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Nuclear Weapons, War with Iraq, and U.S. Security Strategy in the Middle East
The reorientation of U.S. strategic deterrence away from Russia and towards proliferators and rogue regimes has focused U.S. policy and planning on the Middle East. In the short term, it could force the Bush administration to come to terms with the full implications of preventive war strategies. Over the long term, it will raise questions about the relevance of nuclear deterrence as a basis for strategic relations in the region. The Nuclear Posture Review steers the United Sates into uncharted waters in the region. Strategic thinking, not unlike the work that was undertaken during the first decades of the Cold War, is needed to flesh out U.S. strategy.
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Contemporary Conflict
Wirtz, James J., 1958-; Russell, James A. (James Avery), 1958-
2002-09-11
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Negative Security Assurances and the Nuclear Posture Review
Concerns that the United States will violate its NPT negative security assurances are being blown out of proportion. Critics seem to extend these assurances to states that have overt or clandestine nuclear arsenals and to states that violate international norms and treaties against developing, stockpiling or using biological and chemical weapons. Clearly the Bush administration has voiced no intention to be the first to use nuclear weapons against states that lack weapons of mass destruction. The administration's preference is not to use nuclear weapons -- hence the stated intention in he NPR to use conventional weapons in a "strategic" context. The NPR debate, however, does focus attention on a disturbing international trend. Even as the United States and Russia reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals, other state and non-state actors continue in their quest to bolster their nuclear, chemical and biological weapons capabilities. Whenever policies that are intended to foster disarmament -- such as the negative security assurances associated with the NPT -- confront flagrant efforts to obtain weapons of mass destruction, the connection between policy and reality will be strained. The inability of disarmament policies to cope with these circumstances has more to do with bad situations, not the bad intentions of U.S. policymakers.
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Contemporary Conflict
Wirtz, James J., 1958-; Russell, James A. (James Avery), 1958-
2002-07-05
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Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense (1999)
This Report presents the Department of Defense assessment of the relative contributions toward common defense and mutual security made by our NATO allies, our key partners in the Pacific (Japan and the Republic of Korea), and the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). This report responds to the requirements set forth in the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (P.L. 105-261), Title XII, Section 1233, Defense
Burdensharing, paragraphs a-c. Additionally, this Report covers burdensharing reporting requirements set forth in the Department of Defense Military Construction Appropriations Act (P.L. 105-237), Section 119. In its discussion of "Legislative Provisions Adopted" in the Strom Thurmond Act, Congress directed the Secretary to provide a Report to Congress on "National Security Bases for Forward Deployment and Burdensharing Relationships." The baseline legislation for this requirement is the FY1997 National Defense Authorization Act, Title X, Section 1084. In that provision, Congress requests an analysis of forward deployment options, and related force structures and costs (paragraphs c-e). Such information is beyond the scope of this Report, but
readers are advised that the information is available in more comprehensive departmental reports.
These include the National Defense University's 1998 Strategic Assessment (on alternative
basing options and related force structures); and in the Department of Defense OP-53 Exhibit, Defense Overseas Funding, which addresses DOD worldwide overseas costs. Under legislative provisions dating to the Defense Authorization Act of 1981 (P.L. 96-342, Section 1006), the Department of Defense is required to compare the defense burdens borne
by our allies, explain disparities, and describe efforts to eliminate such disparities.
United States. Department of Defense
1999-03
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Regional Conflicts with Strategic Consequences
"During the Cold War, strategic capabilities were synonymous with nuclear capabilities, and US strategic planning focused on nuclear deterrence and response against a single adversary. Today, more potential enemies are developing asymmetric capabilities to inhibit or prevent U.S. military intervention in regional conflicts-in short, to wage strategic warfare by implicitly or explicitly threatening high-value political, military, or economic targets with weapons of mass destruction and disruption. U.S. security over the next several decades will depend increasingly on the ability to deter and respond effectively to strategic regional conflicts with significant escalation potential. The Department of Defense faces the task of ensuring that a comprehensive set of responses is developed for the National Command Authorities and is incorporated into planning before a conflict begins. To meet this challenge, the defense establishment should analyze requirements for deterring and combating strategic warfare in regional conflicts, identify shortcomings in plans and capabilities, and develop solutions. Providing a broad mix of military options could require changes in operational concepts, contingency planning, training, and resource allocation. The effort will require significant input from all the relevant commands and force providers, as well as the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, services, and other agencies."
