadi organizations and the violence they create."
Combating Terrorism Center (U.S.)
2006-03
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Deadly Vanguards: A Study of al-Qa'ida's Violence Against Muslims
"In a 2007 online forum, al-Qa'ida's second in command Ayman al-Zawahiri, confronted questions about the organization's use of violence and especially violence against Muslims. Zawahiri and other leaders have defended al-Qa'ida's use of violence, arguing that their operations do not kill Muslims, and on the rare occasions they do, such individuals are apostates or martyrs. Since the inception of al-Qa'ida, the organization has claimed to represent Muslim interests around the world declaring itself the vanguard of true Islam, and the defender of Muslim people. Unfortunately for al-Qa'ida, their actions speak louder than their words. The fact is that the vast majority of al-Qa'ida's victims are Muslims: the analysis here shows that only 15% of the fatalities resulting from al-Qa'ida attacks between 2004 and 2008 were Westerners."
Combating Terrorism Center (U.S.)
al-Obaidi, Muhammad; Abdullah, Nassir; Helfstein, Scott
2009-12
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Militant Ideology Atlas: Research Compendium
"The Militant Ideology Atlas is the CTC's most recent and comprehensive attempt to better understand the ideology driving the Jihadi Movement. The empirically supported findings from this effort are generated by a systematic research methodology and critical analyses of hundreds of al-Qa`ida's most widely-read and influential texts. The wealth of information contained in the Atlas' Research Compendium provides a new generation of scholars and analysts with the data and evidence they need to understand our adversaries and to devise strategies for combating them."
Combating Terrorism Center (U.S.)
McCants, William R.
2006-11
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Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting al-Qa'ida's Organizational Vulnerabilities
"Based on a collection of al-Qa'ida documents that have recently been released from the Department of Defense's Harmony Database, this report provides an analysis of al-Qa'ida's organizational vulnerabilities. These documents, captured in the course of operations supporting the GWOT, have never before been made available to the academic and policy community. Harmony and Disharmony includes a theoretically informed analysis of potential opportunities to exploit al-Qa'ida's network vulnerabilities, a case study of jihadi operational failure, and specific recommendations for effectively addressing the evolving al-Qa'ida threat."
Combating Terrorism Center (U.S.)
2006-02-14
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Jihadi after Action Report: SYRIA
"Despite its crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood in the early 1980s, the Asad regime has had to contend with a rising tide of Islamist activity due, in part, to its pandering to the Sunni religious establishment to shore up its legitimacy. However, the growing appeal of Islamism (the notion that Islam should be the primary source of law and identity in Muslim-dominated countries) has made it more difficult for the Jihadis to attract a large following. This is due to the following factors: (1) the Jihadis' uncompromising puritanism, which makes their ideology religiously repugnant and prevents them from engaging in pragmatic political actions and alliances; (2) the Jihadis' lack of scholarly firepower, which makes it hard for them to stand up to government-sponsored clerics and justify their cause and their violent tactics to the masses; (3) improved security measures in the past year; (4) the infiltration of Jihadi groups by clerics; (5) the influence of Sufism (Islamic mysticism); (6) popular televangelists that preach tolerance and pacifism; (7) the willingness of popular Islamist groups like Hamas and Hizbullah to participate in democratic elections; (8) competing identities, either ethnic (e.g., Kurds), sectarian (e.g., Alawite, Shia, Christian, Druze), or nationalist; and (9) the pull of Western culture, particularly among the youth."
Combating Terrorism Center (U.S.)
Ulph, Stephen; McCants, William R.
