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• Privacy Impact Assessment for the Mapping Information Platform (MIP), January 27, 2006: Appendix E: Contract Number HSFEHQ-04-D-0025: Page 9 of Section H and Pages 3-5 and 16-18 of Section I

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  This document is an excerpt of sections from Contract HSFEHQ-04-D-0025 and is included as Appendix E to 'Privacy Impact Assessment for the Mapping Information Platform (MIP), January 27, 2006' [https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=461551]. Page 9 of Section H addresses confidentiality of information, and commercial warranty. Pages 3-5 of Section I address security requirements for unclassified information technology resources, and prohibition on contracts with corporate expatriates. Pages 16-18 of Section I address designation of office for government receipt of electronic funds transfer information, qualifications of contractor employees, information technology systems access for contractors, contractor personnel screening for unclassified information technology access, contracting officer's technical representative, and clauses incorporated by reference.

  United States. Department of Homeland Security

  2003-12
• After Action Report Form

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  The Department of Homeland Security has developed this template on how to develop an After Action Report. It outlines what should be included in the executive summary, and then details each chapter: exercise overview, exercise goals and objectives, exercise events synopsis, analysis of mission outcomes, analysis of critical task performance, and finishes with instructions on developing the conclusion.

  United States. Department of Homeland Security
• Privacy Impact Assessment for the Mapping Information Platform (MIP), January 27, 2006: Appendix D: Additional Documentation on Security

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  This document listing "Additional documentation on security" is included as Appendix D to 'Privacy Impact Assessment for the Mapping Information Platform (MIP), January 27, 2006' [https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=461551]. The Executive Orders, Public Laws, and National Policy Documents contained in this list were used as the basis for the establishment of a department-wide IT security program within the Department of Homeland Security.

  United States. Department of Homeland Security
• Privacy Impact Assessment for the Mapping Information Platform (MIP), January 27, 2006: Appendix G: Certifier Penalty Clause

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  The Certifier Penalty Clause is included as Appendix G to 'Privacy Impact Assessment for the Mapping Information Platform (MIP), January 27, 2006' [https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=461551]. This clause is intended for certifiers (registered professional engineers or licensed land surveyors authorized to provide certified elevation information) who have submitted requests through the online MT-EZ form or eLOMA system. It notifies these certifiers that provision of any falsified information is a punishable offense. Any requests submitted for the Mapping Information Platform must contain the following information about the certifier in order to determine the credibility of the certifier: certifier's company, property address, certifier's name, certifier's professional license number and expiration date, certifier's business telephone number, and certifier's e-mail address. All requests are reviewed for accuracy and legitimacy, and if deemed inaccurate or illegitimate will not be processed.

  United States. Department of Homeland Security
• Privacy Impact Assessment for the Mapping Information Platform (MIP), January 27, 2006: Appendix F: Request for MIP eLOMA Access [DRAFT]

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  This document is a draft of the form used to request access for the online eLOMA tool. It is included as Appendix F to 'Privacy Impact Assessment for the Mapping Information Platform (MIP), January 27, 2006' [https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=461551]. "Per FEMA's procedure, a certifier can request access rights [to the Mapping Information Platform] by submitting a request to the applicable Regional Management Center (contractors to FEMA). Based on information provided via a verifiable means of communication (i.e., email), the Regional Management Center employees approve access requests and submit the access request to the MIP Help Desk to grant access. All access to data is defined by the user's need and use of the data."

  United States. Department of Homeland Security
• Department of Homeland: Office of Biometric Identity Management [website]

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  "The Office of Biometric Identity Management (OBIM) supports the Department of Homeland Security's responsibility to protect the nation by providing biometric identification services that help federal, state, and local government decision makers accurately identify the people they encounter and determine whether those people pose a risk to the United States. OBIM supplies the technology for collecting and storing biometric data, provides analysis, updates its watchlist, and ensures the integrity of the data."

