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Getting to Know the President: CIA Breifings of Presidential Candidates: 1952-1992
This document will recount in unclassified form the circumstances under which the Agency established its relationships with successive presidents and to discuss, in general terms, the subjects about which they were briefed. An important issue to be faced by the Agency during each transition concerns how much information derived from sensitive human sources and technical collection efforts and regarding covert action programs should be included in the material given a president-elect, and when. Presidents in office are always informed of such programs, and careful attention is given to the timing, level of detail, and content of the presentation. And finally, concerning the substance of the support provided, there have been dramatic variations in the amount of tailored assistance the Agency has provided presidents-elect to prepare them for pre-inaugural planning and policy deliberations, speeches and press conferences, and, in particular, their meetings and communications with foreign statesmen.
Center for the Study of Intelligence (U.S.)
Helgerson, John L., 1944-
2003?
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Sherman Kent and the Board of National Estimates: Collected Essays
Because of Sherman Kent's importance in the development of the American intelligence profession, the CIA History Staff is publishing this selection of his recently declassified writings on the occasion of the Conference on Estimating Soviet Military Power, 1950--1984, which Harvard University's Charles Warren Center for Studies in American History and the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence are cosponsoring in Cambridge in December 1994. After he retired as chairman of the Board of National Estimates at the end of 1967, Sherman Kent wrote a number of monographs on intelligence topics for the CIA History Staff. In recent years most of those that he published later in the CIA's classified quarterly journal, "Studies in Intelligence", have been declassified and made available to the public at the National Archives. Two of these works, however, are declassified and published for the first time in this volume. Kent left a single sealed typescript copy of his 1970 personal memoir, "The First Year of the Office of National Estimates: The Directorship of William L. Langer," for access only by permission of the author or the Chief or Deputy Chief of the History Staff. Those who read this essay--which Kent noted was "composed from memory 20 years after the fact"--will understand why he sequestered these unbuttoned comments on his Board of Estimates colleagues during his lifetime. The other previously classified and unpublished work is this volume's centerpiece, "The Law and Custom of the National Intelligence Estimate."
Center for the Study of Intelligence (U.S.)
2003
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Sharing Secrets With Lawmakers: Congress as a User of Intelligence: An Intelligence Monograph
Part I of this study describes in general terms how intelligence-sharing with Congress has developed since 1947. It does not try to analyze every significant interaction during this period, but rather seeks to identify the features that have characterized the relationship over time and to examine key milestones. It is not intended as an analysis of how Congress performed oversight of intelligence activities (including covert actions) during this period, although, as a practical matter, Congress's access to substantive intelligence has to a large degree been a function of its attitude toward oversight. Part II contrasts Congress as a user of intelligence with consumers in the executive branch. Part III describes how intelligence-sharing with Congress is carried out today. Part IV assesses the effects of intelligence-sharing on the work of the legislative and executive branches--including the work of the Intelligence Community itself. Part V discusses difficulties in the relationship for the Intelligence Community, for the rest of the executive branch, and for Congress itself. Part VI contains the author's conclusions and recommendations as to how the relationship between the Intelligence Community and Congress might be made less contentious and more predictable and, at the same time; better satisfy the needs of both branches.
Center for the Study of Intelligence (U.S.)
Snider, L. Britt
2003
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Our First Line of Defense: ('Presidential Reflections on US Intelligence')
This document presents an overview of presidential reflections on United States Intelligence beginning with George Washington and continuing through William J. Clinton. Selected Presidential statements dealing with US intelligence activities have been extracted for presentation in this pamphlet. Although the statements of George Washington were written while he was the commanding general during the American Revolution, they are significant enough to warrant inclusion here. Major wars marked the terms of both Presidents Lincoln and Wilson, but neither appears to have addressed intelligence. President Wilson limited his comments to the presence of German spies in the United States.
Center for the Study of Intelligence (U.S.)
2003
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Studies in Intelligence [website]
"The mission of 'Studies in Intelligence' is to stimulate within the Intelligence Community the constructive discussion of important issues of the day, to expand knowledge of lessons learned from past experiences, to increase understanding of the history of the profession, and to provide readers with considered reviews of public literature concerning intelligence. All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in Studies in Intelligence and CSI [Center for the Study of Intelligence] Publications are those of the Authors. They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other US government entity, past or present. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of an article's factual statements and interpretations"
Center for the Study of Intelligence (U.S.)
