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NATO: Finland and Sweden Seek Membership [Updated July 14, 2022]
From the Document: "On June 29, 2022, heads of state and government from NATO's 30 member states (see Figure 1 [hyperlink]) unanimously agreed to invite [hyperlink] Finland and Sweden to join the alliance. Finland and Sweden formally applied [hyperlink] for membership on May 18, prompted by heightened security concerns about Russia after its 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Finland's [hyperlink] and Sweden's applications [hyperlink] marked a historic shift [hyperlink] for these traditionally militarily nonaligned countries. The Biden Administration [hyperlink] and many Members of Congress [hyperlink] support Finland and Sweden joining NATO, arguing that the addition of these two mature democracies [hyperlink] with advanced militaries [hyperlink] will enhance security [hyperlink] in the Baltic Sea region and the broader Euro-Atlantic area. For Finland and Sweden to join the alliance, all NATO members must ratify requisite amendments to NATO's founding North Atlantic Treaty [hyperlink]; U.S. ratification requires Senate advice and consent."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Archick, Kristin; Belkin, Paul; Bowen, Andrew S.
2022-07-14
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Ukrainian Military Performance and Outlook [June 29, 2022]
From the Document: "The Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) continue to face disadvantages in seeking to defend Ukraine's territorial integrity against Russian military forces. On the one hand, since Russia's renewed invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the UAF has successfully defended against, and in some areas pushed back, Russian forces. On the other hand, this resistance has come with losses in personnel and equipment, and the overall outlook for the war remains uncertain. The Biden Administration and Congress have expressed support for Ukraine's defense of its territorial integrity against Russia's invasion. An understanding of the evolving state of the UAF may be of interest to Congress as it continues to weigh policies potentially supporting Ukraine's defense against Russian aggression."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Bowen, Andrew S.
2022-06-29
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U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine [Updated June 24, 2022]
From the Document: "The United States has been a leading provider of security assistance to Ukraine, both before and after Russia renewed its invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. From 2014, when Russia first invaded Ukraine, through June 23, 2022, the United States has provided more than $8.7 billion in security assistance 'to help Ukraine preserve its territorial integrity, secure its borders, and improve interoperability with NATO.' Since the start of the 2022 war, the Biden Administration has committed a total of more than $6.1 billion in security assistance to 'provide Ukraine the equipment it needs to defend itself.' FY2022 security assistance packages are being funded via more than $23 billion in regular and supplemental appropriations, including the Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. [Public Law] 117-103, Division N), and the Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-128). In total, FY2022 appropriations include $12.55 billion to replenish Department of Defense (DOD) equipment stocks sent to Ukraine via presidential drawdown authority; $6.3 billion for DOD's Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI); and $4.65 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for Ukraine and 'countries impacted by the situation in Ukraine.' FY2022 supplemental appropriations also have included funds for additional U.S. troop deployments to Europe."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Arabia, Christina; Bowen, Andrew S.; Welt, Cory
2022-06-24
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NATO: Finland and Sweden Seek Membership [June 10, 2022]
From the Document: "On May 18, 2022, Finland and Sweden applied [hyperlink] to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO[...]). Prompted by growing security concerns about Russia and its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Finland's [hyperlink] and Sweden's decisions [hyperlink] mark a historic shift [hyperlink] for these traditionally militarily nonaligned countries. The Biden Administration [hyperlink] and many Members of Congress [hyperlink] have responded positively to the prospect of Finland and Sweden joining NATO, arguing that the addition of these two mature democracies [hyperlink] with advanced militaries [hyperlink] will enhance security [hyperlink] in the Baltic Sea region and the broader EuroAtlantic area. NATO enlargement must be approved by all 30 current NATO members; U.S. approval requires Senate advice and consent."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Archick, Kristin; Belkin, Paul; Bowen, Andrew S.
