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Chemical Weapons and Materiel: Key Factors Affecting Disposal Costs and Schedule: Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Military Procurement, Committee on National Security, and House of Representatives
GAO transcribes a statement by Henry L. Hinton, Jr., Assistant Comptroller General in the National Security and International Affairs Division. Hinton testifies on his division's work concerning the DoD's management of the various programs that facilitate the destruction of U.S. chemical munitions stockpiles, and the future disposal of non-stockpile chemical warfare materiel.
United States. General Accounting Office
1997-03-11
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DOT's Budget: Safety, Management, and Other Issues Facing the Department in Fiscal Year 1998 and Beyond
When we testified before you last year, we pointed out that the Department of Transportation (DOT) faced tremendous challenges in ensuring the safe and efficient movement of people and goods and a cost-effective investment in the nation's transportation infrastructure, including its highways and transit systems, airports, airways, ports, and waterways. If anything, the obstacles to meeting the challenges have increased primarily because efforts to improve the safety and security of our aviation system will stretch limited resources even further. At the same time, the demand for scarce federal funds for other transportation programs and the continuing pressures to reduce the federal budget have not abated. The $38 billion proposed in DOT's fiscal year 1998 budget represents about a 1-percent reduction from this year's enacted appropriation. Funding constraints intensify the need for the Department to improve its management and oversight processes to ensure that the American people are getting the most out of their transportation investment dollars. My testimony today, based on our recently completed and ongoing work, will discuss the major safety and security, management, and other issues facing the Department.
United States. General Accounting Office
1997-03-06
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Aviation Safety and Security: Challenges to Implementing the Recommendations of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, Statement by Gerald L. Dillingham, Associate Director,Transportation Issues, Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, U.S. Senate
In 1996, 380 people died in accidents involving large U.S. airlines--the largest number in 11 years. The crashes of TWA Flight 800 off Long Island and Valujet Flight 592 in the Florida everglades accounted for most of these deaths. Although the nation's air transportation system remains the safest in the world and the Federal Aviation Administration is a model for other countries, these tragic events underscore the need to continuously increase the existing margin of safety. The recently released report of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security made 57 recommendations concerning safety, security, air traffic control, and disaster response. The GAO testified that these recommendations are good start toward ensuring greater safety and security for passengers, restructuring the relationships between government and private industry, and maintaining America's global leadership in aviation. However, key questions remain about how and when the recommendations will be implemented, how much they will cost, and who will pay the cost. This testimony focuses on the challenges to converting the Commission's recommendations from concepts to realities.
United States. General Accounting Office
1997-03-05
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Air Traffic Control: Status of FAA's Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System Project
The STARS schedule, which calls for implementation at 171 air traffic control facilities between December 1998 and February 2005, is attainable only if FAA is successful in its efforts to mitigate certain risks. Specifically, FAA will need to (1) obtain commitment by key stakeholders to the STARS schedule, (2) resolve schedule conflicts between STARS and other modernization efforts, and (3) overcome difficulties in developing system software that could delay implementing STARS. FAA is aware that these issues pose a risk for STARS and has begun several risk mitigation initiatives. While such actions are encouraging, it is too early to tell how effective they will be. FAA's cost estimate for STARS has the potential to increase. The agency's total cost estimate for STARS is $2.23 billion. FAA approved this estimate in January 1996. However, a September 1996 analysis by agency officials pointed to potential cost increases that could drive the total cost estimate to as much as $2.76 billion. This possible increase is attributable to expected higher costs for operating and maintaining STARS equipment. FAA officials are continuing to revise the STARS cost estimate and now believe that cost increases may be significantly lower. At this time, however, the agency could not provide us with an updated estimate.
United States. General Accounting Office
1997-03
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Weapons of Mass Destruction: DOD Reporting on Cooperative Threat Reduction Assistance Has Improved
The law requires the Defense Department (DOD) to report annually on cooperative threat reduction assistance provided to the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. GAO must assess DOD's report within 30 days after it has been issued. This report discusses whether DOD's report (1) contains current and complete data on cooperative threat reduction assistance deliveries, including their location and condition; (2) presents the best available sources of information to show what assistance was accounted for and how it was used; (3) provides an overall determination of assistance use; and (4) lists planned audits and examinations for the coming year. GAO also follows up on DOD's implementation of recommendations GAO previously made to improve DOD's annual reports.
