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Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options [January 10, 2019]
"Ever since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, the United States and Iran have been at odds, although to varying degrees of intensity. [...] In 2010, the Obama Administration orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to persuade it to agree to strict limits on the program. The pressure contributed to the June 2013 election of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani as president of Iran and the negotiation of a nuclear agreement--the 'Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action' (JCPOA)--which exchanged sanctions relief for limits on Iran's nuclear program. The JCPOA reduced the potential threat from Iran's nuclear program, but did not contain strict or binding limits on Iran's ballistic missile program; its regional influence; its conventional military programs; or its human rights abuses. The Trump Administration cited these deficiencies of the JCPOA in its May 8, 2018, announcement that the United States would exit the JCPOA and reimpose all U.S. secondary sanctions by November 4, 2018. [...] Some experts assert that the threat posed by Iran stems from the nature and ideology of Iran's regime, and that the underlying, if unstated, goal of Trump Administration policy is to bring about regime collapse."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2019-01-10
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Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options [December 19, 2018]
"Ever since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, the United States and Iran have been at odds, although to varying degrees of intensity. During the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. officials identified Iran's support for militant Middle East groups as the primary threat posed by Iran to U.S. interests and allies. Iran's nuclear program took precedence in U.S. policy after 2002 as the potential for Iran to develop a nuclear weapon increased. In 2010, the Obama Administration orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to persuade it to agree to strict limits on the program. The pressure contributed to the June 2013 election of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani as president of Iran and the negotiation of a nuclear agreement--the 'Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action' (JCPOA)--which exchanged sanctions relief for limits on Iran's nuclear program. The JCPOA reduced the potential threat from Iran's nuclear program, but did not contain strict or binding limits on Iran's ballistic missile program; its regional influence; its conventional military programs; or its human rights abuses."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2018-12-19
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [June 17, 2013]
"A priority of Obama Administration policy has been to reduce the perceived threat posed to a broad range of U.S. interests by Iran, in particular by Iran's advancing nuclear program. Well before the nuclear issue rose to the forefront of U.S. concerns about Iran, the United States had seen Iran's support for militant groups in the Middle East, Iraq, and Afghanistan as efforts to undermine U.S. interests and allies. U.S. officials also assert that Iran is providing arms and advice to help Syria's leadership try to defeat the armed rebellion there. The Obama Administration has orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to try to compel it to verifiably demonstrate to the international community that its nuclear program is peaceful. Three rounds of multilateral talks with Iran in 2012 yielded no breakthroughs but did explore a potential compromise under which Iran might cease enriching uranium to 20% purity (a level not technically far from weapons grade) in exchange for modest sanctions relief. Further high-level talks took place on February 26-27, 2013, and April 5-6, 2013, both in Almaty, Kazakhstan. No breakthroughs were achieved in Almaty. Iran's Supreme Leader has not taken up U.S. offers to engage in the direct bilateral talks that many experts believe are required to produce a breakthrough. And, there has been a consensus that international sanctions--although severely harming Iran's economy--have not pressured the regime to the point at which it is compelled to compromise. However, the June 14, 20013 [sic] first round election victory of a relative moderate, Hassan Rouhani, could reflect popular Iranian sentiment for a negotiated nuclear settlement that produces an easing of international sanctions."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2013-06-17
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [November 12, 2013]
"A priority of Obama Administration policy has been to reduce the perceived threat posed by Iran to a broad range of U.S. interests. Well before Iran's nuclear issue rose to the forefront of U.S. concerns about Iran in 2003, the United States had seen Iran's support for regional militant groups, such as Lebanese Hezbollah, as efforts to undermine U.S. interests and allies. To implement U.S. policy, the Obama Administration has orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to try to compel it to verifiably demonstrate to the international community that its nuclear program is for purely peaceful purposes. The five rounds of multilateral talks with Iran in 2012 and 2013--prior to the June 14, 2013, election of relative moderate Hassan Rouhani as president--explored a potential compromise under which Iran might cease producing medium enriched uranium (20% Uranium-235, not technically far from weapons grade) in exchange for modest sanctions relief. International sanctions have harmed Iran's economy, and Rouhani's election appeared to reflect popular Iranian sentiment for a negotiated nuclear settlement that produces an easing of international sanctions."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2013-11-12