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Studies in Intelligence: Journal of the American Intelligence Professional [December 2018]
Articles included in this issue of "Studies in Intelligence" include: "An Interview with Former Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Mike Rogers" by Peter Usowski and Fran Moore; "Ricochet: When a Covert Operation Goes Bad" by Bruce Riedel; "Union Naval Intelligence in the American Civil War: Moving Toward a Global Intelligence System" by Matthew Edward Skros; "Facts and Fears: Hard Truths from a Life in Intelligence" reviewed by David A. Foy and Jason U. Manosevitz; "President Carter: The White House Years" by Thomas G. Coffey; "The Hacked World Order: How Nations Fight, Trade, Maneuver, and Manipulate in the Digital Age" by Jeffrey I.; "The Secret World: A History of Intelligence" by Leslie C.; "The Brink: President Reagan and the Nuclear War Scare of 1983" by David A. Foy; "Spying Across the Centuries: Benedict Arnold and Donald Maclean" by John Ehrman; "The Secret Twenties: British Intelligence, The Russians and The Jazz Age " by J. R. Seeger; "Behind the Lawrence Legend: The Forgotten Few Who Shaped the Arab Revolt" and "Masters of Mayhem" by J. R. Seeger; "Transcription" by John Ehrman; "Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf" compiled and reviewed by Hayden Peake; and "Books Reviewed in Studies in Intelligence 2018."
Center for the Study of Intelligence (U.S.)
2018-12
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Middle East Primed for New Thinking: Insights and Policy Options from the Ancient World
From the Conclusion: "Ancient history can join with other disciplines to propose and test the conceptual frameworks policymakers and citizens need to manage interactions with a transitioning region. To be sure, the patterns and precedents of the past do not predict what will happen or provide a detailed map of how to implement specific policies. Instead, thinking about the ancient world allows us to organize data and test hypotheses that come from the region itself, allowing us to evaluate the meaning of large and often conflicting flows of information. Ancient history is a thinking tool that must work collaboratively with other disciplines to discern objectively what is happening. [...] We have examined in this brief introduction some of the new thinking that can emerge with a recovery of the power of ancient--and sometimes also medieval--history."
Center for the Study of Intelligence (U.S.)
Gilmour, Andrew S.
2019-09
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Studies in Intelligence: Journal of the American Intelligence Professional [September 2019]
In this issue of "Studies in Intelligence," articles include: "On the Trail of a Fourth Soviet Spy at Los Alamos" by Harvey Klehr and John Earl Haynes; "The Use and Abuse of Intelligence in the Public Square" by Michael Warner; "The Dixie Mission 1944: The First US Intelligence Encounter with the Chinese Communists" by Bob Bergin; and "Reflections on a Life of Covering the World of Intelligence and National Security" by Peter Usowski and Fran Moore. Furthermore, this issue contains several reviews of 'Intelligence in Public Media' publications including: "The Fighters: Americans in Combat in Afghanistan and Iraq" by Brent Geary; "War and Chance: Assessing Uncertainty in International Politics" by Charles Heard; "Strategic Warning Intelligence: History, Challenges, and Prospects" by Ryan Shaffer; "The Great Successor: The Divinely Perfect Destiny of Brilliant Comrade Kim Jong Un" and "Le monde selon Kim Jong-un: Guerre ou paix? [The World According to Kim Jong-un: War or Peace?]" by Stephen C. Mercado; "Say Nothing: A True Story of Murder and Memory in Northern Ireland" by Joseph Gartin; "Surprise, Kill, Vanish. The Secret History of CIA Paramilitary Armies, Operators and Assassins" by J. R. Seeger; and "Cover Name: Dr. Rantzau" by Ryan Shaffer. This edition also includes a section on the "Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf" reviewed by Hayden Peake.
Center for the Study of Intelligence (U.S.)
2019-09
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Guarding Against Politicization
Politicization can manifest itself in many ways, but in each case it boils down to the same essential elements: "Almost all agree that it involves deliberately distorting analysis or judgments favor a preferred line of thinking irrespective of evidence. Most consider 'classic' politicization to be only that which occurs if products are forced to conform to policymakers' views. A number believe politicization also results from management pressures to define and drive certain lines of analysis and substantive viewpoints. Still others believe that changes in tone or emphasis made during the normal review or coordination process, and limited means or expressing alternative viewpoints, also constitute forms of politicization."