United States. General Accounting Office
1997-02-27
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National Missile Defense: Risk and Funding Implications for the Space-Based Infrared Low Component, Report to Congressional Committees
The Defense Department (DoD) made plans in 1995 to launch the space and missile tracking system--the low satellite component of the Space-Based Infrared System--in fiscal year 2006. This report reviews the space and missile tracking system to determine the effects of changing the deployment date from fiscal year 2006 (the original schedule) to fiscal years 2002, 2003, 2004, or 2005.
United States. General Accounting Office
1997-02-25
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Telemedicine: Federal Strategy Is Needed to Guide Investments, Report to Congressional Requesters
Telemedicine refers to the use of communications technology to help deliver medical care regardless of the distance that separates doctor and patient. Telemedicine technology today is not only better than it was a decade ago, it is becoming cheaper. However, the expansion of telemedicine is hampered by legal and regulatory, financial, technical, and cultural barriers facing health care providers. This GAO report addresses the (1) scope of public and private telemedicine investments; (2) telemedicine strategies among the Department of Defense, other federal agencies, and the private sector; (3) potential benefits that the public and private sectors may yield from telemedicine initiatives; and (4) barriers facing telemedicine implementation. GAO recommendations in this report are designed to help move federal departments and agencies toward the goals and objectives as stated in the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993.
United States. General Accounting Office
1997-02-14
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Chemical Weapons and Materiel: Key Factors Affecting Disposal Costs and Schedule, Report to Congressional Committees
Since 1985, the Army has spent $3.2 billion on its programs for destroying the U.S. stockpile of chemical munitions and planning for the disposal of nonstockpile chemical warfare materiel. Today, the programs are still in the early stages of implementation and the Army estimates that $24.4 billion more will be needed to complete them.1 Since 1990, GAO has issued a number of reports addressing opportunities to improve various aspects of the disposal programs. Due to continuing congressional and public interest about the progress and cost of the programs, GAO prepared this report under its basic legislative responsibilities to provide an overall assessment of the (1) programs' cost and schedule, (2) alternatives for improving program effectiveness and efficiency, and (3) actions the Army has and is taking to improve the programs.
United States. General Accounting Office
1997-02-10
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Foreign Missile Threats: Analytic Soundness of National Intelligence Estimate 95-19: Statement of Richard Davis, Director, National Security Analysis, National Security and International Affairs Division before the Select Committee on Intelligence
The principal finding of a recent national intelligence estimate that no new foreign power will develop or acquire ballistic missiles that could threaten North America during the next 15 years was worded with 100 percent certainty. GAO found that because of intelligence gaps, this level of certainty was overstated--one of a number of shortcomings in the estimate. This testimony is based on an August 1996 GAO report (GAO/NSIAD-96-225) that evaluates National Intelligence Estimate 95-19, "Emerging Missile Threats to North America During the Next 15 Years."
United States. General Accounting Office
1996-12-04
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Nuclear Nonproliferation: Implications of the U.S./North Korean Agreement on Nuclear Issues
Unless adequate liability protections are put in place, the United States, Japan, and South Korea--members of an international consortium created in 1994 to replace North Korea's nuclear reactors--could be pressured into paying nuclear damage claims arising from an accident at a North Korean reactor. The purpose of this GAO report is to determine whether "(1) the Agreed Framework is a nonbinding political agreement, (2) the United States could be held financially liable for a nuclear accident at the North Korean reactor site, (3) North Korea has obligated itself to pay the cost of upgrading its existing electricity power distribution system, and (4) the agreement is being implemented consistent with the applicable laws
governing the transfer of U.S. nuclear components, materials, and technology."
