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• Army and Homeland Security: A Strategic Perspective

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  This monograph grew out of a tasking by the Army Staff to investigate the Army's role in homeland security from a strategic, rather than a legal or procedural perspective. The author achieves this perspective by placing homeland security missions within the larger spectrum of operations. In so doing, he exposes potential problem areas--missions requiring more or different force structure than that already available--for further action by the Army. He also recommends that the Army consider alternative force-sizing metrics that include, as a minimum, the "high-end" homeland security identified in the study.

  Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute

  Echevarria, Antulio Joseph, 1959-

  2001-03
• Defeating Terrorism: Strategic Issue Analyses

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  This paper is a series of short studies addressing strategic issues in the war on terrorism. The first paper provides historical perspective, but as you read many of the other essays, you will note several common and recurring themes. The first point is that this war can be won. Even now, some analysts question the stated war aims and doubt the possibility of victory. Nobody suggests it will be anything less than a complex undertaking, but victory is possible although that probably only means a new normalcy, not the comparatively halcyon days of the prewar situation. Conversely, the war on terrorism can be lost if missteps produce unintended strategic consequences. One way to do that would be to ignore the other parts of the world where America's interests lie. President Bush and the administration appear to have dodged this pitfall thus far, but they still must work to avoid expanding the war unnecessarily. As the struggle against terrorism proceeds, it is perhaps best to allow other elements of national power not the military to take the lead. The military will still be an essential component, but should be a buttress to the diplomatic, economic, and information elements as they attempt to end the scourge of terrorism with a minimum amount of further warfare.

  Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute

  Martin, John R. (John Robert), 1952-

  2002-01
• Future Leadership, Old Issues, New Methods

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  The monographs in this document focus on the leadership development component of the human and organizational dimension of the Army after Next Program. These monographs offer a collection of ideas in response to a perceived future leadership environment. Some offer solutions that are available right now, some for later, but all of them suggest that it is time to focus on the issues, analyze them, and set to work on overcoming barriers to progress. One may argue that adoption of all these suggestions would set leadership education and training on its ear. With the exception of Sayles' proposal to revamp and reorient basic and continuing education into more electronic disciplines, all the proposals could be implemented today with a solid promise of significant improvement in officer education across the board.

  Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute

  2000-06
• Terrorism: National Security Policy and the Home Front

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  The 1995 bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma has highlighted the complexity of the phenomenon of political extremism. Until this occurred, The United States was focused on foreign terrorists, particularly the so-called Islamic fundamentalists. The Strategic Studies Institute, as part of their continuing investigation of the terrorist problem, held a conference in November 1994 at Georgia Tech, at which a number of terrorist-related issues were considered. The emphasis was on international terror, but the threat of domestic extremism also was examined. Included in this volume are three papers presented at the conference two are related to international terror, while one is concerned with the domestic variety and a concluding chapter. The Oklahoma City bombing suggests that most of the terrorism faced by the United States in the near future will be home-grown. There is the potential, though, that U.S. foreign policy will provoke terrorist attacks from foreign-backed groups. If this happens, the United States is not ready. Americans have grown accustomed to some of the costs of global engagement. Money and military casualties have been deemed acceptable burdens of world leadership, but Americans are not yet used to the idea that terrorism at home may be an additional cost of global engagement. Unfortunately, terrorists understand this. In the near future, they are likely to use this vulnerability and the growing multiculturalism of the United States in attempts to either deter U.S. activity or provoke it. Only wise and persistent leadership, exercised before terrorism at home reaches crisis proportions, can prevent it from paralyzing American involvement in world affairs.

  Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute

  Pelletiere, Stephen C.

