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Ethical Guidance for Rationing Scarce Health-Related Resources in a Severe Influenza Pandemic: Literature and Plan Review
From the Background: "There is no one-size-fits-all ethical framework for rationing plans for mild, moderate, and severe pandemics. Unlike a mild pandemic, a severe pandemic has the potential to cripple normal business operations and disrupt the distribution of essential goods and services globally, including in Minnesota. Unlike other disasters, during a severe pandemic states and communities cannot count on receiving federal assistance. This impact on societal functioning makes planning for a severe pandemic unique. While planning is underway at the federal level, the federal government has made it clear that states should develop their own pandemic plans, including plans for rationing scarce resources. This literature and plan review is part of the Minnesota Pandemic Ethics Project, a collaborative effort that is developing recommendations for the ethical rationing of five health-related resources that will be scarce in a severe influenza pandemic: antiviral medications, N95 respirators (N95s), surgical masks, vaccines and mechanical ventilators. How best to ration during a global public health disaster of such duration, severity and scope raises novel ethical issues. For example, when should antiviral medications be rationed for prevention vs. treatment? When should patients be removed from ventilators so that patients more likely to benefit can be given a chance at survival? Should the supply of N95s be reserved for essential workers?"
University of Minnesota. Center for Biomedical Ethics; Minnesota Center for Health Care Ethics
Prehn, Angela Witt; Vawter, Dorothy E.
2008-04-01
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Extensively Drug-Resistant Tuberculosis (XDR-TB): Emerging Public Health Threats and Quarantine and Isolation [Updated April 1, 2008]
"The international saga of Andrew Speaker, a traveler thought to have XDR-TB, a drug-resistant form of tuberculosis, placed a spotlight on existing mechanisms to contain contagious disease threats and raised numerous legal and public health issues. This report presents the factual situation presented by Andrew Speaker; briefly addresses the existing law relating to quarantine and isolation, with an emphasis on the interaction of state and federal laws and international agreements; and examines the relationship of quarantine and isolation to civil rights protections. It will be updated as necessary."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Jones, Nancy Lee; Swendiman, Kathleen S.
2008-04-01
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Point of Dispensing Standards
"The mass antibiotic dispensing standards were developed in collaboration with federal, state, and local agencies. The Rand Corporation, under contract to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), was directed to develop Point of Dispensing (POD) infrastructure standards in collaboration with HHS/Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (HHS/ASPR), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention/Division of Strategic National Stockpile (CDC/DSNS), and state and local agencies that are current Cities Readiness Initiative (CRI) awardees. As such, CDC/DSNS collaborated closely in formulation and execution of the project, and HHS/ASPR was consulted on a regular basis. Federal, state, and local health officials were represented on an expert panel that was convened to provide guidance on the standards development process, and CRI sites were provided with an opportunity to comment on the draft standards. Detailed information on the development of the standards will be published in a public forum within the next six months. CRI is organized around the planning scenario of an outdoor aerosolized anthrax attack. Anthrax is a particularly challenging scenario because, to be effective, prophylaxis must occur prior to the onset of symptoms."
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.)
2008-04
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Legal Preparedness for School Closures in Response to Pandemic Influenza and Other Emergencies, A Review and Report Submitted to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
"The Center's analysis specifically addresses whether state laws expressly authorize state or local department(s) of health, education, and/or emergency management to close schools during non-emergencies and declared emergencies in response to pandemic influenza or other public health emergencies. While broad public health laws aimed generally at controlling communicable diseases or abating hazards in the community may support closing schools as a preventive measure, the Center's focus is on those laws within each state that appear to expressly authorize school closure for extended periods during non-emergencies and declared emergencies. […] Modeling and analyses conducted by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and others suggest that community-wide school closures may mitigate the incidence of pandemic influenza, thereby reducing its impact on individuals, groups, healthcare providers, public health systems, and the economy. The public health premise, consistent with social distancing theories, is that timely closing of schools may limit the spread of influenza (or other communicable conditions). […] In furtherance of CDC's assignments via the U.S. Homeland Security Council to prepare the Nation for a potential influenza pandemic--specifically action items 6.3.2.1., 6.3.2.2., and 6.3.2.3. of the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan-- (see Appendix A)), CDC's Public Health Law Program and Division of Global Migration and Quarantine asked the Center for Law and the Public's Health ('Center') to examine and characterize patterns in states' legal authorities to close schools. For this purpose, we reviewed the pandemic influenza preparedness and response plans all states submitted to CDC beginning in 2006. We also examined the express state laws of 52 jurisdictions, including the 50 states, the District of Columbia (D.C.), and Puerto Rico."