2006
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Stealing Al Qa'ida's Playbook
"The key to defeating the jihadi movement is identifying its strengths and weaknesses so that the former may be countered or co-opted and the latter exploited. In this article we argue that the people who know these strengths and weaknesses best are the jihadis themselves; one just needs to know where (and how) to look for their insights. Jihadi leaders are surprisingly frank when discussing the vulnerabilities of their movement and their strategies for toppling local regimes and undermining the United States. Their candor is, in large part, a consequence of struggles for leadership within the movement; thus, a leader of one group will publish his strategic vision in order to gain more recruits and achieve a reputation as a serious scholar worthy of respect. It is also a consequence of the United States success in destroying jihadi training camps and denying safe havens jihadi leaders have had to put their writings online so as to provide continuing guidance to a very decentralized following. In a sense, members of the jihadi movement have put their team's playbooks online. By mining these texts for their tactical and strategic insights, the United States will be able to craft effective tactics, techniques, and procedures to defeat followers of the movement. In what follows, we will demonstrate the efficacy of this approach by highlighting the insights we have gleaned from the works of four prominent jihadi ideologues."
Combating Terrorism Center (U.S.)
Brachman, Jarret; McCants, William Faizi, 1975-
2006-02
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Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States government has significantly enhanced its level of engagement with African governments. There is a growing recognition in Washington policy circles that the social and economic instability plaguing Africa is a strategic concern for the United States. In response, the Department of Defense has collaborated with the Department of State to develop the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), which supports African states efforts to improve border security and counterterrorism capacity while also facilitating regional cooperation, promoting democratic governance, and improving relations with the United States.1 BACKGROUND Levels of modernization and development vary enormously among the countries of North Africa and the Sahel.2 Many of the states in this region have stable authoritarian governments while others have been plagued by violence and instability. There are a few fledgling democracies, including Niger. Tribal structures are still the primary political unit in many areas that have never been under the control of a central government. Local authorities have had little success controlling terrorists operating in desert terrain that is extremely difficult to monitor, making this region an excellent example of what the Pentagon calls ungoverned space. The region s economies are fragile, relying on inefficient state owned industries and subsistence agriculture, and they are undermined further by the large volume of black market activity. For some individuals, criminal activity particularly smuggling has been a gateway to direct participation in terrorism Violent extremist groups target unemployed and underemployed young men for recruitment into terrorist organizations. These disenfranchised youth are vulnerable to ideologies that offer simple solutions to their problems and promise great rewards for their participation.
Combating Terrorism Center (U.S.)
Boudali, Lianne Kennedy
2007-04
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CTC Report: An Assessment of 516 Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) Unclassified Summaries
"Between July 2004 and March 2005, the Department of Defense (DoD) conducted Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRT's) for 558 detainees being held at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO). The DoD's objective in conducting this tribunal process was to determine whether those detainees continued to warrant the 'enemy combatant' designation through a non-adversarial, administrative status review process. In early 2005 DoD (the Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants) released 517 CSRT (pronounced 'see-cert') unclassified summaries. These unclassified summaries, prepared in advance of the actual hearings, informed the detainees about the unclassified basis for their detention as enemy combatants. Of the 517 unclassified records, one of those records is a duplicate, which brings the total of CSRT unclassified summaries to 516. The DoD posted those 517 unclassified summaries (including the one duplicate) on its public website in response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. In 2007, the Office of Detainee Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, asked faculty at the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point to review information recorded in the 516 CSRT unclassified summaries (hereinafter referred to as 'CSRT records') and provide an objective assessment of this information. After querying the 516 CSRT unclassified summaries, the CTC found that 73% of the unclassified summaries meet the CTC's highest threshold of a 'demonstrated threat' as an enemy combatant. The CTC established two other categories with four discrete proxy characteristics in each ('potential threat' and 'associated threat') in order to help assess whether the information in these records indicated these individuals posed or potentially posed a threat as an enemy combatant. The CTC found that six of the publicly available CSRT unclassified summaries contained no evidence that fit any of the CTC's twelve threat variables."
Combating Terrorism Center (U.S.)