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [December 17, 2014]
"During the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. officials identified Iran's support for militant Middle East groups as a significant threat to U.S. interests and allies. A perceived potential threat from Iran's nuclear program emerged in 2002, and the United States has orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to try to compel it to verifiably confine that program to purely peaceful purposes. The pressure has harmed Iran's economy and might have contributed to the June 2013 election as president of Iran of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani, who campaigned as an advocate of ending Iran's international isolation. Subsequent multilateral talks with Iran produced an interim agreement ('Joint Plan of Action,' JPA) that halted the expansion of Iran's nuclear program in exchange for modest sanctions relief. The United States and its partners negotiated intensively to reach a comprehensive agreement on the nuclear issue by the November 24, 2014, deadline for the JPA expiration,but agreement was not reached and the parties extended the JPA until June 30, 2015. The parties stated intent to reach a political outline of the agreement by March 1, 2015. The main outstanding issue continues to be the size and scope of Iran's program to enrich uranium. […] Rouhani's unexpected election win--a result of a large turnout of reform-minded voters such as those who protested the 2009 election results--demonstrated strong support not only for reducing Iran's isolation but for domestic reform. Rouhani has sought to satisfy this constituency, in part by orchestrating the release of some political prisoners and easing some media restrictions. But, Iran's judiciary remains in the hands of hardliners who continue to restrict social freedoms and prosecute regime critics and dissenters."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2014-12-17
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [January 26, 2015]
"Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, a priority of U.S. policy has been to reduce the perceived threat posed by Iran to a broad range of U.S. interests. In 2014, a common enemy emerged in the form of the Islamic State organization, reducing gaps in U.S. and Iranian interests, although the two countries have somewhat differing approaches over how to try to defeat the Islamic State. […] The international pressure might have contributed to the June 2013 election as president of Iran of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani, who campaigned as an advocate of ending Iran's international isolation. Subsequent multilateral talks with Iran produced an interim agreement ('Joint Plan of Action,' JPA) that halted the expansion of Iran's nuclear program in exchange for modest sanctions relief. The United States and its partners negotiated intensively to reach a comprehensive agreement on the nuclear issue by the November 24, 2014, deadline for the JPA expiration, but agreement was not reached and the parties have extended the JPA until July 6, 2015. […] Rouhani has sought to satisfy this constituency, in part by orchestrating the release of some political prisoners and easing some media restrictions. But, Iran's judiciary remains in the hands of hardliners who continue to restrict social freedoms and prosecute regime critics and dissenters. For further information, see CRS [Congressional Research Service] Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman; and CRS Report R43333, Iran: Interim Nuclear Agreement and Talks on a Comprehensive Accord, by Kenneth Katzman, Paul K. Kerr, and Mary Beth D. Nikitin."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2015-01-26
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [October 1, 2014]
"Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, a priority of U.S. policy has been to reduce the perceived threat posed by Iran to a broad range of U.S. interests. However, a common enemy has emerged in the form of the Islamic State organization, reducing gaps in U.S. and Iranian interests somewhat. During the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. officials identified Iran's support for militant Middle East groups as a significant threat to U.S. interests and allies. A perceived potential threat from Iran's nuclear program came to the fore in 2002, and the United States orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to try to compel it to verifiably confine that program to purely peaceful purposes. The pressure has harmed Iran's economy and might have contributed to the June 2013 election as president of Iran of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani, who campaigned as an advocate of ending Iran's international isolation. Subsequent multilateral talks with Iran produced an interim agreement ('Joint Plan of Action,' JPA) that halted the expansion of Iran's nuclear program in exchange for modest sanctions relief. In advance of a November 24, 2014 deadline for the JPA to expire, the search for a 'comprehensive solution' on the nuclear issue remains impeded by substantial differences over Iran's long-term capacity to enrich uranium Talks to try to finalize a comprehensive deal began September 18 and will continue until that deadline."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2014-10-01
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [November 17, 2014]