  United States. Department of Homeland Security
• Border Security, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourth Congress, First Session, March 10, 1995

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  From the opening statement of Lamar Smith: "Securing our Nation's borders against illegal immigration is the first priority of our immigration policy. An effective policy would accomplish both prevention of illegal immigration and apprehension and deportation of those illegal immigrants who have managed to enter our country. Today's hearing will focus on prevention strategies. We will address deportation issues in a subsequent hearing. Preventing the entry of illegal aliens requires screening of visa applicants overseas, examining persons arriving in the United States at airports, seaports and land borders, and securing the land borders of our Nation. It is amazing that until recently so little has been done to actually stop illegal immigration at its source by preventing people from crossing the border without permission." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Lamar Smith, Brian Bilbray, Ron Coleman, Gus de la Vina, Laurie E. Ekstrand, Weldon McPhail, Mike Dino, Duncan Hunter, Doris Meissner, Silvestre Reyes, Mary Ryan, Edmund Zysk, Robert Brand, Gary A. Condit, and Ed McElroy.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  1995
• Crude Oil Exports, Hearing Before the Committee on Resources, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourth Congress, First Session on H.R. 70, a Bill to Permit Exports of Certain Domestically Produced Crude Oil, and for Other Purposes, May 9, 1995

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  This is the May 9, 1995 hearing on "Crude Oil Exports," held before the U.S. House Committee on Resources. From the opening statement of Don Young: "While we have taken steps necessary to reduce our vulnerability to others, we have done nothing to encourage domestic energy production. In fact, production on the North Slope has now entered a period of sustained decline. In California small, independent producers have been forced to abandon wells or defer further investments. By precluding the market from operating normally, the export ban has discouraged production. [...] The ban no longer makes sense. Rather than increasing our dependence on foreign oil, it has decreased domestic production and made us more reliant on imported oil. H.R. 70 will allow the market to determine the price and buyer of crude oil. The Trans-Alaska Pipeline will supply the West coast with crude because it is the closest market. The excess that creates a glut would be sold overseas, and the market will take over." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Linda Adamany, Tom Deckard, Nolan W. Hancock, Jerry Hoffman, Kent Jeffreys, Thomas P. Jones Jr., Dan Lawn, Riki Ott, Walt Parker, Stan Stephens, Richard A. Fineberg, Philip J. Loree, Roger Marks, Michael Sacco, Peter A. Sutton, Terry Turner, Douglas P. Wheeler, and William H. White.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  1995
• History of the Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) - The First Decade: 1995 - 2005

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  "The Purpose of this document, History of the Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) - The First Decade: 1995 - 2005, is to describe the program's genesis, growth, content, and achievements to date. This historical perspective is also intended to increase awareness of the scope and success of the MMRS program by tracing emergency preparedness efforts in the United States. In preparing this history, a wide range of sources was used (e.g., hard copy and electronic records were reviewed, Federal contracts with individual MMRS jurisdictions were assessed, and key personnel involved in the MMRS program were interviewed). To the extent that these documents and interviews clarify policies that influenced the MMRS program's development, they are included directly in the body of the text. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) founded the MMRS program in 1966 in response to the increased terrorist threat evidenced by the sarin nerve agent gas attack in the Tokyo subway system in March 1995 and the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in April 1995. The program was designed to enhance and coordinate local and regional response capabilities for highly populated areas that could be targeted by terrorist attack using weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The MMRS concept, organizing principles, and resources are also applicable to the management of large scale incidents such as hazardous material (HazMat) accidents, epidemic disease outbreaks, and natural disasters requiring specialized and carefully coordinated medical preparation and response."

  United States. Department of Homeland Security

  Titan Corporation

  2005-04
• National Preparedness Goal [Final Draft]

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  "The President directed the development of a National Preparedness Goal (or Goal) in Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-8. The Goal reorients how the Federal government proposes to strengthen the preparedness of the United States to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. The Goal establishes a vision, capabilities, and priorities for national preparedness. It should be utilized in conjunction with the three capabilities-based planning tools referenced in the Goal: the National Planning Scenarios, Universal Task List (UTL), and Target Capabilities List (TCL). Development of the Goal and the planning tools involved extensive coordination with other Federal departments and agencies and consultation with State, local, and tribal governments, the private sector, and non-governmental organizations. These documents are not micro-level plans that tell officials how to execute their assigned missions. They do not impose a specific array of assets on each community, or a specific funding formula on each program. Rather, these documents identify core capabilities we want to achieve and sustain as a Nation and therefore, will transform how the Federal government proposes to invest homeland security funding in order to achieve the highest possible readiness."