Center for Law and the Public's Health at Georgetown and Johns Hopkins Universities
Hodge, James G., Jr.; Bhattacharya, Dhrubajyoti; Gray, Jennifer
2008-04
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Pandemic Influenza: Preparedness, Response, and Recovery - Guide for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources: Annex: Emergency Services Sector Pandemic Guideline
"This Sector-specific guideline is an annex to the 'Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Guide for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources' (CI/KR Pandemic Influenza Guide) and intends to assist the entities within the Emergency Services Sector plan for a pandemic. Sectors that fail to prepare for such a prolonged catastrophic event may find themselves without the staff, equipment, or supplies necessary to continue providing essential services. […] The guideline serves as a non-prescriptive reference for owner-operators and a practical tool for business planners to augment and tailor existing emergency response plans given the unique challenges an influenza pandemic presents. It is important to integrate this pandemic influenza planning with your existing business continuity and emergency response plans and/or the CI/KR Pandemic Influenza Guide's comprehensive framework for pandemic influenza catastrophic planning. This annex addresses the major challenges the Emergency Services Sector may face and should assess in its pandemic influenza planning within the seven key areas of vulnerability highlighted in blue boxes in the Guideline. While not necessarily applicable to all businesses or entities in a given sector, each relevant 'Action, Supporting Action, and Question' in this Guideline can be integrated and managed as a separate checklist item during the planning process." "Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Guide for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources" is available through the Homeland Security Digital Library: https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=467293.
United States. Department of Homeland Security
2008-03-25
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Pandemic Influenza: Preparedness, Response, and Recovery - Guide for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources: Annex: Aviation Sub-Sector Pandemic Guideline
"This Sector-specific guideline is an annex to the 'Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Guide for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources' (CI/KR Pandemic Influenza Guide) and intends to assist the Aviation Sub-Sector of the Transportation Sector, and the public and private sector
businesses within the Sector, plan for a severe influenza pandemic. Organizations that fail to prepare for such a prolonged and potentially catastrophic event may find themselves without the staff, equipment, or supplies necessary to continue providing essential transportation services for their customers and the nation. […] The guideline serves as a non-prescriptive reference for owner-operators and a practical tool for business planners to augment and tailor existing emergency response plans given the unique challenges an influenza pandemic presents. It is important to integrate this pandemic influenza planning with your existing business continuity and emergency response plans and/or the CI/KR Pandemic Influenza Guide's comprehensive framework for pandemic influenza catastrophic planning. This annex addresses the major challenges the Aviation Sub-Sector may face and should assess in its pandemic influenza planning within the seven key areas of vulnerability highlighted in blue boxes in the Guideline sections. While not necessarily applicable to all businesses or entities in a given sector, each relevant 'Action, Supporting Action, and Question' in this Guideline can be integrated and managed as a separate checklist item during the planning process." "Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Guide for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources" is available through the Homeland Security Digital Library: https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=467293.
United States. Department of Homeland Security
2008-03-24
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Pandemic Influenza: Preparedness, Response, and Recovery - Guide for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources: Annex: Maritime Sub-Sector Pandemic Guideline
"This Sector-specific guideline is an annex to the 'Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Guide for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources' (CI/KR Pandemic Influenza Guide) and intends to assist the Maritime Sub-Sector of the Transportation Sector, and the public and private sector businesses within the Sector, plan for a severe influenza pandemic. Organizations that fail to prepare for such a prolonged and potentially catastrophic event may find themselves without the staff, equipment, or supplies necessary to continue providing essential transportation services for their customers and the nation. […] The guideline serves as a non-prescriptive reference for owner-operators and a practical tool for business planners to augment and tailor existing emergency response plans given the unique challenges an influenza pandemic presents. It is important to integrate this pandemic influenza planning with your existing business continuity and emergency response plans and/or the CI/KR Pandemic Influenza Guide's comprehensive framework for pandemic influenza catastrophic planning. This annex addresses the major challenges the Maritime Sub-Sector may face during a pandemic influenza outbreak, as well the seven major areas of vulnerability the Sub-sector should fully assess in planning for pandemic influenza. While not necessarily applicable to all businesses or entities in a given sector, each relevant 'Action, Supporting Action, and Question' in this Guideline can be integrated and managed as a separate checklist item during the planning process." "Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Guide for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources" is available through the Homeland Security Digital Library: https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=467293.