National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies
Bunn, M. Elaine; Mosher, David E.; Sokolsky, Richard
2001-07
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U.S. Strategic Posture Review: Issues for the New Administration
"In the past, U.S. decisionmakers have addressed strategic nuclear force and national missile defense issues in an incremental and uncoordinated manner. Too often, force structure decisions have been driven by near-term programmatic, budgetary, arms control, and political pressures rather than by long-term strategy and objectives. The forthcoming Strategic Posture Review (SPR) needs to fundamentally reassess the purposes of nuclear weapons, missile defenses, and the requirements of deterrence and stability in the new security environment. The Bush administration should develop a comprehensive conceptual framework to decide on the size, composition, and posture of strategic offensive and defensive forces. Such a framework should integrate new assessments of deterrence and stability over the next 10-20 years, in light of the much more diverse threats facing the United States. It will not be easy to come up with solutions that balance competing and often contradictory objectives. Improving U.S. capabilities to deal with one set of strategic concerns may complicate efforts to address others. SPR should include a reassessment of U.S. strategic force levels and targeting requirements; consideration of different hedges and reconstitution options against greater-than-expected threats, such as maintaining production capabilities or making unilateral strategic force reductions outside a formal treaty framework; and development of a broad calculus to assess the impact of national missile defense and other strategic developments on deterrence and stability."
National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies
Bunn, M. Elaine; Sokolsky, Richard
2001-02
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Comparing Threats from Saddam and bin Laden
How does the threat to U.S. national security posed by Saddam Hussein compare to that posed by Osama bin Laden? This question bears importantly on U.S. policy in the ongoing war against terrorism. A prerequisite to answering such a question is to define "threat", which from the U.S. perspective can be deemed "a person, state, or organization having motivation, capability, and intent to attack the United States, U.S. personnel or U.S. assets anywhere in the world." While the United States as a global superpower faces a wide array of threats, this analysis focuses only on Saddam and bin Laden--the latter of whom we will assume, for the sake of argument, to be still alive.
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Contemporary Conflict
Rana, Surinder
2002-09-17
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Problems in Using Trade to Counter Terrorism: The Case of Pakistan
Even before the smoke had settled from the September 11 attacks in New York and Washington, United States Trade Representative Robert Zoellick launched a series of speeches arguing that global trade liberalization was a central plank of the counter-offensive against terrorism. In a thoughtful essay, "Countering Terror With Trade" Zoellick's (2001) main premise was that:
America's trade leadership can build a coalition of countries...Open markets are vital for developing nations, many of them fragile democracies that rely on the international economy to overcome poverty and create opportunity; we need answers for those who ask for economic hope to counter internal threats to our common values. To address the relationship between trade agreements and other international objectives the President has proposed that we build on openness and growth in developing countries with a tool box of cooperative policies.
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Contemporary Conflict
Looney, Robert E.
2002-10-01
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Department of Defense Chemical and Biological Defense Program: Volume II: FY 2001-2003 Performance Plan
The Department of Defense (DoD) Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) has prepared this performance plan to align itself more closely with the tenets of the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA). Specifically, the plan: Establishes explicit and outcome-oriented goals linked to warfighters' ability to survive, fight, and win in a CB environment; Identifies quantitative and/or qualitative performance measures that can be used to assess progress towards goal achievement; Describes how performance data is validated; Describes how RDT&E activities of participating DOD and non-DOD organizations are coordinated to achieve program goals; and Identifies human capital, financial, and resource challenges or external factors that limit the ability of the program to achieve its goals. The major portions of this performance plan link performance goals with performance measurements in terms of those systems and programs, which support the warfighter requirements and goals. Section 1 provides the vision, mission, goals and performance measures for the CBDP. Section 2 analyzes performance goals and measurements that support the advanced development and acquisition phases of CB defense systems. Section 3 analyzes the science and technology base of the program to include basic and applied research and advanced technology development, which support essential capabilities meeting warfighter requirements. Performance goals, which support each corporate level goal of the CBDP, establish a measurable path to incremental achievement of specific goals. These performance goals are supported and evaluated by measurable outputs, which are assessed using performance measures. Performance measures quantify the output of the CB defense program for key measures associated with providing a ready force, capable of conducting operations in CB contaminated environments.
