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Performance and Accountability: Challenges Facing the Department of Transportation
This GAO report is a Testimony of John J. Anderson, who discusses the critical challenges facing the Department of Transportation (DOT). His testimony is based on reports issued in January as part of GAO's performance and accountability series on major management challenges and program risks facing federal agencies and the federal government as a whole. With $58.5 billion in funding for fiscal year 2001, the Department faces critical challenges in achieving its goals of ensuring the safe and efficient movement of people and goods and in making cost-effective investments in the nation's transportation infrastructure. The testimony summarizes the challenges for surface transportation, aviation, the U.S. Coast Guard, and for the Department as a whole.
United States. General Accounting Office
2001-02-14
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Coast Guard: Budget Challenges for 2001 and Beyond
This GAO report is a testimony, which is based on recently completed and ongoing work. John H. Anderson addresses two topics: (1) the Coast Guard's progress in justifying and managing its Deepwater Project and (2) opportunities for improving the Coast Guard's operating efficiencies. How the Coast Guard manages risks in the acquisition process, particularly in the next 12 to 18 months, is critical to the success of the Deepwater Project. This document also examines the revised justification for the project and the Coast Guard's management of the acquisition process.
United States. General Accounting Office
2000-03-15
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Homeland Security: Preliminary Observations on Efforts to Target Security Inspections of Cargo Containers, Statement of Richard M. Stana, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives
"After the attacks of September 11, 2001, concerns intensified that terrorists would attempt to smuggle a weapon of mass destruction into the United States. One possible method for terrorists to smuggle such a weapon is to use one of the 7 million cargo containers that arrive at our nation's seaports each year. The Department of Homeland Security's U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is responsible for addressing the potential threat posed by the movement of oceangoing cargo containers. Since CBP cannot inspect all arriving cargo containers, it uses a targeting strategy, which includes an automated targeting system. This system targets some containers for inspection based on a perceived level of risk. In this testimony, GAO provides preliminary findings on its assessment of (1) whether CBP's development of its targeting strategy is consistent with recognized key risk management and computer modeling practices and (2) how well the targeting strategy has been implemented at selected seaports around the country. GAO is completing its assessment and developing recommendations to address strategy development and implementation challenges." -- Highlights
United States. General Accounting Office
2003-12-16
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FBI Reorganization: Progress Made in Efforts to Transform, but Major Challenges Continue, Statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives
This report discusses the efforts of the FBI to transform itself to be more effective in the war on terrorism. Testimony given by David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, Before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives.
United States. General Accounting Office
2003-06-18
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Border Security: New Policies and Procedures Are Needed to Fill Gaps in the Visa Revocation Process, Statement of Jess T. Ford, Director, International Affairs and Trade, Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
The National Strategy for Homeland Security calls for preventing the entry of foreign terrorists into our country and using all legal means to identify; halt; and where appropriate, prosecute or bring immigration or other civil charges against terrorists in the United States. GAO reported in October 2002 that the Department of State had revoked visas of certain persons after it learned they might be suspected terrorists, raising concerns that some of these individuals may have entered the United States before or after State's action. Congressional requesters asked GAO to (1) assess the effectiveness of the visa revocation process and (2) identify the policies and procedures of State, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that govern their respective actions in the process.
United States. General Accounting Office
2003-06-18
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Coast Guard: Comprehensive Blueprint Needed to Balance and Monitor Resource Use and Measure Performance for All Missions: Testimony of JayEtta Z. Hecker, Director, Physical Infrastructure, Before the Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, and Fisheries, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate
The September 11th attacks decidedly changed the Coast Guard's priorities and markedly increased its scope of activities. Homeland security, a long-standing but relatively small part of the Coast Guard's duties, took center stage. For the past several years, the Coast Guard has received substantial increases in its budget to accommodate its increased responsibilities. GAO was asked to review the Coast Guard's most recent level of effort on its various missions and compare them to past levels, analyze the implications of the proposed 2004 budget for these levels of effort, and discuss the challenges the Coast Guard faces in balancing and maximizing the effectiveness of all its missions.