United States. General Accounting Office
1996-10-01
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Nuclear Weapons: Russia's Request for the Export of U.S. Computers for Stockpile Maintenance; Statement for the Record by Mr. Harold J. Johnson, Associate Director, International Relations and Trade Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division before the Subcommittee on Military Procurement, Committee on National Security
This statement for the record provides information on proposed exports of U.S. high performance computers to Russian nuclear laboratories. GAO discusses the policies affecting cooperation between the United States and Russia on nuclear warhead safety and security under a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and Russian officials' requests for access to U.S. high performance computer exports to conduct work under this treaty.
United States. General Accounting Office
1996-09-30
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Weapons of Mass Destruction: Status of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, Report to Congressional Requesters
This report evaluates "the draft 1996 multiyear Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program plan in terms of its scope, depiction of project status and cost estimates, description of changes that occurred after the 1995 CTR multiyear program plan, and release to Congress and the progress, estimated costs, and potential impacts of CTR efforts to help control nuclear weapons and materials, eliminate strategic delivery vehicles, and destroy chemical weapons."
United States. General Accounting Office
1996-09-27
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Aviation Security: Urgent Issues Need to Be Addressed, Statement of Keith O. Fultz, Assistant Comptroller General, Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives
The threat of terrorism against the United States has increased, and aviation remains an attractive target for terrorists. The 1988 terrorist bombing of Pan Am flight 103, for example, which killed 270 people, and the more recent, and as yet unexplained, explosion aboard TWA flight 800 have shaken public confidence in the safety and security of air travel. This testimony before the House of Representatives subcommittee focuses on measures that need to be taken to protect the flying public from terrorists and how technology can improve aviation security. Moreover, issues discussed include (1) the aviation security system and its vulnerabilities, (2) the availability and limitations of explosives detection technology and other methods to counter the threat, and (3) efforts under way to bolster aviation security. The General Accounting Office (GAO) report also addresses the September 1996 recommendations from the Presidential Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism.
United States. General Accounting Office
1996-09-11
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Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Technologies for Detecting Explosives and Narcotics, Report to Congressional Requesters
Aviation security and drug interdiction depend on a complex and costly mix of intelligence, procedures, and technologies. Since 1978, federal agencies have spent about $246 million for research and development on explosives detection technologies and nearly $100 million on narcotics detection technologies. Most of this spending has taken place since 1990, in response to congressional directives, and have been for technologies to screen checked baggage, trucks, and containers. Difficult trade-offs must be made when considering whether to use detection technologies for a given application--chief among them the extent to which intelligence-gathering and procedures can substitute for expensive technology. Some technologies are very effective and could be deployed today, but they are expensive, slow the flow of commerce, and raise issues of worker safety. Other technologies are more widely used but are less reliable, while still others are in the development stage and may not be available for years. Some countries have already deployed advanced explosive and narcotics detection equipment, and the United States may be able to learn from their experiences. The Federal Aviation Administration estimates that use of the best available procedures and technologies to beef up aviation security could cost as much as $6 billion during the next 10 years--the equivalent of a $1.30 surcharge on a one-way ticket.
United States. General Accounting Office
1996-09-04
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Aviation Security: Immediate Action Needed to Improve Security, Statement of Keith O. Fultz, Assistant Comptroller General, Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division, Testimony before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate
Aviation is and will remain an attractive target for terrorists. The 1988 terrorist bombing of Pan Am flight 103, which killed 270 people, and the more recent, but as yet unexplained, explosion aboard TWA flight 800 have shaken the public's confidence in the safety and the security of air travel. The General Accounting Office (GAO) testified that the threat of terrorism against the United States has increased and that aviation is and will remain an attractive target for terrorists. Although the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has mandated additional security procedures as the threat of terrorism has changed, domestic and international aviation systems remain vulnerable. For example, conventional X-ray screening of checked baggage has limitations and offers little protection against moderately sophisticated bombs. Explosive detection devices are commercially available for checked and carry-on luggage and could improve security, but all the devices have shortcomings. Some of the devices are already in use in foreign countries. Other devices are in various stages of development. A mix of technology and procedures will likely be needed to improve security.
