"This paper analyzes the Army,-its relevance as determined by the service's ability to support national security strategy, operational theater strategies, and joint and combined tactical strategies, with an eye toward the emerging environment. These requirements guide the discussion to determine what kind of ground force would be appropriate for future conflict? In determining how the Army will adjust to meet requirements, the analysis will argue the service must balance developing warfighting readiness against furthering peacetime engagement capabilities. Accordingly, this study looks at the Army's capability to respond rapidly and decisively to threats, from major theater war to small scale contingencies, and counterterrorism operations. Disjointed efforts have found the force losing its relevance at the strategic and operational levels as the Army was no longer offering sufficient capabilities to the National Command Authority (NCA) and warfighting commanders-in-chief (CINCs). Equally impeded by the Army's disjointedness was the development of sufficient US strategic lift. Perhaps most significantly affecting the Army's ability to focus on future force development was its sizable investment in conventional Cold War weapon systems and its reluctance to trade current readiness for the future. The personal commitment of the new Army leadership though seems bent on reestablishing service relevancy."