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• Lethal Terrorist Actions Against Americans 1973-1985

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  "This report provides a list of the lethal terrorist actions targeting Americans overseas that were recorded by Bureau of Diplomatic Security's Threat Analysis Division (DSfTAD) as of December 31, 1985. […] This chronology contains all recorded terrorism-related deaths, assassinations, and attempted assassinations of Americans. Kidnappings are included when U.S. hostages were killed or when they disappeared without any communication from the kidnappers. Bombings and rocket attacks directed at U.S. facilities are listed only when people (either Americans or foreign nationals) were killed or injured. Attempted bombings, where the device was discovered and defused, are not included since no act of violence actually occurred."

  United States. Department of State. Bureau of Diplomatic Security

  1986
• Serial No. 50: Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Ninety-Ninth Congress, First and Second Sessions on H.R. 3378 Electronic Communications Privacy Act, September 26, October 24, 1985, January 30, and March 5, 1986

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  From the opening statement of Robert W. Kastenmeier: "This morning we begin a series of hearings on H.R. 3378, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1985[....] When Congress passed the wiretap law in 1968, there was a clear consensus that telephone calls should be private. Earlier Congresses had reached that same consensus regarding mail and telegrams. But in the almost 20 years since Congress last addressed the issue of privacy of communications in a comprehensive fashion, the technologies of communication and interception have changed drastically[....] These new modes of communication have outstripped the legal protection provided under statutory definitions bound by old technologies. The unfortunate result is that the same technologies that hold such promise for the future also enhance the risk that our communications will be intercepted by either private parties or the Government." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Robert W. Kastenmeier, Neal J. Amick, Michael F. Cavanagh, Richard T. Colgan, Clifford S. Fishman, Frederick D. Hess, James Knapp, John W. Kelly, Jr., George Kuhnreich, Patrick J. Leahy, P. Michael Nugent, Philip J. Quigley, John W. Stanton, Philip M. Walker, Fred W. Weingarten, and Perry F. Williams.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  1986
• S. Hrg. 99-591; Serial No. J-99-60: Mercenary Training Camps: U.S.-Based Private Counterterrorism/Mercenary Training Camps, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate Ninety-Ninth Congress, First Session, October 2, 1985,

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  This is the October 2, 1985 hearing on "Mercenary Training Camps: U.S.-Based Private Counterterrorism/Mercenary Training Camps," held before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Committee on the Judiciary. From the Opening Statement of Jeremiah Denton: "This morning we will commence the hearing on U.S.-based private counterterrorism/mercenary training camps, a growing national phenomenon which may impact our foreign policy, our relations with other national states, the safety of the public, and the image of the United States abroad. In November 1984, Alabama was castigated in the national and international media for being the home of a training camp for terrorists and assassins. Some of the charges were incorrect and unfair. However, there is room for concern and a need for investigation." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Mark Richard, Victoria Toensing, Michael Matheson, Clyde Bryant, Daniel Hartnett, Wayne Gilbert, and William H. Webster.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  1986
• Midyear Consultation on U.S. Refugee Programs for Fiscal Year 1986: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-Ninth Congress, Second Session, June 20, 1986

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  From the opening statement of the Hon. Alan K. Simpson, a U.S. Senator from the State of Wyoming, Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy: "The Refugee Act of 1980 provides for "appropriate consultations" between representatives of the President and Members of the Congress to review the refugee situation. To my knowledge, this is the first midyear consultation which the Senate Judiciary Committee has held with the administration. I requested the consultation because of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings legislation and the effect it will necessarily have on the Refugee Program. In addition, a little over 1 year ago, I spent 2 weeks in Southeast Asia, and filed a rather extensive report with a broad range of observations, conclusions, and recommendations. The subcommittee and the committee are interested in knowing exactly how the various Gramm-Rudman-Hollings cuts will affect refugee admissions and the resettlement program here in the United States. I am also curious regarding the implementation of the recommendations contained in that report of last April. We are also interested in knowing the nature of the current refugee situation in Southeast Asia, which seems to be almost a never-ending story." Materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Phillip N. Hawkes, Edward M. Kennedy, Alan C. Nelson, and James N. Purcell, Jr.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  1986
• Political Asylum Procedures for Alien Crewman: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-Ninth Congress, First Session on Political Asylum Procedures for Alien Crewman and How They Were Applied to a Soviet Seaman, Miroslav Medvid, November 5 and 7, 1985