United States. General Accounting Office
1996-08-01
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Defense Transportation: Migration Systems Selected Without Adequate Analysis: Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Readiness, Committee on National Security, House of Representatives
This document shows the results of the GAO's review of the Department of Defense's (DoD) selection of transportation migration systems. Specifically, it evaluates whether Defense made proper and cost-effective transportation migration system selections. The selection of migration systems is par of Defense's Corporate Information Management (CIM) initiative - a department wide effort to improve operations and reduce costs by streamlining business processes, consolidating information systems, and standardizing and integrating data. For transportation, Defense plans to migrate from an inventory of about 130 systems. To date, 28 major migration systems have been selected, with additional minor selections still to be made.
United States. General Accounting Office
1996-08
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Operation Desert Storm: Evaluation of the Air War, Report to Congressional Requesters
"This study responds to your request that we comprehensively evaluate the use and effectiveness of the various aircraft, munitions, and other weapon systems used in the victorious air campaign in Operation Desert Storm in order to aid the Congress in future procurement decisions. Over 5 years ago, the United States and its coalition allies successfully forced Iraq out of Kuwait. The performance of aircraft and their munitions, cruise missiles, and other air campaign systems in Desert Storm continues to be relevant today as the basis for significant procurement and force sizing decisions. For example, the Department of Defense (DOD) Report on the Bottom-Up Review (BUR) explicitly cited the effectiveness of advanced weapons used in Desert Storm"including laser-guided bombs (LGBs) and stealth aircraft"as shaping the BUR recommendations on weapons procurement. This report is an unclassified summary of our classified report. The table of contents for that report is included in appendix I to provide an outline of the breadth of our evaluation."
United States. General Accounting Office
1996-07-02
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Chemical Weapons Stockpile: Emergency Preparedness in Alabama Is Hampered by Management Weaknesses, Report to the Honorable Glen Browder, House of Representatives
"Eight years after CSEPP's inception, Alabama communities near Anniston Army Depot are not fully prepared to respond to a chemical stockpile emergency because they lack critical items. Alabama and six counties have not spent $30.5 million, 66.4 percent of the $46 million allocated to enhance emergency preparedness. The unexpended funds are associated primarily with the following four projects for which federal, state, and local officials have not agreed on specific requirements: (1) a CSEPP [Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program] 800-megahertz (MHz) emergency communications system, (2) equipment and supplies to protect people in public buildings (including schools and hospitals), (3) indoor alert and notification devices for public buildings and homes, and (4) personal protective equipment for emergency workers. Citing these four projects and eight other areas as major emergency preparedness deficiencies, Calhoun County Emergency Management Agency (EMA) opposes the granting of a state environmental permit for the construction of Anniston's disposal facility until it receives a written commitment from the Army to support the county's emergency preparedness requirements or provide acceptable alternatives. The lack of progress in Alabama's CSEPP is the result of management weaknesses at the federal level and inadequate action by state and local agencies. Management weaknesses at the federal level are fragmented and unclear roles and responsibilities, incomplete and imprecise planning guidance, extensive involvement in the implementation of certain local projects, lack of team work in the budget process, and ineffective financial controls. These weaknesses have resulted in time-consuming negotiations and delays in implementing projects critical to emergency preparedness."
United States. General Accounting Office
1996-07
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Drug Control: Counternarcotics Efforts in Mexico, Report to Congressional Requesters
"This report discusses (1) the nature of the drug-trafficking threat from Mexico, (2) Mexican efforts to counter drug-tracking activities, (3) the U.S. strategy and programs intended to stem the flow of illegal drugs through Mexico, and (4) recent initiatives by the United States and Mexico to increase counternarcotics activities."