The most recent levels of effort for the Coast Guard's various missions show clearly the dramatic shifts that have occurred among its missions since the September 11th attacks. Predictably, levels of effort related to homeland security remain at much higher levels than before September 11th. Levels of effort for two major non-security missions--search and rescue and aids to navigational--are now relatively consistent with historical levels. The 2004 budget request contains little that would appear to substantially alter the existing levels of effort among missions. The initiatives in the proposed budget relate mainly to enhancing homeland security and search and rescue missions.
United States. General Accounting Office
2003-03-12
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Weapons of Mass Destruction: Observations on U.S. Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Programs in Russia, Statement of Joseph A. Christoff, Director, International Affairs and Trade, Testimony before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives
"Over the past decade, the United States has responded to increased proliferation risks in Russia by providing $6.4 billion for Departments of Defense, Energy, and State programs in the former Soviet Union. The United States has made important progress in three areas. First, the Department of Defense helped destroy 463 Russian nuclear submarines, long-range bombers, and strategic missiles to support Russia's efforts to meet treaty requirements. Second, the Department of Energy installed security systems that helped protect 32 percent of Russia's weapons usable nuclear material. Third, the United States supplemented the income of thousands of Russian weapons scientists so they would be less inclined to sell their skills to countries of concern. However, U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation programs have consistently faced two critical challenges: (1) the Russian government has not always paid its agreed-upon share of program costs and (2) Russian ministries have often denied U.S. officials access to key nuclear and biological sites. Regarding program costs, Russia did not pay, for example, its previously agreed-upon share of $275 million to design and build a nuclear storage site at Mayak. As of January 2003, the United States plans to spend $385 million for a scaled-down version of this site."
United States. General Accounting Office
2003-03-05
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Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Deployment Challenges, Statement of Richard M. Stana, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, Testimony before the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives
"In November 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) established the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a multiyear, multibillion-dollar program to secure U.S. borders. One element of SBI is the U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) SBI program, which is responsible for developing a comprehensive border protection system through a mix of surveillance and communication technologies known as SBInet (e.g., radars, sensors, cameras, and satellite phones) and tactical infrastructure (e.g., fencing). The House Committee on Homeland Security and its Subcommittee on Management, Investigations, and Oversight asked GAO to monitor DHS progress in implementing CBP's SBI program. This testimony provides GAO's observations on (1) technology deployment; (2) infrastructure deployment; and (3) how the CBP SBI program office has defined its human capital goals and the progress it has ma2e to achieve these goals. GAO's observations are based on prior and new work, including analysis of DHS documentation, such as program schedules, contracts, and status reports. GAO also conducted interviews with DHS and Department of the Interior officials and contractors, and visits to sites on the southwest border where SBI deployment is under way. GAO performed the work from March to September 2008. DHS generally agreed with GAO's findings.
United States. Government Accountability Office
Stana, Richard M.
2008-09-10
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Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant Risks in Delivering Key Technology Investment, Statement of Randolph C. Hite, Director, Information Technology Architecture and System Issues, Testimony before the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives
"The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Secure Border Initiative (SBI) is a multiyear, multibillion-dollar program to secure the nation's borders through, among other things, new technology, increased staffing, and new fencing and barriers. The technology component of SBI, which is known as SBInet, involves the acquisition, development, integration, and deployment of surveillance systems and command, control, communications, and intelligence technologies. GAO was asked to testify on its draft report, which assesses DHS's efforts to (1) define the scope, timing, and life cycle management approach for planned SBInet capabilities and (2) manage SBInet requirements and testing activities. In preparing the draft report, GAO reviewed key program documentation, including guidance, plans, and requirements and testing documentation, interviewed program officials, analyzed a random probability sample of system requirements, and observed operations of the initial SBInet project."
United States. Government Accountability Office
Hite, Randolph C.