Center for the Study of Intelligence (U.S.)
Gates, Robert Michael, 1943-
1992
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Need for Ethical Norms
"The word 'ethics' turns off many and confuses more. Yet the notions of shared values and an agreed-on process for dealing with adversity and change-what many people mean when they talk about corporate culture-seem to be at the heart of the ethical issue. People who are in touch with their own core beliefs and the beliefs of others and are sustained by them can be more comfortable living on the cutting edge. At times, taking a tough line or a decisive stand in a mussel of ambiguity is the only ethical thing to do. If a manger is indecisive and spends time trying to figure out the "good" think to do, the enterprise may be lost. One of the foremost costs has been our seemingly sustained reluctance to formalize the ethical minimums which should govern our business and to pass these findings on to those who join the Agency. Although many of us have discussed the ethics of our profession, little has been done organizationally to capture these thoughts. Rather than possibly hamstringing future options by formalizing Agency dos and don'ts, we seem to prefer risking a repetition of behaviors which have jeopardized our organization standing and credibility in the past. We can ill afford to allow this trade-off to continue."
Center for the Study of Intelligence (U.S.)
Ericson, Paul G.
1992
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Bridging the Intelligence-Policy Divide
"'Intelligence failure' is a frequent topic of discussion in news media and academic journals. The focus usually is on a failure of the intelligence Community to predict events abroad-a dramatic development like the overthrow of the Shah of Iran or a longer term trend like the collapse of Communism. Observers also criticize policymakers who fail to heed intelligence warnings, as in the Vietnam War or US involvement in Lebanon. But there is a third type of weakness that can reduce the effectiveness of intelligence and policy-the failure of communication between intelligence officers and policy officials. In recent years, both intelligence officers and policy officials have taken important steps to improve understanding of each other and to bridge the cultural gap that can reduce effective communication between the two groups. With this in mind, the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence and Georgetown University's Institute for the Study of Diplomacy have sponsored an ongoing dialogue between current and former intelligence officers and policy officials in the hope that discussion of their experiences will provide valuable insights for current and future practitioners. This article summarizes the results of about 20 interviews and three seminars that include more than 60 intelligence officers and policy officials."
Center for the Study of Intelligence (U.S.)
1994
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Lebanon and the Intelligence Community
"Throughout America's Lebanon adventure, US intelligence analysts, particularly CIA analysts, were uncommonly convinced that much of the administration's policy was misguided and ill fated. They eagerly awaited the administration's call for Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE), the premier instrument of US intelligence analysis, in which they might spell out the evidence and reasoning behind their reservations. While they waited, they pushed other established channels of communication, and their professional proprieties, to the limit in an attempt to et their message through. But dissatisfaction with Lebanon intelligence was almost universal: policymakers felt increasingly ill served, and analysts felt increasingly ill used. The two sides agreed only, if for different reasons, that intelligence analysis was not playing its proper role. The intelligence process may not, in the end, have offered up many insights about Lebanon, but Lebanon, in retrospect, says a great deal about the intelligence process."
Center for the Study of Intelligence (U.S.)
Kennedy, David W.; Brunetta, Leslie
1994
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Openness and Secrecy
"The American system of government is rooted in openness. Article I of the Constitution provides that 'Each House shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same' and that 'a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published' by the government. When combined with First Amendment guarantees of a free press, these provisions created the basis for open government. The Founding Fathers believed that openness was vital because the Colonies' disputes with the government of King George III taught them that participation of the governed could succeed only if the governed were well informed."
Center for the Study of Intelligence (U.S.)
Gries, David D.
1994
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Intelligence Revolution and the Future
"The intelligence revolution is a distinctly 20th century phenomenon, one of the least well understood developments of our time. It began with the surfacing of some extraordinary fantasies into the political consciousness of modern Europe. As the century opened, French society shuddered its way through the scandal known as the Dreyfus affair, in which a French Army colonel of Jewish extraction was accused of spying against the state. The charges were trumped up, but before their fictionality could be revealed they set off a wave of anti-Semitism, heightened by manifestations of French national insecurity."
