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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy [August 17, 2010]
"Following two high-level policy reviews on Afghanistan in 2009, the Obama Administration asserts that it is pursuing a fully resourced and integrated military-civilian strategy that should pave the way for a gradual transition to Afghan security leadership beginning in July 2011. The policy is predicated on the view that stabilizing Afghanistan will ensure that it cannot again become a base for terrorist attacks against the United States, and that accomplishing this objective requires reversing a deterioration of security in large parts of Afghanistan since 2006. Each of the two reviews resulted in a decision to add combat troops, with the intent of creating the conditions to expand Afghan governance and economic development. A total of 51,000 additional U.S. forces were authorized by the two reviews, which will bring U.S. troop levels to approximately 104,000 by September 2010, with partner forces holding at about 40,000. At the same time, the Administration is attempting to counter the perception in the region, particularly among Pakistan, India, the Afghan insurgency, and within the Afghan political establishment that U.S. involvement will be sharply reduced after July 2011. That perception may, among other consequences, be inflaming the traditional rivalry between Pakistan and India, in this case to deny each other influence in Afghanistan."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2010-08-17
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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy [July 22, 2010]
"Following two high-level policy reviews on Afghanistan in 2009, the Obama Administration asserts that it is pursuing a fully resourced and integrated military-civilian strategy that will pave the way for a gradual transition to Afghan security leadership beginning in July 2011. The policy is predicated on the view that stabilizing Afghanistan will ensure that it cannot again become a base for terrorist attacks against the United States, and that accomplishing this objective requires reversing a deterioration of security in large parts of Afghanistan since 2006. Each of the two reviews resulted in a decision to add combat troops, with the intent of creating the conditions to expand Afghan governance and economic development, rather than on defeating insurgents. A total of 51,000 additional U.S. forces were authorized by the two reviews, which will bring U.S. troop levels to approximately 104,000 by September 2010. Currently, U.S. troops in Afghanistan total about 95,000 and foreign partners are about 40,000."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2010-07-21
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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy [June 25, 2010]
"Following two high-level policy reviews on Afghanistan in 2009, the Obama Administration asserts that it is pursuing a fully resourced and integrated military-civilian strategy that will pave the way for a gradual transition to Afghan security leadership beginning in July 2011. The policy is intended to address deteriorating security in large parts of Afghanistan since 2006. Each of the two reviews resulted in a decision to add combat troops, with the intent of creating the conditions to expand Afghan governance and economic development, rather than on hunting and defeating insurgents. A total of 51,000 additional U.S. forces were authorized by the two reviews, which will bring U.S. troop levels to approximately 104,000 by September 2010. Currently, U.S. troops in Afghanistan total about 94,000 and foreign partners are about 40,000. U.S. strategy has not shown clear success, to date, although senior U.S. officials say that only now is the effect of the U.S. and partner 'surge' being achieved. These comments have been intended to address a growing sense that the conflict may not produce clear or permanent stability in Afghanistan. That perception has been fed by the failure to fully stabilize Marjah; Afghan reluctance to allow combat to better secure Qandahar Province; President Hamid Karzai's dismissal on June 5 of two top security-related officials on whom the international alliance has placed extensive confidence; and the imminent or near-term departure of several major partner contingents, and growing reluctance of others to continue the effort."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2010-06-25
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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy [June 7, 2010]
"Following two high-level policy reviews on Afghanistan in 2009, the Obama Administration says it is pursuing a fully resourced and more unified military-civilian strategy that will pave the way for a gradual transition to Afghan security leadership beginning in July 2011. The policy is intended to address what the Obama Administration considered to be a security environment that was deteriorating despite a gradual increase in U.S. forces there during 2006-2008. Each of the two reviews resulted in a decision to add combat troops, with the intent of creating the conditions to expand Afghan governance and economic development, rather than on hunting and defeating insurgents. A total of 51,000 additional U.S. forces were authorized by the two reviews, which will bring U.S. troop levels to approximately 100,000 by September 2010. Currently, U.S. troops in Afghanistan total about 94,000 and foreign partners are about 40,000. As U.S. strategy unfolds, a greater sense of U.S. official optimism has started to take hold, with comments to this effect by senior U.S. defense officials, including Gen. Stanley McChrystal, who has been top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan since June 2009. The broader optimism has coincided with the partial success of 'Operation Moshtarak' to stabilize Marjah, and successful arrests of and strikes on key Afghan militants in Pakistan. A more extensive operation-although characterized more by political engagement than actual combat-is planned for June 2010 in the major province of Qandahar."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2010-06-07
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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy [May 11, 2010]