2008-09-10
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Aviation Security: TSA Is Enhancing Its Oversight of Air Carrier Efforts to Screen Passengers Against Terrorist Watch-List Records, But Expects Ultimate Solution to Be Implementation of Secure Flight, Statement of Cathleen A. Berrick, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, before the Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives
"Domestic air carriers are responsible for checking passenger names against terrorist watch-list records to identify persons who should be denied boarding (the No Fly List) or who should undergo additional security scrutiny (the Selectee List). The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is to assume this function through its Secure Flight program. However, due to program delays, air carriers retain this role. This testimony discusses TSA's requirements for domestic air carriers to conduct watch-list matching, the extent to which TSA has assessed compliance with watch-list matching requirements, and TSA's progress in developing Secure Flight. This statement is based on GAO's report on air carrier watch-list matching (GAO-08-992) being released today and GAO's previous and ongoing reviews of Secure Flight. In conducting this work, GAO reviewed TSA security directives and TSA inspections guidance and results, and interviewed officials from 14 of 95 domestic air carriers. GAO is not making any recommendations related to air carriers' watch-list matching programs because TSA initiated actions in April 2008 to strengthen related requirements and its oversight of air carriers' implementation of these requirements. Regarding Secure Flight, GAO previously made recommendations to strengthen the program's development. TSA generally agreed."
United States. Government Accountability Office
Berrick, Cathleen A.
2008-09-09
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Gulf War Illnesses: Basic Questions Unanswered Statement of Kwai-Cheung Chan, Director, Special Studies and Evaluations, National Security and International Affairs Division before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans' Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
"Many of the approximately 700,000 Gulf War veterans have complained of illnesses since the war's end in 1991, and over 10 percent have completed health examinations through the Department of Veterans' Affairs (VA) or Department of Defense (DOD). Some are concerned they are suffering from chronic disabling conditions because of exposures during the war to agents with known or suspected effects on health. In response to this concern, the government has funded research, investigation, and information activities through various agencies, including DOD, VA, and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). These agencies participate in an interagency group, the Persian Gulf Veterans' Coordinating Board, which was established in 1994 to coordinate these activities. The Coordinating Board's Research Working Group, currently chaired by the Department of Veterans' Affairs, focuses on research planning, review, and dissemination, but it is not authorized to manage or distribute the Departments' research funds. In 1996, DOD established the Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses to oversee DOD's efforts regarding illnesses being experienced by Gulf War veterans."
United States. General Accounting Office
Chan, Kwai-Cheung
2000-02-02
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Drug Control: DOD Allocates Fewer Assets to Drug Control Efforts Statement of Jess T. Ford, Associate Director, International Relations and Trade Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
"DOD faces obstacles in providing support to foreign government counterdrug efforts. Over the years, we have raised concerns about the limited capabilities of foreign military and law enforcement organizations to operate and repair the equipment and effectively use the training provided by DOD. For example, one concern we raised in our December 1999 report involved the capability of the Peruvian police to operate and maintain boats to be used for counterdrug river operations. Other concerns include human rights and intelligence sharing. DOD cannot give training support to some foreign military units nor can it share intelligence information with certain foreign counterdrug organizations because of their record on human rights abuses and evidence of corruption within these organizations."
United States. General Accounting Office
Ford, Jess T.
2000-01-27
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Illegal Aliens: INS' Processes for Denying Aliens Entry Into the United States: Testimony of Richard M. Stana, Director, Justice Issues, before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate
This report discusses the Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) processes for handling aliens who attempt to enter the county illegally. The tragic events of September 11, 2001, underscore the importance of effectively controlling the legal and illegal entry of aliens into the United States. Aliens enter the United States legally or illegally. Generally, legal entry requires aliens to first obtain visas at a U.S. consulate and appropriate travel documents, such as passports, from their own country. They then present themselves for INS inspection at a U.S. port of entry. Aliens may enter legally as immigrants or nonimmigrants. Immigrants enter for purposes of becoming lawful permanent residents. In addition, refugees and immediate relatives such as spouses, parents, and children of U.S. citizens can also be admitted. Nonimmigrants are admitted for a specified period of time for a specific purpose, such as tourism, business, or schooling. Under certain conditions, nonimmigrants in the United States may apply to INS to have their status changed to that of immigrant. Aliens enter illegally by evading INS inspections. They might enter at a port of entry and present fraudulent documents or cross the U.S. border between ports of entry. This testimony draws on prior reports and focuses mainly on INS' processes for denying aliens entry at land and airports of entry, including the expedited removal and credible fear processes.
