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Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options [Updated May 20, 2020]
From the Document: "U.S.-Iran relations have been mostly adversarial since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, occasionally flaring into direct conflict while at other times witnessing negotiations or tacit cooperation on selected issues. U.S. officials have consistently identified Iran's support for militant Middle East groups as a significant threat to U.S. interests and allies, and Iran's nuclear program took precedence in U.S. policy after 2002 as that program advanced."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2020-05-20
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Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options [Updated February 6, 2020]
From the Document: "Before and since the escalation of U.S.-Iran tensions in May 2019, President Trump has indicated a willingness to meet with Iranian leaders without preconditions. Iranian leaders say there will be no direct high level U.S.-Iran meetings until the United States reenters the 2015 JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action] and lifts U.S. sanctions as provided for in that agreement. Administration statements and reports detail a long litany of objectionable behaviors that Iran must change for there to be a normalization of relations. Some experts assert that the threat posed by Iran stems from the nature and ideology of Iran's regime, and that the underlying, if unstated, goal of Trump Administration policy is to bring about regime collapse. In the context of escalating U.S.-Iran tensions, President Trump has specifically denied that this is his Administration's goal. Any U.S. regime change strategy presumably would take advantage of divisions and fissures within Iran, as well as evident popular unrest resulting from political and economic frustration. Unrest in recent years has not appeared to threaten the regime's grip on power. However, significant protests and riots, including burning of some government installations and private establishments, broke out on November 15 in response to a government announcement of a reduction in fuel subsidies, as well as in January 2020 in response to the regime's concealment of responsibility for accidentally downing a Ukraine passenger aircraft."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2020-02-06
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Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options [Updated November 20, 2019]
From the Document: "U.S.-Iran relations have been adversarial--to varying degrees of intensity--since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. U.S. officials have consistently identified Iran's support for militant Middle East groups as a significant threat to U.S. interests and allies, and Iran's nuclear program took precedence in U.S. policy after 2002 as that program advanced."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2019-11-20
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Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options [Updated October 22, 2019]
From the Document: "U.S.-Iran relations have been adversarial--to varying degrees of intensity--since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. U.S. officials have consistently identified Iran's support for militant Middle East groups as a significant threat to U.S. interests and allies, and Iran's nuclear program took precedence in U.S. policy after 2002 as that program advanced. In 2010, the Obama Administration led a campaign of broad international economic pressure on Iran to persuade it to agree to strict limits on the program--an effort that contributed to Iran's acceptance of the July 2015 multilateral nuclear agreement known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). That agreement exchanged sanctions relief for limits on Iran's nuclear program, but did not contain binding curbs on Iran's missile program, its regional interventions, or human rights abuses. The Trump Administration cited the JCPOA's deficiencies in its May 8, 2018, announcement that the United States would exit the accord and reimpose all U.S. secondary sanctions. The stated intent of that step, as well as subsequent imposition of additional sanctions on Iran, is to apply 'maximum pressure' on Iran to compel it to change its behavior, including negotiating a new JCPOA that takes into account the broad range of U.S. concerns. Iran has responded to the maximum pressure campaign by undertaking actions against commercial shipping in the Persian Gulf and by exceeding some nuclear limits set by the JCPOA."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2019-10-22
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Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options [Updated August 13, 2019]
From the Document: "U.S.-Iran relations have been mostly adversarial--but with varying degrees of intensity--since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. U.S. officials have consistently identified Iran's support for militant Middle East groups as a significant threat to U.S. interests and allies, and Iran's nuclear program took precedence in U.S. policy after 2002 as that program advanced."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2019-08-13
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Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options [Updated May 30, 2019]
From the Document: "U.S.-Iran relations have been mostly adversarial--but with varying degrees of intensity--since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. Since then, U.S. officials have consistently identified Iran's support for militant Middle East groups as a significant threat to U.S. interests and allies, and Iran's nuclear program took precedence in U.S. policy after 2002 as that program advanced."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2019-05-30
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Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options [Updated April 30, 2019]