  1995-05-15
• Responding to Terrorism Across the Technological Spectrum

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  In April 1994, the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute held its annual Strategy Conference. Dr. Bruce Hoffman presented this paper as part of a panel examining "New Technologies and New Threats." Terrorism, of course, is not new. Hoffman warns, however, of the changing nature of terrorism. In the past, terrorists have been motivated by limited political and ideological objectives. Popular images fostered by terrorist events like the bombing of PAN AM Flight 103 and the attack on the Marine Barracks in Beirut notwithstanding, in the past the preponderance of terrorist attacks targeted specific individuals or small groups. The weapons of choice were the pistol, knife, and, on occasion, dynamite. Often the terrorist was a highly-trained individual, a "professional" in pursuit of specific political or ideological objectives. Hoffman warns that, by comparison, the terrorists of today and tomorrow are amateurs. Furthermore, they are likely to act from religious and racial convictions rather than radical political or ideological motivations. Their objective may be to kill large numbers of people. Indeed, they may want to annihilate an entire race or religious group. Not only are these amateurs less predictable and, therefore, more difficult to apprehend before the incident occurs, they have at their disposal lethal devices that range from the relatively simple fertilizer bomb to biologically-altered viruses. Military professionals and civilian planners must contend with warfare at every level. The threat posed by the changing nature of terrorism falls very much within their purview.

  Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute

  Hoffman, Bruce, 1954-

  1994-07-15
• Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario

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  During the latter half of the 20th century, U.S. military leaders and planners focused heavily on winning wars, and not so much on the peacekeeping or nation-building that comes afterwards. But national objectives can often be accomplished only after the fighting has ceased. With the winds of war swirling around Iraq, it is time to begin planning for the post-conflict reconstruction of that state. This monograph presents some historical insights from past occupations and peace operations, provides some additional analysis of the unique requirements involved in remaking Iraq, and, most importantly, develops a detailed list of potential tasks to help contemporary military commanders plan for post-conflict operations there. Most analysts and commentators focus on World War II for insights about occupying states and replacing regimes. Clearly, the American experience with occupations after major wars provides valuable insights about the importance of long and detailed planning for such missions, and about just how difficult demilitarization and democratization can be, even under the best of conditions. The world has changed a great deal since 1945, however. The experiences of the 1990s are generally more relevant to shape post-conflict operations in Iraq. They reveal past inadequacies in Army planning and preparation, and the difficulties in finding competent and resourced civilian agencies to assume responsibilities from the military. Recent experiences also show that even when the Army plans and performs well in a post-crisis environment, as it did in Haiti, strategic success is not guaranteed. That state quickly reverted back to chaos when military forces left.

  Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute

  Crane, Conrad C.; Terrill, W. Andrew

  2003-02
• Dragon on Terrorism: Assessing China's Tactical Gains and Strategic Losses Post-September 11

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  Every major event in history has unintended consequences. A major unintended (and unsettling, from Beijing's standpoint) consequence of the U.S.-led War on Terrorism has not only been to checkmate and roll-back China's recent moves at strategic expansion in Central, South, and Southeast Asia but also to tilt the regional balance of power decisively in Washington's favor within a short period of time, thereby highlighting how tenuous Chinese power is when compared to that of the United States. In this sense, September 11, 2001, should be seen as a major discontinuity or nonlinearity in post-Cold War international politics. New strategic and political realities emerging in Asia put a question mark over Beijing's earlier certainties, assumptions and beliefs. This monograph offers an overview of China's foreign policy goals and achievements prior to September 11, examines Beijing's response to terrorist attacks on the U.S. mainland, provides an assessment of China's tactical gains and strategic losses following the September 11 attacks, and concludes with an evaluation of Beijing's future policy options. It argues that if China was on a roll prior to 9/11, in a complete reversal of roles post-9/11, it is now the United States that is on the move. The U.S.-led War against Terrorism has radically altered the strategic landscape, severely constricted the strategic latitude that China has enjoyed post-Cold War, undermined China's carefully projected image as the next superpower, and ushered in new geopolitical alignments whose ramifications will be felt for a long time to come.

  Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute

  Malik, Mohan

  2002-10
• Hizballah: Terrorism, National Liberation, or Menace?