United States. General Accounting Office
2001-11-13
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U.S. Postal Service: Issues Associated with Anthrax Testing at the Wallingford Facility: Testimony of Keith Rhodes and Bernard Ungar Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform
At the Wallingford facility, it took four attempts before anthrax contamination was eventually identified. The first two attempts by U.S. Postal Service contractors collected samples at various places in the facility, using dry swabs, the least effective method for sample collection. The Postal Service nationwide sampling plan required that contractors use dry swabs to collect anthrax samples at more than 280 facilities, including Wallingford. But the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), in commenting on the plan, had recommended that the Postal Service use other sampling methods. Nevertheless, the Postal Service did not revise its sampling plan. In the third attempt, CDC and the Agency for Toxic Substance and Disease Registry also found no contamination using wet swabs, but in the fourth attempt------using wet wipes and HEPA vacuums to collect the samples------they found contamination in samples from mail-sorting machines. In an April 2003 report, GAO found that the Postal Service's communication of test results to workers at the Wallingford facility generally appears consistent with its guidelines. But the decision not to release the first positive quantitative test results, after a worker's union requested them, was not consistent with OSHA's requirement to disclose requested results. The Postal Service said it did not release the December 2001 quantitative results because it could not validate them, as required by its guidelines.
United States. General Accounting Office
2003-05-19
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Nuclear Regulation: Emergency Preparedness Issues at the Indian Point 2 Nuclear Power Plant, Statementof Jim Wells, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
In 2001, we reported that, over the years, NRC had identified a number of emergency preparedness weaknesses at Indian Point 2 that had gone largely uncorrected. Consolidated Edison had some corrective actions under way before a February 2000 event raised the possibility that radioactively contaminated water would leak into the environment. In evaluating Consolidated Edison's response to this event, NRC found that critical emergency response personnel were not notified in a timely manner, which delayed the staffing and operation of the on-site emergency response facility. As a result, NRC found emergency preparedness problems similar to those it had identified before and during the event. Consolidated Edison reported that a release had occurred but posed no threat to the public, while county officials reported that no release had occurred. Consolidated Edison, the state, and the counties revised the plant's radiological emergency data form to more clearly show whether a release had occurred. As we also reported, county officials suggested changes to improve communications among NRC, FEMA, and non-state entities. In particular, county officials said that since they are responsible for radiological emergency preparedness for Indian Point 2, NRC and FEMA should communicate directly with them during non-emergency situations. Since our 2001 report, NRC inspection reports have continued to show emergency preparedness weaknesses. NRC officials said that they meet with state officials concerning emergency preparedness and have instituted various initiatives to improve public communication, in which local officials can participate. FEMA officials told us that it would continue to work with state and local governments on emergency preparedness.
United States. General Accounting Office
2003-03-10
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Overseas Presence: Conditions of Overseas Diplomatic Facilities, Statement of Jess T. Ford, Director, International Affairs and Trade, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
The State Department has done much over the last 4 years to improve physical security at overseas posts. State has constructed perimeter walls, anti-ram barriers, and access controls at many facilities; has obtained host government approval to close off nearby streets at many locations; and has implemented other measures. However, even with these new improvements, most office facilities do not meet security standards. Our analysis showed that as of December 2002, the primary office building at 232 posts lacked sufficient security because it did not meet one or more of State's five key standards. Moreover, at 81 posts, the primary building did not meet any of these standards. Only 12 posts have a primary building that meets all 5 standards. As a result, thousands of U.S. government and foreign national employees may be at risk. Security officials at the posts we visited are concerned that many of the buildings we observed are vulnerable to terrorist attacks. At least 96 posts have reported serious overcrowding. In addition to completing construction that is under way, State believes it needs to replace facilities at about 160 posts. State's timeline for completing this program will depend on the amount of funding it receives and how well it manages the program.