United States. General Accounting Office
1996-06-12
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Bottom-Up Review: Analysis of DoD War Game to Test Key Assumptions: Report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Committee on National Security, House of Representatives
This report reviews the objectives, methodology, and results of the Department of Defense's (DoD) war game Nimble Dancer, which assessed the ability of U.S. forces to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRC). It identified assumptions or data used in Nimble Dancer pertaining to several specific areas, such as readiness, threat, and force availability. This report, an unclassified version of a May 1996 classified report, presents observations on the objectives, methodology, and results of the exercise, and appendix I provides details on the specific areas of interest. In its October 1993 Bottom-Up Review of the nation's defense needs, DoD, among other things, judged that it is prudent to maintain the capability to fight and win two nearly simultaneous MRCs. In the review, DoD also determined the forces, enhancements to force capabilities, and funding necessary to execute this element of the national military strategy. Since the Bottom-Up Review, DoD has conducted various studies to examine the two MRC requirement. In an August 1994 memorandum, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized DoD to conduct the Nimble Dancer exercise. The primary objective of the exercise was to assess the capability of the programmed Bottom-Up Review force to fight and win two nearly simultaneous MRCs during different time periods, and the secondary objective was to identify critical issues for further resolution or study. The Chairman's memorandum generally stated that the exercise would test the sufficiency of forces by examining various areas, such as lift, intelligence, and sustainment, and provide a forum for conducting sensitivity analyses.
United States. General Accounting Office
1996-06
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Information Security: Computer Attacks at Department of Defense Pose Increasing Risks, Report to Congressional Requesters
Mounting evidence that attacks on Defense computer systems pose a serious threat to national security. Internet connections make it
possible for enemies armed with less equipment and weapons to gain a
competitive edge at a small price. As a result, this will become an
increasingly attractive way for terrorist or adversaries to wage attacks
against Defense. For example, major disruptions to military operations
and readiness could threaten national security if attackers successfully
corrupted sensitive information and systems or denied service from vital
communications backbones or power systems. In preventing computer attacks, Defense has to protect a vast and complex information infrastructure: currently, it has over 2.1 million computers, 10,000 local networks, and 100 long-distance networks. Defense also critically depends on information technology--it uses computers to help design weapons, identify and track enemy targets, pay soldiers, mobilize reservists, and manage supplies. Indeed, its very warfighting capability is dependent on computer-based telecommunications networks and information systems.
United States. General Accounting Office
1996-05-22
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Passports and Visas: Status of Efforts to Reduce Fraud, Report to the Chairman, Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives
Technical problems and the failure of overseas consular staff to comply with internal management controls have hampered State Department efforts to modernize its visa and passport operations and make them less vulnerable to fraud. After initial delays, State has made steady progress in installing its machine-readable system--the primary initiative for eliminating visa fraud--and provided all visa-issuing posts with automated access to its global database containing the names of persons ineligible for visas. Operational problems, however, have diminished the effectiveness of these efforts. Meanwhile, State's modernization program to reduce passport fraud is behind schedule. State originally planned to install a new wide-area network, develop a system to print a digitalized passport photograph, and install a system to verify the multiple issuance of passports by December 1995. However, only the installation of the wide-area network, upon which the other two projects depend, has been completed. Full implementation also depends on modernizing the passport production system, which according to State depends on funding availability.
United States. General Accounting Office
1996-05-09
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Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Threats and Roles of Explosives and Narcotics Detection Technology, Briefing Report to Congressional Requesters
"The intelligence community believes that the threat of terrorism within the
United States has increased. Unclassified reporting indicates changes in the pattern of terrorism. Although no specific aviation threat is known,
experts believe that aviation is likely to remain an attractive target for
terrorists. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), terrorist
attacks could come from groups that are difficult to infiltrate and control.
Information was uncovered in January 1995 about plans by such a group
for multiple attacks on specific U. S. flights in Asia. Narcotics trafficking is a continuing concern. While cocaine has been the primary threat since
1985, heroin is becoming more of a threat. The intelligence community
believes traffickers are presently most active on the Southwest border of
the United States and use vehicles such as cars, trucks, and tractor-trailers
carrying containers to smuggle narcotics. In 1994, the State Department reported that attacks by state-sponsored, secular terrorist groups declined, but attacks increased from radical fundamentalist groups, who operate more autonomously."
