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• Checklist for Infectious Diseases Which Are Subject to Quarantine

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  This checklist seeks to profile diseases which are highly infectious in order to: To ensure rapid identification of anyone with a highly infectious disease which may require quarantine. To ensure appropriate implementation of infection control practices specifically pertinent to diseases which require quarantine. To ensure that public affairs/risk communication initiatives are embedded into the Infectious Disease guidance.

  United States. Department of the Army. Office of the Surgeon General. Military Vaccine Agency

  2005-04-28
• Pandemic Influenza Tabletop Exercise: California Department of Health Services Division of Communicable Disease Control

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  "This tabletop exercise is based on a fictitious account of a plausible outbreak of pandemic influenza. The scenarios were constructed to facilitate problem-solving and to provoke honest thinking about gaps and vulnerabilities, and were not intended to reflect negatively on how a real person, department, or agency may or may not respond in a real outbreak."

  University of California, Berkeley. School of Public Health

  Aragon, Tomas

  2005-04-07?
• SARS Commission: SARS and Public Health Legislation, Second Interim Report

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  "This second interim report deals with legislation to strengthen the 'Health Protection and Promotion Act' and to enact emergency powers for public health disasters like SARS [Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome] or flu pandemics. It is produced now to respond to current government plans for further amendments to the 'Health Protection and Promotion Act and radical changes to the Emergency Management Act'. The recommendations in this second report are interim, not final or exhaustive. The report touches only on those issues subjected already to sufficient discussion between the government and the health community to make them ripe for action."

  Publications Ontario

  Campbell, Archie

  2005-04-05
• SARS and Public Health Legislation

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  This document contains the Commission's second interim report written to assess legislation passed in Canada to protect its citizen against future outbreaks of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS).

  Commission to Investigate the Introduction and Spread of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (Campbell Commission

  2005-04-05?
• Executive Order 13375: Amendment to Executive Order 13295 Relating to Certain Influenza Viruses and Quarantinable Communicable Diseases

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  This executive order amends Executive Order 13295, which relates to influenza viruses and quarantinable communicable diseases. It adds the following subsection: "(c) Influenza caused by novel or reemergent influenza viruses that are causing, or have the potential to cause, a pandemic."

  United States. Office of the Federal Register

  Bush, George W. (George Walker), 1946-

  2005-04-01
• Plant Protection and Quarantine Strategic Plan FY 2005-2009

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  "This plan sets forth the plant protection and quarantine (PPQ) mission and vision, identifies challenges and critical issues, and sets direction by providing long-term goals, and strategies that will guide our activities over the next several years. The events of September 11, 2001 significantly changed the way that the APHIS does business. The creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS); APHIS contribution of over 2,600 of its port of entry inspectors and associated staff to DHS Customs and Border Protection (CBP); a new emphasis on national protection against agroterrorism and bioterrorism; and PPQs need to develop increased capacity to respond to both emergencies and emerging issues has stretched APHIS capacity to the limit."

  United States. Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

  2005-03-31
• Telecommunications Infrastructure in Disasters: Preparing Cities for Crisis Communications

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  "This report establishes a framework for understanding the interaction between large urban disasters and telecommunications infrastructure, drawing upon the experiences of the 1990s and 2000s. While the majority of past research on telecommunications in disasters has focused on the emergency response phase, this article analyzes the critical role of communications infrastructure in all of phases of disaster prevention and recovery, which can stretch for years after the event. Finally, this report does not focus only on official communications channels, but is concerned with the entire universe of civil telecommunications infrastructure that plays a crucial role in crisis communications. This report is organized in the following manner. First, it describes how telecommunication infrastructure fails during urban disasters, based on available evidence from several well-documented disasters of the 1990s and 2000s. Then, it examines the role of telecommunications infrastructure, and the consequences of failure, during four key phases of post-disaster recovery: emergency response, restoration and repair, reconstruction, and re-development. It concludes by outlining three areas in which urban telecommunications infrastructure and disaster communications practices can be strengthened to increase their effectiveness in future disasters."

  New York University. Center for Catastrophe Preparedness and Response

  Townsend, Anthony M., 1973-; Moss, Mitchell L.