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  "In this monograph, the author advances the thesis that the conditions that give rise to acts of terrorism must be dealt with as urgently as combating those responsible for such acts. In the case of Hizballah, those conditions are essentially political. The situation contributing to the rise of Hizballah involves the political, economic, and social circumstances of the Shiite community of Lebanon as the country began to experience civil strife in the mid-1970s. The immediate cause for the creation of the organization was the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, resulting in the prolonged occupation of south Lebanon. The monograph examines the formation and development of Hizballah in the context of the Lebanese confessional political system that rests on a delicate balance between the country's religious sects. The author concludes with several observations: Hizballah is a complex party firmly grounded in the culture of its constituency and is part of Islamic national liberation movements, it is engaged in guerrilla warfare against Israeli occupation, and despite its identifiable organizational structure, has a mercurial center of gravity. His recommendations: The United States should not engage Hizballah militarily, should encourage Israel to vacate the Shab'a Farms, and should give priority to the Syria-Israel track in the peace process. The menace of Hizballah is related to what is fundamentally a strategic challenge to U.S. Middle East policy that cannot be resolved through tactical measures."

  Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute

  Hajjar, Sami G., 1939-

  2002-08
• 21st Century Security Architecture for the Americas: Multilateral Cooperation, Liberal Peace, and Soft Power

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  The main focus of this monograph is on security cooperation within the Americas. Essentially, much emphasis has been placed on economic cooperation (free trade agreements), but little thought has been given to security cooperation. Existing collective defense systems (Rio Treaty of the Organization of American States [OAS]) are a relic of the Cold War and not sufficient for the challenges and threats of today. The Americas are evidence of liberal or democratic peace. States do not war against each other because values and trade discourage major conflicts. The greater challenge to the state is internal, particularly given the problems of natural disasters, insurgency, drugs, violent crime, poverty, and other problems. Because of spillover effects, domestic issues often become transnational, such as with the drugs, weapons, and people that move across borders. Add to these the problems of natural disasters and one can see that major changes are needed to the security architecture of the Western Hemisphere.

  Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute

  Nuñez, Joseph R. (Joseph Raymond)

  2002-08
• Defining and Achieving Decisive Victory

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  In this paper, the author explores the means and methods most conducive to achievement of decisive victory. He explains that objectively better armies tend to win (war may be the realm of chance, but the dice are loaded in favor of those who are militarily competent); that there is no magic formula which can guarantee victory (not even today's information-led revolution in military affairs [RMA], which tends to equate precise firepower with war); that technology is not a panacea, the answer to all military and strategy difficulties; that the complexity of war and strategy allows for innovative, even asymmetrical, exercises in substitution as belligerents strive to emphasize strength and conceal weakness; and that it is essential to know your enemies, especially if you require them to cooperate in a deterrent or coercive relationship. The author concludes by arguing that the concept of decisive victory is meaningful and important. Also it advises that different enemies in different wars will require the application of different military means and methods. One size in military style will not fit all cases. Readers are recommended not to think of decisive victory in terms of a simple either/or. Strategic success or advantage may serve the goals of policy quite well enough. Finally, the point is made that, among Western states at least, the United States today is surely unique in being interested in the idea of and capability for decisive military victory. America's European allies currently do not discern any serious military issues as clouds on their peaceful horizons.

  Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute

  Gray, Colin S.

  2002-04
• Facing the Hydra: Maintaining Strategic Balance While Pursuing a Global War Against Terrorism

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  "Arguments to maintain strategic balance while fighting the global war on terrorism usually fall on receptive ears in the Pentagon. Although some are ready to disengage internationally to focus on fighting terrorists, most clearly see the value of continuing activities that deter crises and assist tremendously in the resolution of conflict when deterrence fails. Fewer seem to realize that maintaining strategic balance will require more than just better guidance, planning, and training. Increased force structure accompanied by revisions in the makeup of that structure and by reallocation between the Active and Reserve Components will be required to enable the Services to win both operational and strategic victory in the war on terrorism, while also keeping the peace in other parts of the world. Following the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report told the Army and the other services to focus their efforts on conducting major combat operations, strengthening homeland security and force protection, and accelerating transformation. However, the Army must simultaneously continue its operations along three other axes. It must remain committed to day-to-day assurance, dissuasion, and deterrence activities around the world; sustain its capability to execute peace operations and other smaller-scale contingencies (SSCs); and remain ready to conduct other major combat operations. If the Army fails in these critical missions, operational victory in the war on terrorism will be replaced by strategic failure as regional instability increases around the world."

  Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute

  Crane, Conrad C.

  2002-05
• Waging Ancient War: Limits on Preemptive Force

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  The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, stimulated the most far reaching and deep reassessment of American national security strategy since the late 1940s. All of America's objectives, preferences, and methods were open to evaluation. The outcome of this process will shape U.S. strategy for years to come. In this study, conducted under the U.S. Army War College's External Research Associates Program, Dr. D. Robert Worley addresses the ways that the age of terrorism is affecting American grand strategy. He contends that terrorism has made many of the basic concepts of international relations and national security obsolete. Declaring war on a tactic; terrorism, erodes the clarity necessary for coherent strategy. Dr. Worley then develops what he calls a "guerra strategy" more appropriate for dealing with terrorism and other non-state threats.

  Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute

  Worley, D. Robert (Duane Robert), 1949-

  2003-02
• Defeating Saddam Hussein's Strategy

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  To defeat Saddam without causing significant casualties and collateral damage requires more operational finesse than brute force. This paper provides an insightful strategy for both winning the war decisively and setting the conditions for winning the peace.

  Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute

  Millen, Raymond A.

  2003-01
• Hart-Rudman Commission and the Homeland Defense

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  "The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, popularly known as the Hart-Rudman Commission after its chairs, has recently produced a series of reports. The commission believes that recent changes in the security environment mean the rise of new threats, in particular the likelihood of an attack on American soil resulting in thousands of casualties. As a consequence, the commission calls for major changes in the organization of national security institutions in order to respond adequately to these new challenges. This monograph discusses the assumptions underlying the diagnosis and threat assessment made by the commission. It argues that several assumptions made by the commission are of debatable merit and rest on a very selective reading of social science. The commission relies heavily on the notion that globalization has both integrative and disintegrative tendencies. While for much of the world globalization increases integration, there will be an intense rejection of western culture and a backlash to globalization in parts of the Third World. The key assumptions underlying this picture are that people in traditional societies are disoriented by rapid social change and seek to turn the clock back."

  Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute

  Roxborough, Ian

  2001-09
• Beyond Nunn-Lugar: Curbing the Next Wave of Weapons Proliferation Threats from Russia

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  The chapters in this book were originally commissioned by the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC) as part of a study on the future of U.S.-Russian nonproliferation cooperation. This book is different from other studies of U.S.-Russian cooperation because it relies on competitive strategies, which detail how best to pit one's strengths against a competitor's weaknesses in a series of moves and countermoves. The goal is to devise strategies that force one's competitor to spend more time and resources shoring up his weaknesses than in taking offensive action.

  Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute

  Riisager, Thomas; Sokolski, Henry D.

  2002-04
• New Craft of Intelligence: Achieving Asymmetric Advantage in the Face of Nontraditional Threats

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  This monograph is the third in the Strategic Studies Institute's "Studies in Asymmetry" Series. In it, the author examines two paradigm shifts--one in relation to the threat and a second in relation to intelligence methods-- while offering a new model for threat analysis and a new model for intelligence operations in support to policy, acquisition, and command engaged in nontraditional asymmetric warfare. He concludes with an examination of the Revolution in Military Affairs and the need for a Revolution in Intelligence Affairs.

  Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute

  Steele, Robert David, 1952-

  2002-02
• Transnational Threats: Blending Law Enforcement and Military Strategies

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  "On February 2-3, 2000, the U.S. Army War College, the Triangle Institute for Security Studies, and the Duke University Center for Law, Ethics, and National Security co-sponsored a conference in Chapel Hill, North Carolina. The conference examined transnational threats, including terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction, cyber threats to the national infrastructure, and international organized crime. The goal was to evaluate the seriousness of such threats and discuss strategies for dealing with them. In particular, the conference sought to address the question of how military and law enforcement could blend their strategies to better counter transnational threats. A secondary purpose was to clarify the role of the military in meeting challenges that transcend national borders and threaten our national interests. This book highlights some of the main issues and themes that ran through the conference. After looking at the various threats and undertaking a risk assessment, the report considers the unique aspects of transnational threats, and then identifies the key challenges facing the United States, paying particular attention to the role of the military. The book concludes with discussions of some of the steps that should be taken to secure ourselves against transnational threats."

  Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute

  Pumphrey, Carolyn W. (Carolyn Wilson), 1955-

  2002-11
• Information Revolution and National Security

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  The effects of the information revolution are particularly profound in the realm of national security strategy. They are creating new opportunities for those who master them. The U.S. military, for instance, is exploring ways to seize information superiority during conflicts and thus gain decisive advantages over its opponents. But the information revolution also creates new security threats and vulnerabilities. No nation has made more effective use of the information revolution than the United States, but none is more dependent on information technology. To protect American security, then, military leaders and defense policymakers must understand the information revolution. The essays in this volume are intended to contribute to such an understanding. They grew from a December 1999 conference co-sponsored by the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute and the University of Pittsburgh Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Security Studies. The conference brought together some of the foremost members of the academic strategic studies community with representatives of the U.S. Government and U.S. military. As could be expected when examining a topic as complex as the relationship between the information revolution and national security, the presentations and discussions were far-ranging, covering such issues as the global implications of the information revolution, the need for a national information security strategy, and the role of information in U.S. military operations. While many more questions emerged than answers, the conference did suggest some vital tasks that military leaders and defense policymakers must undertake.

  Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute

  Copeland, Thomas E.

  2000-08
• Jihadi Groups, Nuclear Pakistan, and the New Great Game

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  For the United States and other nations concerned with security in South and Central Asia, one of the most ominous trends has been the growing influence of Jihadist groups in Pakistan which feel obligated to wage holy war against everything that they perceive as non-Islamic. Their objective would be a Pakistani government similar to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The danger this would pose to regional stability and U.S. interests is clear. The author assesses Jihadi groups from the framework of a new "Great Game" for influence in Central Asia involving an array of states. He argues that, if this competition leads to increased violence, outside states including the United States could be drawn in. On the other hand, if the region stabilizes, it could provide solid economic and political partners for the United States. A well-designed American strategy, Ahrari contends, might help avoid crises or catastrophe.

  Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute

  Ahrari, Mohammed E.

  2001-08
• Proliferation and Nonproliferation in Ukraine: Implications for European and U.S. Security

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  Limiting nuclear proliferation is a vital goal of U.S. security policy. With this in mind, the Strategic Studies Institute cosponsored a conference at the University of Pittsburgh on March 16-17, 1994 to deal with the issues involved in achieving this objective. An additional U.S. objective is the stabilization of relationships among the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. These two issues come together in Ukraine which, upon achieving independence, found itself in possession of nuclear missiles that were positioned in the former Soviet Union and on Ukraine's territory. Ukraine was reluctant to relinquish control of them for security reasons. This monograph, presented at the conference, seeks to explain why Ukraine originally sought to retain the weapons and then, in 1994, agreed to dismantle them in return for compensation and the very limited security guarantees that exist under the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty. The author also examines the nature of Russia's threat to Ukraine and the implications of the new agreement for U.S. policy vis-a-vis Ukraine and Russia.

  Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute

  Blank, Stephen, 1950-

  1994-07-01
• Toward a National Security Policy and Strategy for Now and the 21st Century

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  In the confusion of effort that has resulted from trying to deal with homeland defense in the complex contemporary global security environment, strategic considerations have played little part in the debate and actions pertaining to national and global security. The general result in the United States has been the ad hoc and piece-meal crisis management of security affairs. That approach, in turn, has led to ad hoc, piecemeal, and less-than-desirable results---and high personnel, monetary, and political costs. As a consequence, many participants in the Conference on Homeland Security, 2000, either call for or respond to a call for clear policy direction---and a strategy and organizational structure that provides the basic guidance regarding how to better defend the United States and its global interests. Manwaring and Corr intend to establish the philosophical underpinnings and a beginning point for a field theory from which to achieve the vision necessary for greater success in safeguarding the American homeland. In that connection, it must be remembered that, in the highly integrated global system, global defense is homeland defense.

  Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute

  Manwaring, Max G.; Corr, Edwin G.

  2000-10
• Strategic View of Where the Army is: Homeland Defense and Issues of Civil-Military Relations

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  There is a proper understanding within the U.S. Army that the military must minimize its involvement in domestic affairs. Yet, the armed forces have been called on more and more to provide direct aid and support in domestic crises that range from Hurricane Andrew to the terrorist bombing of the Oklahoma City Federal Building. Quick, efficient, and effective responses in these and other cases have generated calls for the armed forces to take the lead in confronting the complex issues of contemporary homeland defense because the military knows how to plan for and conduct crises operations, and the federal armed forces are not hamstrung by "artificial" legal constraints, boundaries, or jurisdictions. Because of contradictions among the missions that the Army is now expected to perform and because of the mismatch of resources provided to perform those diverse missions, the Army is in a quandary. The bottom line is that the Army is torn between "fighting the big wars" and preparing for and executing "operations other than war." The hesitancy of the U.S. Army to accept wholeheartedly the missions it is currently being given is thus cause for concern regarding its professionalism. Professionalism, in general, is in decline within western democracies. Professionalism is a result of at least two factors. First, it depends on the effectiveness with which the institution performs its functions. And, second, it depends on the relationship of the profession to society it serves. Therefore the Army must do everything possible to do its job right and well. It is necessary to define clearly and consistently the Army's institutional purpose and the jurisdiction of its professional work. This chapter will proceed to place these problems into the strategic context of military professionalism -- a topic little studied in the military now and even less understood outside the profession. We will analyze two issues within the profession now impeding healthy institutional adaptation to the new era -- the officer corps' intellectual muddle over the purpose of the Army, and their ethical muddle over the role of self-sacrifice in the profession's ethos. We believe these two unresolved contradictions have contributed in very significant ways to the Army's inability thus far to deal effectively with vexing issues such as domestic defense at home and force protection abroad.

  Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute

  Snider, Don M., 1940-; Nagl, John A., 1966-; Pfaff, Tony

  2000-10
• In Support of the Civil Authorities

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  Military assistance to civilian authorities is not a new concept. From before the birth of this nation, the military, whether militia or regular or both, has habitually supported local, state, and federal civilian authorities in times of manmade or natural disaster, civil unrest, or other situations. This support was very often questionable in legality and usefulness. Over time, though, numerous laws and directives have transformed this supporting relationship into an institutionalized interdepartmental and interagency coordination and planning process. The changing nature of threats, however, has expanded the scope of the military's responsibilities in support of civilian authorities. This old mission now involves an ever-widening array of diverse military and Department of Defense (DoD) organizations and agencies equipped with new terminology and new, evolving concepts. The United States faces myriad threats today besides those caused by natural phenomenon. Groups opposed to the thrust of the U.S. post-Cold war policies have multiplied in recent years. The openness of the U.S. society provides an opportunity for our enemies to operate with more freedom than they would have in more restrictive venues. Also exacerbating the threats is the global proliferation of cheap Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The Threats can be defined broadly as international or domestic in nature. International threats fall into one of three separate categories: international terrorism, transnational threats, and conventional attacks. Domestic terrorism stems from domestic groups who are based and operate entirely within the United States, its territories, or possessions, and whose activities are directed at elements of the federal, local, or state governments or the U.S. civilian population.

  Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute

  Haus, Donald A.

  2000-10
• Evolving Roles and Missions for the Reserve Components in Responding to Incidents Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction

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  The U.S. received a wake-up call with the Oklahoma City, World Trade Center, and Khobar Towers bombing incidents. These seminal events spurred Congress and federal, state, and local government agencies to actively assess the nation's readiness to respond to an incident involving a weapon of mass destruction (WMD). The federal government has made WMD consequence management (CM) preparedness one of five major program thrusts associated with countering domestic threats, and the President's budget contains $1.5 billion towards defense against WMD in FY01. Almost 42% ($630M) is dedicated to preparing for and responding to a WMD incident. Within the $630M, $75M is targeted to Reserve Component (RC) integration into this vital area. Early on, the Deputy Secretary of Defense established that Reserve components needed to be fully integrated into the Department's WMD response capabilities. The "Tiger Team Report," Defense Reform Initiative #25, and two Defense Planning Guidance documents have identified roles and missions and funding responsibilities for the RC. Also in January 1998, Defense Reform Initiative #25 requested a DoD plan for integrating the Guard and Reserve into domestic WMD terrorism response. The approved plan leverages unique Guard and Reserve capabilities to improve DoD's ability to plan for and respond to the significant and growing threat posed to the U.S. by WMD. Concurrently, it created a new type of unit (WMD Civil Support Team [CST]) to help fill the existing gaps in civilian response capabilities. The Guard and Reserve share many of the same capabilities, which include aviation operations, search and rescue, engineer operations, transportation, maintenance, law enforcement, fire-fighting, mortuary affairs, explosive ordnance, bridging operations, communications, command and control, medical assets, and chemical capabilities. The WMD CSTs (formally known as Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection [RAID] Teams) were designed to be state assets, operating within federal doctrine, but under the command and control of the state governor and therefore, they are able to respond to a local/state disaster or emergency well before federal response assets could be brought to bear.

  Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute

  Embrey, Ellen

  2000-10
• Strategic Perspective on U.S. Homeland Defense: Problem and Response

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  This document is the transcript of a speech given by Dr. John J. Hamre, former Deputy Secretary of Defense. At the time of this speech Dr. Hamre was the President of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). The speech was given at the Conference on Homeland Protection in April 2000. Dr. Hamre discusses issues of homeland defense beginning in the 1990s and the use of nontraditional means a country would use against the US because of the immense military power the US has. He also discusses the "residue of the Cold War" that includes large inventories of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons that have begun to fall into the hands of "bad people." Additionally, individuals such as Osama Bin Laden have shown that they have the ability to act internationally and involve other organizations. Dr. Hamre identifies and discusses three meanings of homeland defense, as mentioned above, in addition to cyber protections. Dr. Hamre questions who is ultimately able to combat these defense issues because they are so broad - national missile issues are for the DoD, WMD issues are both federal and DoD, and cyber issues are still unclear.

  Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute

  Hamre, John J.

  2000-10
• Where Domestic Security and Civil Liberties Collide

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  Mr. Dunlap examines budget matters concerning domestic security and civil liberties in this report. The report discusses the amount of money spent on anti-terrorism programs when the threats are unknown and non-specific. The data used was the latest available, 1993-1998. Mr. Dunlap poses that the threat of terrorism cannot be combated by the US government or the armed forces, but it should be taken up by the law enforcement personnel of the US because the problem rests with the civilian population (law enforcement agencies, courts, etc.). He also notes that the failing educational system, economics, and social unrest in the nation cause problems for national security yet those problems do not fall to the armed forces to defend or repair. It is also argued that for the US government to accomplish anything, the job must be surrendered to the US armed forces that way it is perceived as a threat and garners more interest by the general population.

  Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute

  Dunlap, Charles J., 1950-

  2000-10
• Resolving Ethical Challenges in an Era of Persistent Conflict

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  "In this monograph, Colonel Tony Pfaff explores the ethical challenges facing the Army in an era of persistent conflict dominated by a variety of irregular threats. Pfaff argues that these challenges arise because irregular adversaries change the character of their war from imposing one's will on the enemy to compelling the enemy to accept one's interest. While this shift may seem subtle, Pfaff argues, it suggests a number of important practical and ethical implications for our way of war. Formerly, civilians were largely separable from warfighting, meaning that our strategies of annihilation and attrition were the most effective--and ethical--paths to victory. But now, when combating irregular threats, civilians are no longer separable from warfighting. Consequently, strategies of annihilation and attrition not only undermine a successful resolution of the conflict, but they are unethical."

  Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute

  Pfaff, Tony

  2011-04
• Developing a Diplomatic Corps That is Second-to-None: The Army War College Partners to Develop Tomorrow's Diplomats (CSL Issue Paper. May 2011, Volume 8-11)

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  This paper highlights the current NSS [National Security Strategy] and its emphasis on U.S. foreign policy and the ability to practice both "hard and soft power" in regard to U.S. engagement options. It also explains that the military remains the "cornerstone" of U.S. national security, but should be one of several tools at the U.S. disposal. This article argues that the U.S. should use a wide range of tools, which is refereed to as "smart power" in our NSS. "Smart power" refers to tools such as "diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and cultural." Additionally, this paper covers several key topics underscoring the Army War College and its role in developing "tomorrow's diplomats." These topics include the following: "The International Strategic Crisis Negotiation Exercise; Partnerships to Achieve Common Educational Goals; and Developing New Partnerships and the Way Ahead."

  Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute

  White, Samuel R.

  2011-05
• Hard Power and Soft Power: The Utility of Military Force as an Instrument of Policy in the 21st Century

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  "The concept of soft power, that is the influence attained through the co-option of foreigners by the attractiveness of our values, ideas, and practices, understandably has great appeal. Soft power is much cheaper than the hard power of military force, and it is more compatible with the culture of a principally liberal American society. All too often, military force seems to fail as an instrument of policy and, as a consequence, it invites the view that it is becoming obsolescent and even anachronistic. Dr. Colin Gray subjects hard and soft power to close critical scrutiny and finds that the latter is significantly misunderstood and, as a consequence, misassessed as a substitute for the threat or use of military force. Each kind of power has its limitations, but the obvious and familiar challenges characteristic of military force do not mean that therefore soft power should be our policy instrument of choice. The author warns against expecting too much of soft power."

  Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute

  Gray, Colin S.

  2011-04
• U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Volume II: National Security Policy and Strategy, 4th Edition

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  "This edition of the U. S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy continues to reflect the structure and approach of the core national security strategy and policy curriculum at the War College. The fourth edition is published in two volumes that correspond roughly to the Department of National Security and Strategy's core courses: 'Theory of War and Strategy' and 'National Security Policy and Strategy'. Like previous editions, this one is largely an expansion of its predecessor rather than a major rewriting. About a quarter of the chapters are new, and several others have undergone significant rewrites or updates. However, approximately half of the book remains unchanged. Although this is not primarily a textbook, it does reflect both the method and manner we use to teach strategy formulation to America's future senior leaders. The book is not a comprehensive or exhaustive treatment of either strategic theory or the policymaking process. Both volumes are organized to proceed from the general to the specific. Thus the first volume opens with general thoughts on the nature and theory of war and strategy, proceeds to look at the complex aspect of power, and concludes with specific theoretical issues. Similarly, the second volume begins by examining the policy/strategy process, moves to a look at the strategic environment, and concludes with some specific issues. This edition adds several short case studies that can be used to illustrate the primary material in the volume."

  Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute

  Bartholomees, J. Boone, 1947-

  2010-07