United States. Department of Homeland Security
2008-03-24
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Pandemic Influenza: Preparedness, Response, and Recovery - Guide for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources: Annex: Railroad Sub-Sector Pandemic Guideline
"This Sector-specific guideline is an annex to the 'Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Guide for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources' (CI/KR Pandemic Influenza Guide) and intends to assist the owners and operators within the Railroad Sub-Sector of the Transportation Sector with planning for a catastrophic pandemic influenza. Organizations that fail to prepare for such a prolonged and potentially catastrophic event may find themselves without the staff, equipment, or supplies necessary to continue providing essential transportation services for their customers and the nation. […] The guideline serves as a non-prescriptive reference for owner-operators and a practical tool for business planners to augment and tailor existing emergency response plans given the unique challenges an influenza pandemic presents. It is important to integrate this pandemic influenza planning with your existing business continuity and emergency response plans and/or the CI/KR Pandemic Influenza Guide's comprehensive framework for pandemic influenza catastrophic planning. This annex addresses the major challenges the Railroad Sub-Sector may face and should assess in its pandemic influenza planning within the seven key areas of vulnerability highlighted in blue boxes in the Guideline. While not necessarily applicable to all businesses or entities in a given sector, each relevant 'Action, Supporting Action, and Question' in this Guideline can be integrated and managed as a separate checklist item during the planning process." "Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Guide for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources" is available through the Homeland Security Digital Library: https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=467293.
United States. Department of Homeland Security
2008-03-24
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Pandemic Influenza: Preparedness, Response, and Recovery - Guide for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources: Annex: Mass Transit Sub-Sector Pandemic Guideline
"This Sector-specific guideline is an annex to the 'Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Guide for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources' (CI/KR Pandemic Influenza Guide) and intends to assist the the owners and operators within the Mass Transit Sub-Sector of the Transportation Sector with planning for a catastrophic pandemic influenza. Organizations that fail to prepare for such a prolonged and potentially catastrophic event may find themselves without the staff, equipment, or supplies necessary to continue providing essential transportation services for their customers and the nation. […] The guideline serves as a non-prescriptive reference for owner-operators and a practical tool for business planners to augment and tailor existing emergency response plans given the unique challenges an influenza pandemic presents. It is important to integrate this pandemic influenza planning with your existing business continuity and emergency response plans and/or the CI/KR Pandemic Influenza Guide's comprehensive framework for pandemic influenza catastrophic planning. This annex addresses the major challenges the Mass Transit Sub-Sector may face and should assess in its pandemic influenza planning within the seven key areas of vulnerability highlighted in blue boxes in the Guideline. While not necessarily applicable to all businesses or entities in a given sector, each relevant 'Action, Supporting Action, and Question' in this Guideline can be integrated and managed as a separate checklist item during the planning process." "Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Guide for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources" is available through the Homeland Security Digital Library: https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=467293.
