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National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza
"The National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza guides our preparedness and response to an influenza pandemic, with the intent of (1) stopping, slowing or otherwise limiting the spread of a pandemic to the United States; (2) limiting the domestic spread of a pandemic, and mitigating disease, suffering and death; and (3) sustaining infrastructure and mitigating impact to the economy and the functioning of society. The Strategy will provide a framework for future U.S. Government planning efforts that is consistent with The National Security Strategy and the National Strategy for Homeland Security." Key components of this strategy include preparedness and communication, surveillance and detection, and a section on response and containment.
United States. White House Office
United States. Homeland Security Council
2005-11
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Providing Logistical Support to Quarantined Citizens During a Public Health Emergency
"Government and local/regional public health departments should develop plans for providing logistical support to individuals quarantined as a result of a public health emergency. A clear, yet flexible, response plan for delivering food, medicine, and supplies to affected individuals should be developed and widely communicated once a quarantine is announced. Public health officials should coordinate with major volunteer and relief organizations to boost manpower and avoid duplication of effort, and should be receptive to smaller groups willing to offer assistance during a crisis."
Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS)
2004-06-07?
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National Strategic Plan for Public Health Preparedness and Response
"CDC [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention] provides technical assistance and resources to state and local public health agencies to support their efforts to build prepared and resilient communities. CDC provides subject-matter expertise and assistance for domestic and global surveillance, laboratory, occupational health and epidemiology functions, and health threats including anthrax, smallpox, influenza and other infectious diseases, food-borne illness, and radiation, among others. CDC's Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response (OPHPR) leads the agency's preparedness and response activities by providing strategic direction, support, and coordination for activities across CDC as well as with local, state, tribal, national, territorial, and international public health partners. In the decade since September 11th and the anthrax attacks, significant investments have been made in the nation's public health system to respond to all-hazard threats. Public health departments at all levels of government can now quickly staff public health emergency operations centers; there is improved proficiency in laboratories testing for biological and chemical agents across the nation and the globe; and states can receive urgent disease reports and rapidly communicate information about health threats and related preventive and protective actions to the public."
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.). Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response
2011-09
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Avian Influenza Functional Exercise [East Lansing, MI; May 8-9, 2006]
From the 'Purpose of the Exercise': "The exercise was designed to enhance the knowledge of participants in morning educational sessions, and to provide a scenario targeted at practicing obtaining appropriate blood and swab samples, observing on-farm biosecurity, and testing a means of communications in the afternoon. The surveillance testing teams were to be comprised of a random mix of participants from the two agencies and the private sector. The educational sessions were to include pandemic flu, wild bird surveillance, the Michigan Avian Disease Response Plan, backyard flocks, bird and sample handling, and reviewing the Incident Command System."
Michigan. Department of Agriculture
Roth, Peggy A.
2006-05-09
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Pandemic Preparedness Handbook
This Pandemic Preparedness Handbook was created to provide detailed guidance to government, corporate, and international planners charged with the development of their pandemic readiness and response plan. Don Philpott, Senior Editor of Homeland Defense Journal authored this handbook with input from federal, state and local emergency response and public health managers.
Homeland Defense Journal (Firm)
Philpott, Don
2007-01-01
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Options for the Use of Human H5N1 Influenza Vaccines and the WHO H5N1 Vaccine Stockpile: WHO Scientific Consultation
"From 1 to 3 October 2007, WHO [World Health Organization] held a scientific consultation to review the current data on H5N1 vaccine immunogenicity, safety and other characteristics, to consider current general options for the use of such vaccine and to identify options specifically for the use of the WHO H5N1 vaccine stockpile. One of the principal objectives of this consultation was to review the available scientific information as a basis for the possible uses of the WHO H5N1 vaccine stockpile in order to inform the discussions of the WHO Strategic Advisory Group of Experts (SAGE) in November 2007. The participants of the October consultation included researchers, representatives from WHO Influenza Collaborating Centres, selected country representatives, SAGE members, and the pharmaceutical industry. Observers were allowed."