United States. General Accounting Office
2003-03-20
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General Services Administration Status of Efforts to Improve Management of Building Security Upgrade Program, Statement of Bernard L. Ungar, Director, Government Business Operations Issues, General Government Division, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Emergency Man
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the General Services Administration's (GSA) progress in upgrading the security of federal buildings under its operation. As you know, following the April 19, 1995, bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, the President directed the Department of Justice (DOJ) to assess the vulnerability of federal office buildings, particularly to acts of terrorism and other forms of violence. Under the direction of DOJ, an interagency working group comprising security professionals from nine federal departments and agencies issued in June 1995 a report recommending specific minimum security standards for federal buildings. Subsequently, the President directed executive departments and agencies to upgrade the security of their facilities to the extent feasible based on the DOJ report's recommendations. The President gave GSA this responsibility for the buildings it controls, and in July 1995, GSA initiated a multimillion-dollar security enhancement program for these buildings.
United States. General Accounting Office
Ungar, Bernard L.
1999-10-07
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Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and National Strategy, Statement for the Record, Raymond J. Decker, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
"Based on our prior and ongoing work, two key issues emerge that the new President and Congress will face concerning programs to combat terrorism. First, the overall leadership and management of such programs are fragmented within the federal government. No single entity acts as the federal governments top official accountable to both the President and Congress. Fragmentation exists in both coordination of domestic preparedness programs and in efforts to develop a national strategy. The Department of Justice worked with other agencies to develop the Attorney General Five-Year Interagency Counterterrorism and Technology Crime Plan. While this plan is the current document that most resembles a national strategy, we believe it still lacks some critical elements to include measurable desired outcomes, linkage to resources, and a discussion of the role of state and local governments."
United States. General Accounting Office
2001-03-27
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Export Controls: Challenges and Changes For Controls on Computer Exports, Statement of Harold J. Johnson, Associate Director, International Relations and Trade Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, Testimony before Governmental Affairs Committee, U.S. Senate
"U.S. policy with respect to the export of sensitive technology, including computers, is to seek a balance between the U.S. economic interest in promoting exports and its national security interests in both maintaining a military advantage over potential adversaries and denying the spread of technologies used in developing weapons of mass destruction. The United States has long controlled the export of high performance computers to sensitive destinations, such as Russia and China. These computers have both civilian (dual use) and military applications and technological advancements in computing power have been rapid. The Department of Commerce has primary responsibility for managing the licensing of these dual-use items and weighing the promotion of commercial interests in exporting items against the protection of national security interests. For the past several years, there has been continuing congressional concern about and debate over whether our national security is being harmed by relaxing export controls on high performance computers and over the rationale for subsequent revised controls." In this document Harold J. Johnson "will discuss our observations about how the executive branch (1) assesses the national security risks associated with the export of high performance computers going to countries of concern, (2) determines when the exports of computers at existing performance levels can no longer be controlled, and (3) has addressed arrangements for post-shipment verifications of high performance computer exports."
United States. General Accounting Office
Johnson, Harold J.
2000-05-26
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Food Safety and Security: Fundamental Changes Needed to Ensure Safe Food: Statement of Robert A. Robinson, Managing Director, Natural Resources and Environment before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, Restructuring and the District of Columbia, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate
Tens of millions of Americans become ill and thousands die each year from eating unsafe foods. The current food safety system is a patchwork structure that cannot address existing and emerging food safety risks. The current system was cobbled together over many years to address specific health threats from particular foods. The resulting fragmented organizational and legal structure causes inefficient use of resources, inconsistent oversight and enforcement, and ineffective coordination. Food safety issues must be addressed comprehensively--that is, by preventing contamination through the entire food production cycle, from farm to table. In this testimony, the Managing Director of Natural Resources and the Environment advocates a single, food safety agency responsible for administering a uniform set of laws. This single agency is needed to resolve long-standing problems with the current system; deal with emerging food safety issues, such as the safety of genetically modified foods or deliberate acts of contamination; and ensure a safe food supply.