2007-07-25
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Response to Seton Hall Study: An Assessment of 516 Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) Unclassified Summaries: Annex A
"The release of these 516 unclassified Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) summaries has contributed to the public debate over the ethical, legal and procedural dimensions of detention policy, enemy combatant status and the need for the Guantanamo Bay detention facility. A research team affiliated with Seton Hall University and the Denbeaux & Denbeaux law firm conducted one of the first studies on the CSRT process drawing on the same 516 unclassified CSRT summaries used in this study. The first report in the Seton Hall series concludes that the DoD is wrongfully holding individuals who, based on the DoD's own data, neither pose a serious threat to America's national security, nor seem to have been involved in conducting or supporting hostile action against the United States. Specifically, the Seton Hall study argues, 'the data analyzed by [its] Report would suggest that many other detainees should likewise not be classified as enemy combatants. The CTC's assessment and analysis of the same 516 CSRT reports used by the authors of the Seton Hall study, however, does not support that conclusion. Coding data from the CSRT summaries is not a precise process and does require some subjective interpretation. However, a number of the Seton Hall report's findings do not appear to be supported available evidence. This Annex identifies the CTC's comments with the Seton Hall study's methodology, data coding process, interpretation of statistical results and analyses."
Combating Terrorism Center (U.S.)
2007-07-25
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Combating Terrorism Center at West Point [website]
The Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) "serves as an important national resource that rigorously studies the terrorist threat and provides policy-relevant research while moving the boundaries of academic knowledge. The CTC's distinguished scholars, international network of experts, and access to senior U.S. government leadership set it apart from any other like enterprise. [...] The Center directs multiple graduate-level seminars on Terrorism and Counterterrorism and administers a minor in terrorism studies. In addition, the CTC directs counterterrorism educational programs for four partner government agencies. [...] The CTC's research program produces path-breaking analysis on the dynamic and evolving terrorist threat. The Center's deep intellectual capital and ability to apply theory to practice creates a unique research model that not only informs strategic counterterrorism thinking but moves the boundaries of academic knowledge. [...] The Center leverages its deep expertise to contribute to discrete advisory efforts for federal, state, and local governments including: strategic analysis, operational support, and organizational strategy design. "
Combating Terrorism Center (U.S.)
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National Security and Immigration Policy: Reclaiming Terms, Measuring Success, and Setting Priorities
"The U.S. debate on immigration has been characterized by a simplistic 'human rights versus national security' paradigm that has inhibited serious discussion of the role of the U.S. immigration system in a coordinated national security strategy. The debate has been further hampered by the paucity of counter-terror experts who understand the immigration system, and by a lack of security expertise in the immigrant rights community. This project attempts to bridge that divide. The stakes could not be higher. The threat of catastrophic terrorism, coupled with the vulnerabilities exposed by the September 11th attacks, demands that the U.S. immigration system be integrated into a comprehensive national security plan. At the same time, U.S. strength and prosperity- a key component of US national security- depends on America's openness to the foreign-born and, even more, on America's adherence to its defining values."
Combating Terrorism Center (U.S.)
Stock, Margaret, 1929-; Kerwin, Donald, 1961-
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Terrorism and Counterterrorism: An Annotated Bibliography
The bibliography is a survey of terrorism and counterterrorism literature from primarily the years 2003 to 2006. The types of materials reviewed include books, reports, white papers, journal articles and news articles. The annotations include an in-depth description of the material, topics assigned and countries associated. Included are indices for topics and for countries.
Combating Terrorism Center (U.S.)
Forest, James J. F.; Bengtson, Thomas A; Martinez, Hilda Rosa
2006-09-11
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Militant Ideology Atlas: Executive Report
"This report, and its accompanying compendium, is the first systematic mapping of the ideology driving the actions of the terrorists responsible for the 9/11 attacks and other violent actions around the world. Using a robust research methodology and critical analyses of the Jihadis' most widely read texts, the Atlas gives us a highly nuanced map of the major thinkers in the Jihadi Movement and their most salient areas of consensus and disagreement. In short, this report identifies who the most influential people are among the Jihadi thinking class, what they are thinking, and where the movement is most vulnerable ideologically."
Combating Terrorism Center (U.S.)
McCants, William R.
2006-11
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Beware of Imitators: al-Qa`ida Through the Lens of its Confidential Secretary
This report "consists of three chapters and a concluding section. The opening chapter is an account of Harun's journey as an al-Qa`ida operative as he presents himself; it is also a discussion of the merits and shortcomings of the manuscript in providing reliable information about al-Qa`ida's activities. The remaining parts of the report focus on two aspects that feature prominently in Harun's account of al-Qa`ida: the first pertains to al-Qa`ida's ideology and the second to its organizational structure."