2022-06-10
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China-Russia Relations [May 2, 2022]
From the Document: "The People's Republic of China (PRC or China) and the Russian Federation (Russia) maintain a strategic and multifaceted relationship with extensive military, diplomatic, and economic connections. Although the contemporary China-Russia relationship dates back to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the two countries also share a long, tumultuous history that has included periods of security and diplomatic cooperation, fluctuations in ideological alignment, diplomatic crises, and a border war in the 1960s. Many experts trace the current dynamism of the relationship to 2014, when the reaction of some countries to Russia's first invasion of Ukraine, including sanctions, led Moscow to seek to strengthen its ties to China and other countries. The two countries' apparent mutual affinity has led some U.S. policymakers and Members of Congress to express concern that Beijing and Moscow constitute a de facto alliance, and to seek ways to counter their global influence. The PRC and Russia's bilateral relationship falls short of a mutual defense pact, more closely resembling a nonbinding alignment based on shared opposition to what they describe as the U.S.-led international order. This common opposition has spurred cooperation between the two countries, but has not fully overcome their historical strategic mistrust."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Bowen, Andrew S.; Barrios, Ricardo
2022-05-02
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U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine [Updated April 29, 2022]
From the Document: "The United States has been a leading provider of security assistance to Ukraine, both before and after Russia renewed its invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. From 2014, when Russia first invaded Ukraine, through April 25, 2022, the United States has provided more than $6.4 billion in security assistance 'to help Ukraine preserve its territorial integrity, secure its borders, and improve interoperability with NATO.' Since the start of the 2022 war, the Biden Administration has committed a total of more than $3.7 billion in security assistance to 'provide Ukraine the equipment it needs to defend itself.'"
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Arabia, Christina; Bowen, Andrew S.; Welt, Cory
2022-04-29
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Russia's War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects [Updated April 27, 2022]
From the Introduction: "Russia's renewed invasion of neighboring Ukraine in February 2022 marked the start of Europe's deadliest armed conflict in decades. It also prompted intensive international efforts to respond to the war. Multiple Members of Congress have engaged with U.S. and international measures, including by supporting sanctions against Russia, providing assistance to Ukraine, and bolstering support to neighboring NATO countries. The immediate and long-term implications of the war are likely to be far-reaching, affecting numerous policy dimensions of concern to Congress. This report addresses Russian and Ukrainian military and intelligence aspects of the war, which are of interest to many in Congress as Congress considers various legislative measures and conducts oversight of U.S. policy. It provides an overview of the conflict, including the run-up to the invasion, the performance and conduct of the Russian and Ukrainian militaries, possible Russian intentions, and recent developments on the ground."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Bowen, Andrew S.
2022-04-27
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Russia's War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects [April 13, 2022]
From the Introduction: "Russia's full-scale invasion of neighboring Ukraine in February 2022 marked the start of Europe's deadliest armed conflict in decades. It also prompted intensive international efforts to respond to the war. Multiple Members of Congress have engaged with U.S. and international measures, including by considering sanctions against Russia, providing assistance to Ukraine, and bolstering support to neighboring NATO countries. The immediate and long-term implications of the war are likely to be far-reaching, affecting numerous policy dimensions of concern to Congress. This report addresses military and intelligence aspects of Russia's war in Ukraine, which are of interest to many in Congress as Congress considers various legislative measures and conducts oversight of U.S. policy. It provides an overview of the conflict, including the run-up to the invasion, the performance and conduct of the Russian and Ukrainian militaries, possible Russian intentions, and recent developments."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Bowen, Andrew S.
2022-04-13
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U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine [Updated March 28, 2022]
From the Document: "In advance of Russia's attack on Ukraine, the Biden Administration and the 117th Congress had boosted security assistance to Ukraine and continue to consider further options. Since Russia launched its invasion in February 2022, the Biden Administration has authorized a total of $1.35 billion to provide immediate security assistance 'to help Ukraine meet the armored, airborne, and other threats it is facing.' In addition, the Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103, Division N) includes $3.5 billion to replenish Department of Defense (DOD) equipment stocks that have been or are to be sent to Ukraine and $650 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for Ukraine and 'countries impacted by the situation in Ukraine.' Defense appropriations also include $300 million for DOD's Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI). Even prior to the start of the war, Ukraine was a leading recipient of U.S. military aid in Europe and Eurasia. From 2014, when Russia first invaded Ukraine, through March 2022, the United States has committed more than $4 billion in State Department- and DOD-funded security assistance 'to help Ukraine preserve its territorial integrity, secure its borders, and improve interoperability with NATO.'"
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Arabia, Christina; Bowen, Andrew S.; Welt, Cory
2022-03-28
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U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine [Updated March 14, 2022]
From the Document: "In advance of Russia's attack on Ukraine, the Biden Administration and the 117th Congress had boosted security assistance to Ukraine and continue to consider further options. Since Russia launched its invasion in February 2022, the Biden Administration has authorized a total of $550 million to provide immediate security assistance 'to help Ukraine meet the armored, airborne, and other threats it is facing.' In addition, the Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 (H.R. 2471, Division N) includes $3.5 billion to replenish Department of Defense (DOD) equipment stocks that have been or are to be sent to Ukraine, $300 million for DOD's Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI), and $650 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for Ukraine and 'countries impacted by the situation in Ukraine.'"