  United States. Department of Homeland Security

  2005-12
• ICE Immigration Enforcement Strategy and Highlights

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  "The Department of Homeland Security and the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement have unveiled the second phase of the Secure Border Initiative focusing on a comprehensive immigration enforcement strategy for the nation's interior. It focuses on three goals: identify and remove criminal aliens, immigration fugitives and other immigration violators from this country; build strong worksite enforcement and compliance programs to deter illegal employment in this country, and; uproot the criminal infrastructures at home and abroad that support illegal immigration, including human smuggling, trafficking organizations and document/benefit fraud organizations. The overall objective of this phase is to reduce the employment of illegal immigrants and to target those businesses that hire them. The first phase of the initiative addresses border control and the detention and removal systems of illegal aliens."

  United States. Department of Homeland Security

  2006-01
• Common Sense Guide to Prevention and Detection of Insider Threats

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  "The threat of attack from insiders is real and substantial. The 2004 ECrime Watch Survey conducted by the United States Secret Service, CERT Coordination Center (CERT/CC), and CSO Magazine, found that in cases where respondents could identify the perpetrator of an electronic crime, 29 percent were committed by insiders. The impact from insider attacks can be devastating. Over the past several years, Carnegie Mellon University has been conducting a variety of research projects on insider threat. One of the conclusions reached is that insider attacks have occurred across all organizational sectors, causing significant damage to the affected organizations. These acts have ranged from 'lowtech' attacks, such as fraud or theft of proprietary information, to technically sophisticated crimes that sabotage the organization. Damages are not only financial but can also include severe damage to the organization's reputation, resulting from widespread public reporting of the event. Insiders have a significant advantage over external people who might want to cause harm to an organization. Insiders can bypass physical and technical security measures designed to prevent unauthorized access. Mechanisms such as firewalls, intrusion detection systems, and electronic building access systems are implemented primarily to defend against external cyber threats. Not only are insiders aware of the policies, procedures, and technology used in their organizations, but they are often also aware of the vulnerabilities, such as loosely enforced policies and procedures or exploitable technical flaws in networks or systems."

  United States. Department of Homeland Security

  2005
• Critical Infrastructure Task Force

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  A PowerPoint presentation overview of the Critical Infrastructure Task Force. The Critical Infrastructure Task Force "review current and provide recommendations on advancing national critical infrastructure policy& planning to ensure the reliable delivery of critical infrastructure services while simultaneously reducing the consequences of the exploitation, destruction, or disruption of critical infrastructure products, services, and/or operations."

  United States. Department of Homeland Security
• U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Science and Technology [website]

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  "Technology and threats evolve rapidly in today's ever-changing environment. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) monitors those threats and capitalizes on technological advancements at a rapid pace, developing solutions and bridging capability gaps at a pace that mirrors the speed of life. S&T's mission is to help strengthen America's security and resiliency by providing assessments, analysis and reports and developing innovative technology solutions for the Homeland Security Enterprise. Created by Congress in 2003, S&T conducts basic and applied research, development, demonstration, testing and evaluation activities relevant to DHS. S&T strives to address current capability gaps while preparing for future challenges. Projects are organized into six primary areas that directly support DHS components, as well as federal, state and local first responders: First responders: Expanding first responder capabilities and improving their effectiveness, efficiency and safety; Borders and maritime security: Enhancing security at our nation's borders and waterways without impeding the flow of commerce; Cybersecurity: Contributing to a safe, secure and resilient cyber environment; Chemical and biological defense: Detecting, protecting against, responding to and recovering from chemical and biological incidents; Explosives: Protecting citizens and infrastructure from the devastating effects of explosives; and Resilience: Improving the nation's preparedness for natural and man-made catastrophes."

  United States. Department of Homeland Security
• Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan for the National Strategy for Maritime Security

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  "The MIRP [Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan] contains procedures for recovery management and provides mechanisms for national, regional, and local decision-makers to set priorities for redirecting commerce, a primary means of restoring domestic cargo flow. This plan is employed when the Secretary of Homeland Security declares an actual or threatened Transportation Security Incident (TSI; 33 CFR 101.105) that occurs under, in, on, or adjacent to waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, to be an Incident of National Significance (INS), in accordance with the criteria set out in the National Response Plan (NRP) and HSPD-5. Any such TSI declared to be an INS accordingly is referred to as a 'national TSI.' Additionally, the MIRP reflects the organizational constructs detailed in the NRP, as well as the use of Incident Command System (ICS) and unified command procedures. As such, the plan can be used for other similarly disruptive incidents requiring maritime infrastructure recovery management. Following an incident that triggers the implementation of this plan, the MIRP is used to guide the designees of the Secretary of Homeland Security in the decision making process to maintain the nation's MTS operational capabilities, and if compromised, to restore transportation capabilities."