United States. Department of Homeland Security
2008-03-24
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Pandemic Influenza: Preparedness, Response, and Recovery - Guide for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources: Annex: Highway and Motor Carrier Sub-Sector Pandemic Guideline
"This Sector-specific guideline is an annex to the 'Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Guide for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources' (CI/KR Pandemic Influenza Guide) and intends to assist the Highway and Motor Carrier Sub-Sector of the Transportation Sector, and the highway and motor carrier businesses within the Sector, plan for a catastrophic pandemic influenza. Organizations that fail to prepare for such a prolonged and potentially catastrophic event may find themselves without the staff, equipment, or supplies necessary to continue providing essential transportation services for their customers and the nation. […] The guideline serves as a non-prescriptive reference for owner-operators and a practical tool for business planners to augment and tailor existing emergency response plans given the unique challenges an influenza pandemic presents. It is important to integrate this pandemic influenza planning with your existing business continuity and emergency response plans and/or the CI/KR Pandemic Influenza Guide's comprehensive framework for pandemic influenza catastrophic planning. This annex addresses the major challenges the Highway and Motor Carrier Sub-Sector may face and should assess in its pandemic influenza planning within the seven key areas of vulnerability highlighted in blue boxes in the Guideline. While not necessarily applicable to all businesses or entities in a given sector, each relevant 'Action, Supporting Action, and Question' in this Guideline can be integrated and managed as a separate checklist item during the planning process." "Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Guide for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources" is available through the Homeland Security Digital Library: https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=467293.
United States. Department of Homeland Security
2008-03-24
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Federal Guidance to Assist States in Improving State-Level Pandemic Influenza Operating Plans
"Effective State, local and community functioning during and following an influenza pandemic requires focused planning and practicing in advance of the pandemic to ensure that States can maintain their critical functions. The Interim Pre-pandemic Planning Guidance: Community Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Mitigation in the United States-Early, Targeted, Layered Use of Nonpharmaceutical Interventions (February 2007) was developed to provide guidance for pandemic planning and response. For community mitigation strategies to be effective, State governments need to incorporate them into their operating plans and assist local communities, businesses, non-governmental organizations, and the public in doing the same. State governments must have robust operating plans that have been sufficiently tested and improved by staff who understand and perform proficiently their supporting activities. Community partners must also perform proficiently their roles and responsibilities and understand accurately what the State government will and won't do and how it will communicate with both them and the public. This document provides a strategic framework to help the 50 States, the District of Columbia (DC), and the five U.S. Territories improve and maintain their operating plans for responding to and sustaining functionality during an influenza pandemic. Hereinafter within this document, the terms 'States' and 'State-level' refer to all 56 governmental entities. At the heart of the strategic framework are the supporting activities that State-level operating plans should address. Representatives of several United States Government (USG) Departments (see Annex) developed this document with input from State representatives."
United States Government
2008-03-11
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Pandemic Flu: Lack of Leadership and Disclosure Plague Vaccine Program
"An influenza pandemic, when it strikes, may cause hundreds of thousands of deaths in the U.S., economic losses in the billions of dollars, and possibly a climate of fear and a breakdown of public order. At the start of a pandemic, the first and best defense is to quickly immunize as many people as possible. In July 2007, Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary Mike Leavitt announced that, over the next five years, vaccine manufacturers will develop the capacity to produce and deliver enough vaccine for the American public within six months of the appearance of a pandemic virus. It should not take that long. The government should be able to speed up the nation's ability to produce enough vaccine. But problems with the current vaccine program, including inadequate leadership and limited public disclosure of information, may be impeding progress. A new agency, BARDA (Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority), facilitates collaboration between government, industry, and academia in the flu vaccine program and other public health emergency programs. BARDA was established by Congress in December 2006. Now, more than twelve months later, it still lacks a permanent director. The magnitude of the threat to the nation calls for the immediate appointment of an exceptional person of near-cabinet-level stature who commands respect in the business and public health communities-someone willing to blast through financial and bureaucratic roadblocks."
Project on Government Oversight
2008-03-06
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Pandemic Influenza: Agriculture Planning Toolkit
This document is meant to be a template or outline for small agribusinesses to, incorporate their own business practices so they can participate and assist in a comprehensive preparedness plan.
Florida. Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services; Florida. Department of Health. Division of Emergency Medical Operations
2008-03
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Protecting the Healthcare Workforce in Pandemic Influenza [video]
This is a video broadcast of a group of California public health officials who discussed the risk faced by healthcare workers to infection and contagion. This video broadcast lasts 58 minutes and is "presented by: The CA Dept. of Public Health Emergency Preparedness Office and The Center for Infectious Disease Preparedness and UC Berkeley School of Public Health."