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Arabia, Christina; Bowen, Andrew S.; Welt, Cory
2022-03-14
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Russia's Invasion of Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Issues and Aspects [Updated March 7, 2022]
From the Document: "On February 21, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced [hyperlink] that Russia would recognize the independence [hyperlink] of two Russia-controlled areas in eastern Ukraine (the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics [hyperlink], or DNR/LNR). Russian recognition appeared to include the entire regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, most of which had remained under Ukrainian control since Russia's first invasion of Ukraine in 2014. Shortly after February 21, Putin announced Russia would send 'peacekeepers [hyperlink]' into the DNR/LNR to defend against fabricated Russian charges [hyperlink] of Ukrainian plans [hyperlink] for invasion and sabotage attempts [hyperlink]. Despite denials from Russian officials, Russia had spent months amassing a significant portion [hyperlink] of its military capabilities [hyperlink] around Ukraine. The attack began after Russia had mobilized [hyperlink] between 150,000 and 190,000 [hyperlink] personnel on the Ukrainian border, in Belarus, and in Ukraine's occupied Crimea region, according to U.S. government estimates [hyperlink]. Russia's invasion follows months of warning and concern [hyperlink] from the Biden Administration [hyperlink], European allies, NATO, and some Members of Congress."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Bowen, Andrew S.
2022-03-07
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U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine [February 9, 2022]
From the Document: "In response to Russia's recent escalation of military pressure on Ukraine, the Biden Administration and the 117th Congress have considered multiple options to boost security assistance to Ukraine. Even prior to recent tensions, Ukraine was a leading recipient of U.S. military aid in Europe and Eurasia. Since Russia's 2014 invasion of Ukraine, the United States has committed more than $2.7 billion in State and Defense Department (DOD)-funded security assistance to help Ukraine defend its territorial integrity and improve interoperability with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). [...] Much of U.S. assistance has been focused on providing systems and capabilities that Ukraine's domestic defense industry cannot produce, as well as on increasing UAF [Ukrainian Armed Forces] resilience and ability to sustain combat operations. U.S. officials continue to receive requests from Ukraine for assistance and have sent teams to evaluate Ukrainian abilities and needs. Ukrainian officials have expressed interest in acquiring advanced systems, including air defense, anti-missile, and anti-ship capabilities. [...] In response to the threat of a new Russian invasion of Ukraine, Congress has authorized or proposed increased funding levels for existing security assistance authorities and introduced multiple bills aimed at bolstering Ukraine's defensive capabilities. [...] Congress may consider the potential impact that new and advanced systems could have on Ukraine's readiness. Similarly, Congress may consider how to balance Ukraine's urgent and short-term defense needs with the long-term and sustainable development of its forces."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Arabia, Christina; Bowen, Andrew S.; Welt, Cory
2022-02-09
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Russian Military Buildup Along the Ukrainian Border [Updated February 7, 2022]
From the Document: "Since mid-October 2021 [hyperlink], social media and news outlets [hyperlink] have reported [hyperlink] significant movement by Russian military forces, with limited Russian transparency [hyperlink], on or near the Ukrainian border and within Ukraine's occupied Crimea region. These movements, which follow a similar but less expansive military buildup in March-April 2021 and Russia's Zapad military exercises [hyperlink] in September 2021, have come amid increasingly aggressive rhetoric [hyperlink] reported from Russian policymakers about the so-called encroachment of NATO near Russia's borders and the geopolitical status of Ukraine [hyperlink]. This rhetoric [hyperlink] has continued despite new bilateral negotiations between the United States and Russia, as well as joint meetings [hyperlink] with NATO and within the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), in January 2022. On February 6, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan [hyperlink] warned, 'Any day now, Russia could take military action against Ukraine,' and said, 'We believe that the Russians have put in place the capabilities to mount a significant military operation into Ukraine.' Many observers [hyperlink] and policymakers [hyperlink], including some in Congress, have expressed concerns about a possible new Russian invasion of Ukraine or other aggressive actions."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Bowen, Andrew S.