United States. General Accounting Office
1996-03-27
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Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status of U.S. Efforts to Improve Nuclear Material Controls in Newly Independent States
Over the years, the Soviet Union produced about 1,200 metric tons of highly enriched uranium and plutonium. U.S. efforts to help the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union better protect their stocks of this deadly material--which are vulnerable to theft and diversion because of antiquated security systems--got off to a slow start but are now gaining momentum. Many independent states lack modern equipment to detect unauthorized removal of highly enriched uranium and plutonium from nuclear facilities. Seizures of nuclear material in Russia and Europe have heightened concerns about a possible black market for this material. The Defense Department (DOD) has obligated $59 million and spent about $4 million during fiscal years 1991-95 for security improvements in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. Initially the program moved slowly because Russian officials had refused access to their facilities, and DOD projects at facilities in Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus were just getting under way. The program gained momentum in January 1995 when U.S. and Russian officials agreed to upgrade nuclear materials controls at five high-priority facilities. The Energy Department plans to request $400 million over seven years to improve controls at nuclear facilities in the newly independent states. However, the expanded program faces uncertainties involving its overall costs and U.S. ability to verify that the assistance is being used as intended. GAO summarized this report in testimony before Congress; see; Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Newly Independent States Improve Their Nuclear Materials Controls, by Harold J. Johnson, Associate Director for International Relations and Trade Issues, before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Senate Committee on Government Affairs. GAO/T-NSIAD-96-119.
United States. General Accounting Office
1996-03-08
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Border Patrol: Staffing and Enforcement Activities, Report to Congressional Committees
"At the end of fiscal year 1994, according to INS data, the Border Patrol had assigned 3,911 of its 4,260 Border Patrol agents to its 145 Border Patrol stations. As of September 13, 1995, according to INS data, it had hired and finished training 530 Border Patrol agents and had an additional 369 agents in training. These new agents are estimated to represent 22 percent of INS expected overall increase. These 899 new hires were not included in our analysis because they were not deployed at the end of fiscal year 1994. Of the 3,911 agents at Border Patrol stations at the end of fiscal year 1994, 3,088 (79 percent) were located at 85 stations that were within 25 miles of the nations border, including 2,543 agents who were located at the 32 Southwest Border stations. Of the 3,911 agents, 701 agents (18 percent) were located at 41 stations that were between 26 and 100 miles from the border, and 122 agents (3 percent) were located at 19 stations that were over 100 miles from the border."
United States. Government Accountability Office
1996-03
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Economic Espionage: Information on Threat From U.S. Allies, Statement for the Record by David E. Cooper, Associate Director, Defense Acquisitions Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, Testimony before the Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate
"U.S. intelligence agencies report a continuing economic espionage threat from certain U.S. allies. Our report discussed the espionage activities of five allies. A goal common to most of these countries was the support of the country's defense industry. Countries seek U.S. defense technologies to incorporate into domestically produced systems. By obtaining the technology from the United States, a country can have cutting-edge weapon systems without the cost of research and development. The cutting-edge technologies not only provide superior weapon systems for a country's own use, but also make these products more marketable for exports."
United States. General Accounting Office
1996-02-28
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Money Laundering: U.S. Efforts to Combat Money Laundering Overseas, Statement of JayEtta Z. Hecker, Associate Director, International Relations and Trade Issues, Testimony before the Committee on Banking and Financial Services, House of Representatives
"Money laundering is a global problem requiring collective international efforts to combat. GAOs testimony describes U.S. efforts to deter this activity, including: (1) U.S. and seven European countries regulation of financial institutions in regard to money laundering, (2) U.S. bank regulators oversight of money-laundering controls at overseas branches of U.S. banks, (3) U.S. law enforcement agencies efforts to coordinate their overseas anti-money-laundering activities with host countries law enforcement agencies, and (4) U.S. participation in international anti-money-laundering arrangements. U.S. banking regulators previous domestic anti-money-laundering efforts relied mainly on reporting regulations that require financial institutions to report currency transactions above certain thresholds. Current approaches include an increased reliance upon reporting suspicious transactions. Also, most U.S. banks have adopted know your customer policies to help identify suspicious transactions, according to the American Bankers Association. European countries GAO visited have relied on suspicious transaction reports as well as on know your customer policies to combat money laundering through financial institutions."