Combating Terrorism Center (U.S.)
Lahoud, Nelly, 1972-
2012-06-04
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Haqqani Network Financing: The Evolution of an Industry
"The purpose of this report is to understand and outline the financial architecture that sustains the Haqqani faction of the Afghan insurgency. The Haqqani network (hereafter 'the network' or 'the Haqqanis') is widely recognized as a semi‐autonomous component of the Taliban and as the deadliest and most globally focused faction of that latter group. What gets far less attention is the fact that the Haqqanis also appear to be the most sophisticated and diversified from a financial standpoint. This report will illustrate that the Haqqani business portfolio mirrors a mafia operation, and illustrate why an understanding of the illicit business side of the network is critical to enriching our understanding of the group. In addition to raising funds from ideologically likeminded donors, an activity the Haqqanis have engaged in since the 1980s, information collected for this report indicates that over the past three decades they have penetrated key business sectors, including import‐export, transport, real estate and construction in Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Arab Gulf and beyond. The Haqqanis employ violence and intimidation to extort legal firms and prominent community members, and engage in kidnap for ransom schemes. According to investigators, they protect and engage in the trafficking of narcotics and the precursor chemicals used to process heroin (although to a much lesser degree than other factions of the Afghan Taliban). The Haqqanis also appear to operate their own front companies, many of which appear to be directed at laundering illicit proceeds. The broad range of business activities in which the Haqqanis engage suggests that the pursuit of wealth and power may be just as important to network leaders as the Islamist and nationalistic ideals for which the Haqqanis claim to fight. This report makes the case that, over three decades of war, the Haqqanis have evolved into an efficient, transnational jihadi industry, one which supports their war effort, and which is supported by it. There's no doubt that the Haqqani network needs to raise funds in order to support its war effort; it is also true that a continued war benefits the Haqqanis' current financial portfolio. The Haqqanis' capacity to raise funds from ideological supporters requires continued struggle, and their capacity to profit off key business activities, in particular extortion, kidnapping and smuggling, depends on a sustained state of insecurity and limited state influence. This suggests that network leaders could have a financial disincentive to ending the conflict through reconciliation."
Combating Terrorism Center (U.S.)
Peters, Gretchen
2012-07
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Abu al-Layth al-Libi: Jihadi Bios Project
This is the biography of the jihadist Abu al-Layth al-Libi. This biography is part of a series of papers by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point that focus on the study of jihadists. From the Introduction: "In the tradition of post-9/11 senior Arab militant figures operating in Khurasan (the Afghanistan-Pakistan region), there is little doubt as to the standing of Libyan jihadi commander Abu al-Layth al-Libi. If Usama bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri came to be the most prominent Arab-Afghan leaders in the wake of the so-called 'War on Terror,' these two were largely absent from the field command in Afghanistan and Pakistan, instead confining their role to strategic guidance by defining the parameters of the global jihad. When it came to leading combat on the front lines, it was al-Libi, a longtime leader of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), who rapidly established himself as the champion of the Arab-Afghan milieu after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. […] This paper draws together the details of al-Libi's rich career, from his early years in militancy in Afghanistan in the late 1980s to his leading duties in the post-9/11 insurgency against Coalition forces and their regional partners. It also situates the slain Libyan commander in the broader spectrum of Arab-Afghan and militant foreigners, outlining the nature of his relationships with a variety of jihadi groups and figures. This profile is mostly based on primary sources, including accounts of jihadis who personally interacted with al-Libi, as well as on materials that contextualize the different stages of his life."
Combating Terrorism Center (U.S.)
Jackson, Kévin
2015-02?