2022-02-07
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Russian Cyber Units [Updated February 2, 2022]
From the Document: "Russia has deployed sophisticated cyber capabilities to conduct disinformation, propaganda, espionage, and destructive cyberattacks globally. To conduct these operations, Russia maintains numerous units that are overseen by various security and intelligence agencies. Russia's security agencies compete with each other and often conduct similar operations on the same targets, making specific attribution and motivation assessments difficult. The U.S. government has indicted and imposed sanctions on Russian security personnel and agents for various cyberattacks. Congress may be interested in Russian agencies, units, and their attributes to better understand why and how Russia conducts cyber operations."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Bowen, Andrew S.
2022-02-02
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Russian Troop Movements and Tensions Along the Ukrainian Border [Updated January 19, 2022]
From the Document: "In mid-October 2021 [hyperlink], social media and news outlets [hyperlink] began reporting [hyperlink] significant movement by Russian military forces, with limited Russian transparency [hyperlink], on or near the Ukrainian border and within Ukraine's occupied Crimea region. These movements, which follow a similar military buildup in March-April 2021 and Russia's Zapad military exercises [hyperlink] in September 2021, have come amid increasingly aggressive rhetoric [hyperlink] reported from Russian policymakers about the so-called encroachment of NATO near Russia's borders and the geopolitical status of Ukraine [hyperlink]. This rhetoric [hyperlink] has continued despite new bilateral negotiations between the United States and Russia, as well as joint meetings [hyperlink] with NATO and within the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), in January 2022. On January 14, Ukraine was hit by a cyberattack that many observers [hyperlink] attributed to Russia. That same day, the Biden administration accused Russia [hyperlink] of sending saboteurs to Ukraine 'to have the option of fabricating a pretext for invasion.' Many observers [hyperlink] and policymakers [hyperlink], including some in Congress, have expressed concerns about a possible new Russian invasion of Ukraine or other aggressive actions."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Bowen, Andrew S.
2022-01-19
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Russian Troop Movements and Tensions Along the Ukrainian Border [Updated December 6, 2021]
From the Document: "Starting in mid-October 2021 [hyperlink], social media and news outlets [hyperlink] have reported [hyperlink] significant movement by Russian military forces, with limited Russian transparency [hyperlink], on or near the Ukrainian border. These movements, which follow a similar military buildup in March-April 2021 and Russia's Zapad military exercises [hyperlink] in September 2021, come amid increasingly aggressive rhetoric [hyperlink] reported from Russian policymakers about the so-called encroachment of NATO near Russia's borders and the geopolitical status of Ukraine [hyperlink]. Many observers, including some in Congress, have expressed concerns that such buildups and exercises could be the prelude to a second Russian invasion of Ukraine or other aggressive actions."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Bowen, Andrew S.
2021-12-06
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Russian Military Intelligence: Background and Issues for Congress [Updated November 15, 2021]
From the Summary: "Following Russia's occupation of Ukraine's Crimea region and invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014, many observers have linked Russia to additional malicious acts abroad. U.S. and European officials and analysts have accused Russia of, among other things, interfering in U.S. elections in 2016; attempting a coup in Montenegro in 2016; conducting cyberattacks against the World Anti-Doping Agency and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in 2016 and 2018, respectively; attempting to assassinate Russian intelligence defector Sergei Skripal in the United Kingdom in 2018; and offering 'bounties' to Taliban-linked fighters to attack U.S. personnel in Afghanistan. Implicated in all these activities is Russia's military intelligence agency, the Main Directorate of the General Staff (GU), also known as the GRU. [...] Congress and the executive branch continue to consider responses and countermeasures to malicious Russian activities. Because the GRU continues to conduct cyberattacks, election interference, assassinations, and disinformation, understanding the agency's structure and the position it occupies in Russian foreign and security policy can help identify what the GRU is capable of and why it conducts particular operations. Understanding the GRU also offers insight into Russia's wider use of cyber, disinformation, and influence operations and can inform broader discussions of potential U.S. responses and countermeasures. This report addresses Russian military intelligence, including organizational structure and activities, and related U.S. policy."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Bowen, Andrew S.