United States. General Accounting Office
2001-10-10
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Export Controls: National Security Risks and Revisions to Controls on Computers, Statement of Harold J. Johnson, Associate Director, International Relations and Trade Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, Testimony before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate
This report discusses export controls for high performance computers. "U.S. policy with respect to the export of sensitive technology, including computers, is to seek a balance between the U.S. economic interest in promoting exports with its national security interests in both maintaining a military advantage over potential adversaries and denying the spread of technologies used in developing weapons of mass destruction. The United States has long controlled the export of high performance computers to sensitive destinations, such as Russia and China. These computers have both civilian (dual use) and military applications and technological advancements in computing power have been rapid. The Department of Commerce has primary responsibility for managing the licensing of these dual use items and weighing the promotion of commercial interests in exporting items against the protection of national security interests. For the past several years, there has been continuing congressional concern about and debate over whether our national security is being harmed by relaxing export controls on high performance computers and over the rationale for subsequent revised controls. [The author discusses the General Accounting Office's] observations about how the executive branch (1) assesses the national security risks associated with the export of high performance computers going to countries of concern and (2) determines when the exports of computers at existing performance levels can no longer be controlled."
United States. General Accounting Office
2000-02-28
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Department of the Interior: Major Management Challenges, Statement of Anu K. Mittal, Director Natural Resources and Environment, Frank Rusco, Director Natural Resources and Environment, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives
"The Department of the Interior (Interior) is responsible for managing much of the nation's vast natural resources. Its agencies implement an array of programs intended to protect these resources for future generations while also allowing certain uses of them, such as recreation and oil and gas development. In some cases, Interior is authorized to collect royalties and fees for these uses. Over the years, GAO [Government Accountability Office] has reported on management challenges at Interior, which are largely characterized by the struggle to balance the demand for greater use of its resources with the need to conserve and protect them. Furthermore, given the government's long-term fiscal challenges, Interior faces difficult choices in balancing its responsibilities. This testimony highlights some of the major management challenges facing Interior today. It is based on prior GAO reports. […] GAO has made a number of recommendations intended to improve Interior's programs by enhancing the information it uses to manage its programs and strengthening internal controls. Interior has agreed with most of the recommendations and taken some steps to implement them. However, Interior has been slow to implement other recommendations, such as developing a cohesive wildland fire strategy and improving oversight of oil and gas activities."
United States. Government Accountability Office
2011-03-01
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Information Technology: Investment Oversight and Management Have Improved but Continued Attention is Needed, Statement of David A. Powner Director, Information Technology Management Issues, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives
"The federal government anticipates spending $79 billion on information technology (IT) in fiscal year 2011. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) plays a key role in overseeing the implementation and management of federal IT investments. Given the size of these investments and their importance to the health, economy, and security of the nation, it is critical for OMB and federal agencies to provide appropriate program oversight and ensure adequate transparency. Over the past several years, GAO has issued a number of reports and testimonies on OMB's initiatives to highlight troubled projects, justify IT investments, and use project management tools. Partly in response to this prior work, in 2009 OMB deployed a public Web site--known as the IT Dashboard--that provides detailed information on approximately 800 major federal IT investments, including assessments of these investments' performance against cost and schedule targets (referred to as ratings). GAO was asked to testify on OMB's key efforts to improve the oversight and management of federal IT investments through the use of the Dashboard and other efforts. To prepare this statement, GAO drew on previously published work on IT investments, including OMB's Dashboard, agencies' oversight boards, and agencies' use of project management tools."