"A perceived potential threat from Iran's nuclear program emerged in 2002, and the United States has orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to try to compel it to verifiably confine that program to purely peaceful purposes. The pressure has harmed Iran's economy and might have contributed to the June 2013 election as president of Iran of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani, who campaigned as an advocate of ending Iran's international isolation. Subsequent multilateral talks with Iran produced an interim agreement ('Joint Plan of Action,' JPA) that halted the expansion of Iran's nuclear program in exchange for modest sanctions relief. As the November 24, 2014 deadline for the JPA expiration approaches, the United States and its partners are negotiating intensively to reach a comprehensive agreement on the nuclear issue, but significant differences reportedly remain. […] The nuclear negotiations also have eased tensions between Iran and its neighbors in the Persian Gulf region--all allies of the United States. However, the Gulf states, Israel, and other regional states express concern that an Iran that is reintegrated into the region and the international community would give Iran additional resources to support movements and regimes that oppose U.S. and U.S.-allied interests. […] President Obama has asserted, both before and after the JPA was agreed, that the option of U.S. military action against Iran's nuclear facilities is available. However, further U.S.--or Israeli--discussion of military options against Iran is unlikely unless nuclear talks collapse outright."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2014-11-17
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [March 18, 2015]
"During the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. officials identified Iran's support for militant Middle East groups as a significant threat to U.S. interests and allies. A perceived potential threat from Iran's nuclear program emerged in 2002, and the United States has orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to try to ensure that the program is verifiably confined to purely peaceful purposes. The United States and its partners negotiated intensively to reach a comprehensive agreement on the nuclear issue by the November 24, 2014, deadline for the Joint Plan of Action (JPA) expiration, but agreement was not reached and the parties have extended the JPA until July 6, 2015. The parties stated intent to reach a political outline of the agreement no later than March 24, 2015. The main outstanding issue remains the scope of Iran's program to enrich uranium. A final nuclear agreement could significantly improve U.S.-Iran relations. […] However, the Persian Gulf states, Israel, and other regional states express concern that an Iran that is reintegrated into the region and the international community would give Iran additional resources to support movements and regimes that oppose U.S. and U.S.-allied interests. Iran would therefore be able to build on gains its foreign policy has made in recent years, for example in supporting the rebel Houthi movement in Yemen and in organizing Shiite forces to defend the embattled government of Bashar Al Assad of Syria. The war against the Islamic State organization has also given Iran additional influence over the government of Iraq as well as common interests with the United States in Iraq."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2015-03-18
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [April 14, 2015]
"Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, a priority of U.S. policy has been to reduce the perceived threat posed by Iran to a broad range of U.S. interests. In 2014, a common enemy emerged in the form of the Islamic State organization, reducing gaps in U.S. and Iranian interests, although the two countries have somewhat differing approaches over how to try to defeat the group. During the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. officials identified Iran's support for militant Middle East groups as a significant threat to U.S. interests and allies. A perceived potential threat from Iran's nuclear program emerged in 2002, and the United States has orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to try to ensure that the program is verifiably confined to purely peaceful purposes. The international pressure might have contributed to the June 2013 election as president of Iran of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani, who campaigned as an advocate of ending Iran's international isolation. Subsequent multilateral talks with Iran produced an interim agreement ('Joint Plan of Action,' JPA) that halted the expansion of Iran's nuclear program in exchange for modest sanctions relief. After more than a year of further talks, on April 2, 2015, the United States and its partners announced a political outline of a comprehensive nuclear agreement, with intent to finalize details by June 30, 2015."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2015-04-14
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Iran, Gulf Security, and U.S. Policy [May 19, 2015]
"Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, a priority of U.S. policy has been to reduce the perceived threat posed by Iran to a broad range of U.S. interests, including the security of the Persian Gulf region. In 2014, a common adversary emerged in the form of the Islamic State organization, reducing gaps in U.S. and Iranian regional interests, although the two countries have somewhat differing approaches over how to try to defeat the group. […] A final nuclear agreement could significantly improve U.S.-Iran relations, but the framework agreement comes in the context of U.S. and allied concerns about Iranian actions in the region. The Persian Gulf states express concern that Iran has made substantial gains in recent years, for example in supporting the rebel Houthi movement in Yemen and in organizing Shiite forces to defend the embattled government of Bashar Al Assad of Syria. The war against the Islamic State organization has also given Iran additional influence over the government of Iraq as well as common interests with the United States in Iraq. On Syria, Iran supports Assad, whereas the United States asserts his departure is key to a political solution. The January 2015 fall of the government of Yemen under pressure from the Houthis has aggravated Saudi-Iranian tensions as Saudi Arabia has undertaken military action against the Houthis there. U.S. allies, particularly Israel and the Gulf states, express concern that a lifting of sanctions will furnish Iran with additional resources with which to expand its influence further. The Gulf states express fears that a nuclear deal could cause the United States to tilt toward Iran or forfeit its role as the final guarantor of Gulf security."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2015-05-19