World Health Organization
2008
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UNCW Pandemic Flu Exercise: October 10, 2007: After Action Report [Wilmington, North Carolina]
"The UNCW [University of North Carolina Wilmington] Pandemic Flu tabletop exercise took place on October 10, 2007. This exercise was conducted to better prepare UNCW emergency responders for a widespread pandemic influenza situation. Participants were presented with a scenario and asked to respond in real time according to the UNCW Pandemic Influenza Response Plan. All participants received a copy of the plan prior to the exercise. The exercise scenario took participants through four modules. However, because of limited time, participants were only able to discuss two of the modules. During these two modules, participants identified many successes in UNCW's pandemic flu procedures as well as several challenges. Successes included the quick identification of a suspected avian flu case at UNCW, effective coordination with the New Hanover County Health Department, and excellent cooperation between the participating groups and departments. Issues included a lack of academic policies for pandemic flu situations, difficulties in communicating with UNCW community members working and studying abroad, and lack of the identification of essential functions at UNCW and succession plans to keep these essential functions filled."
University of North Carolina at Wilmington
2007-10-20
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Interim Pandemic Response Plan
"The NRC [Nuclear Regulatory Commission] Pandemic Response Plan [...] is intended to be complementary to the COOP [Continuity of Operations Plan] in that it provides for continuity of mission essential operations in response to a pandemic which could present a more persistent and widespread assault that may grow and fade across the Nation over a period of many months before finally dying out."
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
2006-01-01?
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Pandemic Preparedness Planning for US Businesses with Overseas Operations
"In the event of pandemic influenza, businesses will play a key role in protecting employees' health and safety as well as limiting the negative impact to the economy and society. The United States Government has created the following guide to help U.S. businesses with overseas operations prepare and implement pandemic business continuity. This is a list of suggestions and can serve as a starting point for developing a comprehensive plan." Please Note: This record has been imported to the HSDL as part of the LLIS Consolidation project and has not yet been reviewed by HSDL staff. Some information may be incomplete, missing, or inaccurate. For more information on the LLIS Consolidation project, please see here: [http://www.hsdl.org/?llis]
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.)
2007-01
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Pandemic Preparedness: Considerations on Exercises to Validate Pandemic Preparedness Plans
"Since the publication of the first Pandemic Preparedness Guidelines in 1999, WHO has advocated that Member States develop preparedness and response plans to mitigate the effects of an influenza pandemic on their populations. To date considerable effort and resources have been committed to developing such plans by the majority of WHO Member States. Preparation and response planning to reduce the impact of any emergency or crisis is a complex process, which requires the coordination and action of multiple players at all administrative levels. Moreover, this process is anticipated to involve a cycle of planning, development, education, practice, testing, evaluation and periodic revision. Many WHO Member States have already begun this process and should be congratulated for their efforts. The revised International Health Regulations (2005) also underline similar processes for preparedness and response to any Public Health Event of International Concern (PHEIC), including Pandemic Influenza."
World Health Organization
2008-02-07?
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Pediatric/Neonatal Disaster and Medical Surge Plan and Preparedness Toolkit
"The events of the Katrina Hurricane (2005), H1N1 Pandemic Flu (2009), Haiti Earthquake (2010) and Japan Earthquake/Tsunami/Nuclear Crisis (2011) demonstrate the need for a strong collaborative approach integrating newborns, infants and children into disaster planning. The resources required for the care of neonates and children are limited and regionally distributed. Successful neonatal and pediatric all-hazard preparedness relies on a strong network of committed public health agencies, emergency medical services, hospitals and communities. First steps to effective response include preserving bed capacity, competency and equipment to support a system of emergency care for infants and children within the county under normal conditions. […] The next step to providing effective disaster preparedness involves the practice of including neonates and pediatrics in all county, provider agency and hospital-based disaster exercises."
Contra Costa County (Calif.). Health Services Department
2011-05
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Emergency Medical Services Agency Draft: Pediatric/Neonatal Disaster and Medical Surge Plan and Preparedness Toolkit
"The events of the Katrina Hurricane (2008), H1N1 Pandemic Flu (2009), and Haiti Earthquake (2010) demonstrate the need for a strong collaborative approach integrating newborns, infants and children into disaster planning. The resources required for the care of neonates and children are limited and regionally distributed. Successful neonatal and pediatric all-hazard preparedness relies on a strong network of committed public health agencies, emergency medical services, hospitals and communities. First steps to effective response include preserving bed capacity, competency and equipment to support a system of emergency care for infants and children within the county under normal conditions."