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  From the opening statement of the Hon. Alan K. Simpson, a U.S. Senator from the State of Wyoming, Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy: "We are here to discuss our Nation's political asylum procedures for alien crewmen in general and in particular how these procedures were applied to a Soviet seaman, Miroslav Medvid. Some of you have heard me say before I do not know what legislative gods have visited upon me the chairmanship of nuclear regulation, immigration and refugee policy, and formerly veterans' affairs, but it is a dazzling array of things that I get to dabble in here. One of the tough things in this area of immigration and refugee policy is that before 1980, being from a Communist country was sufficient to qualify a person as a refugee. That is not the case; under the 1980 refugee act, one must demonstrate persecution or a well founded fear of persecution based upon race, religion, nationality, origin, or membership in a particular social group or political opinion. That is what a refugee is. The fact that one is from a Communist country is not sufficient in itself to qualify one as a refugee. Today we are here to determine if there are additional facts; we need to know them and try to lay to rest the inaccurate information. If this matter was indeed handled improperly, what actions must we take here in our country to ensure that it does not occur again? I think that is the issue. I am very pleased to have the subcommittee members joining me in this effort." Materials submitted for the record include those of the following: J. Robert Grimes, Jim Hergen, Gordon J. Humphrey, Alan C. Nelson, Irene Padoch, and William M. Woessner.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  1986
• Immigration Marriage Fraud: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-Ninth Congress, First Session on Fraudulent Marriage and Fiance Arrangements to Obtain Permanent Immigration Status, July 26, 1985

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  From the opening statement of the Hon. Alan K. Simpson, a U.S. Senator from the State of Wyoming: "We are going to examine this issue of immigration marriage fraud, which could best be described I think as the use of nonbona fide marriage, or fraudulent marriage arrangements and fiance arrangements, which are made to obtain permanent resident immigration status. We are going to inquire into the nature and extent of this situation, determine whether we see but another way of gimmicking our generous, very generous legal immigration laws, consider whether legislation is necessary to address the problem, and if so, what form that legislation might take. Our present immigration laws reserve our very most favored top-drawer status for spouses of American citizens, and the U.S. system, based to a large degree upon the principle of family reunification, certainly there can be no more important reunification than spouses, husband and wife. And yet our concern to benefit the spouses of our citizens can make us very vulnerable to abuse, for among those relationships covered by family reunification, spouse is the one relationship that is largely self-created. We do not have the choices with mother and father and brother and sister, but we do have a rather significant part to play in his or her spouse, and the determination of what that is, obviously. So, today we will examine immigration marriages of convenience." Materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Patricia Beshara, Jose Caringal, Roger L. Conner, Jules E. Coven, Nancy J. Marrero, Amita Narielwala, Alan C. Nelson, David S. North, Richard E. Norton, Vernon D. Penner, Jr., and Cornelius Scully.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  1986
• Floodproofing Non-Residential Structures

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  "This manual has been developed to illustrate a broad range of floodproofing techniques that can be used to reduce flood damages to existing or proposed non-residential structures. The manual is primarily directed at local officials, building owners, designers, contractors and other individuals or organizations that are interested in the design and implementation of floodproofing plans."

  United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency

  1986
• Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone Proposals: Strategic Implications for the United States

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  "This study examines how the two existing nuclear-weapon free zones (NWFZ), one in Latin America and the other in the South Pacific, have affected US strategic interests in the two regions. It also considers the possibility of the establishment of NWFZs in other regions, including Scandinavia, the Balkans, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. The information in this study was derived from a variety of open sources available at the Library of Congress."

  Library of Congress. Federal Research Division

  Katz, Rodney P.

  1986
• Statistical Report United States Attorneys Offices: Fiscal Year 1986

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  This Annual Statistical Report summarizes and presents the criminal prosecutions and civil litigation conducted by the United States Attorneys in Fiscal Year 1986.

  Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys

  1986?
• SDI: A Strategy for Peace and Stability or the End to Deterrence

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  "Since the advent of the nuclear age, humanity has existed and 'progressed' in a politico-military climate increasingly threatened by the possibility of instant annihilation. The prevailing condition now is one in which two superpowers possess and control the means, many times over, to terminate life as we know it on this planet. The nuclear capacities of the United States and the Soviet Union alone equate to roughly two and one half tons of dynamite for each person on the earth.' In this bipolar world, in which the antithetical political ideologies of the two superpowers continually and almost daily conflict with each other at varying levels of intensity, a state of mutual nuclear fear has also existed. Although it cannot be empirically proven, it appears that this state of mutual fear (i.e. the fear that one nation would inflict a nuclear counterstrike of unacceptably devastating proportion against the other, should the other strike first) has successfully ensured that to date these weapons of mass destruction have not been used to settle political differences. This threat of retaliation, in several variations, has become the bedrock of a general philosophy (I hesitate to say strategy) referred to as 'deterrence.'"

  Army War College (U.S.)

  Windmiller, David E.

  1986
• Pacific Command: Multinational Strategy

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  From the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability website: "The United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) Multinational Strategy (MNS), published in 1986, defines USPACOM objectives in working with each nation in the pacific theater. The report states that 'the need for a multinational strategy was first expressed in the Defense Guidance budget of President Reagan's administration. The Defense Guidance stated that global strategy required the U.S. and its allies to contain and reverse the expansion of Soviet control and military presence throughout the world.' The [MNS] thus examines the objectives of the USPACOM in working with multiple nations. The report states that 'the USPACOM Stategy is built primarily on a foundation of bilateral relationships. Larger regional coalitions, to the extent that they can exist, depend on these bilateral relationships and the interactions of the coalition members.'"