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Mokhtar Belmokhtar: One-Eyed Firebrand of North Africa and the Sahel: Jihadi Bios Project
This is the biography of the jihadist Mokhtar Belmokhtar. This biography is part of a series of papers by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point that focus on the study of jihadists. From the Introduction: "For more than two decades, Mokhtar Belmokhtar (alias Khaled Abu al-'Abbas), an Algerian jihadi leader and financier, has been a central player in the West African jihad. Yet it was not until two dramatic terrorist attacks in 2013 - a sophisticated assault on a multinational gas facility in Algeria, and twin attacks in northern Niger - that this one-eyed ex-commander of al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) was propelled into the global spotlight. Belmokhtar, defying countless rumors of his death or surrender, has since merged his battalion with Mali's most potent jihadist group to form al-Mourabitoun, a coalition of fighters that the U.S. State Department now considers to be 'the greatest near-term threat to U.S. and Western interests in the Sahel.' Belmokhtar's story as an intrepid al-Qa'ida freelancer - essential to both AQIM's expansion and its eventual partition - serves as a useful case study for understanding the increasingly diffuse yet dangerous and unpredictable jihadist threat. This article draws on a wide array of primary sources to trace Belmokhtar's background, ideology, activities and objectives, and to situate his role in AQIM, the regional jihad and the global jihad at large. It finds that even as Belmokhtar's ties to AQIM have waned, his increasing audacity, determined opportunism and strategic alliances with like-minded Islamist groups in the Sahel have helped secure his status as the face of jihad in North Africa and the Sahel."
Combating Terrorism Center (U.S.)
Wojtanik, Andrew
2015-02?
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Khattab (1969-2002): Jihadi Bios Project
This is the biography of the jihadist Khattab (1969-2002). This biography is part of a series of papers by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point that focus on the study of jihadists. From the Introduction: "In May 2011, a member of the jihadi website 'Shumukh al-Islam' initiated a survey designed to identify the 'main reason that made you [i.e., the online group's members] love jihad.' Some of the available answers listed included: 'Family member,' 'Internet,' 'a friend' or 'one of the Sheikhs.' Of the eighty-seven Shumukh members who responded, ten of them credited Khattab, the subject of this biography, and the Arab jihad against the Russians in the Caucasus as the reason behind their commitment to jihad. Khattab's influence ranked second to religious upbringing in the survey, credited by eighteen members as their main motivation to love jihad. It is remarkable that Khattab's influence is ranked ahead of Usama bin Ladin's, credited by six members to have caused them to take up jihad. Khattab's role in and influence on the jihadi landscape is not limited to online members of jihadi websites. […] This biography of Khattab covers different stages of his life. It begins with his early years in Saudi Arabia (1969-1988), then moves to his time in Afghanistan (1988-1994) and Tajikistan (1994-1995), and then discusses his time spent in his final destination, Chechnya (1995-2002). This biography is based largely on primary sources in the Arabic language; Khattab's journey is thus presented as an 'insider's' account and not as his enemies saw him."
Combating Terrorism Center (U.S.)
al-`Ubaydi, Muhammad
2015-02?
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Usama bin Ladin's 'Father Sheikh': Yunus Khalis and the Return of al-Qa`ida's Leadership to Afghanistan
"The purpose of this report is to shed light on the poorly understood role that Yunus Khalis played in modern Afghan political history. This research is based on an analysis of several under‐studied primary sources in Pashto and Persian that offer unique insight into Khalis's life and work. Although he was an author, teacher and the leader of the Hizb‐e Islami (Khalis) mujahidin political party during the Soviet Afghan War, today Yunus Khalis is most often discussed in the context of his personal relationships with Jalaluddin Haqqani and Usama bin Ladin. There is little doubt that Khalis was on friendly terms with these two men. However, Haqqani had a far more visible effect on the growth of al‐Qa`ida than Khalis, and the latter apparently had major political disagreements with Bin Ladin. This report will argue that Yunus Khalis's historical impact is better found in his work as an activist intellectual and his refusal to take sides in the Afghan Civil War than in his relatively peripheral contact with Usama bin Ladin."
Combating Terrorism Center (U.S.)
