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Breaking the Bathsheba Syndrome: Building a Performance Evaluation System that Promotes Mission Command
"In 2014, the National Defense Authorization Act directed the Department of Defense to reconsider the way the Army evaluates and selects leaders. This call for reform came after repeated surveys from the Center for Army Leadership suggested widespread dissatisfaction with the current approach. The U.S. Army today is seeking to inculcate a philosophy of mission command across the force based on a culture of mutual trust, clear intent, and decentralized initiative. It is, therefore, reasonable to ask if our current performance evaluation system contributes or detracts from such a culture. This monograph seeks to answer this question by considering the essential leader attributes required for the exercise of mission command and then considering practical methods for evaluating this behavior. It then reviews the history of the existing Army performance evaluation system and analyzes how well this system conforms to the attributes of mission command. Finally, it examines other methods of performance evaluation outside of the Army to determine if those methods could provide a better model. This examination included a variety of best practice models in private business and the public sector and identified alternative approaches to performance evaluation. Three alternative models were chosen for scrutiny because they demonstrated an ability to specifically identify and select for the leader attributes essential to mission command."
Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute
Taylor, Curtis D.
2015-10-26
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Rise of iWar: Identity, Information, and the Individualization of Modern Warfare
From the Brief Synopsis on the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute website: "During a decade of global counterterrorism operations and two extended counterinsurgency campaigns, the United States was confronted with a new kind of adversary. Without uniforms, flags, and formations, the task of identifying and targeting these combatants represented an unprecedented operational challenge for which Cold War era doctrinal methods were largely unsuited. This monograph examines the doctrinal, technical, and bureaucratic innovations that evolved in response to these new operational challenges. It discusses the transition from a conventionally focused, Cold War-era targeting process to one optimized for combating networks and conducting identity-based targeting. It analyzes the policy decisions and strategic choices that were the catalysts of this change and concludes with an in depth examination of emerging technologies that are likely to shape how this mode of warfare will be waged in the future."
Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute
Voelz, Glenn James
2015-10
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Arab Threat Perceptions and the Future of the U.S. Military Presence in the Middle East
From the Brief Synopsis on the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute website: "The threat perceptions of many Arab states aligned with the United States have changed significantly as a result of such dramatic events as the 2011 U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq, the emergence and then fading of the Arab Spring, the rise of Iranian power and Tehran's nuclear agreement with key world powers, the Egyptian revolution and counterrevolution, and the development of civil wars in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya. There have also been some notable differences that have developed between the United States and its Arab allies over how to address these issues and most especially Iranian regional ambitions. This report considers ways in which the United States might react to these events with a specific focus on military coordination and support to friendly Arab countries. It notes that a variety of U.S. officials remain intensely committed to a strong effort to work with Arab allies and to convince them that the United States will not abandon them or downgrade the importance of their security concerns."
Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute
Terrill, W. Andrew
2015-10
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Strategic Insights: The Russian Intervention and the Internal Dynamics of Syria
"The Syrian civil war began in March 2011 and has claimed nearly 250,000 lives so far. After over 4 years of internal fighting, the Kremlin has decided to expand its role in this conflict by moving combat aircraft and some ground troops to Syria to support the Bashar al-Assad government. These actions seem like a clear prelude to a direct Russian combat role, although the scope of such an effort is not yet clear. It has started with a limited number of air strikes against the opposition forces fighting Assad. Additionally, Russia is providing the Syrian army with new weapons supplies which that army seems to be absorbing very quickly. The United States has expressed concern about the deployment and is facing the question of how seriously it seeks to oppose increased Russian involvement in this war, and what, if anything, to do about it."
Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute
Terrill, W. Andrew
2015-10-01
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Strategic Insights: Economic Power: Time to Double Down
"A recent editorial in 'The New York Times' asked the question, 'Who threatens America most?' It proceeded to compare recent pronouncements by incoming senior military leaders, the President, the FBI director, and finally the Director of National Intelligence. The major candidates included the usual nation states (Russia, North Korea, and China), a few nonstate terrorist organizations (ISIS and al-Qaeda), and a couple of unattributed capabilities (weapons of mass destruction and cyberattacks). The editorial concluded with the lament: 'If officials cannot agree on what the most pressing threats are, how can they develop the right strategies and properly allocate resources?' Given the confusion and uncertainty generated by the current strategic environment, compounded by America's resource-driven retrenchment, it is a fair question. However, I contend that we could pursue a more focused national strategy and do a better job of allocating resources if we focus on the opportunities as opposed to this wide array of threats. The opportunity that beckons is the increasingly interconnected global economy and the integral role played by the United States in both its institutional design and future evolution. A functioning, interconnected global economy will mitigate most, if not all, of the previously mentioned threats, whereas a fractured and disconnected global economy will exacerbate them."
Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute
Troxell, John F.
2015-09-29
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Strategic Insights: The Will to Fight
"Events on world battlefields over the past two years should give the U.S. Army
pause to reconsider the entire Foreign Internal Defense (FID) mission. The
seemingly unarguable axiom that 'good training makes good soldiers' has been
proven to be not always true. Good training does not always make good
soldiers. If the definition of a good soldier is 'a member of the armed forces
who stands and fights for his or her country,' then a good deal of money has
been spent in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere without measurable and
sustainable success. More than a third of all Afghan defense forces trained with
U.S. taxpayer money desert in Afghanistan each year, and in Iraq they simply
disappear."
Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute
Mason, M. Chris
2015-09-11
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Future Security Environment: Why the U.S. Army Must Differentiate and Grow Millennial Officer Talent
"The dynamic nature of the future security environment necessitates better retention
of diversified talent among officers from the Millennial Generational Cohort. Although
the U.S. Army has done well to attract a diverse and talented group of junior officers at
commissioning, a revision of the Army's Personnel System that incorporates a more personalized
management approach could help to motivate and retain millennial officers
and better prepare them for senior leadership. Lieutenant colonels and colonels must
provide the transformational leadership and innovation needed to create the intrinsic
value that millennials seek in their profession. In order to explore what is most appealing
to talented millennial officers and what is most effective for the Army, this Carlisle
Paper will explore, as its methodology, the salient features of leadership theory, the
characteristics of the Millennial Generational Cohort, and what senior leaders must do
to improve attraction, motivation, and retention of millennial officers in the U.S. Army."
Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute
Arnold, Michael J.
2015-09
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Limits of Offshore Balancing
"Should the United States undertake a fundamental
strategic retrenchment? Should it roll back, and perhaps
do away with, the system of overseas security
commitments and military deployments that have anchored
its international posture since World War II?
Many academic and strategic studies observers have
answered "yes" to these questions in recent years.
They assert that America's long-standing, postwar
grand strategy has become both dispensable and self-defeating-dispensable
because that grand strategy is
no longer needed to sustain an advantageous global
environment, and self-defeating because it wastes finite
means while eliciting adverse behavior from allies
and adversaries alike. The proper response to this situation,
they believe, is to adopt a minimalist approach
referred to as 'offshore balancing.' Briefly stated,
offshore balancing envisions a dramatic reduction in
America's overseas military deployments and alliance
commitments, and a shift toward greater restraint and
modesty in U.S. policy writ large. It is premised on
the idea that this type of retrenchment will actually
produce better security outcomes at a better price-
that when it comes to grand strategy, less will actually
be more.
Offshore balancing is thus a concept with growing
currency and salience in the debate over the future of
America's approach to international affairs. As this
monograph argues, however, the case for offshore balancing
is actually much weaker than it initially seems."
Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute
Brands, Hal, 1983-
2015-09
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Ethics of Drone Strikes: Does Reducing the Cost of Conflict Encourage War?
"One of the most compelling arguments that has
been raised against drone weapons is that they may
lower inhibitions against going to war by making it
possible to fight without sustaining casualties. This
monograph assesses this argument by using a survey
experiment designed to gauge whether American
civilians are more willing to initiate wars using
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) than using ground
forces or piloted aircraft. The use of UAVs made participants
more likely to support initiating a war, and
this was consistent across four principal policy objectives
that were the cause for war: counterterrorism,
humanitarian intervention, foreign policy restraint,
and internal political change. However, the increase
in support for war caused by UAVs was fairly small,
and would probably not be sufficient to tip the balance
of public opinion in favor of fighting under most
circumstances. Support for war was also heavily influenced
by other factors, such as what principal policy
objective was being pursued."
Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute
Walsh, James Igoe; Schulzke, Marcus
2015-09
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Cyber Defense: An International View
This is part of "The Letort Papers," a series provided by the Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. From the Summary: "Despite the history of offensive cyber activity being much longer than is commonly thought, cyber defense is still considered a new discipline. It is only relatively recently that states have established formal structures to provide for cyber defense, and cyber security more broadly. In this context, each nation has developed its own mix of public, private, and military organizations active in the field. The relationships between these organizations are based on the nation's unique circumstances, determining the overall shape of relations between the state and business, the approach to e-government, civilian control of the military, threat perception, and much more. The United States is no exception and has developed its own approach to organizing cyber defense based on factors specific to it. But the wide range of organizational approaches to reaching a 'best fit' template for successful cyber defense raises the possibility that other nations may have developed approaches that could be usefully adopted in a U.S. context. This Paper introduces four different foreign approaches to cyber defense, each very different from the U.S. model. In surveying the cyber defense organizations of Germany, Sweden, Norway, and Estonia, the Paper aims not only to provide baseline information on overseas structures and planning in order to facilitate U.S. cooperation with international partners, but also to provide policymakers with an overview of effective alternative approaches that may be applicable in a U.S. context."
Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute
Giles, Keir; Hartmann, Kim
2015-09
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Colloquium Brief: Robotics and Military Operations - Kingston Conference on International Security
" The 10th annual Kingston Conference on International Security (KCIS) was held in Kingston, Canada, May 11-13, 2015. This significant North American military research activity represents an important bilateral academic strategic outreach interchange between Canadian and American Landpower forces and has been held since 2006. This year's conference theme focused on 'Robotics and Military Operations' and was co-sponsored by the Centre for International and Defence Policy, Queen's University; the Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre of the Canadian Forces, Royal Military College of Canada; the Canadian Army Command and Staff College; and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Defense College; and was conducted in cooperation with the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College. The 162 conference participants and attendees were drawn from government, nongovernment organizations (NGOs), industry, academic, and military entities from across the United States, Canada, and NATO."
Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute
Bunker, Robert J.
2015-08-14
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Shared Burden: The Military and Civilian Consequences of Army Pain Management Since 2001
"The Army has an opioid drug problem that is not going away under current personnel policies and medical practices. The survey results recorded here indicate that senior officers attending the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) recognize that the opioid problem is distinct in nature and origin from those of recreational drug abuse. Yet, these officers are saddled with a legacy drug enforcement structure and outdated procedures that do not track opioid usage across the force and do not address the root cause of the issue. They are commanding units under a regulatory structure that belatedly responds to opioid-related misuse with the same misconduct-focused disciplinary policies as those for recreational drug use, rather than with a proactive medical and personnel approach crafted for this unique problem set that emphasizes prevention and rehabilitation. The USAWC officer survey responses reflect the fact that the majority of these future Army leaders see misuse originating out of prescribing practices, a lack of medical monitoring, and a lack of soldier training and education on the dangers of opioids, rather than from undisciplined soldiers."
Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute
Trebilcock, Craig T.