Center for the Study of Intelligence (U.S.)
Wark, Wesley K., 1952-
1994
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From COI to CIG: Historical Intelligence Documents
"With this edition, 'Studies in Intelligence' inaugurates a series of reprints of important documents that help illustrate the evolution of the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency]. The following documents chronicle presidential decisions leading to the eventual creation of the Agency." Documents include a "Presidential Order establishing a Coordinator of Information (COI) on July 11, 1941"; "Roosevelt's Military Order of 13 June 1942 creating the Office of Strategic Services (OSS)"; "Roosevelt administration press release announcing the creation of the OSS on 13 June 1942"; "Executive Order 9621 of 20 September 1945 abolishing the OSS"; and "Presidential Directive of 22 January 1946 establishing the Central Intelligence Group (CIG)".
Center for the Study of Intelligence (U.S.)
1994
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Managing Covert Political Action
"Although covert political action became an important tool of US policy America never completely abandoned its moral traditions. The threat of international Communism, however, became a compelling rationale for covert action, to the extent that many operations needed no more specific justification. Thus the Cold War, and the perceived severity of the Soviet threat, made it possible for policymakers to ignore competing ethical considerations when they endorsed covert actions."
Center for the Study of Intelligence (U.S.)
Barry, James A.
1992
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Supporting US Foreign Policy in the Post-9/11 World
"Policymakers' lives are dominated by their 'in boxes' and the crises of the moment; rarely do they have time to contemplate far into the future. These are, of course, cliches. But cliches become cliche precisely because they contain an element of truth. As a policymaker, I confess that I often feel as though 'long term' is later in the week. During the past year, my staff has been deeply involved in the formulation of our response to the attacks of September 11th, the planning for Afghanistan's post-conflict future, the Middle East peace process, exploring new ways to de-escalate the India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir, keeping the Northern Ireland peace process on track, revising our approach to the instabilities shaking Latin America from Colombia to Argentina, and a host of other issues. But to be more than the accumulation of responses to separate crises, a successful foreign policy depends upon bridging the intellectual gap between the imperatives of the present and the potential of the future. In turn, this often depends upon bridging the gap between policymakers and the Intelligence Community. After all, as Robert Bowie--a predecessor of mine as Director of the Policy Planning Staff who later served as a deputy director of the CIA--insightfully defines it, 'intelligence' is 'knowledge and analysis designed to assist action.' Information and insights that do not 'assist action' remain lifeless. Successful intelligence, therefore, requires a mutual understanding between policymakers and the Intelligence Community that is all too often lacking. Policymakers need to ensure that the Community is not working in a vacuum, that analysts know what is on our minds and what questions we need answered. At the same time, members of the Intelligence Community have a responsibility to seek out policymakers, understand their concerns, and tell them what they should be paying attention to. It is important to tell policymakers what they need to hear, not what they want to hear."
Center for the Study of Intelligence (U.S.)
Haass, Richard
2002
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Daunting Challenges, Hard Decisions: The Intelligence Community: 2001-2015
"The American Intelligence Community was born in 1947 with the passage of the National Security Act. It was conceived, however, on 7 December 1941 by the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. The experiences of Pearl Harbor and World War II, and, later, the Cold War, shaped America's views of how intelligence would support defense and foreign policy for the rest of the century. Overall, a finely honed and highly specialized intelligence architecture achieved indisputable success. Its occasional failures illustrate the incredibly high expectations that came to be the norm. The events of 11 September 2001 are another watershed, another chance to reconsider concepts and architectures. Over the past decade, commission upon commission has urged reform of the loose confederation that is the US Intelligence Community. Opposed by implacable champions of the status quo, precious few of these commissions have provoked meaningful change. Ten years after the end of the Cold War, the threat of a nuclear Armageddon has receded, but the collapse of world communism and its repercussions are still works in progress. In a world with only one remaining superpower, even small and materially poor states and groups can pose terrible threats. This is a paper about decisions that must be made now. The problems we face are immediate and compelling. If we cannot identify effective responses to these challenges now, the shape of the future will evolve in ever more dangerous and unknown directions. Are we capable of proactive reform, or will change in intelligence practices and policies require yet another unforeseen disaster? History argues for the latter, but the nation demands that we continue to strive for the former."