Contra Costa County (Calif.). Health Services Department
2010-11
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Contra Costa County Pediatric/Neonatal Disaster and Medical Surge Plan and Preparedness Toolkit
"The events of the Katrina Hurricane (2005), H1N1 Pandemic Flu (2009), and Haiti Earthquake (2010) demonstrate the need for a strong collaborative approach integrating newborns, infants and children into disaster planning. The resources required for the care of neonates and children are limited and regionally distributed. Successful neonatal and pediatric all-hazard preparedness relies on a strong network of committed public health agencies, emergency medical services, hospitals and communities. First steps to effective response include preserving bed capacity, competency and equipment to support a system of emergency care for infants and children within the county under normal conditions. The Contra Costa EMS [Emergency Medical Services] for Children (EMSC) Plan implemented in 2000 has been fundamental to improving and sustaining standards of care for the pediatric population from birth to age 18. The plan was updated in 2008 and is available on the Contra Costa County EMS website at www.cccems.org. The Contra Costa EMSC Plan provides the essential foundation to build an effective infrastructure of sustainable neonatal and pediatric disaster preparedness. The next step to providing effective disaster preparedness involves the practice of including neonates and pediatrics in all county, provider agency and hospital-based disaster exercises. This toolkit has been developed to facilitate this preparedness and is to be used in conjunction with California EMS Authority EMS for Children (EMSC) Pediatric Disaster Preparedness Guidelines for LEMSAs [Local EMS Agencies] and EMSC Pediatric Disaster Preparedness Guidelines for Hospitals."
Contra Costa County (Calif.). Emergency Medical Services Agency
2011-02
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SARS: How Effective is the State and Local Response? Hearing Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Eighth Congress, First Session, May 21, 2003
This is the May 21, 2003 hearing on "SARS: How Effective is the State and Local Response?" held before the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. From the opening statement of Norm Coleman: "When a new disease such as SARS or the West Nile virus hits local communities, several things have to happen. First, local doctors need to know how to recognize that something new is happening and need to know who to turn to for information and support. Second, at the national and international levels, agencies must quickly develop information about the characteristics of the disease in order to treat patients and prevent its spread. The World Health Organization, the National Institutes for Health, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention perform this role well. Third, and this is most important, in my opinion, the information these agencies develop must be transmitted back to mayors, hospital administrators, and airport officials so that doctors, airline attendants, researchers, and average citizens know what to do in order to protect themselves. In the end, our goal ought to be to develop a national response, predicated on the understanding that the bulwark of that response is going to be at the local level--and by local government and elected officials. And that they must have the resources and the cooperation of the Federal Government to do so." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Julie L. Gerberding, Anthony S. Fauci, Michael T. Osterholm, Rodney N. Huebbers, Thomas R. Frieden, Mary C. Selecky, Lawrence O. Gostin, Bruce R. Cords, and Vicki Grunseth.
United States. Government Printing Office
2003-05-21
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LLIS Proven Practice: Policy: Shelter-In-Place Guidebook
"The FEMA's [Federal Emergency Management Act] Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program developed this Guidebook to protect eight communities adjacent to the U.S. Army's chemical weapons stockpile. This Guidebook was made available to FEMA's State and local government partners whose residents might be asked to shelter-in-place in the event of an incident involving the stockpile. This Guidebook is intended for State and local planners and decision-makers. The introduction discusses the value of temporarily sheltering-in-place as part of a comprehensive protective action strategy and the different options for sheltering-in-place. The following chapters address (1) shelter-in-place planning, training, outreach and exercises and (2) initiating, maintaining, and ending shelter-in-place in an actual emergency. An appendix discusses the use of computer models to determine when it is appropriate to terminate an order to shelter-in-place and walks through a hypothetical scenario."
Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS)
2014-04-08?
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Pandemic Influenza Impact on Communications Networks Study: Communications and Information Technology Best Practices
"The communications and information technology (IT) best practices are separated into four categories: 1) Enterprise Network Best Practices - Guidance for businesses on preparing enterprise IT infrastructure to support an anticipated increase in telecommuting traffic during a pandemic 2) Telecommuter Best Practices - Guidance for business telecommuters on techniques to maintain business continuity while working from residential access networks 3) General Public Best Practices - Guidance for the general public on voluntary actions to help reduce potential congestion in residential access networks 4) Network Service Provider Best Practices - Guidance for network service providers on maintaining operations and existing service levels during a pandemic".