2015-08
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Terrorist and Insurgent Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Use, Potentials, and Military Implications
"Derived from the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
use threat scenarios, three levels of military significance
are foreseen with terrorist and insurgent activities
associated with these devices. Because of the
technologies that will eventually be associated with
UAVs-robotics and expert (and artificial intelligence)
systems networked together-their significance is projected
as increasing over time from the tactical to the
operational and then to the strategic levels of concern. [...] These three threat scenarios result in three corresponding
levels of impact found at the tactical, operational,
and strategic levels of military significance. For
the U.S. Army, the tactical implications of such UAV
use will fall within force protection, counterterrorism,
and defense support of civil authorities' missions. It
will focus on UAV detection, countermeasures, and
tactical response and is an immediate concern. The
operational level of impact is insurgency environment
focused and most likely a near futures issue. It pertains
to the use of groups of human controlled and semi-autonomous
UAVs and represents an expeditionary
concern bridging the tactical into the operational level
of impact. This means that experimentation and red
teaming is warranted related to threat forces' use of
UAVs in insurgency type environments. The strategic
level of concern, on the other hand, may still be a few
decades out, and possibly even beyond the capacity
of terrorist and insurgent forces to field on their own
without state sponsorship. Still, its autonomous and
semi-sentient drone swarm potentials are viewed as
having an immense impact on the future conduct of
war. Considerations need to be made concerning arms
control regimes related to such autonomous, intelligent,
and lethal robotic systems as well as their integration
with human soldiers into future force structures,
if that Army unit composition is elected to be
followed-which presently appears to be the national
trajectory."
Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute
Bunker, Robert J.
2015-08
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Duffer's Shoal: A Strategic Dream of the Pacific Command Area of Responsibility
From the 'Brief Synopsis' available on the press release: "This strategic assessment seeks to go beyond a traditional comparative analysis of the military, technological, political, cultural, and economic factors governing the relationships and capabilities of the Asia Pacific environment. To make sense of the intrinsic complexities unique to this region, we endeavor to broaden our view and rely on a tool often overlooked in government studies: imagination. Moreover, we aim to offer a strategic document that is readable, instructive, and provocative. Pulling from a well-referenced piece of military teaching, this assessment borrows a learning concept first employed in 1904 by Major General Sir Ernest Dunlop Swinton in 'The Defence of Duffer's Drift.' This fictional story describes the plight of young Lieutenant Backsight Forethought as he commands a 50-man platoon tasked to hold a tactically critical piece of land called Duffer's Drift. The story unfolds in a series of six dreams, where the blunders of the unwitting lieutenant lead to disaster. As the dreams progress, he harnesses the lessons of each of his failures, and by applying these lessons, his platoon ultimately defends Duffer's Drift."
Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute
Bailey, Russell N.; Parsons, Christopher J.; Smith, Elizabeth R. . . .
2015-08
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Army War College Review [August 2015]
"The Army War College [AWC] Review, a refereed publication of student work, is produced under the purview of the Strategic Studies Institute and the United States Army War College. An electronic quarterly, The AWC Review connects student intellectual work with professionals invested in U.S. national security, land power, strategic leadership, global security studies, and the advancement of the profession of arms." Research in this edition include: "Laws of Unintended Consequences: The Leahy Laws," by Tim L. Rieger; "The Islamic State: Terrorists or Millenarian Mass Movement?" by Edward R. Sullivan; and "The Flawed Strategic Discourse on Cyber Power," by Brandon Newton. Insights in this edition include: "Moving to the City," by Andrew M. Zacherl; and "The Rise of China and U.S. Strategy," by Derrick Lee.
Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute
2015-08
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Duffer's Shoal: A Strategic Dream of the Pacific Command Area of Responsibility
"There is much discussion throughout the U.S. national security and foreign policy communities about the complexities and challenges of the Indo-Asia-Pacific as our Nation increases its strategic focus on this important region. In fact, there is already an abundance of think-tank generated forecasts and strategic net assessments focusing on China s military modernization, its competitive territorial and power pursuits, and the strategies and technologies that will be necessary to counter its growing anti-access/ area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities. While China is the prominent player in the region, it is only one piece of a highly complex and dynamic strategic puzzle. There are a myriad of regional and global dynamics at play. These formidable forces piracy, human trafficking, terrorism, natural disasters, territorial disputes, and a growing dissatisfaction with the current world order, among others present distinct and often overlapping challenges to regional and global security and stability. Yet, they also provide unique opportunities for enhanced collaboration and understanding. The following strategic assessment seeks to go beyond a traditional comparative analysis of the military, technological, political, cultural, and economic factors governing the relationships and capabilities of the Asia Pacific environment. To truly make sense of the intrinsic complexities unique to this region, the authors endeavor to broaden our view and rely on a tool often overlooked in government studies: imagination. Moreover, they aim to offer a strategic document that is readable, instructive, and provocative. Pulling from a well-referenced piece of military teaching, this assessment borrows a learning concept first employed in 1904 by Major General Sir Ernest Dunlop Swinton in The Defence of Duffer s Drift."
Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute
Bailey, Russell N.; Parsons, Christopher; Smith, Elizabeth . . .
2015-08
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Strategic Insights: Fragile States Cannot Be Fixed With State-Building
"The problem with the way the international community thinks about and responds to fragile states is not that we do not understand 'fragility,' its causes, and its cures, but that we think of them as 'states,' as coherent units of analysis. As a result of this strategic level mistake, efforts to build state capacity to contain violence and reduce poverty are at least as likely to destabilize the country as they are to help. The U.S. military should consider the destabilizing potential of its efforts to build capacity, train and equip security forces, and provide support to diplomacy and development when its partners and beneficiaries are officials of fragile states. State formation has always been an exceedingly bloody endeavor. Most stable countries worthy of the term 'state' that are stable, including wealthy, Western, liberal, or democratic nation-states, came into being through complicated social processes, including war, ethnic cleansing, or genocide. That violence was followed by an institutionalization of the values and social priorities of the victors, combined with some degree of accommodation for the vanquished across and within the new state's borders. State formation, in other words, has always been a matter of violent exclusion followed by pragmatic inclusion. In all successful states today, those processes have resulted in stable formal political systems, with a significant degree of internal consensus over how those systems should be governed."
Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute
Lamb, Robert D.
2015-07-27
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U.S. Army War College Key Strategic Issues List [2015-2016]
"Now more than ever, we need to focus the efforts of the Army's educational institutions on addressing these unique challenges. The Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL), developed by the U.S. Army War College, in coordination with Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA) and Major Commands throughout the Army, includes issues that must be addressed to ensure the Army of 2025 and beyond will continue to meet the needs of the nation. I strongly encourage those conducting research through our Senior Service Colleges and Fellows experiences, and other researchers, to consider the issues listed in the KSIL. As we build a new future to deal with this growing complexity, the Army will require evolutionary change, and this change begins by changing mindsets. This necessary change must be based on rigorous research and the development of ideas that are invaluable to the Army and to the Nation."
Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute
2015-07-17
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Approaching Implosion of Venezuela and Strategic Implications for the United States
"The U.S. response to the ever deepening political and economic crisis in Venezuela, and the regime's increasingly aggressive behavior toward its neighbors and the international community, is compelling evidence that the Barack Obama administration is sincere in respecting the sovereignty of nations of Latin America and the Caribbean, and allowing the region to address its own governance issues. While analysts in Washington, DC, and Latin America have long decried the involvement of Venezuelan officials in narcotrafficking, if assertions made by the highly credible 'Wall Street Journal' prove true regarding investigations by U.S. authorities into criminal activity by Venezuelan Parliamentary Speaker Diosdado Cabello, and other top Venezuelan political and military leaders, the scope of the problem that Venezuela represents for the region has reached a new low point. Although a very different situation in a very different time, it was the 1988 indictment of Panamanian strongman Manuel Noriega on drug charges by grand juries in Miami and Tampa, FL, that paved the way for the U.S. invasion of Panama the following year. In the current era of U.S. respect for the sovereignty of the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean, with a very different set of considerations and strategic context, Venezuela's leadership will not come to the same end as that of Panama, holed up in a foreign diplomatic compound in Caracas while the 4th Psychological Operations Group blares rock music into their place of refuge and U.S. Special Envoy Tom Shannon negotiates their surrender. Yet, the situation is no less grave."
Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute
Ellis, Robert Evan
2015-07-10
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Reassessing the Barriers to Islamic Radicalization in Kazakhstan
"Kazakhstan, being the most stable and safe country in the region, witnessed a series of alleged extremist terrorist acts since 2011. The number of Islamic activists has grown, particularly in rural areas. As an official response to that, Kazakhstan continues to improve its legislation on combating terrorism and extremism. However, since this experience of domestic 'political violence' in 2011-12, the country has suffered no major incidents. This analysis begins by providing an overview of historic roots and identity of 'Kazakh Islam,' while attempting to explain how it emerged. Then it describes the nature of connection and influence reaching Kazakhstan from neighboring North Caucasus and Afghanistan and how it affects radicalization of the youth. Then main reasons for misleading assumptions are closely examined to identify how Kazakhstan is viewed from the outside world. Separate sections explore the state structures and the role of the state overseeing the issues regarding Islam and its practices. Special attention is drawn upon banned extremist groups, their specifics, and the country's experience of political violence in 2011-12, as well as the state's response to the acts of violence."
Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute
Baizakova, Zhulduz; McDermott, Roger N.
2015-07
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Limits of Military Officers' Duty to Obey Civilian Orders: A Neo-Classical Perspective
From the Summary: "Several post-September 11, 2001, events--the invasion of Afghanistan and the second invasion of Iraq, the use of 'enhanced interrogation,' the detentions at Guantanamo, the 'air-only' attacks on the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria--have raised a perennially perplexing issue of civilian/military relations: principled limitations on military officers' duty to obey civilian orders. Not surprisingly, contemporary answers have split along a familiar fault line. Those on one side emphasize, more or less rigorously, officers' general professional duty to obey; those on the other emphasize, more or less expansively, familiar exceptions for irrational, illegal, or immoral orders. Paradoxically, both sides find support in the classic statement of modern military professionalism, Samuel P. Huntington's 'The Soldier and the State.' More paradoxically, flaws in Huntington's original analysis compound the problem, even as the correction of those flaws offers a common ground. This reexamination of Huntington's original position can thus narrow, if not wholly bridge, the gap between opponents in the current debate over military obedience. Part I situates the general obligation of officers to obey the orders of civilian authorities in Huntington's basic theory of civilian/military relations. Part II examines two logical limitations that Huntington's theory implies for the duty of military officers to obey civilian orders: when civilian authorities usurp military officers' tactical expertise and when civilian authorities lapse in the exercise of their own expertise as 'statesmen.' Part III maps this latter exception onto the two general exceptions to military obedience, illegal orders and immoral orders, and then ties all three exceptions back into the common ground of military professionalism, the common defense, which rests on the deeper foundation of both American constitutional law and neo-classical political theory: the common good."
Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute
Atkinson, Rob, 1957-
2015-07
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Hard Look at Hard Power: Assessing the Defense Capabilities of Key U.S. Allies and Security Partners
"Since World War II, a key element of America's
grand strategy has been its worldwide network of
strategic allies and partners. This network has provided
the United States with the framework for sustaining
its global presence, enhanced deterrence against
adversaries in key regions of the world, and, when
called upon, provided men and materiel necessary
to fight wars. Indeed, since the fall of the Berlin Wall,
with one exception-the U.S. invasion of Panama in
December 1989-American forces have not engaged
in a major conflict without allies fighting alongside
them. Although, in the words of Bill Clinton administration
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, the
United States might be 'the indispensable nation,' as
a matter of practice, America is so in conjunction with
its security partners."
Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute
Schmitt, Gary James, 1952-
2015-07
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Chinese People's Liberation Army in 2025
"The 2014 Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) conference occurred during a time of flaring regional tensions in the East and South China Seas, increasing military modernization by China and its neighbors, and a potentially changing Chinese approach to its regional security environment. In light of these continuing developments, the topic of this conference and this volume--'The Chinese People's Liberation Army in 2025'--is both timely and prescient. China's increasing military capabilities are creating complex shifts in regional security calculations. To understand the trends in China's military modernization and its implications for regional and global security, conference participants assessed: 1) the various domestic, international, and technological drivers of China's military modernization; 2) potential trajectories for PLA modernization; 3) and the implications of PLA modernization for the Asia-Pacific, the international order, and U.S.-China relations. The bulk of this volume presents the papers that resulted from the 2014 Conference." These 2014 Conference papers include: "Whither China? Alternative Military Futures, 2010-30," by Lonnie D. Henley; "Domestic Drivers of China's Future Military Modernization," by Joseph Fewsmith; "People's Liberation Army Trajectories: International Drivers," by Eric Heginbotham and Jacob Heim; "Capacity for Innovation: Technological Drivers of China's Future Military Modernization," by Richard A. Bitzinger and Michae Raska; "The People's Liberation Army in 2020-30 Focused on Regional Issues," by Bernard D. Cole; "A Global Expeditionary People's Liberation Army: 2025-30," by Oriana Skylar Mastro; "China's Military Force Posture Under Conditions of a Weakened People's Liberation Army: Aternative Military Futures, 2020-30," by Daniel Gearin and Erin Richter; "Regional Dynamics in Response to Alternative PLA Development Vectors," by Michael McDevitt; "Implications: China in the International System," by Phillip C. Saunders; and "Implications for U.S.-China Strategic Dynamics," by Robert Sutter.
Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute
2015-07
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China's Rise and Reconfiguration of Central Asia's Geopolitics: A Case for U.S. 'Pivot' to Eurasia
"Just as in the Asia-Pacific, it is the rise of China and its perceived efforts at domination in Central Asia that are driving the reconfiguration of the region's geopolitics and are challenging the U.S. global supremacy, requiring Washington to advance creative economic and military solutions in the heart of Eurasia. To stay relevant globally and regionally, the United States has to pursue a robust, direct, and long-term strategy of engagement in Central Asia. As it seeks to do so, Washington cannot premise its cooperation with other powers in Central Asia on the isolation of China--a global force calling for engagement where beneficial and containment where necessary. Washington should boost military engagement in the region, upgrade its New Silk Road Strategy (NSRS), advance cooperation with key partners, and shape China's global ascendance by leveraging its position in Central Asia. It should consider joining multilateral institutions involving the regional countries and China, or seek the creation of new ones to shape China's regional activities. It should link its NSRS with China's 'belt' strategy where it benefits the region's development while ensuring multidirectional contours of regional geo-economic forces. It should also start pondering how to leverage its potential strategic relationship with Iran, which links the Middle East with Central and South Asia, and shares growing economic ties with China. Finally, it should develop platforms of cooperation with China in economic and security spheres pertaining to both global and regional affairs. None of these tasks are easy to accomplish. This policy monograph, written in March 2015, sheds light on the crucial forces at work, assesses the possibility and implications of China's hegemony in Central Asia, and highlights the need for Washington to play real politics at the table rather than from across the high seas."
Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute
Muzalevsky, Roman
2015-07
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Strategic Importance of the Global Oil Market
"This Letort Paper will explain why the confluence of four major factors: 1) rising oil supplies, 2) weak oil demand, 3) financial shifts on Wall Street, and 4) a strong U.S. dollar far outweigh the geopolitical risks in the Mideast and put downward pressure on oil prices. This Paper analyzes the concomitant factors that are now putting upward pressure on oil prices, as well as those that continue to keep oil prices relatively low."
Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute
Rosenberger, Leif
2015-06
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New Russian Engagement with Latin America: Strategic Position, Commerce, and Dreams of the Past
"In many ways, Russia's expanded engagement
in Latin America as a response to escalating tension
over the Ukraine was a repetition of its answer to U.S.
involvement in the 2008 conflict in the former Soviet
Republic of Georgia. In the 2008 conflict, as the U.S.
deployed naval forces to the Black Sea in response to
Russian support for the breakaway republics of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia, Russia countered with a
series of actions in Latin America, including sending
nuclear-capable Tu-160 bombers to Venezuela, from
where they conducted symbolically charged flights
around the Caribbean. This was followed a month
later by the deployment of a four-ship Russian naval
flotilla to the area to conduct military exercises with
the Venezuelan navy before making port calls in Cuba
and Nicaragua. [...] By comparison to the extensive literature on the
activities of the Soviet Union in the Western Hemisphere
during the Cold War, and by contrast to the
rapidly growing body of works on China's activities
in the region, very little beyond journalistic accounts
have been written to examine contemporary Russian
activities in Latin America and the Caribbean. As
Russia's reassertion of its global position and associated
tensions with the United States proceed apace,
a broad understanding of Russia in the Americas becomes
evermore important, both as a question of U.S.
national security and as an important dynamic shaping
the global geopolitical environment. This monograph
seeks to do so, focusing on the character of the
ongoing Russian re-engagement with Latin America
and the Caribbean and its implications for the
United States."
Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute
Ellis, Robert Evan
2015-06
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Iraq's Shia Warlords and Their Militias: Political and Security Challenges and Options
"As America's de facto co-belligerents who often share the same battlespace in the fight against Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the presence and activity of Iraq's Shia warlords and their militias have an impact on U.S. interests and policies at both the strategic and operational levels. The practical objective of this monograph is to provide a better understanding of the Shia militia phenomenon and to highlight the factors with which U.S. policymakers and U.S. Army planners and commanders will have to deal with respect to operations in Iraq."
Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute
Cigar, Norman L.
2015-06
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First Things First for Future Defense Strategy
"The Department of Defense (DoD) will face a dramatic and sustained transition period over the next decade. At no other time in recent memory have American defense strategists faced such a dizzying and complex array of challenges like those which they will be required to direct their attention, energy, and resources toward in the coming years. It is frankly impossible to overstate the scale and complexity of the decisions that they will be required to make. This degree of uncertainty and complexity makes the task of deliberately charting a responsible way ahead that much more difficult and urgent. In the wake of 15 years of persistent combat operations, senior defense leaders will need to repurpose institutions and capabilities for use against a wider range of 21st century threats and challenges. They will have to do so with fewer aggregate forces and resources, more top-down constraints on their use, less clarity of overall purpose, and no bipartisan consensus on either the most compelling threats or the most appropriate responses to those threats. These factors support calls for top to bottom adaptation within DoD."
Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute
Freier, Nathan; McAleer, Laura
2015-05-27
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From Frozen Ties to Strategic Engagement: U.S.-Iranian Relationship in 2030
"The nuclear talks between Iran and P5+1 following the most stringent sanctions against Iran to date have opened new prospects for relaxation of tensions between Tehran and the West and for a U.S.-Iranian détente in the long run. The coming to power of new presidential administrations in both the United States and Iran, the additional sanctions, major geo-economic and geopolitical trends, and U.S.-Iranian economic and security cooperation imperatives all contributed to these dynamics. Some view the talks as a new beginning in U.S.-Iranian ties, which could herald the emergence of a U.S.-Iranian strategic relationship in the next 15 years. This work has developed three such possible strategic relationships: 1) strategic engagement involving a nuclear weapons-capable Iran; 2) comprehensive cooperation following a 'Grand Bargain'; and, 3) incremental strategic engagement after a nuclear deal. These relationships deliberately focus on constructive engagement, skipping the status quo and a strike on Iran as two other possible outcomes. If they pull it off by 2030, a U.S.-Iranian détente would advance external integration of the region, aiding the U.S. strategy of fostering global connectivity. It would promote resolution of conflicts and development and reconstruction of countries ravaged by wars and sectarian violence. It would also enable Washington to deploy select military assets to other locales to address other challenges while repurposing remaining forces to face new threats in the Greater Middle East. "
Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute
Muzalevsky, Roman
2015-05-12
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Bridging the Planning Gap: Incorporating Cyberspace Into Operational Planning
"Cyberspace operations have a far-reaching, permanent impact on military operations. At the conceptual level, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) now recognizes five warfighting domains: land, maritime, air, space, and cyber. While there are examples of how cyberspace support to military operations have advanced over the past decade, one gap has not been addressed in detail--operational planning. […] Despite this critical requirement, incorporating cyberspace operations into operational-level planning at the Army Service Component Command (ASCC), Joint Task Force (JTF), and Combatant Command (CCMD) levels has proven much more difficult than anticipated. For this reason, Joint and Army senior leaders have identified operational-level cyberspace planners to be a critical shortage. However, although a number of operational-level planners have been sent to cyberspace training courses and a number of cyberspace experts have been sent to operational-level headquarters to support planning, relatively little progress has been made overall. This is because not just one, but several major systemic obstacles hinder the incorporation of cyberspace into operational planning."
Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute
VanDriel, Martha S. H.
2015-05-04