  United States. Department of Homeland Security

  2006-04
• Domestic Outreach Plan for the National Strategy for Maritime Security

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  "The Domestic Outreach Policy Action Working Group was one of eight working groups assigned to develop implementation plans in support of the National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS). Acting on the direction of NSPD-41/HSPD-13, the Domestic Outreach working group facilitated the process of gathering comments and recommendations from non-federal stakeholders to help other working groups develop their implementation plans. Simultaneously, the Domestic Outreach working group created its own implementation strategy for outreach activities to support the roll out of NSMS and related plans. Outreach objectives were designed to open a meaningful dialogue between key stakeholders and the NSPD-41/HSPD-13 working groups. In order to gain fair, representative feedback on behalf of the millions of individual stakeholders who have an interest in maritime security-within the available time frame-successively broader outreach was conducted in two stages, focusing on strategically selected individuals and organizations that represent larger groups of stakeholders, without giving any specific organization a competitive advantage over another."

  United States. Department of Homeland Security

  2005-10
• Annual Report to the President and the Congress [March 1996]

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  From the Document: "Despite favorable developments in the law of the sea, including the entry into force of the UN Law of the Sea (LOS) Convention, the adoption of the Part XI agreement which reforms the LOS Convention, and the recent negotiation of the 1995 UN Convention on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, a number of states continue to assert excessive maritime claims inconsistent with international law in waters off their coasts. Many of these claims impair the freedoms of navigation and overflight guaranteed in the LOS Convention. Although not yet a party to the Convention, the United States views the navigational provisions of the Convention as reflective of customary international law and, as such, available for all nations to enjoy. The United States also believes that unchallenged excessive maritime claims may, in time, become valid through acquiescence. Accordingly, it is necessary for maritime nations to protest excessive coastal claims through diplomatic channels and to exercise their navigation and overflight rights in disputed regions. The United States has accepted this responsibility by establishing and preserving the Freedom of Navigation Program. Since its inception in 1979, over 100 diplomatic protests have been filed and over 300 operational assertions have been conducted. During FY 1995, operational assertions were conducted by the U.S. armed forces against the following countries that maintained claims contrary to international law[.]"

  United States. Department of Defense

  Perry, William James, 1927-

  1996-03
• Annual Report to the President and the Congress [February 1992]

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  From the Document: "The President's United States Oceans Policy Statement of March 10, 1983, states 'The United States will exercise and assert its navigation and overflight rights and freedoms in a worldwide basis in a manner that is consistent with the balance of interests reflected in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. The United States will not, however, acquiesce in unilateral acts of other states designed to restrict the rights and freedoms of the international community in navigation and overflight and other related high seas uses.' When nations appear to acquiesce in excessive maritime claims and fail to exercise their rights actively in the face of constraints on international navigation and overflight, those claims and constraints may, over time, come to be considered to have been accepted by the international community as reflecting the practice of nations and as binding upon all users of the seas and superjacent airspace. Consequently, it is incumbent upon maritime nations, such as the United States, to protest through diplomatic channels all excessive claims of coastal or island nations, and to exercise their navigation and overflight rights in the face of such claims. The United States has accepted this responsibility as an element of its national policy, and the Department of Defense conducts an active program of Freedom of Navigation operational assertions. Freedom of Navigation assertions were conducted against the following countries for the listed excessive maritime claims during the year from October 1, 1990, to September 30, 1991. Countries are listed alphabetically."

  United States. Department of Defense

  Cheney, Richard B.

  1992-02
• Annual Report to the President and the Congress [February 1995]

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  From the Document: "Despite the entry into force of the 1982 U.N. Law of the Sea Convention on November 16, 1994, several coastal states maintain maritime claims considered excessive when measured against the Convention. Many of these claims are excessive because they impair freedoms of navigation and overflight. Although not yet a party, the United States views the Convention's navigation and overflight provisions as generally confirming existing maritime law and practice and, as such, available for all nations to enjoy. The United States also believes that unchallenged excessive maritime claims may, in time, become valid through acquiescence. Accordingly, it is necessary for maritime nations, such as the United States, to protest excessive coastal claims through diplomatic channels and to exercise their navigation and overflight rights in the disputed regions. The United States has accepted this responsibility by establishing a Freedom of Navigation program. Established in 1979, the Freedom of Navigation program continues as an active tenet of national policy. From October 1, 1993, to September 30, 1994, Freedom of Navigation assertions were conducted by the U.S. military units against the following countries maintaining claims contrary to international law[.]"