  2005-04
• Question of Bioterrorism Preparedness: Testimony of Stephen Gale, Co-Chair, Foreign Policy Research Institute's Center on Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism, and Homeland Security, and Gergory Montanaro, Executive Director, Foreign Policy Research Institute's Center on Terrorism, before the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's Committee on Public Health and Welfare, March 22, 2005

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  From the statement of Stephen Gale, Co-Chair, Foreign Policy Research Institute's Center on Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism, and Homeland Security, and Gergory Montanaro, Executive Director, Foreign Policy Research Institute's Center on Terrorism, before the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's Committee on Public Health and Welfare, held on March 22, 2005: "Neither Mr. Montanaro nor I are healthcare professionals. However, we do have a broad understanding of terrorism, the potential effects of bioterrorism, and the measures that the Commonwealth needs to employ in order to prevent and/or mitigate the effects of bioterrorism attacks. As we understand it, the primary reason for this hearing is to address reports that suggest that the Commonwealth is prepared for neither bioterrorism attacks nor natural health-care crises such as pandemic flu epidemics. As we see it, while it is useful to analyze the general state of the health care infrastructure, treatment facilities, and manpower, it is critical that you understand that the Commonwealth must deal with preparations for bioterrorism attacks independently of the procedures used in standard healthcare planning. Terrorist attacks are volitional and, unlike natural events, bioterrorism attacks will be planned and executed in order to achieve objectives that are only indirectly related to the loss of lives or the disruption America's healthcare system. As we see it, then, to the extent that any of the states is 'prepared' to deal with the threat of a bioterrorism attack, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is certainly not in a worse position--and, in fact, may be significantly better."

  Foreign Policy Research Institute

  Gale, Stephen; Montanaro, Gregory

  2005-03-22
• Mass Vaccination and Strategies for Containment of Pandemic Influenza and Smallpox

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  This presentation describes Smallpoxs key epidemiological characteristics.

  University of California, Berkeley. School of Public Health

  Backer, Howard

  2005-03-01
• Pandemic Flu: Influenza Pandemic Contingency Planning, Operational Guidance for Health Service Planners in England

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  "Health services have considerable experience of dealing with outbreaks and epidemics of influenza. Such seasonal influenza results in up to 900,000 GP consultations and an estimated 12,000 deaths in England and Wales each year and contributes to winter pressures on health services. Should a pandemic of influenza occur due to the emergence of a novel strain of the influenza virus to which there is little or no immunity in the general population it is likely to present a far more serious threat to human health and result in widespread social disruption. National and international experts consider the probability of an influenza pandemic to be high. A pandemic would spread rapidly and no country can expect to be exempt from its impact. The Department of Health published a revised UK Health Departments Influenza Pandemic Contingency Plan in March 2005 (www.dh.gov.uk/pandemicflu) which sets the overall strategic framework, and provides a technical source document, for the UK response to an influenza pandemic. This operational guidance supplements, and should be read alongside the UK Plan. It is directed at health service organisations at national and local levels to help them prepare for and support an effective response to an influenza pandemic. It sets out specific measures and actions required from health and other organisations. It is intended to stimulate, inform and support the development, maintenance and implementation of multi-agency contingency arrangements that are flexible enough to meet local needs whilst ensuring an integrated national and international approach."

  Great Britain. Department of Health

  2005-03
• Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Plan: Core Document

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  "The national response to a pandemic will largely reflect the ability of states and local areas to respond. Because of the potential impact of a pandemic and the need to coordinate a number of partners to effectively respond, planning for such an event needs to occur in advance. An Influenza Pandemic would require an immediate and coordinated response from the District of Columbia's Department of Health (DOH) the medical community, and other stakeholders to maintain the health and well being of the residents, workers and visitors to the District of Columbia. […] The plan will serve as a supplemental annex to the DC DOH Bioterrorism Response Plan, and addresses such issues as command and control procedures, legal authority, surveillance and epidemiological investigation procedure, organization, security, communications, and education and training. This plan and the DC DOH Bioterrorism Response Plan are integral parts of the Terrorism Annex to the District Response Plan (DRP)."