Bell, Kevin
2013-05-14
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Crime and Insurgency in the Tribal Areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan
"Insurgent and terror groups operating in the tribal areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan are deepening their involvement in organized crime, an aspect of the conflict that at once presents enormous challenges and also potential opportunities for Coalition forces trying to implement a population‐centric counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy. Within a realm of poor governance and widespread state corruption, anti‐state actors engage in and protect organized crime--mainly smuggling, extortion and kidnapping--both to raise funds and also to spread fear and insecurity, thus slowing the pace of development and frustrating attempts to extend the rule of law and establish a sustainable licit economy. Militant groups on either side of the frontier function like a broad network of criminal gangs, not just in terms of the activities in which they engage, but also in the way they are organized, how funds flow through their command chains and how they interact--and sometimes fight--with each other. There is no doubt that militant groups have capitalized on certain public grievances, yet their ties to criminal profiteering, along with the growing number of civilian casualties they cause on both sides of the frontier, have simultaneously contributed to a widening sense of anger and frustration among local communities. Through a series of focused and short anecdotal case studies, this paper aims to map out how key groups engage in criminal activity in strategic areas, track how involvement in illicit activity is deepening or changing and illustrate how insurgent and terror groups impose themselves on local communities as they spread to new territory. It is hoped that a closer examination of this phenomenon will reveal opportunities for disrupting the problem, as well as illustrate how Coalition forces, the international community and moderate Muslim leaders might capitalize on an untapped public relations opportunity by better protecting local communities who are the main victims of it."
Combating Terrorism Center (U.S.)
Peters, Gretchen
2010-10-15
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GSPC: Newest Franchise in al-Qa'ida's Global Jihad
"The GSPC, one of the most notorious terrorist groups in North Africa, has aligned with Al‐Qa'ida and changed its name to 'The Organization of al‐Qa'ida in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb.' On April 10, 2007, the new organization claimed credit for two suicide car bomb attacks in Algiers that killed 23 people. Some observers have speculated that North Africa may be the next safe‐haven for al‐Qa'ida, and that European countries may face a greater risk of attack if Algerian terrorist groups expand their base of support in Europe. The alignment of the GSPC with al‐Qa'ida represents a significant change in the group's strategy, however, its decision to join al‐Qa'ida's global jihad should be understood as an act of desperation. The Groupe Salafist pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC) was founded in 1998 as an offshoot of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). The GIA was one of the strongest and most violent groups fighting the Algerian government in a civil war that killed over a hundred thousand civilians. Operating as a guerilla army, the GIA was able to establish control over large areas of the Algerian countryside by using terrorism against civilian populations. GIA fighters executed- and sometimes beheaded- anyone suspected of collaborating with the police or gendarmerie. By the late 1990's, the group had lost momentum as government crackdowns reduced its numbers while the group's own hyper‐violent tactics alienated the Algerian population."
Combating Terrorism Center (U.S.)
Boudali, Lianne Kennedy
2007-04
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Paradigmatic Jihadi Movements
"In January 2005, veteran jihadi thinker, propagandist, and historian Abu Musa`b al-Suri released his 1,600 page study of the jihadi movement, Da`wat al-muqawama al- Islamiyya al-`alamiyya (The Call for Global Islamic Resistance). Suri hoped this book would stimulate the creation of a comprehensive jihadi curriculum for future generations of jihadi fighters, thinkers, and activists who could learn from the mistakes and successes of jihads past. In The Call, Suri identifies twenty-five paradigmatic jihadi movements, or particularly edifying historical cases, where jihadis have both succeeded and failed to rally supporters, defeat their opposition, or establish territorial control. However, many of these jihadi movements are very obscure, and, consequently rarely studied within the Western counterterrorism community. In order to better appreciate the jihadi movement's strategic objectives and mindset, the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point invited David Cook, an expert on Islamic history and jihad, to provide deeper background on four of Suri's identified paradigmatic jihads: 1. The experience of the Harakat al-Shabiba in Morocco (1969) 2. The experience of the Harakat al-Dawla al-Islamiyya in Algeria (1982-1987) 3. The experience of the Afghani Arabs in Lebanon under Abu `A'isha al Lubnani 4. The experience of the Islamic Army of Aden Abyan in Yemen during the 1990s. Despite the factual errors Cook identifies throughout Suri's work, the latter's stature in the jihadi movement means that future jihadis will take his analysis seriously and model their strategies accordingly."
Combating Terrorism Center (U.S.)
Cook, David
2006