United States. Department of Defense
2002-04
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Joint Service Chemical and Biological Defense Program: FY00-FY01 Overview
In an effort to provide a concise description of the Department of Defense's (DoD) Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP), this pamphlet has been developed to highlight major program efforts, inlcluding a summary of FY99 accomplishments and goals for FY2000 and beyond. Training and doctrine needs to improve readiness are also outlined here. Contents include Global Threat, Threat to Military Missions, Management Stuctures, Funding, Commodity Area Overview, Contamination Avoidance, Decontamination, Protection, Medical Issues, Modeling and Simulation, and Additional Information.
United States. Department of Defense
2000
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Integrated Chemical and Biological Defense Research, Development and Acquisition Plan: Chemical & Biological Point Detection and Decontamination (April 2002)
"The Integrated Chemical and Biological Defense Program Research, Development and Acquisition Plan for the Departments of Defense and Energy: Bio Point Detection, published in March 2001, presented the first technology area-focused roadmap. The narrower and more detailed scope of the roadmap reports serves the second and equally important purpose of the effort. The technology area roadmaps are "living" documents intended to facilitate coordination and cooperation between DOE and DoD at both the high level of national policy and planning and at the working level in the technology focus areas. They depict participating organization R&D programs and plans for testing and transitioning technologies into the acquisition process. Program data comes from existing planning documents in many cases; however, it should be noted that appearance within the roadmap does not imply funding commitments. Rather, the integration of these efforts into a single planning document represents a significant step toward a more formal, unified, long-term investment strategy. This second report is responsive to the above guidance. It includes both an expanded bio point detection roadmap, which now covers chemical point detection as well, and the decontamination roadmap (see Figure 1 for progress to date). In addition, the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG), the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) provided input to this year's report. Intelligence community representatives have participated in Focus Group meetings. Coordination has begun with the Nonproliferation and Arms Control Technology Working Group (NPAC TWG)."
United States. Department of Defense
2002-04
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Joint Service Chemical and Biological Defense Program: FY02-03 Overview
This document provides an overview of Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) major focus area efforts, providing a summary of FY01 accomplishments and goals set for FY02 and beyond. An additional
publication, the DoD Annual Report to Congress on the Chemical and Biological Defense Program, provides
a more detailed look at programmatic accomplishments as well as the roadmap to the future. The FY03 budget request provides funding for a number of new Homeland Security initiatives; including a Center for Biological Terrorism Research, a comprehensive program to build a National Biological Defense System for the Office of Homeland Security, a Joint Service Installation Protection Project, and continued equipping of the 32 WMD Civil Support Teams.
United States. Department of Defense
2002
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Joint Warfighting Science and Technology Plan, Chapter 12: Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Section 1 of this chapter, Chemical/Biological Defense, focuses on passive defense and consequence management in scenarios involving chemical and biological threats. Section 2, Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction, focuses on nonproliferation and counterforce against the full spectrum of WMD threats. Other aspects of counterproliferation capabilities, as defined by the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee (Reference 24), are addressed in the Information
Superiority (Chapter IV), Air and Missile Defense (Chapter VII), Combating Terrorism (Chapter XIII), and Hard and Deeply Buried Target Defeat (Chapter XV) JWCOs.
United States. Department of Defense
2002-02
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Report on the Integrated Chemical and Biological Research, Development and Acquisition Plan for the Departments of Defense and Energy: Bio Point Detection (March 2001)
This report serves a dual purpose. First, it fulfills Counterproliferation Program Review Committee (CPRC) and Congressional coordination and reporting requirements1 for the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of Energy (DOE) in the area of chemical and biological defense (CBD) research, development and acquisition (RDA). The first CBD RDA report published in April 20002 explained the rationale for and genesis of interagency coordination via the CPRC-chartered CBD RDA Focus Group and the roles and responsibilities of DoD and DOE and other agencies. This report focuses in detail on a specific technology areabiological point detection. It is this narrower and more detailed scope that allows the report to serve its second and equally important purpose. This report is a "living" document intended to facilitate coordination and cooperation between DOE and DoD at both the high level of national policy and planning and at the working level in the area of biological point detection. report achieves these objectives through a detailed "roadmap" that depicts R&D programs within the DoD Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP), Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the DOE Chemical and Biological National Security Program (CBNP) as well as plans for testing and transitioning technologies into the acquisition process through FY10.