  United States. Department of Defense

  Perry, William James, 1927-

  1995-02
• Annual Report to the President and the Congress [January 1994]

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  From the Document: "The United States remains committed to the principle that the world's seas must be open to all nations. The armed forces continue to be the instrument for the United States to exercise and assert its navigation and overflight rights and freedoms consistent with the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. As a matter of policy, the United States will not acquiesce in unilateral acts of other states that unlawfully restrict the rights and freedoms of the international community in navigation and overflight and other related high seas uses. When nations do not exercise these rights, the international community may come to accept claims constraining use of the seas as binding. Accordingly, it is necessary for maritime nations, such as the United States, to protest excessive claims through diplomatic channels and to exercise their navigation and overflight rights in the disputed regions. The United States has accepted this responsibility as an important tenet of national policy. Therefore, the Department of Defense maintains an active Freedom of Navigation program. From October 1, 1992, to September 30, 1993, Freedom of Navigation assertions were conducted against the following countries with maritime claims contrary to international law."

  United States. Department of Defense

  Aspin, Les

  1994-01
• Annual Report to the President and the Congress [1998]

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  From the Document: "For 18 years, the U.S. Freedom of Navigation program has ensured that excessive coastal state claims over the world's oceans and airspace are repeatedly challenged. By diplomatic protests and operational assertions, the United States has insisted upon adherence by the nations of the world to the international law of the sea, as reflected in the UN Law of the Sea Convention. A significant majority of countries (over 120) are now Parties to the Convention, and there is an encouraging trend toward the rolling-back of excessive maritime claims. Nonetheless, some coastal states continue to assert maritime claims inconsistent with international law, which left unchallenged would limit navigational freedoms vital to U.S. national security and essential to peaceful uses of the world's oceans. In FY 1997, U.S. armed forces conducted operational assertions challenging the excessive maritime claims listed in the accompanying table. In addition, military vessels and aircraft frequently conducted routine transits through international straits, such as the Straits of Gibraltar, Hormuz, and Malacca. Air and surface units also transited the Indonesian Archipelago in archipelagic sea lane passage on 73 occasions and transited the Philippine Archipelago by exercising high seas freedoms, transit passage, and innocent passage, as applicable, on 4 7 occasions. Combined with robust and highly visible routine operations by U.S. forces on, over, and under the world's oceans, and scrupulous adherence by the United States to the navigational provisions of the UN Law of the Sea Convention, Freedom of Navigation operations have continued to underscore the U.S. commitment to a stable legal regime for the world's oceans."

  United States. Department of Defense

  Cohen, William S.

  1998
• Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

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  The International Atomic Energy Agency, which has primary responsibility for verifying compliance with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, plays a central role in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. But the limitations of the IAEA's system of nuclear safeguards were highlighted in the aftermath of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, when it was revealed that Iraq had mounted an extensive, covert nuclear weapon program in addition to, and partly in proximity to, its open nuclear research activities that were under IAEA safeguards. This report analyzes what IAEA safeguards can and cannot be expected to accomplish, identifies areas where they might be broadened and improved, and presents options for doing so.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  United States. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment

  1995-04
• Joint Field Office Activation and Operations: Interagency Integrated Standard Operating Procedure - Version 8.3, Interim Approval April 2006

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  "The purpose of this SOP is to provide a comprehensive national all-hazards process for activating, establishing, operating, and demobilizing the JFO across a spectrum of activities including prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery. The SOP is designed to provide the field-level procedures for implementation of the Concept of Operations for the JFO detailed in the NRP. The JFO SOP is built on the guiding principles of the NIMS relating to multi-agency coordination systems, resources, communications, and common terminology. The SOP incorporates best practices and procedures from various incident management disciplines-disaster logistics, homeland security information-sharing protocols, continuity of operations, interagency coordination, physical and information security, financial management, strategic and operational planning-into a unified coordinating structure."