University of California (System). Regents
2008-02-26
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Pandemic Influenza: Preparedness, Response, and Recovery - Guide for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources: Annex: Postal and Shipping Sector Pandemic Guideline
"This Sector-specific guideline is an annex to the 'Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Guide for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources' (CI/KR Pandemic Influenza Guide) and intends to assist the Postal and Shipping Sector plan for a catastrophic pandemic influenza. Companies that fail to prepare for such a prolonged catastrophic event may find themselves without the staff, equipment, or supplies necessary to continue providing essential transportation services for their customers and the nation. […] The guideline serves as a non-prescriptive reference for owner-operators and a practical tool for business planners to augment and tailor existing emergency response plans given the unique challenges an influenza pandemic presents. It is important to integrate this pandemic influenza planning with your existing business continuity and emergency response plans and/or the CI/KR Pandemic Influenza Guide's comprehensive framework for pandemic influenza catastrophic planning. This annex addresses the major challenges the Postal and Shipping Sector may face and should assess in its pandemic influenza planning within the seven key areas of vulnerability highlighted in blue boxes in the Guideline. While not necessarily applicable to all businesses or entities in a given sector, each relevant 'Action, Supporting Action, and Question' in this Guideline can be integrated and managed as a separate checklist item during the planning process." "Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Guide for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources" is available through the Homeland Security Digital Library: https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=467293.
United States. Department of Homeland Security
2008-02-22
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Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, Response, and Recovery - Guide for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources: Annex: Food and Agriculture Sector Pandemic Guideline
"This Sector-specific guideline is an annex to the 'Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Guide for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR Pandemic Influenza Guide)' and intends to assist the Food and Agriculture Sector, and the businesses and entities within the Sector, plan for a catastrophic pandemic. Companies that fail to prepare for such a prolonged catastrophic are more likely to find themselves without the staff, equipment, or supplies necessary to provide food and agriculture products to their communities and customers than those companies that do prepare for a pandemic." "Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Guide for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources" is available through the Homeland Security Digital Library: https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=467293.
United States. Department of Homeland Security
2008-02-21
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Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, Response, and Recovery - Guide for critical Infrastructure and Key Resources: Annex: Oil and Natural Gas Sub-Sector Pandemic Guideline
"This Sector-specific guideline is an annex to the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Guide for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CI/KR Pandemic Influenza Guide) and intends to assist the Oil and Natural Gas (ONG) Sector plan for a catastrophic influenza pandemic. Companies that fail to prepare for such a prolonged catastrophic event may find themselves without the staff, equipment, or supplies necessary to continue providing oil and natural gas to their customers and the nation." "Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Guide for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources" is available through the Homeland Security Digital Library: https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=467293.
United States. Department of Homeland Security
2008-02-21
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Pandemic Flu Emergency Preparedness for Senior Citizens
This document provides information about pandemic influenza preparedness such as how to avoid infection, what to do in the event of illness, and tips for communication during a pandemic. The document also contains space to record information such as emergency contacts and medicine records.
Pleasanton (Calif.)
2008-02-20?
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International Symposium on the U.S. Financial Services Sector Pandemic Flu Exercise: Keynote Speech of John E. Lange, January 29, 2008
From the speech of John E. Lange: "This is the first opportunity I have had to address an audience made up primarily of financial-sector officials and representatives of international financial organizations. As you know, while a pandemic will not physically damage banks or computer networks, it will threaten the financial system by removing essential personnel from the workplace for weeks, or even months. Even a back-up telecommuting strategy that relies on residential Internet access could be significantly affected in the face of school closures and high absenteeism scenarios and may be unusable for large numbers of telecommuters during the peak of the pandemic. Any strategy to allay the pandemic threat must extend well beyond health and medical boundaries, to include sustaining critical infrastructure, private-sector activities, and the movement of goods and services across the country and the globe, as well as taking into account other economic and related security considerations. And it is, of course, the financial system that makes trade and investment possible by facilitating payments and keeping the markets open for stocks, bonds, and other investment instruments. And to complete a vicious circle, our ability to mitigate the impact of a pandemic and relieve the suffering that results from it will depend to a very large degree on the relative health of the global economy and the financial system that sustains it."