United States. Department of Defense
2001-03
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Counterproliferation Program Review Committee Annual Report to Congress: Executive Summary (1995)
"The recommendations of the 1994 NPRC report constitute an integrated, top level plan to improve the overall capability of the United States in countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Although it will take a period of years to implement all of the NPRC recommendations, the represented organizations have taken a number of actions since the report was submitted. The CPRC can report that progress has been made over the past year in many areas leading toward a strengthening of U.S. capabilities for countering proliferation. This strengthening includes implementing initiatives that will lead to rapid fielding of essential capabilities and improved integration, management, and oversight of programs related to countering proliferation."
United States. Department of Defense
1995
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Counterproliferation Program Review Committee Annual Report to Congress: Executive Summary (1994)
In accordance with NDAA 94, this report provides a top-down overview of existing, planned and proposed capabilities and technologies, as well as a description of priorities, programmatic options and other issues. Other than Nunn-Lugar activities, this report specifically excludes activities and programs for dealing with extant weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them in the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and China, but does address non/counterproliferation activities and programs for dealing with issues germane to the proliferation of WMD through illicit export of materials, technology, and expertise from FSU states. The report discusses ongoing and planned Agency programs and activities that are unique to the non/counterproliferation problem as well as those that are strongly related. The funding summaries presented for these efforts are estimates. The report focuses on the non/counterproliferation capabilities to support US policy goals.
United States. Department of Defense
1994
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President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC): Issue Review (2000): A Review of NSTAC Issues Addressed through NSTAC XXIII
This edition of the Issue Review provides a status report of issues addressed by the President's National
Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) from its first meeting in December 1982 until the May 15-16, 2000, meeting of the NSTAC. The Issue Review documents the history of issues currently and previously addressed by the NSTAC. For each issue, the following information is provided when applicable: names of the investigating groups, length of time required for the investigation, issue
background, a synopsis of NSTAC actions and recommendations, recent and planned activities to further
address the issue, actions resulting from NSTAC recommendations, members of the current investigating groups, and reports issued. Appendix C provides related acronyms for the reader's convenience.
United States. President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee
2000-05
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Globalization Task Force Report (2000)
Since the last meeting of the President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) in June 1999, the Globalization Task Force (GTF)1 has concentrated its efforts on national security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP) issues related to the global
information infrastructure (GII) in 2010, foreign ownership of NS/EP critical communications systems, and technology export policies. The GTF concluded that in 2010, NS/EP communications would be facilitated by a GII featuring new technologies and improved network features. The GII in 2010 would also provide increased global availability of broadband communications, with satellite communications and wireless
technologies bringing the GII and NS/EP communications to less accessible geographic regions. In addition to planning for the global availability of the GII in 2010, the Government must also consider the richness of service envisioned in the future network architecture and decide whether NS/EP communications will require quality of service (QoS) features beyond commercially available capabilities. The GTF also examined the implications of foreign ownership of critical U.S. telecommunications facilities on NS/EP services. Subsequently, the GTF tasked NSTAC's Legislative and Regulatory Working Group (LRWG) with developing a scoping paper on the
issue and reporting any findings to the GTF before the completion of the GII report. The LRWG concluded that the current regulatory structure effectively accommodated increasing levels of foreign ownership of U.S. telecommunications facilities, while allowing the Federal Government to retain the authority to prevent any such foreign ownership that might compromise national security interests. The GTF concluded that because technology progresses faster than policy can keep up with it, industry and Government should continue to reevaluate the limits
placed on the export of technologies.
United States. President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee
2000-05
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Guide to Understanding the National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications and the Network Security Information Exchanges
The purpose of this document is to serve as a single, accessible document that provides background information about the NCC, its ISAC function, and the NSIEs, and describes their relationships. To fully understand the NCC and the
NSIEs, it is necessary to understand the relationships each entity has with the NSTAC and the OMNCS. Although having the same general objective (i.e., ensuring adequate NS/EP telecommunications services) the NCC and the NSIE have different, but complementary, characteristics in terms of focus, time frame, skill sets, products, and value. Provided in this document is a table that summarizes the key features of the NCC, its ISAC function, and the NSIEs, as well as background information, and conclusions.
National Communications System (U.S.)
