Advanced search Help
Searching for terms: EXACT: "Carus, W. Seth" in: author
Clear all search criteria
Only 2/3! You are seeing results from the Public Collection, not the complete Full Collection. Sign in to search everything (see eligibility).
-
Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents Since 1900 (February 2001 Revision)
This is the eighth revision of a working paper on biological terrorism first released in August 1998. The last version was released in April 2000. As with the earlier versions, it is an interim product of the research conducted by the author into biological terrorism at the National Defense University's Center for Counterproliferation Research. It incorporates new cases identified through December 31, 2000, as well as a considerable amount of new material on older cases acquired since publication of the previous revision. The working paper is divided into two main parts. The first part is a descriptive analysis of the illicit use of biological agents by criminals and terrorists. It draws on a series of case studies documented in the second part. The case studies describe every instance identifiable in open source materials in which a perpetrator used, acquired, or threatened to use a biological agent. While the inventory of cases is clearly incomplete, it provides an empirical basis for addressing a number of important questions relating to both biocrimes and bioterrorism. This material should enable policymakers concerned with bioterrorism to make more informed decisions.
National Defense University. Center for Counterproliferation Research
Carus, W. Seth
2001-02
-
Iran as a Military Threat
Much has been written recently about Iran's efforts to enhance its conventional military capabilities through the acquisition of new armaments. The problem for Iran is that it lacks the resources to acquire a modern military capable of competing with others in the region, much less with the United States. According to the December 1994 World-Wide Conventional Arms Trade (1994-2000): A Forecast and Analysis from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Iran will acquire $7.7 billion in weapons during the period 1994-2000 (about $1.1 billion per year). This will include "fighter aircraft, Scud missiles, attack boats, submarines, surface-to-air missiles, ship-to-ship missiles, tanks and armored personnel carriers." By comparison, Saudi Arabia is expected to acquire $32.4 billion in weapons, Kuwait and the UAE together a total of $13 billion. Indeed, the UAE alone is expected to buy more than Iran.
National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies
Carus, W. Seth
1997-05
-
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction: Looking Back, Looking Ahead
"Nearly 20 years have passed since the United States began worrying in earnest about the risks of regional weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation. Never have weapons so seldom used commanded such attention for so long. It is one of the more notable continuities across the post-Cold War administrations. Countering WMD: Looking Back, Looking Ahead, the seventh Occasional Paper of the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction at the National Defense University, examines the evolution of U.S. perceptions of the WMD threat and major responses to that threat from the Clinton administration to the first few months of the Obama administration. It also considers why our worst fears for WMD use and proliferation have not been realized and anticipates some of the major WMD challenges that lie ahead."
National Defense University Press
Carus, W. Seth; Caves, John P.; Bernstein, Paul I.
2009-10
-
Threat of Bioterrorism
"Biological agents are organisms, or toxins derived from living organisms, that can be used against people, animals, or crops. In contrast, chemical agents, poisonous substances that can kill or incapacitate, are man-made materials. The agents used for biological warfare are drawn from pathogens and toxins that exist in nature. Among the pathogens that have been adopted as biological warfare agents are the organisms that cause smallpox, anthrax, plague, tularemia, brucellosis, and Q-fever. However, a terrorist could use virtually any pathogen or toxin. Terrorists could employ agents or dissemination techniques different from those adopted by military programs. Thus, while military biological warfare programs have concentrated on aerosol dispersal of biological agents, terrorists have shown a greater interest in contamination of food and water."
National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies
Carus, W. Seth
1997-09
-
Defining 'Weapons of Mass Destruction' [January 2006]
"This paper explores the issue of defining weapons of mass destruction. To give historical context for the rest of the paper, the first several sections summarize how the term has been used in disarmament negotiations, U.S. national security policy, Soviet and Russian military doctrine, and American political discourse. Next, the paper identifies alternative definitions for WMD, addresses some of the key policy issues associated with different definitions, and proposes a definition appropriate for the Department of Defense. The following sections expand upon the use of the term throughout recent history, from its first appearance in 1937 through developments after World War II and subsequent international negotiations. Finally, the conclusion provides some suggestions for future use of the term within the U.S. Government."
