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A.Q. Khan Illicit Nuclear Trade Network and Implications for Nonproliferation Efforts
"A year and a half after the dramatic arrest of Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan's gas-centrifuge program, much has been learned about his illicit, transnational nuclear smuggling network, called the 'Khan network.' Key questions, however, remain unanswered about this network's customers and inner workings. Understanding the Khan network is critical to ensuring that it is no longer operating and for safeguarding against a similar network emerging in the future. This chapter provides a brief overview of what the Khan network offered to its customers and describe some of the efforts to fix holes in the international nonproliferation system that are being exposed by the investigations into Khan's activities."
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Contemporary Conflict
Albright, David; Hinderstein, Corey
2006-07
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Threats to US Security in a Postcontainment World
"The US must take into account the nature of the threats confronting it in devising its military strategy and force structure. Recent years, however, have brought significant changes in these threats. Therefore, the threats need to be reassessed and reprioritized, and the implications of the outcome for US military strategy and force structure should be examined. In carrying out the reassessment and reprioritization of threats, it is essential to observe two key principles: (1) emphasis should go to direct challenges to US interests rather than to those of a peripheral concern, and (2) threats should be weighted primarily in terms of the probability that they will actually materialize and not in terms of what havoc they would wreak if they did materialize. On the basis of these criteria, four major threats seem likely to face the US in the coming years. In descending order of importance, they are regional conflicts, Soviet strategic nuclear forces, anti-US terrorism, and Soviet conventional military forces. This configuration of challenges establishes a number of requirements for future US military strategy and force structure. Although it does not afford detailed guidelines for either, it does set broad parameters for both. A few of these requirements merely revalidate aspects of past strategy and force structure, but many dictate new approaches."
Air University (U.S.). Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education
Albright, David
1992-04
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Drawing Lessons from the Case of South Africa's Disarmament for Today [PASCC Research in Progress]
"South Africa abandoned its nuclear weapon program publicly in the early 1990s. It is the only state to have relinquished its program voluntarily, making it an excellent case study from which to draw lessons. The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) has a wealth of unpublished information on the program's disarmament and subsequent external verification. This project aims to develop lessons from South Africa's experience that provide a potential path forward for dealing with other countries, such as North Korea and Iran, which may require similar denuclearization. In addition, the research will provide policy makers with advice on how South Africa's case can inform international agreements and initiatives to improve U.S. and international nuclear security." This document has been added to the Homeland Security Digital Library in agreement with the Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD (PASCC) as part of the PASCC collection. Permission to download and/or retrieve this resource has been obtained through PASCC.
Institute for Science and International Security; Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Contemporary Conflict
Albright, David
2015-05
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Iraq's Aluminum Tubes: Separating Fact from Fiction
When David Kay, a senior advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence, presented the interim findings of the Iraq Survey Group on weapons of mass destruction in early October 2003, he said little about the attempts by Iraq to acquire over 100,000 high strength aluminum tubes. Before the 2003 Iraq war, these tubes were widely described by President George W. Bush and senior administration officials as key gas centrifuge components, demonstrating that Iraq not only had reconstituted its nuclear weapons program but would soon be able to produce highly enriched uranium (HEU) for nuclear weapons. These tubes became central to the Bush Administration's pre-war claim that Iraq posed a menacing and growing threat to the United States and its allies. But extensive evidence collected during recent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections and after the fall of Baghdad shows that Iraq did not plan to use the tubes in gas centrifuges. This report outlines many of the details and applications of the tubes, as well as additional findings from the survey.
United States. Central Intelligence Agency
Albright, David
2003-12-05
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Future World of Illicit Nuclear Trade: Mitigating the Threat
"Of the roughly two dozen countries that have pursued or obtained nuclear weapons during the last fifty years, almost all of them depended importantly on foreign supplies. As a short term projection over the next five to ten years, illicit nuclear trade is likely to be conducted by several nations seeking nuclear weapons or wanting to maintain existing nuclear weapons arsenals or capabilities. Additional states in regions of proliferation concern may utilize smuggling methods to acquire advanced, ostensibly civilian, nuclear technology including uranium enrichment and plutonium production and separation capabilities. And despite many recent, particularly United States-led, successes, stopping this trade will remain difficult. Absent mitigating actions, several existing or expected trends are projected to make it easier for smugglers to succeed in acquiring nuclear and nuclear-related goods and technology. Future illicit trade can be stopped through measures taken today as long as the political will is there to foresee and address future threats. A range of countermeasures aimed at mitigating or eliminating these future threats must be employed today to stop them from emerging in the next five to ten years. Preventing the future world of illicit trade is imperative to U.S. and international security and to the creation of a world safer from the spread and use of nuclear weapons." Note: This document has been added to the Homeland Security Digital Library in agreement with the Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD (PASCC) as part of the PASCC collection. Permission to download and/or retrieve this resource has been obtained through PASCC.
Institute for Science and International Security
Albright, David; Stricker, Andrea; Wood, Houston
2013-07-29
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Revisiting South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: Its History, Dismantlement, and Lessons for Today
"Twenty five years ago South Africa acceded to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty after dismantling its nuclear weapons. Yet, the full story of that nuclear weapons program was not revealed publicly at that time. Parts were hidden from the International Atomic Energy Agency as well. Now, after many years of work by the media and independent experts, with the cooperation of a number of former members of the nuclear weapons program, a much fuller picture of South Africa's nuclear weapons program has emerged. At the Institute for Science and International Security, work on South Africa's nuclear program goes back to its founding in 1992. One of its first projects was working with African National Congress (ANC) officials, who were interested in learning more about nuclear non-proliferation in anticipation of assuming key government positions in a democratic South African government. This cooperation led to contacts with several former members of South Africa's nuclear weapons program and a range of collaborative endeavors with them. It included two tours of the old nuclear weapons production sites. On the trip in August 2002, Albright was allowed to photograph the old weapon production sites before they were modified beyond recognition of their original purpose. Many of these images appear here for the first time." Note: This document has been added to the Homeland Security Digital Library in agreement with the Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD (PASCC) as part of the PASCC collection. Permission to download and/or retrieve this resource has been obtained through PASCC.
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Contemporary Conflict; United States. Defense Threat Reduction Agency; Institute for Science and International Security
Albright, David; Stricker, Andrea
2016
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