2001-03
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DoD Chemical/Biological Defense Program Overview: Presentation to the National Academy of Sciences Board on Chemical Sciences and Technology
This presentation reiterates Rumsfeld's statement that "We need to prepare, as an Alliance, for the full range of asymmetric threats: new forms of terrorism, ... and nuclear,
chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. All of
these are emerging dangers. None can be ignored. We need to prepare, as an Alliance, for the full range of
asymmetric threats: new forms of terrorism, ... and nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. All of these are emerging dangers. None can be ignored. It should be of particular concern to all of us that the list of
countries which today support global terrorism overlaps significantly with the list of countries that have weaponized chemical and biological
agents, and which are seeking nuclear,
chemical and biological weapons--and
the means to deliver them." An overview of the CBDP vision is given here, along with current capabilities in detection and a list of acronyms at the end of the presentation.
United States. Department of Defense
Johnson-Winegar, Anna
2002-04-07
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Enduring Freedom for Central Asia?
China's leaders also have been forging strong economic ties with the Central Asian states over many years, and have launched a crackdown against what they are calling Islamic extremists in the Chinese regions bordering Central Asia. Although Beijing has given the Bush administration its support in the war on terrorism, Chinese officials have expressed their alarm over the rapidly expanding U.S. military presence in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, and openly question what plans the United States might have for the region's future.
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Contemporary Conflict
Skinner, Elizabeth
2002-04
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Nuclear Smuggling: How Serious a Threat?
Cases of illicit transactions in nuclear materials have occurred over the last 20 years virtually throughout the world, to include the United States. Of the 450 reported attempts of illegal trafficking recorded by the Department of Energy through 1994, most proved to be nothing more than profit-motivated scams involving bogus material, perpetrated by opportunists. The unprecedented leakage of nuclear materials from the former Soviet Union (FSU) in 1994 signaled a clear shift in the nature and significance of the nuclear smuggling problem. While recognizing that the reporting was incomplete and of mixed reliability, there were increases observed in the numbers of attempted transactions including the number of participants and in the types and quantities of materials offered for sale. The apparent pause in the leakage of nuclear materials in 1995 is welcome, but does not provide much comfort because conditions in the FSU conducive to nuclear smuggling remain relatively unchanged and substantial leakage (still unrecovered) may have already occurred.
National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies
Ford, James L.
1996-01
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Iraq's Enduring Proliferation Threat
UN inspections, and revelations triggered by the defection in summer of 1995 of Iraq's chief of NBC programs, Hussein Kamel, have confirmed what many suspected: Iraq's NBC programs went well beyond what had been assessed prior to DESERT STORM or at the initiation of post-war sanctions, or admitted by Iraq in declarations to the UN. Iraq had a crash program to make its first nuclear warhead for missile delivery by April 1991. Its Biological Weapons (BW) program produced enough anthrax and botulinum toxin to kill the world's entire population. Before DESERT STORM, Iraq filled about 200 missile warheads and aerial bombs with BW agents and deployed them to missile bases and air fields. It had even more capability for Chemical Weapons (CW) employment. Documents obtained by the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) indicate that Iraq contemplated strategic offensive use of CW (and probably BW) through surprise attack.
National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies
Sullivan, Peter
1996-11
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South China Sea: Future Source of Prosperity or Conflict in South East Asia?
The South China Sea, an area of 648,000 square nautical miles between the coast of Asia and the islands of Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia, is dotted with hundreds of islets, reefs, rocks and shoals, which are the subject of conflicting territorial claims. The presumed existence of large oil and gas deposits in these waters and the strategic importance of shipping lanes between East Asia and South Asia, the Middle East and Europe have increased the risk of confrontations over disputed areas of the South China Sea and the urgency of averting these possible confrontations through a peaceful settlement
National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies
Hull, Richard E.
1996-02
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Iraq: Next Phase of the Campaign?
The Bush Administration's foreign policy is now being driven by a set of principles described by President Bush in his 2002 State of the Union Address. Characterized by various observers as the "Bush Doctrine," the outlines of this policy are: (1) that the United States will combat terror wherever it exists using all means at its disposal, including force; (2) that bilateral relationships around the world will be increasingly defined in terms of those countries that support the war on terrorism and those that do not; and (3) that "rogue" nations and/or terrorist organizations cannot be permitted to acquire and/or threaten the United States with weapons of mass destruction.
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Contemporary Conflict
Russell, James A. (James Avery), 1958-; Bravo, IIiana P.