United States. Government Accountability Office
1996-02-28
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Counterfeit U.S. Currency Abroad: Observations on Counterfeiting and U.S. Deterrance Efforts, Statement of JayEtta Z. Hecker, Associate Director, International Relations and Trade Issues, Testimony before the Subcommittee on General Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Banking and Financial Services, House of Representatives
"U.S. currency has become a vulnerable target for international counterfeiting because it is widely used abroad and currently lacks updated security features. GAOs testimony focuses on the diverse nature and the unknown extent of counterfeiting abroad, as well as the recent U.S. efforts to deter this activity. U.S. law enforcement officials say that counterfeiters range from office workers to organized crime and terrorist groups and that the equipment used for counterfeiting U.S. currency includes both simple photocopiers and sophisticated offset presses. Moreover, counterfeit currency varies significantly in quality. Of increasing concern is a very high-quality family of counterfeits commonly known as the 'Superdollar.' According to reports by the House Republican Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, the Superdollar is printed in the Middle East on 'high-tech state-owned presses with paper only acquired by governments.' However, the Secret Service says that the task force has provided little evidence to support its allegations. Counterfeiting is a criminal activity. Thus, it is impossible to determine the actual extent of this activity abroad. Both Treasury and Secret Service officials agreed that counterfeiting of U.S. currency is a threat to be taken seriously but said that it is not now at a level that poses an economic threat to the U.S. monetary system."
United States. Government Accountability Office
1996-02-27
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Defense Industrial Security: Weaknesses in U.S. Security Arrangements with Foreign-Owned Defense Contractors, Report to Congressional Requesters
"Since the mid-1980s, development, production, and marketing of weapon systems has been increasingly internationalized through government-sponsored cooperative development programs and various kinds of industrial linkages, including international subcontracting and teaming arrangements, joint ventures, and cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Foreign companies have acquired many U.S. defense companies and have legitimate business interests in them. The U.S. government allows such foreign investment as long as it is consistent with U.S. national security interests. Some foreign-owned U.S. companies are working on highly classified defense contracts, such as the B-2, the F-117, the F-22, and military satellite programs. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and intelligence agencies have reported that foreign intelligence activities directed at U.S. critical technologies pose a significant threat to national security. According to these agencies, some close U.S. allies are actively trying to obtain U.S. defense technologies through unauthorized means. To reduce the national security risks of foreign control over companies working on sensitive classified contracts, the Department of Defense (DOD) requires controls known as voting trusts, proxy agreements, and special security agreements (SSA)."
United States. General Accounting Office
1996-02-20
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Counterfeit U.S. Currency Abroad: Issues and U.S. Deterrence Efforts
U.S. currency is counterfeited by a diverse group of perpetrators using a variety of methods. Although counterfeiters may engage in this activity for direct economic gain, counterfeiting is sometimes linked with other more nefarious criminal endeavors, such as drug trafficking, aims dealing, and alleged terrorist activities. According to law enforcement officials, counterfeiters run the gamut from office workers to organized crime and terrorist groups, and the equipment used for counterfeiting U.S. currency ranges from photocopiers to sophisticated offset presses. Moreover, the quality of counterfeit notes varies significantly, and even those made using the same method vary according to the sophistication of the perpetrator and the type of equipment used. Of increasing concern is the fact that certain foreign counterfeiters are becoming extremely sophisticated and are producing very high- quality counterfeit notes that are more difficult to detect than any previous counterfeits. Due to the criminal nature of this activity, the true extent of counterfeiting of U.S. currency abroad cannot be determined. The total level of counterfeit-currency detections-$208.7 million in fiscal year 1994-represented less than one one-thousandth of U.S. currency in circulation. Both Treasury and Secret Service officials agreed that counterfeiting of U.S. currency is a threat to be taken seriously, but that it is not now at a level that poses an economic threat to the U.S. monetary system. Treasury Department and Secret Service officials use counterfeit-detection data from the Secret Service to help assess the extent of counterfeiting. The Secret Service has also used these data to demonstrate significant increases in counterfeiting activity abroad, citing a 300-percent rise in detections in fiscal year 1993.
United States. General Accounting Office
1996-02