From the Introduction: "The United States and Iran have been at odds, with varying degrees of intensity, since the 1979 Islamic Revolution there. U.S. officials have identified Iran's support for militant Middle East groups as a significant threat to U.S. interests and allies, but Iran's nuclear program took precedence in U.S. policy after 2002 as that program advanced. In 2010, the Obama Administration led a campaign of broad international economic pressure on Iran to persuade it to agree to strict limits on the program--an effort that contributed to the June 2013 election of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani as president of Iran and the July 2015 multilateral nuclear agreement--the 'Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action' (JCPOA). That agreement exchanged sanctions relief for limits on Iran's nuclear program, but did not contain binding limits on Iran's ballistic missile program or on its regional influence or human rights abuses."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2019-04-30
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Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options [Updated March 6, 2019]
From the Document: "Ever since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, the United States and Iran have been at odds, although to varying degrees of intensity. During the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. officials identified Iran's support for militant Middle East groups as the primary threat posed by Iran to U.S. interests and allies. Iran's nuclear program took precedence in U.S. policy after 2002 as the potential for Iran to develop a nuclear weapon increased. In 2010, the Obama Administration orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to persuade it to agree to strict limits on the program. The pressure contributed to the June 2013 election of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani as president of Iran and the July 2015 multilateral nuclear agreement-- the 'Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action' (JCPOA). That agreement exchanged sanctions relief for limits on Iran's nuclear program, but did not contain binding limits on Iran's ballistic missile program or any curbs on its regional influence or its human rights abuses."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2019-03-06
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Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options [January 10, 2019]
"Ever since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, the United States and Iran have been at odds, although to varying degrees of intensity. [...] In 2010, the Obama Administration orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to persuade it to agree to strict limits on the program. The pressure contributed to the June 2013 election of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani as president of Iran and the negotiation of a nuclear agreement--the 'Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action' (JCPOA)--which exchanged sanctions relief for limits on Iran's nuclear program. The JCPOA reduced the potential threat from Iran's nuclear program, but did not contain strict or binding limits on Iran's ballistic missile program; its regional influence; its conventional military programs; or its human rights abuses. The Trump Administration cited these deficiencies of the JCPOA in its May 8, 2018, announcement that the United States would exit the JCPOA and reimpose all U.S. secondary sanctions by November 4, 2018. [...] Some experts assert that the threat posed by Iran stems from the nature and ideology of Iran's regime, and that the underlying, if unstated, goal of Trump Administration policy is to bring about regime collapse."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2019-01-10
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Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options [December 19, 2018]
"Ever since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, the United States and Iran have been at odds, although to varying degrees of intensity. During the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. officials identified Iran's support for militant Middle East groups as the primary threat posed by Iran to U.S. interests and allies. Iran's nuclear program took precedence in U.S. policy after 2002 as the potential for Iran to develop a nuclear weapon increased. In 2010, the Obama Administration orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to persuade it to agree to strict limits on the program. The pressure contributed to the June 2013 election of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani as president of Iran and the negotiation of a nuclear agreement--the 'Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action' (JCPOA)--which exchanged sanctions relief for limits on Iran's nuclear program. The JCPOA reduced the potential threat from Iran's nuclear program, but did not contain strict or binding limits on Iran's ballistic missile program; its regional influence; its conventional military programs; or its human rights abuses."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2018-12-19
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Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options [October 17, 2018]
"Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, the United States and Iran have been at odds. During the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. officials identified Iran's support for militant Middle East groups as the primary threat posed by Iran to U.S. interests and allies. Iran's nuclear program took precedence in U.S. policy after 2002 as the potential for Iran to develop a nuclear weapon increased. In 2010, the Obama Administration orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to persuade it to agree to strict limits on the program -- pressure that contributed to the June 2013 election of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani as president of Iran and the negotiation of a nuclear agreement-- the 'Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action' (JCPOA). The JCPOA exchanged sanctions relief for limits on Iran's nuclear program. The JCPOA reduced the potential threat from Iran's nuclear program, but did not contain strict or binding limits on Iran's ballistic missile program; its regional influence; its conventional military programs; or its human rights abuses."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2018-10-17