  United States. Department of Homeland Security

  2006-04-28
• Analysis of Avian Influenza Virus Issues for the Catastrophic Assessment Task Force (CATF) Table-Top Exercise

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  "This document summarizes analyses of the factors affecting a potential outbreak of avian influenza on the United States. Produced by the DHS National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC) (a DHS/IP program utilizing a core partnership of Sandia and Los Alamos National Laboratories) and CIP/DSS (a DHS/S&T program, a core partnership of Sandia, Los Alamos, and Argonne National Laboratories), the document provides results for epidemiological, economic, and infrastructure studies, with the intent of aiding decision makers by analyzing the consequences and tradeoffs associated with decisions at different points in the course of a pandemic. DHS's information needs are both short-term and long-term, and while containing and mitigating the consequences of an outbreak is of central concern, the continued functioning of infrastructures must also be addressed to ensure social services and overall quality of life. Optimal decision-making will depend greatly on the specifics of any potential pandemic. A policy decision that may be optimal for the initial stages of disease outbreak could be deleterious several weeks or months later."

  United States. Department of Homeland Security

  2005-12-07
• Public Law 104-19: Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Additional Disaster Assistance, for Anti-Terrorism Initiatives, for Assistance in the Recovery from the Tragedy that Occurred at Oklahoma City, and Recessions Act, 1995

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  "An Act Making emergency supplemental appropriations for additional disaster assistance, for anti-terrorism initiatives, for assistance in the recovery from the tragedy that occurred at Oklahoma City, and making rescissions for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1995, and for other purposes."

  United States. Government Printing Office

  1995-07-27
• Fact Sheet: DHS Inspector General Finds That FEMA's Flood Map Program Is Underfunded and Inadequate

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  "Today, the Department of Homeland Security's Inspector General is releasing a report entitled 'Challenges in FEMA's Flood Map Modernization Program'. The report raises serious questions about the adequacy of program funding and warns that inaccurate, outdated, and obsolete flood maps may place homeowners and residents at physical and financial risk. The report is also highly critical of FEMA's management of the $1.5 billion program and the contractor's performance, which have resulted in significant delays and cost overruns. These findings raise serious questions about FEMA's capacity to manage activities within its core responsibilities and call further into question the agency's ability to oversee the spending of billions of dollars in the response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita."

  United States. Department of Homeland Security

  2005-10-18
• Be Informed: Chemical Threat

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  "A chemical attack is the deliberate release of a toxic gas, liquid or solid that can poison people and the environment." This document provides brief instructions on what one should do in the event of a chemical attack.

  United States. Department of Homeland Security
• SHAred RESources (SHARES) High Frequency Radio Program [website]

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  "The SHAred RESources (SHARES) High Frequency (HF) Radio program, administered by the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) National Coordinating Center for Communications (NCC), provides an additional means for users with a national security and emergency preparedness mission to communicate when landline and cellular communications are unavailable. SHARES members use existing HF radio resources to coordinate and transmit messages needed to perform critical functions, including those areas related to leadership, safety, maintenance of law and order, finance, and public health."

  United States. Department of Homeland Security
• Community Emergency Response Team: Participant Manual

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  "If available, emergency services personnel are the best trained and equipped to handle emergencies, and you should use them. However, following a catastrophic disaster, you and the community may be on your own for a period of time because of the size of the area affected, lost communications, and unpassable roads. CERT training is designed to prepare you to help yourself, your family, and your neighbors in the event of a catastrophic disaster. Because emergency services personnel will not be able to help everyone immediately, you can make a difference by using the training in this Participant Manual to save lives and protect property. This training covers basic skills that are important to know in a disaster when emergency services are not available. With training and practice and by working as a team, you will be able to do the greatest good for the greatest number of victims after a disaster, while protecting yourself from becoming a victim."

  United States. Department of Homeland Security

  2003-06
• Homeland Security Advisory Council Private Sector Information Sharing Task Force on Homeland Security Information Sharing between Government and the Private Sector Final Report

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  "Because the Private Sector controls the great majority of the nation's critical infrastructure, effective cooperation between the Federal Government - particularly the Department of Homeland Security - and the Private Sector is essential to protecting those assets from terrorist attack. Nowhere is that cooperation more vital than in the area of information sharing. And yet that cooperation has been hampered by a variety of legal and procedural obstacles. The Homeland Security Advisory Council charged its Private Sector Information Sharing Task Force on March 21 to understand the nature of those obstacles and to propose solutions to them. The Task Force concluded that the best way to understand these obstacles - which could be real or perceived - was to ask the Private Sector about them. Accordingly, the Task Force assigned several of its members to reach out to numerous private sector critical infrastructures, as well as State and local government."

  United States. Department of Homeland Security

  2005-08-10