"Following two high-level policy reviews on Afghanistan in 2009, the Obama Administration says it is pursuing a fully resourced, integrated military-civilian strategy that will pave the way for a gradual transition to Afghan security leadership beginning in July 2011. The policy is intended to address what the Obama Administration considered to be a security environment that was deteriorating despite a gradual increase in U.S. forces there during 2006-2008. Some of the deterioration has been attributed to Afghan disillusionment with insufficient, ineffective, and corrupt Afghan governance, and the relative safe haven in parts of Pakistan enjoyed by Afghan militants. [...] A major issue during the Karzai visit to Washington D.C. is the effort to persuade insurgent fighters and leaders to end their fight and join the political process. The effort was also the focus of an international meeting on Afghanistan held in London on January 28, 2010.There is not universal international support for Karzai's vision of reconciling with high-level insurgent figures, potentially including Taliban leader Mullah Umar. However, Karzai says he plans to pursue this initiative at a 'peace jirga' to convene in Kabul planned on/about May 20. As U.S. strategy unfolds, a greater sense of U.S. official optimism has started to take hold, with comments to this effect by Gen. McChrystal, Secretary of Defense Gates, and CENTCOM [Central Command] commander Gen. David Petraeus. Their comments have coincided with the partial success of 'Operation Moshtarak' to stabilize Marjah, and successful arrests of and strikes on key Afghan militants in Pakistan. A more extensive operation--although characterized more by political engagement than actual combat--is planned for June 2010 in the major province of Qandahar. Including FY2009, the United States has provided over $40 billion in assistance to Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, of which about $21 billion has been to equip and train Afghan forces."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2010-05-11
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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy [April 20, 2010]
"Following two high-level policy reviews and the appointment of a new overall U.S. commander in Afghanistan in 2009, the Obama Administration says it is pursuing a fully resourced, integrated military-civilian strategy that will pave the way for a gradual transition to Afghan security leadership beginning in July 2011. The policy is intended to address what the Obama Administration considered to be a security environment that was deteriorating despite a gradual increase in U.S. forces there during 2006-2008. Some of the deterioration has been attributed to Afghan disillusionment with corruption in the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, and the relative safe haven in parts of Pakistan enjoyed by Afghan militants. […]. A major issue under discussion in Afghanistan, and a focus of an international meeting in London on January 28, 2010, on Afghanistan, is efforts to try to persuade insurgent fighters and leaders to end their fight and join the political process. […]. As U.S. strategy unfolds and reintegration and reconciliation talks gather strength, a greater sense of U.S. official optimism has started to take hold, with comments to this effect by Gen. McChrystal, Secretary of Defense Gates, and CENTCOM commander Gen. David Petraeus. Their comments have coincided with the apparent success of 'Operation Moshtarak' to push insurgents out of Marjah and establish Afghan governance there, and successful arrests of and strikes on key Afghan militants in Pakistan. A more extensive operation--although characterized more by political engagement than actual combat--is planned for June 2010 in the major province of Qandahar."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2010-04-20
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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy [March 25, 2010]
"Following two high-level policy reviews and the appointment of a new overall U.S. commander in Afghanistan in 2009, the Obama Administration says it is pursuing a fully resourced, integrated military-civilian strategy that will pave the way for a gradual transition to Afghan security leadership beginning in July 2011. The policy is intended to address what the Obama Administration considered to be a security environment that was deteriorating despite an increase in U.S. forces there during 2006-2008. Some of the deterioration was attributed to Afghan disillusionment with corruption in the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, and the relative safe haven in parts of Pakistan enjoyed by Afghan militants. Each of the two high-level policy reviews in 2009 resulted in a decision to add combat troops, with the intent of creating the conditions to expand Afghan governance and economic development, rather than on hunting and defeating insurgents. A total of an additional 51,000 forces were authorized to deploy by the two reviews--21,000 in March 2009 and another 30,000 authorized in December 2009. Each review was accompanied by announcements of force increases by U.S. partners in Afghanistan. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, who was appointed top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan in May 2009, is a key architect and proponent of the current strategy. The strategy is predicated not only on creating secure conditions, but also empowering and improving Afghan governance and promoting economic development. These functions have involved a significant buildup of U.S. diplomats and other civilians as advisors and mentors."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2010-03-25
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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy [January 27, 2010]
"Upon taking office, the Obama Administration faced a deteriorating security environment in Afghanistan, despite a steady increase in U.S. forces there in recent years. Signs of deterioration included an expanded area and greater intensity of militant operations, higher levels of overall violence, Afghan and international disillusionment with corruption in the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, and the ease of infiltration of Taliban militants from safe havens in Pakistan. Building on assessments completed in the latter days of the Bush Administration, the Obama Administration has conducted two 'strategy reviews' the results of which were announced on March 27, 2009, and on December 1, 2009, respectively. The outcome of both reviews was to add combat troops but with the intent of creating safe conditions to expand Afghan governance and economic development. As part of the early 2009 review, the President announced an increase of 21,000 U.S. troops, which arrived by November 2009 and brought U.S. force levels to about 68,000, in partnership with about 39,000 international forces from 43 other nations, and about nearly 200,000 Afghan security forces."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2010-01-27