Center for the Study of Intelligence (U.S.)
Pappas, Aris A.; Simon, James M., Jr.
2002
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Counterpoint to 'The Coming Revolution in Intelligence Analysis': Evolution Beats Revolution in Analysis
"The recommendations presented in Carmen Medina's article, 'The Coming evolution in Intelligence Analysis: What To Do When Traditional Models Fail,' come across as solutions in search of a problem. Her description of the Directorate of Intelligence (DI) fails to take into account many of the changes that the DI has made in the past decade. Constructive self-assessments are important to any organization, but this critique of the Directorate's current practices lapses from examination to undeserved flagellation. The author is well known for having been thoughtfully engaged in seeking ways to improve the DI for many years; therefore, the suspicion arises that she crafted her article with the intent to provoke as much discussion as possible. In brief, Medina argues that the DI's current model of intelligence analysis is failing to respond to rapid changes in consumer needs and preferences. She contends that the DI is insufficiently focused on the consumer and is devoting its resources to increasingly useless syntheses of intelligence reporting. She recommends what she calls a revolutionary model that would shift analysis from a focus on day-to-day 'developments' to forward-leaning, conceptual thinking that is 'less independent and neutral' and more tailored to the policymakers' specific needs.
The article's main failing is that its primary contentions fly in the face of history and recent feedback from our consumers and Agency leadership. This essay joins the debate by commenting in general on Medina's thesis and defending, in particular, the DI's focus on 'developments' as the basis of any successful model of intelligence analysis."
Center for the Study of Intelligence (U.S.)
Ward, Steven R.
2002
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Never-Ending Necessity: The Ten Commandments of Counterintelligence
"The need for counterintelligence (CI) has not gone away, nor is it likely to. The end of the Cold War has not even meant an end to the CI threat from the former Soviet Union. The foreign intelligence service of the new democratic Russia, the Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki Rossii (SVRR), has remained active against us. It was the SVRR that took over the handling of Aldrich Ames from its predecessor, the KGB, in 1991. It was the SVRR that ran CIA officer Harold James Nicholson against us from 1994 to 1996. It was the SVRR that was handling FBI special agent Earl Pitts when he was arrested for espionage in 1996. It was the SVRR that planted a listening device in a conference room of the State Department in Washington in the summer of 1999. And it was the SVRR that was handling FBI special agent Robert Hanssen when he was arrested on charges of espionage in February 2001. The Russians are not alone. There have been serious, well-publicized concerns about Chinese espionage in the United States. The Department of Energy significantly increased security at its national laboratories last year in response to allegations that China had stolen US nuclear weapons secrets. Paul Redmond, the former Associate Deputy Director of Operations for Counterintelligence at the CIA, told the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in early 2000 that a total of at least 41 countries are trying to spy on the United States. Besides mentioning Russia, China, and Cuba, he also cited several 'friends', including France, Greece, Indonesia, Israel, the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan. He warned of a pervasive CI threat to the United States. The United States, as the world's only remaining superpower, will be the constant target of jealousies, resentments, rivalries, and challenges to its economic well-being, security, and leadership in the world. This inevitably means that the United States will be the target of large-scale foreign espionage."
Center for the Study of Intelligence (U.S.)
Olson, James M.
2001
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Understanding Our Craft: Wanted: A Definition of 'Intelligence'
"In a business as old as recorded history, one would expect to find a sophisticated understanding of just what that business is, what it does, and how it works. If the business is 'intelligence,' however, we search in vain. As
historian Walter Laqueur warned us, so far no one has succeeded in crafting a theory of intelligence. I have to wonder if the difficulty in doing so resides more in the slipperiness of the tools than in the poor skills of the craftsmen or the complexity of the topic. Indeed, even today, we have no accepted definition of intelligence. The term is defined anew by each author who addresses it, and these definitions rarely refer to one another or build off what has been written before. Without a clear idea of what intelligence is, how can we develop a theory to explain how it works? If you cannot define a term of art, then you need to rethink something. In some way you are not getting to the
heart of the matter. Here is an opportunity: a compelling definition of intelligence might help us to devise a theory of intelligence and increase our understanding. In the hope of advancing discussions of this topic, I have
collected some of the concise definitions of intelligence that I deem to be distinguished either by their source or by their clarity. After explaining what they do and do not tell us, I shall offer up my own sacrificial definition to the tender mercies of future critics."
