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LLIS Best Practice: Incident Site Security: Secondary Attacks
"Effective incident site security (ISS) requires immediate action to address the threat of secondary attacks. This Best Practice reviews key elements that secondary attack standard operating procedures (SOPs) should address: identifying/locating devices and/or potential attackers, disarming secondary devices, defining response logistics, establishing perimeter security, and validating threat."
Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS)
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LLIS Best Practice: Use of Amateur Radio Operators to Augment Emergency Communications: Amateur Radio Information and Emergency Planning
"Amateur radio operators will be most effective during an emergency if key technical and operational issues are addressed in the emergency planning process. Emergency management agencies (EMAs) and amateur radio operators should work together to update emergency management plans to address these technical and operational considerations."
Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS)
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LLIS Best Practice: Incident Site Security: Perimeter Security: Outer Perimeters
"Outer perimeters and their associated standard operating procedures (SOPs) are essential components of perimeter security at incident scenes. They enable emergency response personnel to isolate and control access to the incident scene and associated areas, including the incident command post (ICP), staging and reception areas, the centralized dispatch center, and the emergency operations center (EOC). Effective outer perimeters protect emergency responders from external influences and protect the public from dangers emanating from the incident site. They also help to preserve evidence at the incident site. This Best Practice reviews the two core elements of outer perimeters: evacuation procedures and physical barrier construction. This document can aid jurisdictions when developing new or revising existing perimeter security plans for emergencies. Jurisdictions' outer perimeter plans and SOPs will vary according to their specific targets, resources, and logistics."
Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS)
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LLIS Best Practice: Use of Amateur Radio Operators to Augment Emergency Communications: Overview
"Communications are a critical component of effective emergency responses at the local, state, and federal levels. Because major emergencies may overwhelm traditional communications systems, developing a secondary, nonstandard system of communications is invaluable for an effective emergency response. For decades, amateur radio operators have organized themselves into volunteer associations with the purpose of assisting in emergency response communications. Because amateur radio operators fund and equip themselves and operate on unique frequencies that are less easily disrupted in the event of an emergency, amateur radio operators represent a cost-effective way of providing auxiliary emergency communications. Should normal communications be disrupted during an emergency, amateur radio operators can ensure continued communication between emergency responders using their own frequencies. Amateur radio operators can also assist emergency responders by managing and easing heavy communications traffic, providing up-to-date information through established communications networks, and helping to locate and facilitate the distribution of muchneeded resources. These best practices discuss how to establish contact and develop a working relationship with existing amateur radio organizations. The practices highlight technical issues that emergency managers should consider when incorporating amateur radio operators into emergency planning. The practices also make recommendations for including amateur radio operators in training exercises and for purchasing or housing useful additional equipment for amateur operators."
Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS)
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LLIS Best Practice: Use of Amateur Radio Operators to Augment Emergency Communications: Equipment
"Amateur radio operators own their own equipment, which, when they are activated in an emergency, significantly reduces costs to EMAs [Emergency Management Agencies]. However, it can be time-consuming to collect and transport this equipment to an EOC [emergency operations center] or incident site. By purchasing and prepositioning vital equipment in agency facilities, EMAs can accelerate amateur radio operators' assistance in emergencies."
Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS)
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LLIS Best Practice: Regional Emergency Planning for Healthcare Facilities: Regional Information Management Systems
"Effective information management is essential for a coordinated regional emergency response by healthcare facilities. Regional emergency planning and agreements need to establish information management systems among the participating healthcare facilities. These should also delineate protocols that govern the system, especially in an emergency."
Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS)
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LLIS Best Practice: Regional Emergency Planning for Healthcare Facilities: Transfer of Resources, Personnel, and Patients
"A large-scale disaster or terrorist incident is likely to overwhelm the capacity of any single healthcare facility. A coordinated regional response to such events may require the transfer of resources, personnel, and patients between healthcare facilities."
Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS)
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LLIS Best Practice -- Regional Emergency Planning for Healthcare Facilities: Regional Agreements
"Agreements are critical components of the regional emergency planning efforts of healthcare facilities. They enable a region's healthcare facilities to respond to a large-scale disaster or terrorist event in a rapid, coordinated, and effective manner. Such agreements establish a formal relationship among signatories by setting roles and responsibilities in emergencies."
Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS)
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LLIS Practice Note: Special Event Coordination: The Minnesota Joint Analysis Center's Support to the Carlton County Sheriff's Office for the 2009 Annual Hells Angels Motorcycle Run
"The Minnesota Joint Analysis Center (MNJAC) assisted the Carlton County, MN, Sheriff's Office in gathering and disseminating threat information prior to and during the 2009 Annual Hells Angels Motorcycle Run. MNJAC analysts also served at the emergency operations center (EOC) during the event period, providing real-time threat information to on-duty law enforcement officers as well as maintaining an open channel of communication with other state fusion centers in the region."
Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS)
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LLIS Practice Note: Special Event Management: Serve DC's Volunteer Planning and Coordination during the 2009 Presidential Inauguration
"Serve DC, the District of Columbia Mayor's Office on Volunteerism, successfully recruited and trained volunteers to support the District's operations during the 2009 Presidential Inauguration."
Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS)
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LLIS Practice Note: Fusion Center Collaboration: State of Washington Joint Analytical Center--Federal Bureau of Investigation Field Investigative Group Partnership
"The State of Washington Joint Analytical Center (WAJAC) is co-located with the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Field Intelligence Group (FIG). The two entities operate jointly to facilitate the rapid exchange of critical intelligence and information."
Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS)
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LLIS Practice Note: Points of Dispensing Operations: The Yolo County, California, Health Department's Use of Online Training
"During a point of dispensing (POD) exercise, the Yolo County, California, Health Department utilized a Web-based training system that educated staff members and volunteers on POD operations prior to the exercise."
Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS)
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LLIS Practice Note: Points of Dispensing Operations: Positioning the Incident Command Post
"During a point of dispensing (POD) full-scale exercise (FSE), exercise planners from the Yolo County, California, Health Department positioned the incident command post in a location that overlooked the vaccination floor. This allowed command staff members to observe operations on the vaccination floor during the FSE."
Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS)
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LLIS Practice Note: Information and Intelligence Sharing: The Louisiana State Analytical and Fusion Exchange's Assistance to State and Local Law Enforcement Personnel
"Louisiana State Analytical and Fusion Exchange (LA-SAFE) personnel leveraged their technical, analytical, and information-dissemination capabilities to help law enforcement agencies apprehend a wanted fugitive, identify a missing terrorist suspect, and uncover a drive-by-shooting hoax."
Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS)
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LLIS Practice Note: Influenza Antiviral Deployment: The Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services' Securing of Temporary Pharmaceutical Distributor's Licenses
"The Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services (MDHSS) obtained temporary pharmaceutical distributor's licenses for personnel transporting influenza antiviral medications. This ensured that MDHSS's antiviral distribution operations complied with the state's pharmaceutical distribution laws."
Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS)
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LLIS Practice Note: Disaster Recovery: The Public Information Partnership Formed by the Cities of Joplin and Duquesne, the State of Missouri, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency after the May 22, 2011 Tornado
"The cities of Joplin and Duquesne, Missouri, the State of Missouri, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) partnered to effectively communicate public information about the debris removal process after the May 22, 2011, tornado that struck Jasper and Newton counties. The information partnership employed innovative strategies and developed customized products for the impacted areas. These strategies ensured that residents received accurate and up-to-date information about debris removal, which helped them make informed choices for their own recoveries."
Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS)
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LLIS Practice Note: Field Training: The Federal Emergency Management Agency Region VII Disaster Field Training Operation's Management Training Series
"The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region VII Disaster Field Training Operation (DFTO) management training series increases the effectiveness and efficiency of supervisory personnel by enhancing their knowledge, skills, and abilities."
Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS)
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LLIS Practice Note: Los Angeles, California's Operation Archangel
"The City of Los Angeles launched Operation Archangel to identify and protect critical assets in 2004. Archangel supports the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) by building security partnerships, managing risk, and maximizing efficient use of resources. Operation Archangel utilizes the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Automated Critical Asset Management System (ACAMS), a data collection and reporting tool, to track and report CI/KR [critical infrastructure and key resources] protection data."
Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS)
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LLIS Practice Note: Hazardous Materials: The State of Ohio's First Responder Personal Protective Equipment Kits
"The State of Ohio Security Task Force (SOSTF) implemented a hazardous materials
(HazMat) and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) awareness training program in 2003 for
the state's first responders. As SOSTF developed that program, it realized that many Ohio
responders did not have access to PPE for use in the event of a chemical or biological
incident. To address this deficiency, SOSTF formed a working group to develop a low cost,
self-contained PPE kit that could be carried by Ohio responders operating in the field."
Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS)
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FY2006 Homeland Security Grants Program Guidance and Application Kit
"Several significant changes in the HSGP [Homeland Security Grant Program] and its focus are being made for FY 2006. First, this marks the first grant cycle in which the Interim National Preparedness Goal is in place to outline National Priorities and focus expenditures on building capabilities. This common planning framework and the tools that support it allow the Nation to define target levels of performance and measure progress made toward achieving them. In addition, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is adopting in FY 2006 a risk- and need-based approach to allocating funding for certain programs within HSGP. The aim is to allocate and apply these resources to generate the highest return on investment and, as a result, strengthen national preparedness in the most effective and efficient manner. In addition to integrating these new policy developments, the FY 2006 HSGP guidance: Highlights the Interim National Preparedness Goal and its applicability to the FY 2006 HSGP; Highlights the Target Capabilities List and its applicability to the FY 2006 HSGP; Presents overall FY 2006 HSGP policy and program requirements, including overall FY 2006 HSGP allowable costs; Guides grantees in the application and award process for the FY 2006 HSGP; Provides detail on the specific requirements associated with FY 2006 SHSP [ State Homeland Security Program], UASI [Urban Areas Security Initiative], LETPP [Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program], MMRS [Metropolitan Medical Response System], and CCP [Citizen Corps Program]."
United States. Department of Homeland Security
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Strengthen, Prepare, Respond: The Interagency Board FY 2016 Annual Report
"The IAB's [InterAgency Board] mission is to strengthen the Nation's ability to prepare for and to respond safely and effectively to emergencies, disasters, and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear,
and explosive (CBRNE) incidents. Today, this mission is more complex than in the early days of the IAB. Attacks on police, civil unrest, wildfires, and widespread addiction were not as prominent then as they are now. These incidents have significant impacts on our communities and tax public safety resources. Incidents today routinely cross disciplinary lines and have raised citizens' expectations of local, state, and federal response capabilities. Public safety responses to local incidents now include emergency management, public health, and state and federal partners in addition to police, fire, and emergency medical services. Assets such as the National Guard Civil Support Teams, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection are increasingly integrated into local planning meetings. Additionally, our Nation's Fusion Centers are routinely involved in intelligence sharing with local partners. Interagency cooperation across all tiers of response is vital as we all work in a common mission space."
InterAgency Board
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Interagency Board: 2004 Annual Report and 2005 Standardized Equipment List
This is an annual report of the Interagency Board (IAB). IAB for Equipment Standardization and Inter Operability Working Group is designed to establish and coordinate local, state, and federal standardization, interoperability, and responder safety to prepare for, respond to, mitigate, and recover from any incident by identifying requirements for Chemical, Biological, and Radiological, Nuclear, or Explosives (CBRNE) incident response equipment.
InterAgency Board
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Large-Scale Building Collapse: Prioritizing Damage and Safety Assessments at the Command Level
"Following a large-scale building collapse, command-level responders should resist becoming involved in individual rescue efforts. Instead, commanders should focus on assessing the overall damage and safety situation."
Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS)
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Large-Scale Building Collapse: Initial Building Damage Assessments from a Variety of Vantage Points
"The collapse of a large building because of an explosion will produce smoke that may obscure certain views of the collapsed structure. Incident command (IC) may need to request damage reports from a variety of vantage points in order to acquire a clearer picture of collapsed structure."
Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS)
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Hurricane Katrina Response Lessons Learned
This document covers issues with the response to Hurricane Katrina and gives recommendations.
United States. Department of Homeland Security
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Large-Scale Building Collapse: Low-Impact Methods and Devices for Searching Voids
"Following a large-scale building collapse, search and rescue teams will need to search voids for survivors and victims' bodies. Many of these voids may not be accessible without the removal of heavy debris, a process that can threaten the stability of the collapsed structure. When possible, search and rescue teams should use low impact means for searching voids, including pole cameras, listening devices, heat-sensing cameras, and/or canine teams."
Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS)
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Large-Scale Building Explosions: Extinguishing Car Fires
"A large-scale building explosion may ignite cars located in nearby parking lots and on adjacent streets. The thick, black smoke from car fires can significantly hamper visibility at the incident site. Incident command (IC) should immediately designate fire department units to extinguish all car fires. This measure will help improve visibility and aid damage assessments."
Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS)
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Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) Structure
"This Handbook is published under the authority of DoD Instruction 7045.7, 'Implementation of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS),' May 23, 1984 (reference (a)). It contains the DoD program structure and the definition of each Major Force Program (MFP) and Program Element (PE) approved by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Also included are other related codes for the specific resources assigned to each PE and an explanation of their use. This edition covers changes through FYDP Structure Coordination Document 2004-00, dated March 5, 2004. All previous editions of DoD 7045.7-H are hereby superseded. This Handbook applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified or Specified Combatant Commands, the Defense Agencies, Field Activities, and other Defensewide activities (hereafter referred to collectively as the 'DoD Components'). This Handbook is effective immediately and is mandatory for use by all the DoD Components. Heads of the DoD Components may issue supplementary instructions only when necessary to provide for unique requirements within their Components."
United States. Department of Defense
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Public Communications: Vital Link to Maintaining the Public's Trust During Crisis
This report is part of chapter five of five chapters in the series: Threats at Our Threshold: Homeland Defense and Homeland Security in the New Century: A Compilation of the Proceedings of the First Annual Homeland Defense and Homeland Security Conference. The following is taken from the introduction of the report: "Pick up a daily newspaper; turn to any national news broadcast; type in the web address for your favorite Internet search engine. What you find from these sources is a smorgasbord of crises du jour. Several recent examples: A website claims that seven National Football League gridiron stadiums will be attacked with radiological dirty bombs. NFL stadiums in New York, Miami, Atlanta, Seattle, Houston, Oakland and Cleveland. Fortunately, only a hoax, the FBI states. What was initially thought to be another 9/11 attack over New York City turned out to be a tragic aircraft accident taking the life of New York Yankee pitcher, Cory Lidle, who crashed into a 50- story apartment building on Manhattan's Upper East Side. Within moments of the Space Shuttle Discovery, STS-121, taking off the pad in Florida, on July fourth North Korea was making their own holiday fireworks launching seven missiles, one a long- range type. For several frightening moments their final impact points were unknown. Was the United States a target? Daily, at local, state and federal levels, there are situations that cause the public affairs (PA) community to rapidly decide to engage or to not engage in public communications. The instant information age in which we work and live with Internet access nearly everywhere from homes to offices, from airports and coffee shops to mobile devices now hanging from ears of driver--is jammed with components that bring news and information rapidly to our citizens. The potential downside for the PA practitioner is there is little time to execute crisis strategic communication plans and be responsive to an onslaught of public inquiry. In the future, the speed and flow of information will continue to increase requiring organizations to use all the tools of a 21st century society when addressing, affecting and assessing public opinion."
Army War College (U.S.). Center for Strategic Leadership
Perini, Michael B.
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Hurricane Katrina: Communications & Infrastructure Impacts
This report is part of chapter five of five chapters in the series: Threats at Our Threshold: Homeland Defense and Homeland Security in the New Century: A Compilation of the Proceedings of the First Annual Homeland Defense and Homeland Security Conference. The following is taken from the introduction of the report: "In some respects, Hurricane Katrina was the equivalent of a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attack on the Gulf Coast. The hurricane caused catastrophic damage over an area roughly the size of Great Britain. However, while it is tempting to view a storm such as Katrina as a once-in- a-lifetime event, doing so would be an exercise in wishful thinking. Although Katrina was a very large hurricane, it was not 'The Storm of the Century,' or even 'The Big One' which forecasters have warned about for many years. The best estimates are that at landfall, Katrina was at Category 3 strength (winds of 11-130 miles per hour [MPH]). Sustained wind strength at landfall was about 125 MPH. By contrast, 1969's Hurricane Camille was a Category 5 storm with winds greater than 155 MPH. Much of the extensive damage caused by Katrina was due to storm surge, especially along the Gulf Coast, and by levee breaches and resulting flooding in the New Orleans area, rather than by the wind and rain from the storm itself. In other words, it should be clear that Katrina-sized incidents are neither unprecedented nor unlikely to recur. We will see more, and we may well see worse, either from storms, earthquakes, or other natural or man-made causes. The fact that a replay of Katrina-sized events are all but certain makes it all the more urgent that we draw appropriate lessons from the 2005 experience."
Army War College (U.S.). Center for Strategic Leadership
Miller, Robert I.