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Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options [August 23, 2018]
"Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, the United States and Iran have been estranged and at odds. During the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. officials identified Iran's support for militant Middle East groups as the primary threat posed by Iran to U.S. interests and allies. Iran's nuclear program took precedence in U.S. policy after 2002 as the potential for Iran to develop a nuclear weapon increased. In 2010, the Obama Administration orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to persuade it to agree to strict limits on the program--pressure that contributed to the June 2013 election of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani as president of Iran and the negotiation of a nuclear agreement--the 'Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action' (JCPOA). The JCPOA exchanged sanctions relief for limits on Iran's nuclear program. The JCPOA reduced the potential threat from Iran's nuclear program, but did not contain strict or binding limits on Iran's ballistic missile program; its regional influence; its conventional military programs; and its human rights abuses."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2018-08-23
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Iran: Politics, Human Rights, and U.S. Policy [May 21, 2018]
"Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, the United States and Iran have been broadly at odds. During the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. officials identified Iran's support for militant Middle East groups as the primary threat posed by Iran to U.S. interests and allies. Iran's nuclear program took precedence in U.S. policy after 2002 as the potential for Iran to develop a nuclear weapon increased. Beginning in 2010, the United States orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to persuade it to agree to strict limits on the program--pressure that contributed to the June 2013 election of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani as president of Iran and the eventual negotiation of a 'Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action' (JCPOA). The JCPOA, which took effect in January 2016, exchanged broad sanctions relief for temporary limits on Iran's nuclear program. The JCPOA reduced the potential threat from Iran's nuclear program, but did not directly address the full range of threats posed by Iran, including from its ballistic missile program; its regional influence and support for armed factions; its conventional military programs; and its human rights abuses."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2018-05-21
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Iran: Politics, Human Rights, and U.S. Policy [November 01, 2017]
"Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, the United States and Iran have been at odds politically and diplomatically. During the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. officials identified Iran's support for militant Middle East groups as the primary threat posed by Iran to U.S. interests and allies. Iran's nuclear program took precedence in U.S. policy after 2002 as the potential for Iran to develop a nuclear weapon increased. Beginning in 2010, the United States orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to persuade it to agree to strict limits on the program-- pressure that contributed to the June 2013 election of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani as president of Iran and the eventual negotiation of a 'Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action' (JCPOA). The JCPOA, which began formal implementation on January 16, 2016, exchanged broad sanctions relief for nuclear program limits intended to ensure that Iran would require at least a year to produce a nuclear weapon after a decision to do so."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2017-11-01
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Iran: Politics, Human Rights, and U.S. Policy [October 3, 2017]
"Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, the United States and Iran have been at odds politically and diplomatically over the perceived threat posed by Iran to a broad range of U.S. interests. U.S. officials also express a broad range of concerns about Iran's human rights abuses, including its repeated detentions of U.S.-Iran dual nationals. During the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. officials identified Iran's support for militant Middle East groups as the primary threat posed by Iran to U.S. interests and allies. Iran's nuclear program took precedence in U.S. policy after 2002 as the potential for Iran to develop a nuclear weapon increased. Beginning in 2010, the United States orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to persuade it to agree to strict limits on the program --pressure that undoubtedly contributed to the June 2013 election of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani as president of Iran and the eventual negotiation of a 'Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action' (JCPOA). The JCPOA, which began formal implementation on January 16, 2016, exchanged broad sanctions relief for nuclear program limits intended to ensure that Iran would require at least a year to produce a nuclear weapon after a decision to do so."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2017-10-03
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Iran: Politics, Human Rights, and U.S. Policy [August 22, 2017]
"Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, the United States and Iran have been at odds politically and diplomatically over the perceived threat posed by Iran to a broad range of U.S. interests. U.S. officials also express a broad range of concerns about Iran's human rights abuses, including its repeated detentions of U.S.-Iran dual nationals. During the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. officials identified Iran's support for militant Middle East groups as the primary threat posed by Iran to U.S. interests and allies. Iran's nuclear program took precedence in U.S. policy after 2002 as the potential for Iran to develop a nuclear weapon increased. Beginning in 2010, the United States orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to persuade it to agree to strict limits on the program--pressure that contributed to the June 2013 election of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani as president of Iran and the eventual negotiation of a 'Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action' (JCPOA). The JCPOA, which began formal implementation on January 16, 2016, exchanged broad sanctions relief for nuclear program limits intended to ensure that Iran would require at least a year to produce a nuclear weapon after a decision to do so."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2017-08-22
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Iran: Politics, Human Rights, and U.S. Policy [June 2, 2017]
"Beginning in 2010, the United States orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to persuade it to agree to strict limits on the program--pressure that contributed to the June 2013 election of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani as president of Iran and the eventual negotiation of a 'Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action' (JCPOA). The JCPOA, which began formal implementation on January 16, 2016, exchanged broad sanctions relief for nuclear program limits intended to ensure that Iran would require at least a year to produce a nuclear weapon after a decision to do so. President Obama asserted that the implementation of the JCPOA presented an opportunity to construct a new and more positive U.S. relationship with Iran. However, Iran has continued to test ballistic missiles; maintained support for regional movements such as Hamas, Lebanese Hezbollah, and Houthi rebels in Yemen; arrested additional U.S.-Iran dual nationals; and conducted high speed intercepts of U.S. naval vessels in the Persian Gulf. The Trump Administration has characterized Iran as an adversary of the United States and stated a commitment to countering Iran's regional influence--although without taking steps that would conflict with U.S. commitments under the JCPOA. The Administration has not articulated a hope or intent to develop an improved relationship with Iran [...] The United States has supported programs to promote civil society in Iran, but successive U.S. Administrations, including the Trump Administration, have stopped short of adopting policies that specifically seek to overthrow Iran's regime."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2017-06-02
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Iran: Politics, Human Rights, and U.S. Policy [February 17, 2017]
"Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, the United States and Iran have been at odds politically and diplomatically, and U.S. policy has been intended to reduce the perceived threat posed by Iran to a broad range of U.S. interests. U.S. officials also express a broad range of concerns about Iran's human rights abuses, including its detentions of U.S.-Iran dual nationals. […] Beginning in 2010, the United States orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to persuade it to agree to strict limits on the program - pressure that contributed to the June 2013 election of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani as president of Iran. His government subsequently negotiated a November 2013 interim nuclear agreement and then the 'Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action' (JCPOA), which was finalized on July 14, 2015. The JCPOA, which began formal implementation on January 16, 2016, exchanged broad sanctions relief for nuclear program limits intended to give the international community confidence that Iran would require at least a year to produce a nuclear weapon if it decided to do so. President Obama asserted that the implementation of the JCPOA presents an opportunity to reduce the long-standing U.S.-Iran enmity and construct a new relationship. However, Iran has continued to test ballistic missiles; maintained support for regional movements and factions such as Syrian President Bashar Al Assad, Lebanese Hezbollah, and Houthi rebels in Yemen; arrested additional U.S.-Iran dual nationals; and conducted high speed intercepts of U.S. naval vessels in the Persian Gulf. The administration of President Donald Trump has characterized Iran as an adversary of the United States and stated a commitment to countering Iran's regional influence -- although without taking steps that would conflict with U.S. commitments under the JCPOA."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2017-02-17
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Iran: Politics, Gulf Security, and U.S. Policy [August 19, 2016]
"Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, a priority of U.S. policy has been primarily to reduce the perceived threat posed by Iran to a broad range of U.S. interests, including the security of the Persian Gulf region. U.S. officials also express a broad range of concerns about Iran's human rights abuses. The implementation of a July 14, 2015, 'Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action' (JCPOA) nuclear agreement between Iran and six negotiating powers appeared to represent an opportunity to reduce the long-standing U.S.-Iran enmity and construct a new relationship. During the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. officials identified Iran's support for militant Middle East groups as the primary threat posed by Iran to U.S. interests and allies. Iran's nuclear program took precedence in U.S. policy after 2002 as the program expanded and the chances that Iran could develop a nuclear weapon increased. In 2010, the United States orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to persuade it to agree to strict limits on the program. The pressure might have contributed to the June 2013 election of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani as president of Iran, whose government subsequently negotiated a November 2013 interim nuclear agreement and then the JCPOA. The JCPOA, which began formal implementation on January 16, 2016, exchanged broad sanctions relief for nuclear program limits intended to give the international community confidence that Iran would require at least a year to produce a nuclear weapon if it decided to do so."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2016-08-19