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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy [December 30, 2009]
"U.S. strategy--which depends on the presence of a legitimate Afghan partner to implement--was complicated by the widespread fraud allegations in the August 20, 2009, presidential election. Following extensive investigation, President Hamid Karzai accepted a run-off vote with the second-place finisher, former Foreign Minister Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, as required by the Afghan constitution. However, Dr. Abdullah, pulled out of the run-off and Karzai was declared the winner of the presidency on November 2. He was inaugurated November 19 and presented to parliament a new cabinet on December 19. It retained about half the incumbents, including most of the widely praised economic sector ministers, but also included some new figures purportedly linked to traditional ethnic and political faction leaders."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2009-12-30
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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy [December 2, 2009]
"Upon taking office, the Obama Administration faced a deteriorating security environment in Afghanistan, despite a build-up of U.S. forces there in preceding years. Signs of deterioration have included an expanded area in which militants are operating, increasing numbers of civilian and military deaths, Afghan and international disillusionment with corruption in the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, and the ease of infiltration of Taliban militants from safe havens in Pakistan. Building on assessments completed in the latter days of the Bush Administration, the Obama Administration conducted a 'strategic review,' the results of which were announced on March 27, 2009. The outcome of the review leaned toward those in the Administration who believe that adding combat troops is less crucial than building governance. [...] A series of high level meetings to again review strategy began September 30, and policy was announced on December 1, 2009. Its highlights are: the provision of 30,000 additional U.S. forces to begin deploying by January 2010 to 'reverse the Taliban's momentum and strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan's security forces and government so that they can take the lead.'; a conditions-based plan to draw down U.S. forces beginning in July 2011; [and] a call for additional partner contributions, with no specific figure mentioned."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2009-12-02
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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy [November 10, 2009]
"Upon taking office, the Obama Administration faced a deteriorating security environment in Afghanistan, despite a build-up of U.S. forces there in preceding years. Signs of deterioration have included an expanded militant presence in some areas, increasing numbers of civilian and military deaths, Afghan and international disillusionment with corruption in the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, and the ease of infiltration of Taliban militants from safe havens in Pakistan. Building on assessments completed in the latter days of the Bush Administration, the Obama Administration conducted a 'strategic review,' the results of which were announced on March 27, 2009. [...] Of the approximately 68,000 U.S. forces in Afghanistan, about 56,000 are part of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) that operates throughout Afghanistan, and the remainder are under the separate U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom. U.S. and partner forces also run 26 regional enclaves to secure reconstruction (Provincial Reconstruction Teams, PRTs), and are expanding an Afghan National Army and reforming an Afghan National Police force-the two combined now total about 175,000. The United States has provided about $40 billion in assistance to Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, of which about $18 billion was to equip and train these Afghan forces. Breakdowns are shown in the tables at the end. See also CRS Report RL33627, 'NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance,' by Vincent Morelli and Paul Belkin; and CRS Report RL32686, 'Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy,' by Christopher M. Blanchard."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2009-11-10
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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy [October 6, 2009]
"Upon taking office, the Obama Administration faced a deteriorating security environment in Afghanistan, despite a build-up of U.S. forces there in preceding years, including an expanding militant presence in some areas, increasing numbers of civilian and military deaths, Afghan and international disillusionment with corruption in the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, and the infiltration of Taliban militants from safe havens in Pakistan. […]. The strategy emphasized non-military steps such as increasing the resources devoted to economic development, building Afghan governance primarily at the local level, reforming the Afghan government, expanding and reforming the Afghan security forces, and trying to improve Pakistan's efforts to curb militant activity on its soil. Still, the Administration decided that more innovative counter-insurgency tactics that limit civilian casualties and holds territory cleared of insurgents was needed to promote those goals, and in May 2009, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. David McKiernan, was replaced by Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal. […]. In response to an anticipated request by McChrystal for about 40,000 additional U.S. combat forces needed for that strategy, President Obama said on September 20, 2009, he would first decide on whether the United States 'has the strategy right' before deciding on 'resources,' and a series of high level meetings to again review strategy began September 30. The Administration has developed about 50 'metrics' to measure U.S. progress in Afghanistan and Pakistan. U.S. strategy has been complicated by the August 20, 2009, presidential election, which has been marred by widespread fraud allegations."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2009-10-06