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Iran, Gulf Security, and U.S. Policy [May 28, 2015]
"Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, a priority of U.S. policy has been to reduce the perceived threat posed by Iran to a broad range of U.S. interests, including the security of the Persian Gulf region. In 2014, a common adversary emerged in the form of the Islamic State organization, reducing gaps in U.S. and Iranian regional interests, although the two countries have somewhat differing approaches over how to try to defeat the group. […] The Persian Gulf states express concern that Iran has made substantial gains in recent years, for example in supporting the rebel Houthi movement in Yemen and in organizing Shiite forces to defend the embattled government of Bashar Al Assad of Syria. The war against the Islamic State organization has also given Iran additional influence over the government of Iraq as well as common interests with the United States in Iraq. On Syria, Iran supports Assad, whereas the United States has asserted that his departure is key to a political solution. The January 2015 fall of the government of Yemen under pressure from the Houthis has aggravated Saudi-Iranian tensions as Saudi Arabia has undertaken military action against the Houthis there. U.S. allies, particularly Israel and the Gulf states, express concern that a lifting of sanctions would furnish Iran with additional resources with which to expand its influence further. The Gulf states express fears that a nuclear deal could cause the United States to tilt toward Iran or forfeit its role as the final guarantor of Gulf security."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2015-05-28
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [July 31, 2013]
"A priority of Obama Administration policy has been to reduce the perceived threat posed to a broad range of U.S. interests by Iran. Well before Iran's nuclear issue rose to the forefront of U.S. concerns about Iran in 2003, the United States had seen Iran's support for militant groups--most of them Shiite Muslim--in the Middle East, Iraq, and Afghanistan as efforts to undermine U.S. interests and allies. U.S. officials also assert that Iran is providing arms and advice to help Syria's leadership try to defeat the armed rebellion there. Lebanese Hezbollah is Iran's closest regional ally and Hezbollah not only is providing fighters to help the Syrian regime, but it also has allegedly been responsible for a number of acts of terrorism against Israeli citizens and interests over the past two years."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2013-07-31
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Iran: Politics, Gulf Security, and U.S. Policy [August 19, 2016]
"Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, a priority of U.S. policy has been primarily to reduce the perceived threat posed by Iran to a broad range of U.S. interests, including the security of the Persian Gulf region. U.S. officials also express a broad range of concerns about Iran's human rights abuses. The implementation of a July 14, 2015, 'Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action' (JCPOA) nuclear agreement between Iran and six negotiating powers appeared to represent an opportunity to reduce the long-standing U.S.-Iran enmity and construct a new relationship. During the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. officials identified Iran's support for militant Middle East groups as the primary threat posed by Iran to U.S. interests and allies. Iran's nuclear program took precedence in U.S. policy after 2002 as the program expanded and the chances that Iran could develop a nuclear weapon increased. In 2010, the United States orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to persuade it to agree to strict limits on the program. The pressure might have contributed to the June 2013 election of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani as president of Iran, whose government subsequently negotiated a November 2013 interim nuclear agreement and then the JCPOA. The JCPOA, which began formal implementation on January 16, 2016, exchanged broad sanctions relief for nuclear program limits intended to give the international community confidence that Iran would require at least a year to produce a nuclear weapon if it decided to do so."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2016-08-19
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Iran: Politics, Gulf Security, and U.S. Policy [March 30, 2016]
"President Obama has asserted that the JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action] has the potential to produce the added benefit of improving U.S.-Iran relations. However, since the deal was finalized, Iran, Iran has tested ballistic missiles and vowed to continue doing so, it has sought new conventional arms from Russia, it has maintained its support for such regional movements and factions such as Syrian President Bashar Al Assad of Syria and Lebanese Hezbollah, and the United States has indicted seven Iranians for cyberattacks on the United States. The Arab states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman) and other U.S. allies such as Israel continue to assert sanctions relief provides Iran with additional political and financial resources to continue such objectionable activities. The United States and the GCC states have a long-standing and extensive security relationship that enables the United States to maintain about 35,000 military personnel at facilities throughout the Gulf. To try to reassure the GCC that Iran's regional influence can and will be contained, U.S. officials have held several high level meetings with GCC leaders to increase security cooperation, including pledging additional U.S. arms sales. The second U.S.-GCC summit will be held in Riyadh on April 21. Domestically, Rouhani and the JCPOA appear to have broad support, but many Iranians say they also want greater freedoms of expression and assembly. Rouhani's public support was demonstrated by the strong showing of moderate conservative candidates in the February 26 elections for the parliament and a key clerical body. However, it is not clear that the election results will enable Rouhani to limit the hardliner control of the judiciary or the security forces that are the main instruments to curb dissent and free expression."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2016-03-30