Center for the Study of Intelligence (U.S.)
Warner, Michael
2002
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Sorting Out 'National Interests': Ways to Make Analysis Relevant but Not Prescriptive
"The CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] is neither a policy nor a law-enforcement agency--this is our mantra from the day that we sign on. Analysts do not have policy preferences. Analytic products do not lean in specific policy directions. The Agency produces intelligence free from political bias. We say implicitly that we focus on national interests, not the policy or political interests of an administration or the Congress. Every piece of intelligence we produce is to be both policy relevant and--despite the correlation between relevance and the political stakes behind it--reflect a non-politicized interpretation of the national interest. We say we can swim without getting wet. Remaining relevant but neutral is a noble goal, but not an easy one. The lure of conforming to the view of reality held by interested players in the Executive and Legislative Branches is strong, although our culture in the Intelligence Community alerts us to resist. But who determines what is in the national interest if not the policymakers and the political processes that empower them? The answer, in a democracy such as ours, is no one. Our system encourages a political competition to define problems as well as solutions. 'Good analysis of the problem gets us 90 percent of the way to a solution,' a senior national security adviser told me. For that reason, one party may see the other's analysis of an international matter as a crass manipulation to achieve an advantageous policy outcome. In fact, some solutions are embraced more readily than are analyses of the problems. In the late 1990s, for example, US counter narcotics efforts in Colombia received bipartisan support, but there was nowhere near a consensus on the causes, effects, and prognosis for the Andean nation's difficulties--or the resultant implications for what we loosely called 'US national interests.' Analytic papers in the Intelligence Community traditionally have ended with a section that lays out the implications of foreign developments for US national interests. But how do intelligence analysts know what measures to use? At the dawn of the 21st century, rapid changes in international affairs and in how they are covered by the information business, of which we are a specialized part, make defining and prioritizing national interests more urgent and more difficult than ever before. We in the Intelligence Community have to do a lot of the defining for ourselves."
Center for the Study of Intelligence (U.S.)
Armstrong, Fulton T.
2002
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Coming Revolution in Intelligence Analysis: What to Do When Traditional Models Fail
"The great challenge facing analysts and managers in the Directorate of Intelligence (DI) is providing real insight to smart policymakers. Meeting this challenge is hard, but intelligence officers have long believed that careful attention to the tradecraft of intelligence analysis would lead to work that added value to the information available to policymakers. During its 50-plus years, the CIA, we believed, evolved a model that needed only successful execution to produce quality intelligence analysis. When we faltered, we blamed the analysts (or the collectors), but not the model. What if the failing, however, lies not with the analysts but with the model they are asked to follow? Customer needs and preferences are changing rapidly, as is the environment in which intelligence analysis operates. Yet the DI's approach to analysis has hardly changed over the years. A DI analyst from decades ago would recognize most of what a typical analyst does today, from reading traffic to preparing finished intelligence. Stability is often comforting, but in the DI's case change may be what is most needed."
Center for the Study of Intelligence (U.S.)
Medina, Carmen A.
2002
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Creation of the Central Intelligence Group
"The problem for the Truman administration that fall of 1945 was that no one, including the President, knew just what he wanted, while each department and intelligence service knew fully what sorts of results it wanted to avoid. With this context in mind, it is informative to view the formation of CIG with an eye toward the way administration officials preserved certain essential functions of OSS and brought them together again in a centralized, peacetime foreign intelligence agency. Those decisions created a permanent intelligence structure that, while still incomplete, preserved some of the most useful capabilities of the old OSS while resting on a firmer institutional foundation."
Center for the Study of Intelligence (U.S.)