2002-04
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Beijing and the American War on Terrorism
The American war on terrorism since the 11 September attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon has presented Beijing with a dilemma. On one hand, Washington's call for international support in the war on terrorism gave Beijing an opportunity to improve bilateral relations with a new Bush Administration that previously had regarded ties with the PRC with a cool skepticism. On the other hand, Washington's conduct of the war on terrorism has given it new strategic assets and military relationships in Asia that, Beijing fears, may be used in the long term to contain China itself. With diverging key interests at stake, Beijing's view of the war on terrorism has been publicly collaborative but also increasingly ambivalent.
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Contemporary Conflict
Miller, H. Lyman
2002-07-01
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NORTHCOM to Coordinate DoD Role in Homeland Defense
On April 17, 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced the formation of the Northern Command, or NorthCom, to assume responsibility for defense of the land, sea and air of the continental United States -- the first time CONUS has been assigned to a unified combatant commander. NorthCom, which is slated to become operational in October 2002, will exercise command over all forces that operate within the United States in response to external threats and in support of civil authorities.[1] The announcement marks only the beginning of DoD's efforts to organize itself for the mission of supporting homeland defense -- a critical new mission for the department as identified in the Quadrennial Defense Review.
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Contemporary Conflict
Russell, James A. (James Avery), 1958-
2002-05-06
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Network Group Internet Report: An Examination of the NS/EP Implications of Internet Technologies
The purpose of this report is to examine how a severe disruption of the Internet could affect NS/EP operations over the next 3 years. The report focuses on the current Internet infrastructure and anticipated near-term enhancements, and recognizes traditional threats and vulnerabilities, such as equipment malfunctions, natural hazards, sabotage, and physical design. It addresses potential concerns as new technologies and regulatory mandates affect the evolution of the Internet. Additionally, the growing threat from malicious intruders is considered.
United States. President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee
1999-06
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Legislative and Regulatory Group Report (1998)
The National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee's (NSTAC) Industry Executive
Subcommittee (IES) charged the Legislative and Regulatory Group (LRG) to examine the implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (Telecom Act) and other legislative,
regulatory, and judicial actions for their potential impact on national security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP) telecommunications. The LRG monitored the implementation of the
Telecom Act based on a framework for analysis it established in 1997 to consider the impact of the law's implementation on NS/EP telecommunications. The LRG also monitored regulatory developments with respect to the Internet. In addition to monitoring the implementation of the Telecom Act, the IES tasked the LRG to address several other issues following NSTAC XX. This paper covers the recommendations of the LRG on these issues.
United States. President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee
1998-09
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NS/EP Implications of Electronic Commerce
This analysis focuses primarily on NS/EP issues related to recent activities within the Federal
Government to incorporate EC into business operations. In particular, the NSTAC focused on how the transition to EC could affect the departments and agencies that conduct NS/EP functions. Currently, EC use among such organizations has been limited to the support of nonmission
critical activities. However, as NS/EP organizations increase their reliance on EC for contracting, ordering and distributing essential supplies in support of the public welfare, national security posture, or any other NS/EP function, the security of these transactions will become more critical to NS/EP operations. As the NS/EP community transitions to EC for business
operations, the departments and agencies should be alert to a number of issues that could affect how EC is implemented. This analysis reflects the importance of encouraging a broader awareness of NS/EP issues related to the introduction of EC. The NSTAC has found a lack of focus on NS/EP needs within these various entities. Therefore, there is a need to establish a focal point within the Federal Government to work with these various public and private organizations to increase their
awareness of NS/EP issues related to EC.
United States. President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee
1999-06
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Network Group Report (1998)
Since the last meeting of the President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) in December 1997, the Network Group (NG) has directed its efforts to five activities. Two of these activities involve the NG's ongoing responsibilities: facilitating the
exchange of network security research and development (R&D) information between Government and industry and overseeing the NSTAC Network Security Information Exchange (NSIE). Discussions at NSTAC XX resulted in two additional activities: examining how national security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP) operations might be affected by a severe disruption of Internet service and clarifying the findings in the Widespread Outage Subgroup's (WOS) report to NSTAC XX. The NG initiated a fifth activity- a review of the status of efforts to prepare the telecommunications infrastructure for the millennium change- in response to a request from the Manager, National Communications System.
United States. President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee
1998-09