2021-11-15
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Russian Arms Sales and Defense Industry [October 14, 2021]
From the Introduction: "Russia uses arms sales to advance its foreign policy interests, including developing defense relationships and enhancing Russia's regional and global influence. Since 2000, Russia has been one of the top five arms exporters in the world in dollar-value terms (often behind only the United States), averaging $13-$15 billion in reported annual sales, according to official Russian statistics and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), a nongovernmental organization. [...] This report focuses on Russia's defense industry, arms sales, selected weapon systems, and arms exports to Russia's top five clients. It also presents an analysis of related congressional and U.S. policy issues. Data in this report are based on official and unofficial open sources. To assess the value of arms transfers, this report uses data from SIPRI. SIPRI records data using a common unit, the 'trend indicator value' (TIV). According to SIPRI, 'the TIV is based on the known unit production costs of a core set of weapons and is intended to represent the transfer of military resources rather than the financial value of the transfer."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Bowen, Andrew S.
2021-10-14
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Russian Military Exercises [October 4, 2021]
From the Document: "The Russian military has routinely conducted two types of military exercises: annual strategic command staff exercises and combat readiness inspections. Many of these exercises are what most analysts consider part of a military's normal training routine. Russia uses these exercises to test military readiness, refine operational concepts, assess new equipment and technologies, and improve command and control. Russia also may use some of these exercises as a form of coercive signaling toward neighboring states and foreign audiences. Some observers are also concerned about Russian use of military exercises as a pretext to mask preparations for potential and actual invasions[.] In particular, the size and nature of the exercises, including the recently concluded Zapad 2021 joint Russian-Belarusian strategic exercise, have caused concern among U.S. and European observers, including some Members of Congress. Some Members expressed concern about the exercise reflecting Russian aggression toward allies in the region."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Bowen, Andrew S.
2021-10-04
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Ukrainian Armed Forces [June 23, 2021]
From the Document: "In 2014, the Ukrainian military, which observers noted had been weakened by years of neglect and underfunding, faced Russia's occupation of Ukraine's Crimea region and invasion of eastern Ukraine. Since that time, the Ukrainian armed forces have made considerable improvements; they have undertaken efforts to adopt NATO standards and received significant NATO and U.S. assistance. Many of these reforms began out of the experience of defending against Russian aggression. Reforms range from the tactical to the strategic levels and include both political measures (e.g., increasing transparency, countering corruption, and ensuring civilian control over the military) and military reforms (e.g., modernizing equipment, reforming command and control, and increasing professionalization). Significant hurdles remain, however, and the reform process is complicated by Ukraine's Soviet legacy, the continued Russian occupation of parts of Ukraine, and the threat of further Russian aggression. Members of Congress have expressed interest in understanding Ukraine's military capabilities to help guide policymaking to support Ukraine's defense of its territorial integrity and its aspirations for eventual NATO membership."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Bowen, Andrew S.
2021-06-23
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Russian Military Mobilization on Ukraine's Borders and in Occupied Crimea [April 27, 2021]
From the Document: "In March 2021, Russia began massing troops on the Ukrainian border and in Ukraine's occupied Crimea region. Observers have disagreed about whether Russia is preparing for a future invasion or engaging in coercive signaling. Russia continued to build up its forces in April, dismissing concerns and stating that it was conducting military exercises. On April 22, Russia announced [hyperlink] that most units would return to their permanent bases but some would remain deployed through upcoming exercises in September. Which units will remain and which will return to their bases remains to be seen. Congress has expressed support for Ukraine's territorial integrity and for deterring Russian aggression."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Bowen, Andrew S.
2021-04-27
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Russia: Foreign Policy and U.S. Relations [Updated April 15, 2021]
From the Introduction: "This report focuses on Russian foreign policy, key issue areas, and related U.S. policy. The report first addresses foreign policymaking institutions and processes within Russia. It next examines Russia's relations with key countries and regions. It follows with sections on Russia's use of force and military power; influence and cyber operations; and foreign economic policies. The report then analyzes U.S.-Russia relations, including U.S. policy during the current and prior Administrations and recent congressional actions. The report is compartmentalized, so that readers primarily interested in a particular issue may find the relevant information in a subsection of the report. Russia's domestic politics, human rights situation, and economy are not within the scope of this report."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Bowen, Andrew S.; Welt, Cory
2021-04-15
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Defense Primer: What Is Command and Control? [April 8, 2021]
From the Document: "The Department of Defense (DOD) defines command and control (C2) as '[t]he exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission.' At its most fundamental level, C2 represents how DOD makes operational decisions. One can view C2 through the context of five variables: who, what, when, where, and how. Traditionally, Congress has focused on the authorities (the 'who') and technology (the 'how') variables, and less so on the force mix ('what'), temporal ('when'), and geographic ('where'). China and Russia have developed strategies to disrupt or potentially deny DOD its ability to make decisions; as a result, DOD is modernizing systems and processes to command and control military forces."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Hoehn, John R.; Campbell, Caitlin; Bowen, Andrew S.
