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• Iran: Torn by Domestic Disputes

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  The Islamic Republic of Iran has not done well at maintaining the popular support it initially had. The young and women are, in general, either disinterested in politics or hostile to radical Islam. War veterans are another important dissatisfied group, who feel they protected the revolution and are now unappreciated. Ethnically, the groups that are not well integrated into the Islamic Republic are the various Sunni minorities, such as the Kurds, the Baluch, the Turkmen, and the Afghans. Popular attitudes are important, because the Islamic Republic is more subject to public pressure for change than might be expected. Elections are bitterly fought, although within tight bounds: opponents of clerical rule and of radical Islamism are not allowed to run. Four major factions contend, none of which is able to dominate on its own. Despite the setback it received in the May 1997 presidential elections, the clerical-bazaar alliance led by Majlis (parliament) Speaker Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri is the most powerful, controlling much of the media and the wealthy revolutionary foundations. That alliance is loosely linked to the Ansar-e Hezbollah, an ardent and radical Khomeinist group drawn from the poorer classes. The two factions share a traditionalist outlook that rejects modern culture and politics. A cornerstone of their politics is opposition to what they call Western cultural aggression. The other two factions are both modernists, heavily influenced by Western ideas, to which they give an Islamic cast. Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, president from 1989 to 1997, sympathizes with the technocratic faction, most of whom are Western-educated and who value technological and economic development. Mohammad Khatemi, whose presidential term runs from August 1997 to 2001, comes from the left-wing faction. That faction has many differences with the technocrats; for instance, on economics it leans towards egalitarianism and social justice. The left-wingers and the technocrats cooperate at present largely because neither can, on its own, defeat the clergy-bazaar alliance. The factional alignment could reshuffle in the mid-term, as it has in the past. In the late 1980s, when the left-wing faction was strong, the technocrats and the clerical-bazaar alliance cooperated against the left-wingers until they won, but they then turned on each other

  National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies

  Clawson, Patrick, 1951-

  1997-07
• Strategic Assessment 1995: U.S. Security Challenges in Transition

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  Contents include: The Strategic Setting; Asia Pacific; Europe; Russia and Neighbors; Greater Middle East; Western Hemisphere; Sub-Saharan Africa; Oceans and the Law; Weapons of Mass Destruction; U.S. Force Structure; Arms Transfer and Export Controls; Information Technologies; Peace Operations; Transnational Threats; Trends in the Sovereign State; Economics.

  National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies

  Clawson, Patrick, 1951-

  1995
• Energy and National Security

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  "Phil Sharp, long-time chairman of the House Energy Subcommittee, vigorously argued that the best energy security policy is to have lots of people producing and lots of people distributing the energy that the United States needs. This minimizes the risk of a disruption at any one point in the production/distribution chain. In this context, he said that the one enduring energy security question that requires diplomacy, military presence, and the willingness to use force is the concentration of oil reserves, production, and surge capacity in the Middle East. Backing up Sharp, long-time Amoco vice-president John Lyman argued that U.S. energy security is best maintained by ensuring that the United States is, and is perceived to be, fully supportive of free trade and of the use of market forces on a global scale."

  National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies

  Clawson, Patrick, 1951-

  1995-04
• Energy Security in a Time of Plenty

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  "From 1986-1996, the world energy supply increased by 2.6 percent per year, excluding the former Soviet Union (FSU) where production fell sharply. Oil's share of the world energy supply held constant at about 40 percent; natural gas' share rose to 23 percent, while coal's fell to 27 percent, with hydro and nuclear power sources making up the remaining 10 percent. Most natural gas and coal supplies are consumed in the country in which they are produced; oil makes up about 90 percent of the energy traded between countries. The main factor driving the increasing supply of energy between 1986-96 was not price. In fact, prices were not particularly attractive for producers." According to this paper, "Energy supply trends are good for Western Security. Dependence on the volatile Persian Gulf may increase only slightly, as additional supplies come from stable pro-Western areas. [...] An energy security issue for the coming decade will be adjusting to the next energy trade pattern, in which East Asia and the Persian Gulf become more tightly tied--each more reliant on the other."

  National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies

  Clawson, Patrick, 1951-

  1997-10
• Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran

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  "Little more than a year ago, the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC) completed its initial analysis of Iran's nuclear program, Checking Iran's Nuclear Ambitions. Since then, Tehran's nuclear activities and public diplomacy have only affirmed what this analysis first suggested: Iran is not about to give up its effort to make nuclear fuel and, thereby, come within days of acquiring a nuclear bomb. Iran's continued pursuit of uranium enrichment and plutonium recycling puts a premium on asking what a more confident nuclear-ready Iran might confront us with and what we might do now to hedge against these threats. These questions are the focus of this volume. The book is divided into four parts. The first presents the findings of the NPEC's working group on Iran." Part two of the book examines the likely consequences and security risks of a nuclear Iran, part three evaluates the policy options of military strikes and economic sanctions, and part four concludes the book by laying out possible alternative policies.

  Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute

  Clawson, Patrick, 1951-; Sokolski, Henry D.

  2005-11
• Checking Iran's Nuclear Ambitions

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  Were Iran to acquire nuclear weapons, there is a grave risk it would be tempted to provide them to terrorists. After all, mass casualty terrorism done by proxies has worked well for Iran to date. The fear about what Iran might do with nuclear weapons is fed by the concern that Tehran has no clear reason to be pursuing nuclear weapons. The strategic rationale for Iran's nuclear program is by no means obvious. Unlike proliferators such as Israel or Pakistan, Iran faces no historic enemy who would welcome an opportunity to wipe the state off the face of the earth. Iran is encircled by troubled neighbors, but nuclear weapons does nothing to help counter the threats that could come from state collapse in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, or Azerbaijan. Achieving trans-Atlantic consensus on how to respond to Iran's nuclear program will be difficult. This is a remarkably bad time for the international community to face the Iran nuclear problem, because the tensions about the Iraq WMD issue still poison relations and weaken U.S. ability to respond. Nevertheless, Iran's nuclear program poses a stark challenge to the international nonproliferation regime. There is no doubt that Iran is developing worrisome capabilities. If the world community led by Western countries is unable to prevent Iranian proliferation, then it is unclear that there is much meaning to global nonproliferation norms.

  Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute

  Clawson, Patrick, 1951-; Sokolski, Henry D.

  2004-01
• Post-Asad Syria: Opportunity or Quagmire?

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  "The government of President Bashar al-Asad in Syria faces strong pressure from its neighbors and the Western powers. In the background is the fall in 2011 of longstanding governments in Tunisia and Egypt to popular protests and, of course, the overthrow of Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi in a civil war backed by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military action. It is not clear if Asad will fall or if he will hold on to power. It is fair to say that because his hold on power is sufficiently in doubt, it is well worth examining what would be the strategic consequences if he fell and what would be the strategic implications if he is able to muddle through Syria's current difficulties. Moreover, given the many sudden and unpredicted Middle East developments in 2011, such an examination should note which low-probability developments might have major impacts on the region and on U.S. interests."

  National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies

  Clawson, Patrick, 1951-

  2012-02
• U.S.-GCC Security Relations, II: Growing Domestic Economic and Political Problems

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  The Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf-- Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Oman--grouped in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) face economic problems. Adjusted for inflation, their oil income is less today than 15 years ago, while their populations are 50 percent larger. During the oil boom years from 1973 through 1984, the false impression was created that the GCC countries were world-class economic powers. For the moment, they were important in world financial markets, when the oil revenues were flooding in faster than could be spent. The image of this period remains in the minds of many, even though the reality has long since changed. The only GCC state with significant foreign assets, above the normal needs of a central bank for smoothing out fluctuations, is Kuwait. And those assets are endangered by the large deficits in Kuwait's budget. Nor are the GCC countries fabulously wealthy any longer. At the height of the oil boom fifteen years ago, they were the world's richest countries: per capita income in the GCC states exceeded that in the United States then. The situation is entirely different now. In 1995, the six GCC states have a collective GDP of about $210 billion, and a total population of 24 million, giving them a GDP per capita of $8,700. That is one-third of the U.S. level and two-thirds of the Israeli level. To be sure, the GCC figures are distorted by the large numbers of low income foreign workers. Comparing the GDP to only the citizen population of 13 million, the GDP per citizen works out at $16,000, or two-thirds of the U.S. level and the same as for Israel's Jewish population. In other words, the GCC states are economically at the cusp between developing nations and industrial states -- they are not at the economic level of the major industrial powers.

  National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies

  Clawson, Patrick, 1951-

  1995-08
• Iran's Strategic Intentions and Capabilities

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  "Iran appears to be pursuing an assertive foreign policy that confronts the United States on a variety of points: the Middle East peace process, the stability of moderate Muslim states, terrorism (such as the death threat to Rushdie), security in the Persian Gulf, and nuclear proliferation. However, Iran's intentions and capabilities are by no means clear. [...] On the intentions side, some observors expect that a desire for good economic relations with the West and a waning of revolutionary fervor will lead to moderation in action if not in words; others, myself included, see a broad consensus inside Iran for assertiveness, uniting Persian nationalism with Islamic fundamentalism. [...] On the capabilities side, Iran is short on cash and faces growing internal political dissension, which some say means it will not be able to devote much to foreign adventures and the military build-up, while others say internal problems give Iran reason to acquire a military with which to pressure its rich neighbors. To discuss these issues, the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University convened a workshop on 'Iran's Strategic Intentions.' The workshop brought together leading experts on Iranian security policy: speakers with access to Iranian officials and with the language skills to follow Iranian developments."

  National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies

  Clawson, Patrick, 1951-

  1994-04