United States. Department of State
2008-02-15
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Pandemic Influenza Response Plan: Clark County, Washington
"The Clark County [Washington] Pandemic Influenza Response Plan provides guidance to the health and medical community and regional partners regarding detection, response and recovery from an influenza pandemic. The Plan describes the unique challenges posed by a pandemic that may necessitate specific leadership decisions, response actions, and communications mechanisms."
Clark County (Wash.)
2008-02-08
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Pandemic Preparedness: Considerations on Exercises to Validate Pandemic Preparedness Plans
"Since the publication of the first Pandemic Preparedness Guidelines in 1999, WHO has advocated that Member States develop preparedness and response plans to mitigate the effects of an influenza pandemic on their populations. To date considerable effort and resources have been committed to developing such plans by the majority of WHO Member States. Preparation and response planning to reduce the impact of any emergency or crisis is a complex process, which requires the coordination and action of multiple players at all administrative levels. Moreover, this process is anticipated to involve a cycle of planning, development, education, practice, testing, evaluation and periodic revision. Many WHO Member States have already begun this process and should be congratulated for their efforts. The revised International Health Regulations (2005) also underline similar processes for preparedness and response to any Public Health Event of International Concern (PHEIC), including Pandemic Influenza."
World Health Organization
2008-02-07?
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El Dorado County Public Health Department Pandemic Influenza Fact Sheet
This fact sheet includes a general overview of pandemic influenza and what El Dorado County is doing to prepare.
El Dorado County (Calif.). Public Health Department
2008-02-06
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State of Alaska: Division of Public Health: Pandemic Influenza Response Plan [2008]
"Influenza pandemics occur when there is a major change in the structure of a strain of influenza virus such that most (or all) of the world's population is vulnerable to infection. These major changes emerge by at least two mechanisms: genetic recombination and adaptive mutation. [...]. At some point in the future, the world will be faced with another pandemic caused by a novel strain of influenza virus that spreads rapidly and causes extraordinarily high rates of illness and death--higher, in fact, than virtually any other natural health threat. Because novel influenza viruses have the potential to spread rapidly, high levels of absenteeism in the workforce can quickly jeopardize essential community services, including health care services throughout affected regions. Furthermore, it is currently estimated that it will only take one to six months from the time the pandemic is identified to the time that the first outbreak will occur in Alaska, provided the pandemic does not start in Alaska. Because no one can predict exactly when or where the next influenza pandemic will occur, and little time will be available to prepare after the pandemic is first identified, it is critically important for us to promptly maximize our ability to respond effectively to this imminent threat."
Alaska. Division of Public Health
2008-02
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Iowa State University Emergency Preparedness Pandemic Flu Plan Draft
The purpose of this plan is to ensure that faculty, staff, and students at Iowa State University are adequately prepared for an influenza pandemic.
Iowa State University
2008-02
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LLIS Practice Note: Protective Actions: Contra Costa County, California, Community Awareness and Emergency Response Group's All School Shelter-In-Place Drill
"The Contra Costa County, California, Community Awareness and Emergency Response Group's All School Shelter-In-Place Drill enables schools to evaluate the effectiveness of their emergency preparedness plans in response to a chemical release or a transportation incident involving hazardous materials."
Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS)
2008-01-11?
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EMR-ISAC: InfoGram 1-08 [January 10, 2008]
The Emergency Management and Response Information Sharing and Analysis Center's (EMR-ISAC) InfoGram is a weekly publication of information concerning the protection of critical infrastructures relevant to members of the Emergency Services Sector. This issue includes the following articles: "2008 CIP [Critical Infrastructure Protection] Resolution"; "Pandemic Flu Preparedness"; "Injury Risks for EMS [Emergency Medical Services] Responders"; and "Examples of Mitigation Measures".
Emergency Management and Response-Information Sharing and Analysis Center (U.S.)