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Iran: Politics, Gulf Security, and U.S. Policy [March 30, 2016]
"President Obama has asserted that the JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action] has the potential to produce the added benefit of improving U.S.-Iran relations. However, since the deal was finalized, Iran, Iran has tested ballistic missiles and vowed to continue doing so, it has sought new conventional arms from Russia, it has maintained its support for such regional movements and factions such as Syrian President Bashar Al Assad of Syria and Lebanese Hezbollah, and the United States has indicted seven Iranians for cyberattacks on the United States. The Arab states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman) and other U.S. allies such as Israel continue to assert sanctions relief provides Iran with additional political and financial resources to continue such objectionable activities. The United States and the GCC states have a long-standing and extensive security relationship that enables the United States to maintain about 35,000 military personnel at facilities throughout the Gulf. To try to reassure the GCC that Iran's regional influence can and will be contained, U.S. officials have held several high level meetings with GCC leaders to increase security cooperation, including pledging additional U.S. arms sales. The second U.S.-GCC summit will be held in Riyadh on April 21. Domestically, Rouhani and the JCPOA appear to have broad support, but many Iranians say they also want greater freedoms of expression and assembly. Rouhani's public support was demonstrated by the strong showing of moderate conservative candidates in the February 26 elections for the parliament and a key clerical body. However, it is not clear that the election results will enable Rouhani to limit the hardliner control of the judiciary or the security forces that are the main instruments to curb dissent and free expression."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2016-03-30
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Iran, Gulf Security, and U.S. Policy [January 14, 2016]
"Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, a priority of U.S. policy has been to reduce the perceived threat posed by Iran to a broad range of U.S. interests, including the security of the Persian Gulf region. In 2014, a common adversary emerged in the form of the Islamic State organization, reducing gaps in U.S. and Iranian regional interests, although the two countries have often differed over how to try to defeat the group and still disagree on many other issues. The finalization on July 14, 2015, of a 'Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action' (JCPOA) between Iran and six negotiating powers could enhance Iran's ability to counter the United States and its allies in the region, but could also pave the way for cooperation to resolve regional conflicts."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2016-01-14
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Iran, Gulf Security, and U.S. Policy [December 29, 2015]
"In 2014, a common adversary emerged in the form of the Islamic State organization, reducing gaps in U.S. and Iranian regional interests, although the two countries have often differed over how to try to defeat the group and still disagree on many other issues. The finalization on July 14, 2015, of a 'Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action' (JCPOA) between Iran and six negotiating powers could enhance Iran's ability to counter the United States and its allies in the region, but could also pave the way for cooperation to resolve regional conflicts. […] The JCPOA has the potential to improve U.S.-Iran relations, but relations with Iran on regional issues have worsened in some respects since the agreement was finalized. In October and November 2015, Iran tested ballistic missiles that appear to constitute violations of applicable U.N. Security Council resolutions. Iran has also increased its involvement in the Syria conflict in support of President Bashar Al Assad of Syria, whose brutal tactics against domestic armed opponents is, according to U.S. officials, fueling support for the Islamic State organization with brutal tactics. […] Domestically, Rouhani and the JCPOA appear to have broad support, but many Iranians say they also want greater easing of media and social restrictions. Iran's judiciary remains in the hands of hardliners who continue to prosecute dissenters and hold several U.S.-Iran dual nationals on various charges--including U.S.-Iranian journalist Jason Rezaian. Another dual national was arrested after the JCPOA was finalized."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2015-12-29
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Iran, Gulf Security, and U.S. Policy [August 14, 2015]
"In 2014, a common adversary emerged in the form of the Islamic State organization, reducing gaps in U.S. and Iranian regional interests, although the two countries have often differing approaches over how to try to defeat the group. The finalization on July 14, 2015, of a 'Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action' (JCPOA) between Iran and six negotiating powers could enhance Iran's ability to counter the United States and its allies in the region, but could also pave the way for cooperation to resolve some of the region's several conflicts. […] The JCPOA could significantly improve U.S.-Iran relations, but the agreement comes in the context of U.S. and allied concerns about Iranian actions in the region. U.S. allies, particularly Israel and the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman) express concern that a lifting of sanctions will furnish Iran with additional resources with which to expand its influence further. The Persian Gulf states express concern that Iran has made substantial gains in recent years, for example in supporting the rebel Houthi movement in Yemen and in organizing Shiite forces to defend the embattled government of Bashar Al Assad of Syria. The war against the Islamic State organization has also given Iran additional influence over the government of Iraq as well as common interests with the United States in Iraq. On Syria, Iran has supported Assad, whereas the United States has asserted that his departure is key to a political solution."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2015-08-14