2021-04-08
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Azerbaijan and Armenia: The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict [January 7, 2021]
From the Introduction: "In autumn 2020, a six-week war fundamentally reshaped the dynamics of a decades-old conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh (or Mountainous Karabakh, also known in Armenian as Artsakh) and surrounding territories internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan. [...] This report focuses on the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict, the autumn 2020 war, and related U.S. policy. It first provides brief historical background and then discusses the post-1994 conflict resolution process and the relationships of Azerbaijan and Armenia with regional powers Russia and Turkey. In addition, the report provides analysis of the autumn 2020 war, the November 2020 cease-fire agreement, and the war's domestic impact in Armenia and Azerbaijan. The report then discusses U.S. responses to the war, longer-term U.S. policy toward the conflict, and the role of Congress."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Welt, Cory; Bowen, Andrew S.
2021-01-07
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Russian Cyber Units [January 4, 2021]
From the Document: "Russia has deployed sophisticated cyber capabilities to conduct disinformation, propaganda, espionage, and destructive cyberattacks globally. To conduct these operations, Russia maintains numerous units overseen by its various security and intelligence agencies. Russia's security agencies compete with each other and often conduct similar operations on the same targets, making specific attribution and motivation assessments difficult. Congress may be interested in the various Russian agencies, units, and their attributes to better understand why and how Russia conducts cyber operations."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Bowen, Andrew S.
2021-01-04
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Russian Military Intelligence: Background and Issues for Congress [November 24, 2020]
From the Introduction: "Russia's military intelligence agency is a large, expansive, and powerful organization responsible for the collection of foreign intelligence and the operation of Russia's special forces units ('voiska spetsialnogo naznacheniya', or 'spetsnaz'). Since 2010, its official title has been the Main Directorate ('Glavnoye upravleniye') of the General Staff, formally referred to in abbreviated form as the GU although commonly referred to as the GRU ('Glavnoye razvedyvatel'noye upravleniye', or Main Intelligence Directorate). Due to its operations and responsibilities, the GRU is one of the most well-known of Russia's intelligence agencies. It plays a large role in Russian foreign and security policy. By understanding the GRU and its operations, Members of Congress may gain greater insight into the conduct of Russian foreign and security policy, including the use of disinformation, propaganda, and cyber strategies. [...] This report focuses on the GRU's origins, missions, documented or reported operations, and related U.S. policy. It first addresses the GRU's history and background to provide context for understanding its organizational mindset and traditional responsibilities. It then examines the GRU's organizational structure; analyzes the GRU's various missions, including intelligence collection, control of 'spetsnaz' units, and cyber capabilities and operations; and addresses related U.S. policy and congressional action. The report concludes with a brief assessment of the GRU's future outlook."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Bowen, Andrew S.
2020-11-24
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Russian Private Military Companies (PMCs) [September 16, 2020]
From the Document: "Over the last decade, Russian private military companies (PMCs) have appeared globally in various conflicts. Observers believe the Russian government is increasingly using PMCs to project power cheaply and deniably. Russian PMCs often operate alongside local militias, volunteers, criminal groups, and other non-state actors. In many cases, such PMCs appear closely connected to and controlled by the Russian government; in other cases, the extent of government control is uncertain. Members of Congress may be interested in examining the scope of Russian PMC operations to understand the full range of Russian tactics and operations when evaluating Russia's efforts to advance its foreign policy."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Bowen, Andrew S.
2020-09-16
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Russian Law Enforcement and Internal Security Agencies [September 14, 2020]
From the Document: "Russia has an extensive internal security system, with multiple, overlapping, and competitive security agencies vying for bureaucratic, political, and economic influence. Since Vladimir Putin assumed Russia's leadership, these agencies have grown in both size and power, and they have become integral to the security and stability of the government. If Putin extends his rule beyond 2024, as is now legally permissible, these agencies could play a role in the leadership succession process and affect the ability of a transitional regime to quell domestic dissent. For Members of Congress, understanding the numerous internal security agencies in Russia could be helpful in assessing the prospects of regime stability and dynamics of a transition after Putin leaves office. In addition, Russian security agencies and their personnel have been targeted by U.S. sanctions for cyberattacks and human rights abuses."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Bowen, Andrew S.
2020-09-14
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