  District of Columbia. Health Department

  2005-03
• Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Plan: Executive Summary

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  "The national response to a pandemic will largely reflect the ability of states and local areas to respond. Because of the potential impact of a pandemic and the need to coordinate a number of partners to effectively respond, planning for such an event needs to occur in advance. An Influenza Pandemic would require an immediate and coordinated response from the District of Columbia's Department of Health (DOH) the medical community, and other stakeholders to maintain the health and well being of the residents, workers and visitors to the District of Columbia."

  District of Columbia. Health Department

  2005-03
• Pandemic Flu UK Health Departments: UK Influenza Pandemic Contingency Plan, March 2005

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  This document updates the UK's 1997 Multiphase Contingency Plan for Pandemic Influenza. It sets the scene and outlines the UK's plan for responding to an influenza pandemic. LLIS Core Capability: Public Health; Community Preparedness

  Great Britain. National Health Service

  2005-03
• District of Columbia Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Plan

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  The District of Columbia's Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Plan provides guidance for the district's Department of Health to prepare for and respond to a pandemic influenza.

  District of Columbia. Department of Health

  2005-03-01?
• State of Alaska Pandemic Influenza Plan Annex C Appendix 1 Draft

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  The purpose of this plan is to reduce morbidity, mortality, and the social and economic impact of a influenza pandemic in Alaska. The plan defines the roles, responsibilities, and actions of key stakeholders before, during and after a pandemic.

  Alaska. Department of Health and Social Services

  2005-03
• LLIS Best Practice: Crisis Communications Planning: Pre-Packaging Informational Materials

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  From the Purpose: "Provides Public Information Officers (PIOs) and Public Affairs Officials (PAOs) with guidance on preparing pre-packaged informational materials for distribution to the public during an emergency." From the Summary: "During an emergency response, incident managers will need to provide the public with basic information describing the nature of the incident, communicate risks and dangers to the public, and provide guidance on protective actions and ways to avoid risks. By preparing informational materials in advance of an emergency, PIOs will have information and guidance available for immediate distribution to the public at the start of the crisis." From the Description: "PIOs and PAOs can begin preparing informational materials for public distribution during emergencies as part of their crisis communications planning and preparedness activities. This Best Practice reviews important considerations when pre-packaging and pre-selecting the following types of materials: 1.) Fact Sheets; 2.) Press Releases; 3.) Pamphlets and Brochures; 4.) Maps; and, 5.) Diagrams and Illustrations."

  Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS)

  2005-02-04?
• LLIS Best Practice: Crisis Communications Planning: Overview

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  "Public communication is a critical response function following a terrorism incident, natural disaster, or other major emergency. Pre-incident planning, coordination, and preparation will improve the ability of public safety, public health, and healthcare organizations to communicate effectively with the public during the response and recovery to an emergency."

  Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS)

  2005-02-04
• Establishing a Global Quarantine Against Weapons of Mass Destruction

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  "The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is on the brink of developing into an epidemic, with the potential to spread to over a dozen nuclear-capable states. This article concludes that given the limitations of traditional arms controls frameworks, a global prohibition against WMD transfer may be the last viable line of defense. It discusses why this strategy is justified under the doctrine of self-defense, as well as how it can be implemented to create both a normative foundation and an appropriate institutional framework."

  Yale Law School

  Smith, Derek D.

  2005-02-02
• Quarantine and Isolation: Developing Quarantine Guidelines

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  "Public health officials may be required to impose quarantine orders in the event of an infectious disease outbreak. Before implementing quarantine, officials should develop guidelines identifying when public health concerns should override a citizen's right to move freely."

  Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS)

  2005-01-31?
• New Hope-Solebury School District Shelter-In-Place Emergency Management Plan

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  "The New Hope-Solebury School District has developed a 'Shelter-In-Place' plan in the event of a natural, weather or manmade disaster that may prohibit our students and staff from leaving the building. The faculty and staff at our schools have been trained on how to react in this situation. The safety and welfare of students and staff are the primary concern of this plan. This plan is to be used as the official reference guide on how to react and what to do in the event that a Shelter-In-Place command is given. The main objective is to move students and staff to designated safe locations that will protect them until the disaster is declared over. Each school has developed a plan that conforms to its specific needs. The Shelter-In-Place plan is implemented when directed by the Bucks County Intermediate Unit (BCIU), police and/or fire department or other Federal, State or local agency."