United States. Department of Homeland Security
2007-10
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SEMP Biot #679: What Did the 2009 Swine Flu Pandemic Response Accomplish?
"As the 2009 swine flu consternation slowly fades into history, barring a third wave, some alert observers from a variety of countries and cultures are beginning to ask questions, such as what did pandemic preparedness and response accomplish? Who benefited from the efforts? Who did not? How much did the efforts cost? Were the preparedness and response activities a good value? How good? Why? For whom? What trends characterize the health management of anthrax bioterrorism, SARS, avian flu, and novel swine flu outbreaks in the decade 2001-2010? In these four outbreaks, were preparedness and response activities based on reliable and valid data and information? Is anyone studying preparedness and response processes and outcomes for these four outbreaks as a group?"
Suburban Emergency Management Project (U.S.)
2010-01-13
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Influenza Pandemic: Opportunities Exist to Address Critical Infrastructure Protection Challenges That Require Federal and Private Sector Coordination, Report to Congressional Requesters
"An outbreak of pandemic flu would require close cooperation between the public and private sectors to ensure the protection of our nation's critical infrastructure, such as drinking water and electricity. Because over 85 percent of the nation's critical infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector, it is vital that both sectors effectively coordinate to successfully protect these assets. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for coordinating a national protection strategy and government and private sector councils have been created as a collaborating tool. GAO [Government Accountability Office] was asked to assess how the federal and private sectors are working together at a national level to protect the nation's critical infrastructure in the event of a pandemic, the challenges they face, and opportunities for addressing these challenges. GAO reviewed 5 of the 17 critical infrastructure sectors. These 5 sectors are energy (electricity), food and agriculture, telecommunications, transportation (highway and motor carrier), and water."
United States. Government Accountability Office
2007-10
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After Action Report: SARS Complaint, Mid-Continent Airport, Wichita, KS, June 12, 2003
"The best way to start an examination of this event is to begin with the sequence of events as much in their entirety as possible, and then analyze what went right, and what can be improved. The situation began in the skies over Oklahoma when a passenger on a commercial flight noticed a person hacking and wheezing. This person, a resident of Wichita, had spent the last three weeks in Hanoi, Vietnam. Another passenger on the flight became convinced the coughing passenger was infected by Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)."
Sedgwick County Emergency Management
2003-06-19
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SARS Commission Final Report (Pages 1-873): Spring of Fear
This report contains the first portion of the full official report which investigated the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in Ontario, Canada (September 2003). It contains sections addressing the commission's mandate, the pandemic threat, and the story of the SARS outbreak.
Commission to Investigate the Introduction and Spread of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (Campbell Commission
2006-12
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Learning from SARS: Renewal of Public Health in Canada
The National Advisory Committee on SARS and Public, Health was established in early May 2003 by the, Minister of Health of the Government of Canada, the, Hon. A. Anne McLellan, in the circumstances surrounding, the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome [SARS]. The Committee's mandate was to provide a third party, assessment of current public health efforts and lessons, learned for ongoing and future infectious disease control." Committee members represented a multitude of disciplines, and perspectives from across Canada. Several were, directly involved in responding to SARS in different, capacities. We reviewed source documents, conducted, interviews, and engaged consultants to undertake surveys,, additional interviews, and analyses to illuminate aspects, of the SARS experience. Advice was also sought from a, constitutional legal expert. Over 30 non-governmental, and voluntary sector stakeholders submitted helpful, briefs and letters."
Canada. Health Canada
2003-10-01?
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SARS and Public Health Legislation
This document contains the Commission's second interim report written to assess legislation passed in Canada to protect its citizen against future outbreaks of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS).
Commission to Investigate the Introduction and Spread of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (Campbell Commission
2005-04-05?
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SARS Commission Final Report, Pages 874-1204: Spring of Fear (Volume 3)
This document contains the second portion of the full official report which investigated the SARS [severe acute respiratory syndrome] outbreak in Ontario, Canada in September 2003. The report contains sections addressing the victim's of SARS, a nurse's survey, and recommendations.