2008-01-10
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Public Health Guidance for Community-Level Preparedness and Response to Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) Version 2: Core Document
"This is an updated version of the draft guidance document issued by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) on November 3, 2003. CDC revised the draft based on comments received from public health partners, healthcare providers, professional organizations, and others. CDC will continue to update the document as necessary to incorporate additional comments and to reflect increased understanding of SARS-CoVtransmission dynamics and the availability of improved prevention tools. […] Although the United States had a limited SARS outbreak, it is clear that we are susceptible to the more widespread outbreaks experienced in other countries. It is not possible to predict whether SARS-CoV will reappear, but it could from its original animal reservoir, persistent infection in humans, or the laboratory. To achieve the type of swift and decisive response that is required to control a SARS outbreak, we must be prepared. Public Health Guidance for Community-Level Preparedness and Response to Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outlines a framework and approach to assist public health and healthcare officials in preparing for and responding rapidly and decisively to the appearance of SARS-CoV in a healthcare facility or a community. The document has its basis in the United States Government Interagency SARS Concept of Operations Plan (CONPLAN), which outlines the Federal government's strategy for a coordinated national response to an outbreak of SARS. The CONPLAN provides planning guidance for a timely, coordinated response by federal agencies to a SARS emergency and serves as a foundation for the development of operational plans and procedures at the national, state, and local levels."
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.)
2008-01-08
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Privacy and Pandemic Flu Guide
The Privacy and Pandemic Flu Guide is designed to aid public, health professionals when privacy concerns are raised about, activities related to pandemic flu planning and response., The guide describes four steps that will walk a public health, professional through an analysis of the activities. The guide, was developed as a result of a May 2007 discussion among, a small group of experts in privacy and preparedness. This, guide is intended to be a dynamic document, and it is hoped, that feedback from the field on its utility will inform future, iterations.
Association of State and Territorial Health Officials (U.S.)
2008-01-08?
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Field Evaluation of Whole Airliner Decontamination Technologies for Narrow-Body Aircraft
From the Abstract: "The outcome of a field evaluation of AeroClave's thermal decontamination system is discussed. This exercise evaluated the system both as a stand-alone technology and as a means of delivering STERIS vaporized hydrogen peroxide (VHP®)*. The report is submitted in the context of a decontamination technology selection exercise and work conducted on the efficacy of thermal decontamination. The field evaluation, performed on a McDonnell Douglas DC-9 aircraft, determined that the stand-alone thermal decontamination system exhibited reasonable temperature and relative humidity control capabilities. Indeed, the system reproduced the environmental conditions needed to be efficacious as an antiviral process, based on an earlier study. The thermal decontamination system also provided an effective means of providing environmental preconditioning for the use of VHP and for aeration after VHP exposure. The field evaluation did leave a number of unanswered issues which are discussed in the report. Overall, the field evaluation of both the stand-alone thermal decontamination system and the VHP add-in can be described as successful."
United States. Federal Aviation Administration
Gale, W. F. (William Francis); Gale, Hyacinth S.; Watson, Jean
2008-01
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Quarantine Facilities for Arriving Air Travelers: Identification of Planning Needs and Costs
"Threats to public health are a concern to the air travel industry for many reasons, not the least of which is the potential for air travelers to be ill with one of nine communicable diseases that could require quarantine at or near an airport. The threat of pandemic flu and the specter of terrorists using pathogens as a weapon have mobilized many government and defense agencies which are addressing how to detect and contain the spread of potentially deadly illnesses to the general public. Since one of the most effective means of controlling communicable diseases is to reduce the exposure of healthy individuals to persons who have the illness, the subject of quarantine has surfaced as a critical tool to be employed when necessary. The Airport Cooperative Research Program sponsored research undertaken by TriData the division of System Planning Corporation into what would be necessary to effectively quarantine up to 200 travelers from an international flight for 2 weeks, and how much it might cost. This study also presents information on the nature of quarantine and the laws that authorize this form of medical surveillance. There are four phases of quarantine: (1) the decision to quarantine, (2) establishing quarantine, (3) quarantine operations, and (4) demobilization (including recovery). For this study, quarantine at an airport facility away from the main terminal was the premise on which a range of costs was estimated. These costs include the price for stand-by readiness, the costs of activating the site, the financial requirements attendant to operating a quarantine for 2 weeks, and recovery or demobilization costs. Each of these is described in terms of the specific services, supplies, and some of the infrastructure that would be needed."
National Research Council (U.S.). Transportation Research Board
Stambaugh, Hollis; Sensenig, Daryl; Casagrande, Rocco . . .
2008