  New Hope-Solebury (Pa.) School District

  2005-01-31
• Quarantine and Isolation: Public Awareness Campaigns

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  "During an infectious disease outbreak, public awareness campaigns are essential for averting panic, promoting good sanitary practices, and limiting discrimination. Public health officials should improve public awareness about an epidemic by developing a strategy for communicating essential disease information and steps to protect against infection."

  Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS)

  2005-01-21?
• Quarantine and Isolation: Ensuring Funding to Private Hospitals for Involuntary Isolation

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  "During a contagious disease outbreak, federal and state officials may request that privately owned hospitals involuntarily isolate individuals suspected of carrying the disease. Private hospitals may resist such isolation requests unless financial compensation strategies are enumerated."

  Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS)

  2005-01-21?
• Federal and State Isolation and Quarantine Authority [Updated January 18, 2005]

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  From the Summary: "In the wake of recent terrorist attacks and increasing fears about the spread of highly contagious diseases, such as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), federal, state and local governments have become increasingly aware of the need for effective public health response to such events. An effective response could include the isolation of persons exposed to infectious biological agents released during an attack or infected with a communicable disease, as well as the quarantine certain states, cities, or neighborhoods. Currently, state and local governments have the primary authority to control the spread of dangerous diseases within their jurisdiction, with the federal government's role limited to interstate and foreign quarantine. However, many states have inadequate procedures in place for isolating individuals who are infected or believed be infected and quarantining areas that are or may be infected. Generally, the laws currently in effect do not address the spread of disease resulting from a biological attack, and for the most part only address specific diseases that were the cause of past epidemics, not newly emerging diseases such as SARS. In light of recent events, many states are reevaluating their public health emergency response plans and are expected to enact more comprehensive regulations relating to isolation and quarantine. Public health experts have developed a Model State Emergency Health Powers Act to guide states as they reevaluate their emergency response plans. This report provides an overview of federal and state quarantine laws as they relate to the isolation or quarantine of individuals, as well as a discussion of the relevant case law. The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act is also discussed."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Welborn, Angie A.

  2005-01-18
• Combined Injury: Radiation in Combination with Trauma, Infectious Disease, or Chemical Exposures

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  "In an accident, a terrorist attack, or an act of war, radiation exposures are likely to be confounded by other injuries, diseases, and toxic chemicals. In this chapter we will review the current status of the research on combined injuries. Although the term 'combined injury' has often been used strictly to refer to radiation in combination with traumatic injuries, we will use it to encompass any combined exposure: radiation with a burn, wound, infection, or chemical contact. Past experiences have shown us that with a nuclear detonation traumatic injuries such as burns and wounds will occur in combination with radiation exposure. Disruption of the public health infrastructure with a nuclear or radiological attack can increase the risk of communicable disease. The source of infection could be endemic opportunistic pathogens or an intentionally dispersed biological warfare agent. Chemical releases from local industrial or storage facilities or by chemical weapons can also complicate radiation injury in an actual event. Trauma, pathogens, and chemicals will all exacerbate the biomedical consequences of irradiation. To be fully prepared for a nuclear or radiological event, it will be important to understand the potential interactions, medical consequences, and treatment options when combined effects are encountered."

  Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute (U.S.)

  Ledney, G. D.; Pellmar, T. C. (Terry C.)