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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy [ August 14, 2009]
"Upon taking office, the Obama Administration faced a deteriorating security environment in Afghanistan, despite a build-up of U.S. forces there in preceding years, including an expanding militant presence in some areas, increasing numbers of civilian and military deaths, Afghan and international disillusionment with corruption in the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, and the infiltration of Taliban militants from safe havens in Pakistan. Building on assessments completed in the latter days of the Bush Administration, the Obama Administration conducted a 'strategic review,' the results of which were announced on March 27, 2009. The outcome of the review leaned toward those in the Administration who believe that adding combat troops is less crucial than building governance, although the review did announce an increase of 21,000 U.S. troops by September 2009. The strategy emphasizes non-military steps such as increasing the resources devoted to economic development, building Afghan governance primarily at the local level, reforming the Afghan government, expanding and reforming the Afghan security forces, and trying to improve Pakistan's efforts to curb militant activity on its soil. The strategy also backs Afghan efforts to negotiate with Taliban figures who are willing to enter the political process."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2009-08-14
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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy [July 20, 2009]
"Upon taking office, the Obama Administration faced a deteriorating security environment in Afghanistan, including an expanding militant presence in some areas, increasing numbers of civilian and military deaths, growing disillusionment with corruption in the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, and Pakistan's inability to prevent Taliban and other militant infiltration into Afghanistan. The Obama Administration conducted a 'strategic review,' the results of which were announced on March 27, 2009, in advance of a March 31, 2009 international meeting in the Netherlands and an April 3-4, 2009, NATO summit. This review built upon assessments completed in the latter days of the Bush Administration which led to decisions in 2008 to plan a build-up of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. In part because of the many different causes of continued instability in Afghanistan, there reportedly were some differences within the Obama Administration on a new strategy. Apparently leaning toward those in the Administration who do not believe that more combat troops will reverse U.S. difficulties, the review focuses not on adding U.S. troops--although at least 21,000 are being added in 2009-- but rather on enhancing non-military steps. The thrust of the strategy is to increase the resources devoted to economic development and coordination among international donors, building Afghan governing structures primarily at the local level, reforming the Afghan government, expanding and reforming the Afghan security forces, and trying to improve Pakistan's efforts to curb militant activity on its soil."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2009-07-20
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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy [June 18, 2009]
"Upon taking office, the Obama Administration faced a deteriorating security environment in Afghanistan, including an expanding militant presence in some areas, increasing numbers of civilian and military deaths, growing disillusionment with corruption in the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, and Pakistan's inability to prevent Taliban and other militant infiltration into Afghanistan. The Obama Administration conducted a 'strategic review,' the results of which were announced on March 27, 2009, in advance of a March 31, 2009 international meeting in the Netherlands and an April 3-4, 2009, NATO summit. This review built upon assessments completed in the latter days of the Bush Administration which led to decisions in 2008 to plan a build-up of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. In part because of the many different causes of continued instability in Afghanistan, there reportedly were some differences within the Obama Administration on a new strategy. Apparently leaning toward those in the Administration who do not believe that more combat troops will reverse U.S. difficulties, the review focuses not on adding U.S. troops--although at least 21,000 are being added in 2009-- but rather on enhancing non-military steps. The thrust of the strategy is to increase the resources devoted to economic development and coordination among international donors, building Afghan governing structures primarily at the local level, reforming the Afghan government, expanding and reforming the Afghan security forces, and trying to improve Pakistan's efforts to curb militant activity on its soil."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2009-06-18
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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy [May 22, 2009]
"Upon taking office, the Obama Administration faced a deteriorating security environment in Afghanistan, including an expanding militant presence in some areas, increasing numbers of civilian and military deaths, growing disillusionment with corruption in the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, and Pakistan's inability to prevent Taliban and other militant infiltration into Afghanistan. The Obama Administration conducted a 'strategic review,' the results of which were announced on March 27, 2009... [building] upon assessments completed in the latter days of the Bush Administration which led to decisions in 2008 to plan a build-up of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. [...] The review focuses not on adding U.S. troops--although at least 21,000 are being added in 2009--but rather on enhancing non-military steps. The thrust of the strategy is to increase the resources devoted to economic development and coordination among international donors, building Afghan governing structures primarily at the local level, reforming the Afghan government, expanding and reforming the Afghan security forces, and trying to improve Pakistan's efforts to curb militant activity on its soil. The review also backs Afghan efforts to negotiate with Taliban figures who are willing to enter the political process, and Afghan-led reconciliation talks reportedly have expanded since the strategy was announced. [...] In May 2009, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. David McKiernan, was removed and Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal was named to succeed him."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2009-05-22