United States. Government Accountability Office
2011-03-17
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Moving Illegal Proceeds: Opportunities Exist for Strengthening the Federal Government's Efforts to Stem Cross-Border Currency Smuggling, Statement of Richard M. Stana, Director, Homeland and Security Issues, Testimony Before the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control
From the statement of Richard M. Stana: "I am pleased to be here today to discuss federal efforts to stem currency smuggling across our nation's borders. Mexican drug-trafficking organizations, terrorist organizations, and other groups with malevolent intent finance their operations by moving funds into or out of the United States. For example, a common technique used for taking proceeds from drug sales in the United States to Mexico is a method known as bulk cash smuggling. The National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) has stated that proceeds from drug trafficking generated in this country are smuggled across the southwest border and it estimates that the proceeds total from $18 billion to $39 billion a year. NDIC also estimates that Canadian drug-trafficking organizations smuggle significant amounts of cash across the northern border from proceeds of drugs sold in the United States [...]. My testimony today is based on our October 2010 report on cross-border currency smuggling and updated information on bulk cash seizures and the status of one our recommendations.2 Like the report, it will cover the following three issues: (1) the actions CBP [Customs and Border Protection] has taken to stem the flow of bulk cash leaving the country through land ports of entry and the challenges that remain, (2) the regulatory gaps that exist for cross-border reporting and other anti-money laundering requirements involving the use of stored value, and (3) the extent to which FinCEN [Financial Crimes Enforcement Network] has taken action to address these regulatory gaps."
United States. Government Accountability Office
2011-03-09
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Flood Insurance: Public Policy Goals Provide a Framework for Reform, Statement of Orice Williams Brown, Managing Director Financial Markets and Community Investment, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Insurance, Housing, and Community Opportunity, Committee on Financial Services, House of Representatives
"The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) has been on GAO's high-risk list since 2006, when the program had to borrow from the U.S. Treasury to cover losses from the 2005 hurricanes. The outstanding debt is $17.8 billion as of March 2011. This sizeable debt, plus operational and management challenges that GAO has identified at the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which administers NFIP, have combined to keep the program on the high-risk list. NFIP's need to borrow to cover claims in years of catastrophic flooding has raised concerns about the program's long-term financial solvency. This testimony 1) discusses ways to place NFIP on a sounder financial footing in light of public policy goals for federal involvement in natural catastrophe insurance and 2) highlights operational and management challenges at FEMA that affect the program. In preparing this statement, GAO relied on its past work on NFIP and on its ongoing review of FEMA's management of NFIP, which focuses on its planning, policies, processes, and systems. The management review includes areas such as strategic and human capital planning, acquisition management, and intra-agency collaboration."
United States. Government Accountability Office
2011-03-11
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Measuring Disaster Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Limited Progress in Assessing National Capabilities, Statement of William O. Jenkins, Jr., Director Homeland Security and Justice Issues, Testimony Before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate
"This testimony discusses the efforts of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)--a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)--to measure and assess national capabilities to respond to a major disaster. According to the Congressional Research Service, from fiscal years 2002 through 2010, Congress appropriated over $34 billion for homeland security preparedness grant programs to enhance the capabilities of state, territory, local, and tribal governments to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks and other disasters. Congress enacted the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (Post-Katrina Act) to address shortcomings in the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina that, among other things, gave FEMA responsibility for leading the nation in developing a national preparedness system. The Post-Katrina Act requires that FEMA develop a national preparedness system and assess preparedness capabilities--capabilities needed to respond effectively to disasters--to determine the nation's preparedness capability levels and the resources needed to achieve desired levels of capability. Federal, state, and local resources provide capabilities for different levels of 'incident effect' (i.e., the extent of damage caused by a natural or manmade disaster). FEMA's National Preparedness Directorate within its Protection and National Preparedness organization is responsible for developing and implementing a system for measuring and assessing national preparedness capabilities. The need to define measurable national preparedness capabilities is a well-established and recognized issue."