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Iran, Gulf Security, and U.S. Policy [May 28, 2015]
"Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, a priority of U.S. policy has been to reduce the perceived threat posed by Iran to a broad range of U.S. interests, including the security of the Persian Gulf region. In 2014, a common adversary emerged in the form of the Islamic State organization, reducing gaps in U.S. and Iranian regional interests, although the two countries have somewhat differing approaches over how to try to defeat the group. […] The Persian Gulf states express concern that Iran has made substantial gains in recent years, for example in supporting the rebel Houthi movement in Yemen and in organizing Shiite forces to defend the embattled government of Bashar Al Assad of Syria. The war against the Islamic State organization has also given Iran additional influence over the government of Iraq as well as common interests with the United States in Iraq. On Syria, Iran supports Assad, whereas the United States has asserted that his departure is key to a political solution. The January 2015 fall of the government of Yemen under pressure from the Houthis has aggravated Saudi-Iranian tensions as Saudi Arabia has undertaken military action against the Houthis there. U.S. allies, particularly Israel and the Gulf states, express concern that a lifting of sanctions would furnish Iran with additional resources with which to expand its influence further. The Gulf states express fears that a nuclear deal could cause the United States to tilt toward Iran or forfeit its role as the final guarantor of Gulf security."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2015-05-28
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Iran, Gulf Security, and U.S. Policy [May 19, 2015]
"Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, a priority of U.S. policy has been to reduce the perceived threat posed by Iran to a broad range of U.S. interests, including the security of the Persian Gulf region. In 2014, a common adversary emerged in the form of the Islamic State organization, reducing gaps in U.S. and Iranian regional interests, although the two countries have somewhat differing approaches over how to try to defeat the group. […] A final nuclear agreement could significantly improve U.S.-Iran relations, but the framework agreement comes in the context of U.S. and allied concerns about Iranian actions in the region. The Persian Gulf states express concern that Iran has made substantial gains in recent years, for example in supporting the rebel Houthi movement in Yemen and in organizing Shiite forces to defend the embattled government of Bashar Al Assad of Syria. The war against the Islamic State organization has also given Iran additional influence over the government of Iraq as well as common interests with the United States in Iraq. On Syria, Iran supports Assad, whereas the United States asserts his departure is key to a political solution. The January 2015 fall of the government of Yemen under pressure from the Houthis has aggravated Saudi-Iranian tensions as Saudi Arabia has undertaken military action against the Houthis there. U.S. allies, particularly Israel and the Gulf states, express concern that a lifting of sanctions will furnish Iran with additional resources with which to expand its influence further. The Gulf states express fears that a nuclear deal could cause the United States to tilt toward Iran or forfeit its role as the final guarantor of Gulf security."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2015-05-19
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [April 14, 2015]
"Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, a priority of U.S. policy has been to reduce the perceived threat posed by Iran to a broad range of U.S. interests. In 2014, a common enemy emerged in the form of the Islamic State organization, reducing gaps in U.S. and Iranian interests, although the two countries have somewhat differing approaches over how to try to defeat the group. During the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. officials identified Iran's support for militant Middle East groups as a significant threat to U.S. interests and allies. A perceived potential threat from Iran's nuclear program emerged in 2002, and the United States has orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to try to ensure that the program is verifiably confined to purely peaceful purposes. The international pressure might have contributed to the June 2013 election as president of Iran of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani, who campaigned as an advocate of ending Iran's international isolation. Subsequent multilateral talks with Iran produced an interim agreement ('Joint Plan of Action,' JPA) that halted the expansion of Iran's nuclear program in exchange for modest sanctions relief. After more than a year of further talks, on April 2, 2015, the United States and its partners announced a political outline of a comprehensive nuclear agreement, with intent to finalize details by June 30, 2015."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2015-04-14
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [March 18, 2015]
"During the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. officials identified Iran's support for militant Middle East groups as a significant threat to U.S. interests and allies. A perceived potential threat from Iran's nuclear program emerged in 2002, and the United States has orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to try to ensure that the program is verifiably confined to purely peaceful purposes. The United States and its partners negotiated intensively to reach a comprehensive agreement on the nuclear issue by the November 24, 2014, deadline for the Joint Plan of Action (JPA) expiration, but agreement was not reached and the parties have extended the JPA until July 6, 2015. The parties stated intent to reach a political outline of the agreement no later than March 24, 2015. The main outstanding issue remains the scope of Iran's program to enrich uranium. A final nuclear agreement could significantly improve U.S.-Iran relations. […] However, the Persian Gulf states, Israel, and other regional states express concern that an Iran that is reintegrated into the region and the international community would give Iran additional resources to support movements and regimes that oppose U.S. and U.S.-allied interests. Iran would therefore be able to build on gains its foreign policy has made in recent years, for example in supporting the rebel Houthi movement in Yemen and in organizing Shiite forces to defend the embattled government of Bashar Al Assad of Syria. The war against the Islamic State organization has also given Iran additional influence over the government of Iraq as well as common interests with the United States in Iraq."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2015-03-18