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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy [April 30, 2009]
This CRS report provides an updated analysis of the situation on the ground in Afghanistan. The three main issues discussed include: post-war governance, security, and U.S. Policy. More specifically the report states that "U.S. and outside assessments of the effort to stabilize Afghanistan are increasingly negative, to the point where some senior U.S. officials say they are not sure the effort is 'winning.' These assessments emphasize an expanding militant presence in some areas previously considered secure, and increased numbers of civilian and military deaths. Both the official U.S. as well as outside assessments increasingly point to Pakistan's failure to prevent Taliban and other militant infiltration into Afghanistan as a cause of the security deterioration. The Bush Administration has concluded several recent reviews of U.S. strategy, and has made actionable recommendations to the incoming Obama Administration, which is expected to favor greater emphasis on Afghanistan and to revamp U.S. strategy. There appears to be little clear consensus on a new strategy, although most U.S. officials and commanders agree that U.S. strategy must go beyond adding U.S. troops to include enhancing non-military steps such as economic development and improved coordination among international donors, building local governing structures, and reform of the Afghan central government. The Bush Administration also increased direct U.S. action against militant concentrations inside Pakistan."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2009-04-30
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Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy [March 23, 2009]
"As U.S. and outside assessments of the effort to stabilize Afghanistan became increasingly negative throughout 2008, the Bush Administration conducted several reviews of U.S. strategy, and made actionable recommendations to the Obama Administration. The new Administration is reportedly aggregating the recommendations into a new policy framework to be developed in advance of an April 3, 2009 NATO summit. Obama Administration policy in Afghanistan is facing an expanding militant presence in some areas previously considered secure, increased numbers of civilian and military deaths, growing disillusionment with corruption in the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, and an inability of Pakistan to prevent Taliban and other militant infiltration into Afghanistan. There appears to be little clear consensus on a new strategy, although most U.S. officials and commanders agree that U.S. strategy must go beyond adding U.S. troops to include enhancing non-military steps such as economic development and improved coordination among international donors, building local governing structures, and reform of the Afghan central government. The question of how to curb militant activity in Pakistan is said to comprise a major part of the Obama reviews, as is the question of whether to try to engage Iran on the issue. Reflecting the growing connection between militant activity in Pakistan and Afghanistan, as well as the Obama Administration's priority on Afghanistan, the new Administration has named Ambassador Richard Holbrooke as a special representative on Pakistan and Afghanistan."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2009-03-23
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Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy [February 9, 2009]
"As U.S. and outside assessments of the effort to stabilize Afghanistan became increasingly negative throughout 2008, the Bush Administration conducted several reviews of U.S. strategy, and made actionable recommendations to the Obama Administration. The new Administration is reportedly aggregating the recommendations into a new policy framework to be developed in advance of an April 3, 2009 NATO summit. Obama Administration policy in Afghanistan is facing an expanding militant presence in some areas previously considered secure, increased numbers of civilian and military deaths, growing disillusionment with corruption in the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, and an inability of Pakistan to prevent Taliban and other militant infiltration into Afghanistan. There appears to be little clear consensus on a new strategy, although most U.S. officials and commanders agree that U.S. strategy must go beyond adding U.S. troops to include enhancing non-military steps such as economic development and improved coordination among international donors, building local governing structures, and reform of the Afghan central government. The question of how to curb militant activity in Pakistan is said to comprise a major part of the Obama reviews, as is the question of whether to try to engage Iran on the issue. Reflecting the growing connection between militant activity in Pakistan and Afghanistan, as well as the Obama Administration's priority on Afghanistan, the new Administration has named Ambassador Richard Holbrooke as a special representative on Pakistan and Afghanistan."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2009-02-09
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Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy [January 16, 2009]