National Defense University. Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Carus, W. Seth
2006-01
-
Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Their Nature and Role in 2030
From the Executive Summary: "The longstanding efforts of the international community writ large to exclude weapons of mass destruction (WMD) from international competition and conflict could be undermined in 2030. The proliferation of these weapons is likely to be harder to prevent and thus potentially more prevalent. Nuclear weapons are likely to play a more significant role in the international security environment, and current constraints on the proliferation and use of chemical and biological weapons could diminish. There will be greater scope for WMD terrorism, though it is not possible to predict the frequency or severity of any future employment of WMD. New forms of WMD--beyond chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons--are unlikely to emerge by 2030, but cyber weapons will probably be capable of inflicting such widespread disruption that the United States may become as reliant on the threat to impose unacceptable costs to deter large-scale cyber attack as it currently is to deter the use of WMD. The definition of 'weapons of mass destruction' will remain uncertain and controversial in 2030, and its value as an analytic category will be increasingly open to question."
National Defense University. Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Caves, John P.; Carus, W. Seth
2014-06
-
Defining 'Weapons of Mass Destruction' [January 2012]
"When the original version of this occasional paper appeared in January 2006, DOD [Department of Defense] was still debating how to revise its WMD [Weapon of Mass Destruction] definition. Accordingly, the paper focused on framing the issues that confronted DOD in selecting a new definition. This revised edition takes into account developments during the past 5 years, and it reduces the focus on DOD-specific considerations. The result is an updated and reorganized review of the topic intended for readers interested in better understanding issues related to the proliferation and control of weapons of mass destruction. The paper has three main parts. Following a short introduction, the first section describes the origins of the term WMD and its subsequent use in arms control and disarmament negotiations. The second section discusses how the national security and law enforcement communities use the term. A third section dissects the main alternative definitions for WMD, including an assessment of the problems associated with their use."
National Defense University. Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Carus, W. Seth
2012-01
-
Scoping Study of a U.S.-Israel Security Dialogue
"During the last six years, U.S.-Israel relations have come under increasing strain and pressure. Structural changes in the strategic environment facing both countries, as well as differences in the worldviews and leadership styles of American and Israeli leaders, have led to rare public discord. As of May 2016, the bilateral U.S.-Israel Strategic Dialogue, the highest formal level of coordination between the two countries, has not been held since September 2014. The current turbulence in U.S.-Israel relations, however, should be viewed within the broader context of the U.S.-Israel 'special relationship.' While tactical differences between the United States and Israel have emerged in the past, the two allies have managed to find ways to work closely toward a greater alignment on shared security and strategic goals. The purpose of this paper is to determine for the incoming U.S. administration whether there is a need for a future U.S.-Israel security dialogue to address current policy gaps, with special emphasis on enhancing cooperation to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), strengthen nonproliferation norms, and prepare for regional security emerging threats. The paper will present the results of a scoping study conducted by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) and the National Defense University's Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWSMD) assessing the desirability, feasibility, and scope of a U.S.-Israel security dialogue to be implemented after the 2016 U.S. presidential election. The project team conducted in-depth consultations with over 30 serving U.S. and Israeli government officials and experts, including a research trip to Israel on March 16-17, 2016." Note: This document has been added to the Homeland Security Digital Library in agreement with the Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD (PASCC) as part of the PASCC collection. Permission to download and/or retrieve this resource has been obtained through PASCC.
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Contemporary Conflict; United States. Defense Threat Reduction Agency; Monterey Institute of International Studies. Center for Nonproliferation Studies . . .
Kane, Chen; Carus, W. Seth; Gerami, Nima
2016-05-24?