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Iran, Gulf Security, and U.S. Policy [January 14, 2016]
"Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, a priority of U.S. policy has been to reduce the perceived threat posed by Iran to a broad range of U.S. interests, including the security of the Persian Gulf region. In 2014, a common adversary emerged in the form of the Islamic State organization, reducing gaps in U.S. and Iranian regional interests, although the two countries have often differed over how to try to defeat the group and still disagree on many other issues. The finalization on July 14, 2015, of a 'Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action' (JCPOA) between Iran and six negotiating powers could enhance Iran's ability to counter the United States and its allies in the region, but could also pave the way for cooperation to resolve regional conflicts."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2016-01-14
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Iran, Gulf Security, and U.S. Policy [December 29, 2015]
"In 2014, a common adversary emerged in the form of the Islamic State organization, reducing gaps in U.S. and Iranian regional interests, although the two countries have often differed over how to try to defeat the group and still disagree on many other issues. The finalization on July 14, 2015, of a 'Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action' (JCPOA) between Iran and six negotiating powers could enhance Iran's ability to counter the United States and its allies in the region, but could also pave the way for cooperation to resolve regional conflicts. […] The JCPOA has the potential to improve U.S.-Iran relations, but relations with Iran on regional issues have worsened in some respects since the agreement was finalized. In October and November 2015, Iran tested ballistic missiles that appear to constitute violations of applicable U.N. Security Council resolutions. Iran has also increased its involvement in the Syria conflict in support of President Bashar Al Assad of Syria, whose brutal tactics against domestic armed opponents is, according to U.S. officials, fueling support for the Islamic State organization with brutal tactics. […] Domestically, Rouhani and the JCPOA appear to have broad support, but many Iranians say they also want greater easing of media and social restrictions. Iran's judiciary remains in the hands of hardliners who continue to prosecute dissenters and hold several U.S.-Iran dual nationals on various charges--including U.S.-Iranian journalist Jason Rezaian. Another dual national was arrested after the JCPOA was finalized."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2015-12-29
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Iran, Gulf Security, and U.S. Policy [August 14, 2015]
"In 2014, a common adversary emerged in the form of the Islamic State organization, reducing gaps in U.S. and Iranian regional interests, although the two countries have often differing approaches over how to try to defeat the group. The finalization on July 14, 2015, of a 'Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action' (JCPOA) between Iran and six negotiating powers could enhance Iran's ability to counter the United States and its allies in the region, but could also pave the way for cooperation to resolve some of the region's several conflicts. […] The JCPOA could significantly improve U.S.-Iran relations, but the agreement comes in the context of U.S. and allied concerns about Iranian actions in the region. U.S. allies, particularly Israel and the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman) express concern that a lifting of sanctions will furnish Iran with additional resources with which to expand its influence further. The Persian Gulf states express concern that Iran has made substantial gains in recent years, for example in supporting the rebel Houthi movement in Yemen and in organizing Shiite forces to defend the embattled government of Bashar Al Assad of Syria. The war against the Islamic State organization has also given Iran additional influence over the government of Iraq as well as common interests with the United States in Iraq. On Syria, Iran has supported Assad, whereas the United States has asserted that his departure is key to a political solution."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2015-08-14
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Iran: Politics, Human Rights, and U.S. Policy [February 17, 2017]
"Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, the United States and Iran have been at odds politically and diplomatically, and U.S. policy has been intended to reduce the perceived threat posed by Iran to a broad range of U.S. interests. U.S. officials also express a broad range of concerns about Iran's human rights abuses, including its detentions of U.S.-Iran dual nationals. […] Beginning in 2010, the United States orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to persuade it to agree to strict limits on the program - pressure that contributed to the June 2013 election of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani as president of Iran. His government subsequently negotiated a November 2013 interim nuclear agreement and then the 'Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action' (JCPOA), which was finalized on July 14, 2015. The JCPOA, which began formal implementation on January 16, 2016, exchanged broad sanctions relief for nuclear program limits intended to give the international community confidence that Iran would require at least a year to produce a nuclear weapon if it decided to do so. President Obama asserted that the implementation of the JCPOA presents an opportunity to reduce the long-standing U.S.-Iran enmity and construct a new relationship. However, Iran has continued to test ballistic missiles; maintained support for regional movements and factions such as Syrian President Bashar Al Assad, Lebanese Hezbollah, and Houthi rebels in Yemen; arrested additional U.S.-Iran dual nationals; and conducted high speed intercepts of U.S. naval vessels in the Persian Gulf. The administration of President Donald Trump has characterized Iran as an adversary of the United States and stated a commitment to countering Iran's regional influence -- although without taking steps that would conflict with U.S. commitments under the JCPOA."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2017-02-17
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Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy
"In accordance with Section 1259 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. 'Buck' McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, Public Law 113-291, this report outlines the Department of Defense's strategy with regard to maritime security in the Asia-Pacific region. Recognizing the importance of the Asia-Pacific region and its maritime domain for the security of the United States, the Department is focused on safeguarding freedom of the seas, deterring conflict and coercion, and promoting adherence to international law and standards. As it does around the world, the Department will continue to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows, in support of these goals and in order to preserve the peace and security the Asia-Pacific region has enjoyed for the past 70 years. [...] The United States has enduring economic and security interests in the Asia-Pacific region. And because the region - stretching from the Indian Ocean, through the South and East China Seas, and out to the Pacific Ocean - is primarily water, we place a premium on maintaining maritime peace and security. To that end, the Department of Defense has three maritime objectives in the Asia-Pacific region: to safeguard the freedom of the seas; deter conflict and coercion; and promote adherence to international law and standards."
United States. Department of Defense
2015
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [November 4, 2013]
"A priority of Obama Administration policy has been to reduce the perceived threat posed by Iran to a broad range of U.S. interests. Well before Iran's nuclear issue rose to the forefront of U.S. concerns about Iran in 2003, the United States had seen Iran's support for regional militant groups, such as Lebanese Hezbollah, as efforts to undermine U.S. interests and allies. To implement U.S. policy, the Obama Administration has orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to try to compel it to verifiably demonstrate to the international community that its nuclear program is for purely peaceful purposes. Five rounds of multilateral talks with Iran in 2012 and 2013 yielded no breakthroughs but did explore a potential compromise under which Iran might cease producing medium-enriched uranium (20% Uranium-235--a level not technically far from weapons grade) in exchange for modest sanctions relief. International sanctions have harmed Iran's economy, and the June 14, 2013, first round election victory of a relative moderate, Hassan Rouhani, appeared to reflect popular Iranian sentiment for a negotiated nuclear settlement that produces an easing of international sanctions. […] Rouhani's presidency has the potential to increase the domestic popularity of Iran's regime if he implements campaign pledges to ease repression and social restrictions. His unexpected election win--a result of a large turnout of reform-minded voters such as those who protested the 2009 election results--appeared to counter the views of many experts who assessed the domestic reform movement as cowed by regime suppression and inactive."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2013-11-04
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Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options [October 17, 2018]
"Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, the United States and Iran have been at odds. During the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. officials identified Iran's support for militant Middle East groups as the primary threat posed by Iran to U.S. interests and allies. Iran's nuclear program took precedence in U.S. policy after 2002 as the potential for Iran to develop a nuclear weapon increased. In 2010, the Obama Administration orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to persuade it to agree to strict limits on the program -- pressure that contributed to the June 2013 election of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani as president of Iran and the negotiation of a nuclear agreement-- the 'Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action' (JCPOA). The JCPOA exchanged sanctions relief for limits on Iran's nuclear program. The JCPOA reduced the potential threat from Iran's nuclear program, but did not contain strict or binding limits on Iran's ballistic missile program; its regional influence; its conventional military programs; or its human rights abuses."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2018-10-17
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Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options [August 23, 2018]
"Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, the United States and Iran have been estranged and at odds. During the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. officials identified Iran's support for militant Middle East groups as the primary threat posed by Iran to U.S. interests and allies. Iran's nuclear program took precedence in U.S. policy after 2002 as the potential for Iran to develop a nuclear weapon increased. In 2010, the Obama Administration orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to persuade it to agree to strict limits on the program--pressure that contributed to the June 2013 election of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani as president of Iran and the negotiation of a nuclear agreement--the 'Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action' (JCPOA). The JCPOA exchanged sanctions relief for limits on Iran's nuclear program. The JCPOA reduced the potential threat from Iran's nuclear program, but did not contain strict or binding limits on Iran's ballistic missile program; its regional influence; its conventional military programs; and its human rights abuses."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2018-08-23
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Iran: Politics, Human Rights, and U.S. Policy [May 21, 2018]
"Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, the United States and Iran have been broadly at odds. During the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. officials identified Iran's support for militant Middle East groups as the primary threat posed by Iran to U.S. interests and allies. Iran's nuclear program took precedence in U.S. policy after 2002 as the potential for Iran to develop a nuclear weapon increased. Beginning in 2010, the United States orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to persuade it to agree to strict limits on the program--pressure that contributed to the June 2013 election of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani as president of Iran and the eventual negotiation of a 'Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action' (JCPOA). The JCPOA, which took effect in January 2016, exchanged broad sanctions relief for temporary limits on Iran's nuclear program. The JCPOA reduced the potential threat from Iran's nuclear program, but did not directly address the full range of threats posed by Iran, including from its ballistic missile program; its regional influence and support for armed factions; its conventional military programs; and its human rights abuses."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2018-05-21
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Iran: Politics, Human Rights, and U.S. Policy [August 22, 2017]
"Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, the United States and Iran have been at odds politically and diplomatically over the perceived threat posed by Iran to a broad range of U.S. interests. U.S. officials also express a broad range of concerns about Iran's human rights abuses, including its repeated detentions of U.S.-Iran dual nationals. During the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. officials identified Iran's support for militant Middle East groups as the primary threat posed by Iran to U.S. interests and allies. Iran's nuclear program took precedence in U.S. policy after 2002 as the potential for Iran to develop a nuclear weapon increased. Beginning in 2010, the United States orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to persuade it to agree to strict limits on the program--pressure that contributed to the June 2013 election of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani as president of Iran and the eventual negotiation of a 'Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action' (JCPOA). The JCPOA, which began formal implementation on January 16, 2016, exchanged broad sanctions relief for nuclear program limits intended to ensure that Iran would require at least a year to produce a nuclear weapon after a decision to do so."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2017-08-22
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Iran: Politics, Human Rights, and U.S. Policy [October 3, 2017]
"Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, the United States and Iran have been at odds politically and diplomatically over the perceived threat posed by Iran to a broad range of U.S. interests. U.S. officials also express a broad range of concerns about Iran's human rights abuses, including its repeated detentions of U.S.-Iran dual nationals. During the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. officials identified Iran's support for militant Middle East groups as the primary threat posed by Iran to U.S. interests and allies. Iran's nuclear program took precedence in U.S. policy after 2002 as the potential for Iran to develop a nuclear weapon increased. Beginning in 2010, the United States orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to persuade it to agree to strict limits on the program --pressure that undoubtedly contributed to the June 2013 election of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani as president of Iran and the eventual negotiation of a 'Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action' (JCPOA). The JCPOA, which began formal implementation on January 16, 2016, exchanged broad sanctions relief for nuclear program limits intended to ensure that Iran would require at least a year to produce a nuclear weapon after a decision to do so."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2017-10-03
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Iran: Politics, Human Rights, and U.S. Policy [November 01, 2017]
"Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, the United States and Iran have been at odds politically and diplomatically. During the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. officials identified Iran's support for militant Middle East groups as the primary threat posed by Iran to U.S. interests and allies. Iran's nuclear program took precedence in U.S. policy after 2002 as the potential for Iran to develop a nuclear weapon increased. Beginning in 2010, the United States orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to persuade it to agree to strict limits on the program-- pressure that contributed to the June 2013 election of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani as president of Iran and the eventual negotiation of a 'Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action' (JCPOA). The JCPOA, which began formal implementation on January 16, 2016, exchanged broad sanctions relief for nuclear program limits intended to ensure that Iran would require at least a year to produce a nuclear weapon after a decision to do so."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2017-11-01
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Iran: Politics, Human Rights, and U.S. Policy [June 2, 2017]
"Beginning in 2010, the United States orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to persuade it to agree to strict limits on the program--pressure that contributed to the June 2013 election of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani as president of Iran and the eventual negotiation of a 'Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action' (JCPOA). The JCPOA, which began formal implementation on January 16, 2016, exchanged broad sanctions relief for nuclear program limits intended to ensure that Iran would require at least a year to produce a nuclear weapon after a decision to do so. President Obama asserted that the implementation of the JCPOA presented an opportunity to construct a new and more positive U.S. relationship with Iran. However, Iran has continued to test ballistic missiles; maintained support for regional movements such as Hamas, Lebanese Hezbollah, and Houthi rebels in Yemen; arrested additional U.S.-Iran dual nationals; and conducted high speed intercepts of U.S. naval vessels in the Persian Gulf. The Trump Administration has characterized Iran as an adversary of the United States and stated a commitment to countering Iran's regional influence--although without taking steps that would conflict with U.S. commitments under the JCPOA. The Administration has not articulated a hope or intent to develop an improved relationship with Iran [...] The United States has supported programs to promote civil society in Iran, but successive U.S. Administrations, including the Trump Administration, have stopped short of adopting policies that specifically seek to overthrow Iran's regime."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2017-06-02
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Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate: S. 3410, A Bill to Extend the Undertaking Spam, Spyware, and Fraud Enforcement with Enforcers Beyond Borders Act of 2006, and for Other Purposes
"CBO [Congressional Budget Office] estimates that implementing S. 3410 would have no significant effect on discretionary spending over the 2013-2017 period. Enacting S. 3410 could result in collections of additional civil and criminal penalties, which would affect both revenues and direct spending; therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures apply. However, CBO estimates that those effects also would be insignificant. S. 3410 would reauthorize the Undertaking Spam, Spyware, and Fraud Enforcement with Enforcers beyond Borders Act, which will expire on December 22, 2013. The act provides administrative tools to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) that augment its authority to enforce federal laws related to unfair and deceptive trade practices, such as sharing information with foreign agencies and investigating fraud that originates outside of the United States. The bill also would extend an authorization to appropriate $100,000 each year for the FTC to collaborate with foreign governments and to participate in multinational organizations related to law enforcement. Based on information from the FTC, CBO expects that enacting S. 3410 could change the types of fraud cases the agency investigates but would not change the agency's workload. Therefore, CBO estimates that implementing S. 3410 would not have a significant effect on discretionary costs over the 2013-2017 period."
United States. Congressional Budget Office
2012-08-16
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Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate: H.R. 6131, A Bill to Extend the Undertaking Spam, Spyware, and Fraud Enforcement with Enforcers Beyond Borders Act of 2006, and for Other Purposes
"CBO [Congressional Budget Office] estimates that implementing H.R. 6131 would have no significant effect on discretionary spending over the 2013-2017 period. Enacting H.R. 6131 could result in collections of additional civil and criminal penalties, which would affect both revenues and direct spending; therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures apply. However, CBO estimates that those effects also would be insignificant. H.R. 6131 would reauthorize the Undertaking Spam, Spyware, and Fraud Enforcement with Enforcers beyond Borders Act, which will expire on December 22, 2013. The act provides administrative tools to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) that augment its authority to enforce federal laws related to unfair and deceptive trade practices, such as sharing information with foreign agencies and investigating fraud that originates outside of the United States. The bill also would extend an authorization to appropriate $100,000 each year for the FTC to collaborate with foreign governments and to participate in multinational organizations related to law enforcement. Based on information from the FTC, CBO expects that enacting H.R. 6131 could change the types of fraud cases the agency investigates but would not change the agency's workload. Therefore, CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 6131 would not have a significant effect on discretionary costs over the 2013-2017 period."
United States. Congressional Budget Office
2012-08-16