This CRS report provides an updated analysis of the situation on the ground in Afghanistan. The three main issues discussed include: post-war governance, security, and U.S. Policy. More specifically the report states that "U.S. and outside assessments of the effort to stabilize Afghanistan are increasingly negative, to the point where some senior U.S. officials say they are not sure the effort is 'winning.' These assessments emphasize an expanding militant presence in some areas previously considered secure, and increased numbers of civilian and military deaths. Both the official U.S. as well as outside assessments increasingly point to Pakistan's failure to prevent Taliban and other militant infiltration into Afghanistan as a cause of the security deterioration. The Bush Administration has concluded several recent reviews of U.S. strategy, and has made actionable recommendations to the incoming Obama Administration, which is expected to favor greater emphasis on Afghanistan and to revamp U.S. strategy. There appears to be little clear consensus on a new strategy, although most U.S. officials and commanders agree that U.S. strategy must go beyond adding U.S. troops to include enhancing non-military steps such as economic development and improved coordination among international donors, building local governing structures, and reform of the Afghan central government. The Bush Administration also increased direct U.S. action against militant concentrations inside Pakistan."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2009-01-16
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Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy [Updated December 23, 2008]
"U.S. and outside assessments of the effort to stabilize Afghanistan are increasingly negative, to the point where some U.S. officials say they are not sure the effort is 'winning.' These assessments emphasize an expanding militant presence in some areas previously considered secure, and increased numbers of civilian and military deaths. Both the official U.S. as well as outside assessments increasingly point to Pakistan's failure to prevent Taliban and other militant infiltration into Afghanistan as a cause of the security deterioration. The Administration has recently concluded a review of U.S. strategy, and is reportedly making actionable recommendations to the incoming Obama Administration, which is expected to favor greater emphasis on Afghanistan. Steps already planned or under way, even before the U.S. transition, include adding U.S. troops to the theater, consolidating the command structure for U.S. and partner forces, planning a major expansion of the Afghan National Army, rebuilding and empowering local security and governance structures, attempting to accelerate development activities to increase support for the Afghan government, and backing Afghan efforts to persuade Taliban leaders to cease fighting. The Administration also has increased direct U.S. action against militant concentrations inside Pakistan. On the other hand, there is skepticism among some observers that adding combat troops will necessarily produce major security gains."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2008-12-23
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Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy [October 15, 2008]
This Congressional Research Service (CRS) report discusses Afghanistan, including its security, governance and attempts to stabilize the country and the surrounding area. "U.S. and outside assessments of the effort to stabilize Afghanistan are increasingly negative, to the point where top U.S. commanders say they are not sure the effort is 'winning' and some partner commanders say the effort is being lost. U.S. and outside assessments emphasize a growing sense of insecurity in areas around Kabul previously considered secure, increased numbers of suicide attacks and civilian deaths, and divisions within the NATO alliance about total troop contributions and missions. Both the official U.S. as well as outside assessments are increasingly pointing to Pakistan, and particularly the new Pakistani government, as failing to prevent Taliban and other militant infiltration from Pakistan. Although available U.S. forces are short, the Administration is conducting a review of U.S. strategy, adding U.S. troops to the Afghanistan theater, consolidating the command structure for U.S. and partner forces, expanding the Afghan National Army, and attempting to accelerate development activities to increase support for the Afghan government. The Administration also has increased direct U.S. action against Taliban concentrations inside Pakistan. The central government is relatively stable, but it is perceived as weak, corrupt, and unresponsive to core needs, causing popular disillusionment. A key component of U.S. strategy is to try to compel the Afghan government to redress these deficiencies. […] The United States has given Afghanistan about $30 billion (appropriated, including FY2009 to date) since the fall of the Taliban, of which about $15 billion was to equip and train the security forces."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2008-10-15
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Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy [Updated September 29, 2008]
"Assessments of the U.S. effort to stabilize Afghanistan are mixed. The political transition was completed with the convening of a parliament in December 2005, but since 2006 insurgent threats to Afghanistan's government have escalated. In the political process, a new constitution was adopted in January 2004, successful presidential elections were held on October 9, 2004, and parliamentary elections took place on September 18, 2005. The parliament has become an arena for factions that have fought each other for nearly three decades to debate and peacefully resolve differences. […] In 2006 and 2007, the insurgency led by remnants of the former Taliban regime has escalated after four years of relatively minor violence. Contributing to the renewed violence is popular frustration with lack of economic development, official corruption, and the failure to extend Afghan government authority into rural areas. […] U.S. and partner stabilization measures include strengthening the central government and its security forces. The United States and other countries are building an Afghan National Army, deploying a 39,000 troop NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) that now commands peacekeeping throughout Afghanistan, and running regional enclaves to secure reconstruction (Provincial Reconstruction Teams, PRTs). Approximately 27,000 U.S. troops are in Afghanistan, of which all but about 12,000 are under NATO/ISAF command. To build security institutions and assist reconstruction, the United States has given Afghanistan over $21 billion since the fall of the Taliban, including funds to equip and train Afghan security forces. Breakdowns are shown in the several tables at the end of this paper. Pending legislation, H.R. 2446, would reauthorize the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2008-09-29
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Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy [Updated September 2, 2008]