-
Why the U.S.-Israel Military Aid Package Matters
"After months of tense and drawn-out negotiations, on September 14 the United States and Israel signed the largest U.S. military aid package given to any country, amounting to $3.8 billion annually. The new aid package reaffirms the United States' unwavering commitment to the security of Israel. But the culmination of the aid deal, set to come into effect in 2018, also underscores the delicate and increasingly fractured relations between the United States and Israel during the Obama-Netanyahu era. While bilateral security cooperation between the two allies remains strong-and will likely remain so regardless of who is elected U.S. president in November-the last five years highlight a widening rift in U.S. and Israeli strategic objectives at a time of increasing turmoil and uncertainty in the Middle East. With the effective conclusion of U.S.-Israeli negotiations for the military aid package, the next U.S. administration should take note of the need to restore trust with Israel and find ways to foster a more collective security mindset in the Middle East."
National Defense University. Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Carus, W. Seth; Gerami, Nima; Kane, Chen
2016-09-25
-
Defining 'Weapons of Mass Destruction'
This paper explores the issue of defining weapons of mass destruction (WMD). To give historical context for the rest of the paper, the first several sections summarize how the term has been used in disarmament negotiations, US national security policy, Soviet and Russian military doctrine, and American political discourse. Next, the paper identifies alternative definitions for WMD, addresses some of the key policy issues associated with different definitions, and proposes a definition appropriate for the Department of Defense.
National Defense University
Carus, W. Seth
2006-02
-
Short History of Biological Warfare: From Pre-History to the 21st Century
"This short monograph reviews the history of biological warfare (BW) from prehistory to the present. It covers what we know about the practice of BW and briefly describes the programs that developed BW weapons based on the best available research. […] This survey breaks the history of BW into three periods. The first section examines prehistory to 1900--the period before scientific advances proved that microorganisms were the cause of many diseases. Despite many claims to the contrary, resort to BW was exceedingly rare during this era. Readers interested only in BW's modern history can skip this section. The second section looks at the years from 1900 through 1945. This period saw the emergence of state BW programs, the employment of biological weapons in both world wars, and the use of biological agents by nonstate actors, including criminals. This period witnessed the most significant resort to BW. It included the first organized state campaign to wage BW--sabotage operations organized by the German government during World War I. It also saw the most extensive use--the Japanese attacks in China. Almost all the known victims of BW were Chinese, mostly civilians, who were killed in these operations. This period also saw the initial efforts to control BW in the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which essentially prohibited the first use of BW agents. Finally, the third section, covering the period from 1945 to the present, focuses mostly on developments during the Cold War, including descriptions of state BW programs as well as known uses of biological agents by states, terrorists, and criminals."
National Defense University. Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction; National Defense University Press
Carus, W. Seth
2017-08
-
DoD and Consequence Management: Mitigating the Effects of Chemical and Biological Attack
The threat of chemical and biological weapons attack against U.S. forces and population centers, as well as those of our allies, is real and growing. Mitigating the effects of such an attack--consequence management--is an essential part of responding to the threat. Many state and local governments have improved their capabilities to deal with this challenge. While progress is being made at the federal level, several departments and agencies, including the Department of Defense (DoD), are struggling to develop and coordinate effective responses. DoD organization, planning, and funding for consequence management fail to reflect the complexity of today's security environment, including: the potential for asymmetric warfare, the vulnerability of military facilities at home and abroad, and the indiscriminate character of chemical and biological weapons when used against military facilities near civilian population centers. Within DoD, effective consequence management is constrained by the presence of arbitrary conceptual and organizational divisions that inadequately define the response according to the nature, location, and target of the attack. The lack of an integrated DoD approach to many similar and overlapping consequence management activities involving the same resources and units contributes to poorly-defined mission requirements, organizational confusion, and inefficient resource allocation. These problems lead to unrealistic planning assumptions regarding the ability of DoD to conduct overseas operations in case of a major chemical or biological attack in the United States.
National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies
Hersman, Rebecca K. C.; Carus, W. Seth
1999-12
1