United States. Government Accountability Office
2011-03-17
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Border Security: Preliminary Observations on the Status of Key Southwest Border Technology Programs, Statement of Richard M. Stana, Director Homeland Security and Justice Issues, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives
"Securing the nation's borders from illegal entry of aliens, contraband, terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, is a long-term challenge. In November 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) launched the Secure Border Initiative network (SBInet)--a program which was to provide the Border Patrol, within DHS's U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), with the tools to detect breaches and make agent deployment decisions by installing surveillance systems along the border. Alternative (Southwest) Border Technology is DHS's new plan to deploy a mix of technology to protect the border. This testimony is based on GAO's ongoing work conducted for the House Committee on Homeland Security and provides preliminary observations on (1) the status of SBInet and user views on its usefulness, and (2) the Alternative (Southwest) Border Technology plan and associated costs. GAO reviewed planning, budget, and system documents, observed operations along the southwest border, and interviewed DHS officials."
United States. Government Accountability Office
2011-03-15
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Critical Infrastructure Protection: Comments on the Proposed Cyber Security Information Act of 2000, Statement of Joel C. Willemssen, Director, Civil Agencies Information Systems Accounting and Information Management Division, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Management, Information Technology, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
H.R. 4246, the proposed Cyber Security Information Act of 2000, would remove barriers to information sharing between government and private industry. In GAO's view, the legislation would help build the meaningful private-public partnerships that are essential to protecting critical infrastructure assets. To successfully engage the private sector, however, the federal government itself must be a model of good information security. Today, it is not. Significant computer security weaknesses--from poor controls over sensitive systems and data to weak or nonexistent continuity of service plans--plague nearly every major agency. And, as seen in the recent "ILOVEYOU" computer virus, mechanisms already in place to ease information sharing among federal agencies about impending threats have not been working well. Moreover, the federal government may not yet have the right tools for identifying, analyzing, coordinating, and disseminating the type of information that H.R. 4246 envisions collecting from the private sector.
United States. General Accounting Office
2000-06-22
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Chemical and Biological Defense: Observations on Nonmedical Chemical and Biological R&D Programs, Statement of Kwai-Cheung Chan, Director, Special Studies and Evaluations, National Security and International Affairs Division, Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans' Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform
In the last decade, concerns about the possible use of chemical and biological weapons in both military and civilian settings has prompted Congress and federal agencies to launch new programs or expand existing ones to address these threats. Overall funding in these areas has risen significantly since 1996. Today, several civilian and military agencies are conducting research and development to counter these threats. Without effective coordination among the different agencies, however, their efforts might be unnecessarily duplicated and important questions may be overlooked. This testimony identifies similarities among nonmedical research and development programs and explains how coordination mechanisms could effectively address potential duplication, research gaps, and opportunities for collaboration. GAO focuses on the following four programs: (1) the Defense Department's Chemical and Biological Defense Program, (2) the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's Biological Warfare Defense Program, (3) the Department of Energy's Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program, and (4) the Counterterror Technical Support Program conducted by an interagency working group.
United States. General Accounting Office
2000-03-22
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Proactive Management of FAA's Security Program Needed, Statement of Kenneth M. Mead, Director, Transportation Issues Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division, Testimony before the President's Commission on Aviation Security
GAO discussed the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) policies and procedures for preventing criminal acts against aviation. GAO noted that reviews of FAA domestic and international security programs identified major deficiencies in: (1) passenger screening, with airlines widely varying in screening effectiveness and lacking clearly defined performance expectations; (2) airport security controls, with airlines not complying with FAA standards and FAA inadequately monitoring airports' compliance, resulting in easy access to areas that should be secured; (3) security inspections, which did not include procedures or guidance on the extent of testing or verification needed to ensure the adequacy of security features; and (4) airline training requirements for security personnel, with the quality of training varying widely among airlines. GAO also noted that, although FAA has taken several steps to improve its aviation security programs, it should also consider: (1) establishing a quality assurance program capable of providing proactive, routine, critical assessments of its security programs; and (2) working with foreign governments to identify emerging security issues, such as how to ensure that foreign air carriers provide adequate security for U.S. citizens travelling abroad.
United States. General Accounting Office
1989-12-18