  2005
• Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry Protecting the Public's Health

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  "The profusion of people and goods that daily traverse the globe disperse microbial threats in their wake, usually without intent to harm. Yet living things get infected along the way, and the lag time before signs and symptoms appear can be days, weeks, or months. These phenomenon and other forces intrinsic to modern technology and ways of life favor the emergence of new diseases and the reemergence or increased severity of known diseases. Meanwhile, the risk of bioterrorism has become a pressing national security issue. Taken together, these factors have stimulated calls for greater vigilance for microbial threats of public health significance at U.S. gateways. Some of those calls have focused attention on the number and"more importantly"the role of quarantine stations for human disease at U.S. ports of entry. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) have quarantine stations at 8 of the United States 474 ports of entry (CRS, 2004; DGMQ, 2003). Unlike their namesakes, todays quarantine stations are not stations per se, but rather small groups of individuals located at major U.S. airports. Their core mission remains similar to that of old: Mitigate the risks to residents of the United States posed by infectious diseases of public health significance originating abroad. These quarantine station staff, their offices, and their patient isolation rooms are run by CDCs Division of Global Migration and Quarantine (DGMQ)."

  National Academies Press (U.S.)

  Benjamin, Georges C.; Stratton, Kathleen R.; Sivitz, Laura B.

  2005
• UK Operational Framework for Stockpiling, Distributing and Using Antiviral Medicines in the Event of Pandemic Influenza

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  "This framework sets out arrangements for the storage and distribution of antiviral medicines from national stockpiles and provides guidance to support the development of effective local plans for making those medicines available for the treatment of patients. It supplements the guidance contained in UK Health Departments Influenza Pandemic Contingency Plans and should be read in conjunction with those documents."

  Great Britain. Department of Health

  2005
• Pandemic Flu: What It Is and How to Prepare [Arabic]

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  "When many people get a disease at the same time, it is called a pandemic. Pandemic flu is caused when people get sick or infected from a new flu virus. This type of flu spreads easily from person to person and can cause many people to become very ill or die." This fact sheet, in English and Arabic, discusses the pandemic flu and how to prepare for an outbreak, including signs of flu, what to do to control its spread, the importance of planning ahead for a flu outbreak, how to make a pandemic flu plan, and how to compile an emergency kit.

  Ohio State University Medical Center; Mount Carmel Health System; OhioHealth

  2005
• Pandemic Flu: What It Is and How to Prepare [Spanish]

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  "When many people get a disease at the same time, it is called a pandemic. Pandemic flu is caused when people get sick or infected from a new flu virus. This type of flu spreads easily from person to person and can cause many people to become very ill or die." This fact sheet, in English and Spanish, discusses the pandemic flu and how to prepare for an outbreak, including signs of flu, what to do to control its spread, the importance of planning ahead for a flu outbreak, how to make a pandemic flu plan, and how to compile an emergency kit.

  Ohio State University Medical Center; Mount Carmel Health System; OhioHealth

  2005
• It's Not Flu As Usual: What Faith-Based and Community Organizations Need to Know About Pandemic Flu

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  This brochure describes how a pandemic influenza would differ from the season flu, and presents facts about pandemic flu outbreaks. It suggests measures that faith-based and community organizations can take to prepare for a possible pandemic. LLIS Core Capability: Community Preparedness

  Trust for America's Health

  2005-01-01?
• Learning from Experience: The Public Health Response to West Nile Virus, SARS, Monkeypox, and Hepatitis A Outbreaks in the United States

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  "State and local public health systems play a critical role in responding to emergencies and are central to the nation's efforts to improve its preparedness for bioterrorism. But public health departments have faced some significant challenges over the years. During the last half of the 20th century, the capacity of state and local public health systems in the United States seriously declined. Problems in the systems-such as weaknesses in laboratory capacity and poor communications with the public and health care professionals-were vividly displayed during the anthrax attack in 2001. In the aftermath of these events, Congress and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) accelerated efforts to strengthen the public health infrastructure. In the spring of 2002, approximately $1.1 billion was distributed through the Office of Public Health Emergency Preparedness, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) as part of cooperative agreements to strengthen state and local public health as well as hospital preparedness, with an additional $2.9 billion provided to the states in 2003 and 2004 (Schuler, 2004). After three years of major federal investment, it is appropriate to take stock of the current state of preparedness in local and state public health departments. Four recent disease outbreaks from 1999 to 2003 provide a rare opportunity to assess the quality of the public health response and to gain insights into overall preparedness for a bioterrorist attack."

  RAND Corporation

  Davis, Lois M.; Stoto, Michael A.; Dausey, David J.

  2005