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [January 26, 2015]
"Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, a priority of U.S. policy has been to reduce the perceived threat posed by Iran to a broad range of U.S. interests. In 2014, a common enemy emerged in the form of the Islamic State organization, reducing gaps in U.S. and Iranian interests, although the two countries have somewhat differing approaches over how to try to defeat the Islamic State. […] The international pressure might have contributed to the June 2013 election as president of Iran of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani, who campaigned as an advocate of ending Iran's international isolation. Subsequent multilateral talks with Iran produced an interim agreement ('Joint Plan of Action,' JPA) that halted the expansion of Iran's nuclear program in exchange for modest sanctions relief. The United States and its partners negotiated intensively to reach a comprehensive agreement on the nuclear issue by the November 24, 2014, deadline for the JPA expiration, but agreement was not reached and the parties have extended the JPA until July 6, 2015. […] Rouhani has sought to satisfy this constituency, in part by orchestrating the release of some political prisoners and easing some media restrictions. But, Iran's judiciary remains in the hands of hardliners who continue to restrict social freedoms and prosecute regime critics and dissenters. For further information, see CRS [Congressional Research Service] Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman; and CRS Report R43333, Iran: Interim Nuclear Agreement and Talks on a Comprehensive Accord, by Kenneth Katzman, Paul K. Kerr, and Mary Beth D. Nikitin."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2015-01-26
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [December 17, 2014]
"During the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. officials identified Iran's support for militant Middle East groups as a significant threat to U.S. interests and allies. A perceived potential threat from Iran's nuclear program emerged in 2002, and the United States has orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to try to compel it to verifiably confine that program to purely peaceful purposes. The pressure has harmed Iran's economy and might have contributed to the June 2013 election as president of Iran of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani, who campaigned as an advocate of ending Iran's international isolation. Subsequent multilateral talks with Iran produced an interim agreement ('Joint Plan of Action,' JPA) that halted the expansion of Iran's nuclear program in exchange for modest sanctions relief. The United States and its partners negotiated intensively to reach a comprehensive agreement on the nuclear issue by the November 24, 2014, deadline for the JPA expiration,but agreement was not reached and the parties extended the JPA until June 30, 2015. The parties stated intent to reach a political outline of the agreement by March 1, 2015. The main outstanding issue continues to be the size and scope of Iran's program to enrich uranium. […] Rouhani's unexpected election win--a result of a large turnout of reform-minded voters such as those who protested the 2009 election results--demonstrated strong support not only for reducing Iran's isolation but for domestic reform. Rouhani has sought to satisfy this constituency, in part by orchestrating the release of some political prisoners and easing some media restrictions. But, Iran's judiciary remains in the hands of hardliners who continue to restrict social freedoms and prosecute regime critics and dissenters."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2014-12-17
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [November 17, 2014]
"A perceived potential threat from Iran's nuclear program emerged in 2002, and the United States has orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to try to compel it to verifiably confine that program to purely peaceful purposes. The pressure has harmed Iran's economy and might have contributed to the June 2013 election as president of Iran of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani, who campaigned as an advocate of ending Iran's international isolation. Subsequent multilateral talks with Iran produced an interim agreement ('Joint Plan of Action,' JPA) that halted the expansion of Iran's nuclear program in exchange for modest sanctions relief. As the November 24, 2014 deadline for the JPA expiration approaches, the United States and its partners are negotiating intensively to reach a comprehensive agreement on the nuclear issue, but significant differences reportedly remain. […] The nuclear negotiations also have eased tensions between Iran and its neighbors in the Persian Gulf region--all allies of the United States. However, the Gulf states, Israel, and other regional states express concern that an Iran that is reintegrated into the region and the international community would give Iran additional resources to support movements and regimes that oppose U.S. and U.S.-allied interests. […] President Obama has asserted, both before and after the JPA was agreed, that the option of U.S. military action against Iran's nuclear facilities is available. However, further U.S.--or Israeli--discussion of military options against Iran is unlikely unless nuclear talks collapse outright."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2014-11-17