Commission to Investigate the Introduction and Spread of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (Campbell Commission
2006-12
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SARS Commission First Interim Report: SARS and Public Health in Ontario (Volume 4)
"SARS [severe acute respiratory syndrome] showed that Ontario's public health system is broken and needs to be fixed. Despite the extraordinary efforts of many dedicated individuals and the strength of many local public health units, the overall system proved woefully inadequate. SARS showed Ontario's central public health system to be unprepared, fragmented, poorly led, uncoordinated, inadequately resourced, professionally impoverished, and generally incapable of discharging its mandate. The SARS crisis exposed deep fault lines in the structure and capacity of Ontario's public health system. Having regard to these problems, Ontario was fortunate that SARS was ultimately contained without widespread community transmission or further hospital spread, sickness and death. SARS was contained only by the heroic efforts of dedicated front line health care and public health workers and the assistance of extraordinary managers and medical advisors. They did so with little assistance from the central provincial public health system that should have been there to help them."
Commission to Investigate the Introduction and Spread of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (Campbell Commission
2004-04-15
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Public Health Guidance for Community-Level Preparedness and Response to Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) Version 2, Supplement C: Preparedness and Response in Healthcare Facilities
"The goals of a preparedness and response plan in a healthcare facility are: [1] Rapidly identify and isolate all potential SARS [severe acute respiratory syndrome] patients. [2] Implement infection control practices and contract tracing to interrupt SARS-CoV transmission. [3] Ensure rapid communication within healthcare facilities and between healthcare facilities and health departments."
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.)
2004-01-08
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SARS in Healthcare Facilities, Toronto and Taiwan
"The healthcare setting was important in the early spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in both Toronto and Taiwan. Healthcare workers, patients, and visitors were at increased risk for infection. Nonetheless, the ability of individual SARS patients to transmit disease was quite variable. Unrecognized SARS case-patients were a primary source of transmission, and early detection and intervention were important to limit spread. Strict adherence to infection control precautions was essential in containing outbreaks. In addition, grouping patients into cohorts and limiting access to SARS patients minimized exposure opportunities. Given the difficulty in implementing several of these measures, control measures were frequently adapted to the acuity of SARS care and level of transmission within facilities. Although these conclusions are based only on a retrospective analysis of events, applying the experiences of Toronto and Taiwan to SARS preparedness planning efforts will likely minimize future transmission within healthcare facilities."
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.)
2004-05
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After-Action Report: SARS Complaint, Mid-Continent Airport, June 12, 2003
This brief after-action report outlines the response to a suspected severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) case at the Mid-Continent Airport in Wichita, Kansas. The document provides a timeline of events and offers lessons learned.
Sedgwick County Emergency Management
2003-06-19?
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SARS Commission Interim Report: SARS and Public Health in Ontario
"SARS [severe acute respiratory syndrome] showed that Ontario's public health system is broken and needs to be fixed. Despite the extraordinary efforts of many dedicated individuals and the strength of many local public health units, the overall system proved woefully inadequate. SARS showed Ontario's central public health system to be unprepared, fragmented, poorly led, uncoordinated, inadequately resourced, professionally impoverished, and generally incapable of discharging its mandate. The SARS crisis exposed deep fault lines in the structure and capacity of Ontario's public health system. Having regard to these problems, Ontario was fortunate that SARS was ultimately contained without widespread community transmission or further hospital spread, sickness and death. SARS was contained only by the heroic efforts of dedicated front line health care and public health workers and the assistance of extraordinary managers and medical advisors. They did so with little assistance from the central provincial public health system that should have been there to help them. These problems need urgently to be fixed."
Ontario. Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care
Campbell, Archie
2004-04-15
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Pandemic Influenza Functional Tabletop Exercise
"The University of Washington's (UW) 2006 annual emergency preparedness exercise was held on Wednesday, May 31, 2006. The exercise involved a simulated communicable disease outbreak that affected the Seattle, Bothell, and Tacoma campuses, and the entire region. There were 56 participants, representing UW administrators, unit leaders, and departments as well as external agencies. The primary purpose of this exercise was to test the adequacy of the University's emergency response plan during all phases of a simulated pandemic influenza (flu) event. This report is based upon the observations and evaluations of the exercise, and is intended to assist UW units and operating departments in enhancing emergency preparedness. The suggested actions in this report should be viewed as recommendations only."
University of Washington
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After Action Report: Tabletop Pandemic Influenza Exercise
This exercise was designed to test the Emergency Action Plans and preparedness in the event of an influenza pandemic. A key result of this tabletop exercise was the realization that the private sector must be involved in pandemic planning.
Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS)