Warner, Michael
1996
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Some Thoughts on Irregular Warfare
"Westerners, with their superior technology and organization, have been killed for a long time by primitives or 'savages' whose style of war the Westerners misunderstood and whose skills exceeded those of the West in irregular wars. Irregular warfare is the oldest form of warfare, and it is a phenomenon that goes by many names, including tribal warfare, primitive warfare, 'little wars,' and low intensity conflict. The term irregular warfare seems best to capture the wide variety of these 'little wars.' Such wars plague much of the non-Western world, and they will increasingly claim the Intelligence Community's attention. Since World War II, by one count, there have been more than 80 irregular conflicts. They include civil wars in Rwanda and Somalia, guerrilla wars in Sudan, and rebellions in Chechnya; they involve irregular elements fighting against other irregular elements, regular forces of a central government, or an external intervention force. The acquisition and use of modern military technology is often seen as a solution to the problems of warfare in the late 20th century, with information warfare the latest example. Irregular warfare, however, remains confounding unaffected by changes in technology. In an irregular conflict, sociology, psychology, and history will have more to say about the nature of the conflict, including its persistence and intensity."
Center for the Study of Intelligence (U.S.)
White, Jeffrey (Jeffrey B.)
1996
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Brown Commission and the Future of Intelligence
A transcript of a discussion between board members of the Studies in Intelligence and members of the Brown Commission regarding the report issued by the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community (the Brown Commission) to the President and Congress. The discussion participants were Brian Latell, Robert Herd, John Wiant, and Bill Nolte (Studies in Intelligence board members), Ann Z. Caracristi, a member of the Commission; Staff Director L. Britt Snider; and staff members Douglas Horner, Brendan Melley, Kevin Scheid, and William Kvetkas.
Center for the Study of Intelligence (U.S.)
1995
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Intelligence Community: Is It Broken? How To Fix It?
"A session held on the Georgetown campus on 30 November 1994 included former Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence Richard Kerr and John McMahon and the now-deceased Les Aspin, former Secretary of Defense who was Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and who would be named to head the study commission. They heard expressions of concern, rhetorical questions, and a measure of exasperation mingled with the counsel that came from three speakers: the immediate past chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Dan Glickman; former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Robert Gates; and the longtime chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, now Vice Chairman of the newly named International Relations Committee, Representative Lee Hamilton. Some common themes emerge from the formal remarks and ensuing dialogue. One is that change is not an option but an imperative, and that change must be visible. It is not enough for the Intelligence Community simply to give public assurances that internal changes have taken place, even though they have, and that more are under way, even though they are. There must be some external involvement in effecting changes that can be seen. This reflects a consensus that the initiative for change has shifted; cooperation should come from within the Intelligence Community, but the political reality is that, like it or not, change will be directed from without."
Center for the Study of Intelligence (U.S.)
Hedley, John Hollister
1995
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Policymaker's Perspective on Intelligence Analysis
"Ambassador Blackwill's career as a Foreign Service Officer began in 1967, after a stint in Africa with the Peace Corps. During 1979-80, he served on the NSC Staff as Director for West European Affairs. In the early 1980s, he worked at the State Department as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, first for Political-Military Affairs, and then for European Affairs. From 1985-87, he was US Ambassador and head of the US Delegation to the NATO--Warsaw Pact negotiations for reduction of conventional military forces in Europe. This article is based on the author's interviews during 1991-93 of Ambassador Robert D. Blackwill."
Center for the Study of Intelligence (U.S.)
1995
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Challenge of Managing Uncertainty
"This article on the views of Amb. Paul D. Wolfowitz is the second in a series by the author on what ranking officials of the administration of President Bush believed worked well in intelligence-policy relations, what did not, and why. Ambassador Wolfowitz is now Dean of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University. In February 1995, President Clinton appointed Ambassador Wolfowitz to the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the US Intelligence Community. The author interviewed Ambassador Wolfowitz in December 1994 and elicited additional views during February-March 1995. The article also reflects informal remarks Ambassador Wolfowitz made on intelligence and policy in two group meetings the author attended during 1994 and a short essay the Ambassador drafted on the issue, also in 1994."
Center for the Study of Intelligence (U.S.)
Davis, Jack
1995
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Some Lessons in Intelligence
The award-winning author made the following remarks at a symposium at CIA
Headquarters on 26 October 1993: "Most of what I have to say here about our common interest, the subject of intelligence, can be found in the two books, 'Most Secret War (or The Wizard War)' and 'Reflections on Intelligence', which you already have. And, if there are matters arising from them on which you would like to question me, I shall be glad to respond. Compared with some of you, though, I spent a relatively few years in full-time intelligence, and most of my experience was gained around 50 years ago. I therefore address you with some diffidence."
Center for the Study of Intelligence (U.S.)
1995