This CRS report provides an updated analysis of the situation on the ground in the war-torn country of Afghanistan. More specifically, the report examines the issues of post-war governance, security and U.S. policy. "U.S. and outside assessments of the effort to stabilize Afghanistan are mixed; the Administration notes progress on reconstruction, governance and security in many areas of Afghanistan, but says the mission is still 'under-resourced' to address escalating insurgent activity in some sectors, particularly the east and the consistently restive south. Recent outside studies emphasize a growing sense of insecurity in areas previously considered secure, increased numbers of suicide attacks, increasing aggregate poppy cultivation, and growing divisions within the NATO alliance about total troop contributions and the relative share of combat primarily in the south. Both the official U.S. as well as outside assessments are increasingly pointing to Pakistan, and particularly the new Pakistani government, as failing to prevent Taliban and other militant infiltration from Pakistan. With available U.S. forces short, the Administration is anticipating adding U.S. troops to the Afghanistan theater, reorganizing the command structure for U.S. and partner forces, and expanding the Afghan National Army. The Administration also has increased direct U.S. action against Taliban concentrations inside Pakistan. Politically, the Afghan central government is relatively stable, but it is perceived as weak and rife with corruption."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2008-09-02
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Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy [Updated August 8, 2008]
This CRS report provides an updated analysis of the situation on the ground in the war-torn country of Afghanistan. More specifically, the report examines the issues of post-war governance, security and U.S. policy. "U.S. and outside assessments of the effort to stabilize Afghanistan are mixed; the Administration notes progress on reconstruction, governance and security in many areas of Afghanistan, but says the mission is still 'under-resourced' to address escalating insurgent activity in some sectors, particularly the east and the consistently restive south. Recent outside studies emphasize a growing sense of insecurity in areas previously considered secure, increased numbers of suicide attacks, increasing aggregate poppy cultivation, and growing divisions within the NATO alliance about total troop contributions and the relative share of combat primarily in the south. Both the official U.S. as well as outside assessments are increasingly pointing to Pakistan, and particularly the new Pakistani government, as failing to prevent Taliban and other militant infiltration from Pakistan. With available U.S. forces short, the Administration is anticipating adding U.S. troops to the Afghanistan theater, reorganizing the command structure for U.S. and partner forces, and expanding the Afghan National Army. The Administration also has increased direct U.S. action against Taliban concentrations inside Pakistan. Politically, the Afghan central government is relatively stable, but it is perceived as weak and rife with corruption."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2008-08-08
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Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy [Updated July 11, 2008]
"U.S. and outside assessments of the effort to stabilize Afghanistan are mixed; the Administration notes progress on reconstruction, governance and security in many areas of Afghanistan, but says the mission is still "under-resourced" to address escalating insurgent activity in some sectors. Recent outside studies contain relatively pessimistic assessments, emphasizing a growing sense of insecurity in areas previously considered secure, increased numbers of suicide attacks, increasing aggregate poppy cultivation, and growing divisions within the NATO alliance about total troop contributions and the relative share of combat primarily in the south. Both the official U.S. as well as outside assessments are increasingly pointing to Pakistan, and particularly the new Pakistani government, as failing to prevent Taliban and other militant infiltration from Pakistan. With available U.S. forces short, the Administration is anticipating adding U.S. troops to the still combat-intense south, and eventually assuming U.S. command of the southern sector. The Administration also has increased direct U.S. action against Taliban concentrations inside Pakistan."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2008-07-11
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Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy [Updated June 6, 2008]
This CRS report discusses Afghanistan including its security, governance and attempts to stabilize the country and the surrounding area. Sections include: "Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security and U.S. Policy. Bush Administration Policy Pre-September 11, 2001 toward the Taliban resembled Clinton Administration policy--applying economic and political pressure while retaining dialogue with the Taliban, and refraining from providing military assistance to the Northern Alliance. [...] There is debate over U.N. involvement in Afghanistan, representing the United Nations, the European Union, and NATO in Afghanistan subsumed the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). [...] A cornerstone of the effort to strengthen the central government was a program, run by UNAMA, to dismantle identified and illegal militias. The program, which formally concluded on June 30, 2006, was the 'DDR' program: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and was run in partnership with Japan, Britain, and Canada, with U.S. participation. [...] Since June 11, 2005, the disarmament effort has emphasized another program called 'DIAG,' Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups. [...] Post-War Security Operations and Force Capacity Building included the top security priority of preventing Al Qaeda and the Taliban from challenging the Afghan government. The pillars of the U. S. security effort are: continuing combat operations by U.S. forces and a NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); U.S. and NATO operation of 'provincial reconstruction teams' (PRTs); and the equipping and training of an Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) force." Also included are 17 different tables regarding the U.S. and Afghanistan.
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2008-06-06
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Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy [Updated May 15, 2008]
This CRS report discusses Afghanistan including its security, governance and attempts to stabilize the country and the surrounding area. Sections include: "Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security and U.S. Policy. Bush Administration Policy Pre-September 11, 2001 toward the Taliban resembled Clinton Administration policy--applying economic and political pressure while retaining dialogue with the Taliban, and refraining from providing military assistance to the Northern Alliance. [...] There is debate over U.N. involvement in Afghanistan, representing the United Nations, the European Union, and NATO in Afghanistan subsumed the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). [...] A cornerstone of the effort to strengthen the central government was a program, run by UNAMA, to dismantle identified and illegal militias. The program, which formally concluded on June 30, 2006, was the 'DDR' program: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and was run in partnership with Japan, Britain, and Canada, with U.S. participation. [...] Since June 11, 2005, the disarmament effort has emphasized another program called 'DIAG,' Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups. [...] Post-War Security Operations and Force Capacity Building included the top security priority of preventing Al Qaeda and the Taliban from challenging the Afghan government. The pillars of the U. S. security effort are: continuing combat operations by U.S. forces and a NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); U.S. and NATO operation of 'provincial reconstruction teams' (PRTs); and the equipping and training of an Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) force." Also included are 17 different tables regarding the U.S. and Afghanistan.
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2008-05-15
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Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy [Updated April 30, 2008]
"U.S. and outside assessments of the effort to stabilize Afghanistan are mixed and subject to debate; the Administration notes progress on reconstruction, governance and security in many areas of Afghanistan, particularly the U.S.-led eastern sector of Afghanistan. However, a November 2007 Bush Administration review of U.S. efforts in Afghanistan reportedly concluded that overall progress was inadequate. This mirrors recent outside studies that contain relatively pessimistic assessments, emphasizing a growing sense of insecurity in areas previously considered secure, increased numbers of suicide attacks, and increasing aggregate poppy cultivation, as well as increasing divisions within the NATO alliance about the relative share of combat among the nations contributing to the peacekeeping mission. Both the official U.S. as well as outside assessments are increasingly pointing to Pakistan as failing-either through lack of attention or deliberate strategy-to prevent Taliban commanders from operating from Pakistan. To try to gain momentum against the insurgency, the United States is considering new initiatives including adding U.S. troops to the still combat-intense south, possibly assuming U.S. command of the southern sector, and increasing direct U.S. action against Taliban concentrations inside Pakistan. Politically, the Afghan government remains reasonably stable. The post-Taliban transition was completed with the convening of a parliament in December 2005; a new constitution was adopted in January 2004, successful presidential elections were held on October 9, 2004, and parliamentary elections took place on September 18, 2005."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2008-04-30
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Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy [Updated April 7, 2008]
"U.S. and outside assessments of the effort to stabilize Afghanistan are mixed and subject to debate; the Administration notes progress on reconstruction, governance and security in many areas of Afghanistan, particularly the U.S.-led eastern sector of Afghanistan. However, a November 2007 Bush Administration review of U.S. efforts in Afghanistan reportedly concluded that overall progress was inadequate, and a number of efforts to augment the U.S. stabilization effort are underway or under consideration. Outside studies have tended to contain relatively pessimistic assessments, emphasizing a growing sense of insecurity in areas previously considered secure, increased numbers of suicide attacks, and increasing aggregate poppy cultivation, as well as increasing divisions within the NATO alliance about the relative share of combat among the nations contributing to the peacekeeping mission. […].To help stabilize Afghanistan, the United States and partner countries are deploying a 47,000 troop NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) that now commands peacekeeping throughout Afghanistan, including the restive south. Of those, 19,000 of the 28,000 U.S. forces in Afghanistan are part of ISAF. The U.S. and partner forces also run regional enclaves to secure reconstruction (Provincial Reconstruction Teams, PRTs), and are building an Afghan National Army and National Police. The United States has given Afghanistan over $23 billion (appropriated, including FY2008 to date) since the fall of the Taliban, including funds to equip and train Afghan security forces. About $1.05 billion in economic aid is requested for FY2009. Breakdowns are shown in the tables at the end of the paper."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2008-04-07