  United States. Pacific Command

  1986
• Fire Management Notes (Vol.47 No.3)

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  This is Volume 47, No.3 of Fire Management Notes, a quarterly periodical devoted to the technique of forest fire control, produced by the U.S. Forest Service.

  United States. Forest Service

  1986
• Fire Management Notes (Vol.47 No.2)

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  This is Volume 47, No.2 of Fire Management Notes, a quarterly periodical devoted to the technique of forest fire control, produced by the U.S. Forest Service.

  United States. Forest Service

  1986
• Fire Management Notes (Vol.47 No.1)

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  This is Volume 47, No.1 of Fire Management Notes, a quarterly periodical devoted to the technique of forest fire control, produced by the U.S. Forest Service.

  United States. Forest Service

  1986
• Fire Management Notes (Vol.46 No.4)

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  This is Volume 46, No.4 of Fire Management Notes, a quarterly periodical devoted to the technique of forest fire control, produced by the U.S. Forest Service.

  United States. Forest Service

  1986
• Essays on Strategy III: Selections from the 1985 Joint Chiefs of Staff Essay Competition

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  "In 1982, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff sponsored the first JCS Strategy Essay Competition, challenging students at our Senior Service Schools to write innovatively about issues of national security. The students met the challenge well, and have continued to do so in each year's competition, examining old problems from new perspectives, raising new questions, proffering solutions. This book contains four essays that won recognition in the 1985 competition." The essays are: "International Terrorism and US Diplomacy: Putting the Genie Back Into the Bottle" by Lawrence P. Taylor; "Soviet Military Policy: Subject of Political-Military Infighting?" By Voy J. Nicholson and Charles T. Robertson, Jr.; "The New Soviet Aircraft Carrier: Implications for the United States: by D. A. Richwine; and "Operational Art in the US Army: New Vigor" by L. D. Holder."

  National Defense University

  1986-01
• DoD Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria

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  "The trusted computer system evaluation criteria defined in this document classify systems into four broad hierarchical divisions of enhanced security protection. They provide a basis for the evaluation of effectiveness of security controls built into automatic data processing system products. The criteria were developed with three objectives in mind: (a) to provide users with a yardstick with which to assess the degree of trust that can be placed in computer systems for the secure processing of classified or other sensitive information; (b) to provide guidance to manufacturers as to what to build into their new, widely-available trusted commercial products in order to satisfy trust requirements for sensitive applications; and (c) to provide a basis for specifying security requirements in acquisition specifications. Two types of requirements are delineated for secure processing: (a) specific security feature requirements and (b) assurance requirements."

  United States. Department of Defense

  1985-12-26
• National Security Decision Directive 204: Transfer of National Intelligence Collection Tasking Authority

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  National Security Decision Directive 204 "provides policy guidance concerning the transfer of national intelligence collection tasking authority between the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) as warranted by international crisis conditions."

  United States. White House Office

  1985-12-24
• National Security Decision Directive 203: Nuclear Testing Limitation: Responding to the Soviet Proposal of December 5

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  National Security Decision Directive 203 provides policy guidance on Nuclear Testing Limitation in response to Soviet proposals from Secretary General Gorbachev in a letter dated December 5, 1985.

  United States. White House Office

  1985-12-23
• National Security Decision Directive 202: Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements

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  "National Security Decision Directive 202 addresses U.S. policy in regards to Soviet violations of arms control agreements and lists specific instances of Soviet noncompliance."

  United States. White House Office

  1985-12-20
• National Security Decision Directive 201: National Security Emergency Preparedness (NSEP) Telecommunications Funding

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  National Security Decision Directive 201 directs that "Implementation and recurring costs for national level NSEP telecommunications programs (i.e. those which benefit multiple departments, agencies, or entities) shall be shared on a pro rata basis determined by each organization's share of NSEP telecommunications requirements. The Executive Agent, National Communications System (NCS) shall fund all development costs for national level NSEP telecommunications programs."

  United States. White House Office

  1985-12-17
• Industrial Security Regulation

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  This regulation is issued under the authority of Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 5220.22, "DoD Industrial Security Program," December 8, 1980. Its purpose is to prescribe uniform procedures that ensure the safeguard and protection of classified information made available to industry. The provisions of this regulation apply to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Military Departments and the DoD Agencies (hereafter referred to collectively as "DoD Components"), and to other federal agencies.

  United States. Department of Defense

  1985-12-04
• National Security Decision Directive 200: U.S. Port Security Program

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  National Security Decision Directive 200 sets forth policy regarding port security, requiring that vessels controlled by Soviet or Eastern European countries only be allowed access to U.S. ports in reciprocity for the admission of U.S. vessels into the ports of those countries.

  United States. White House Office

  1985-12-04
• Symposium on International Terrorism, 2-3 December 1985

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  This compilation of papers from the 1985 Symposium on International Terrorism includes the following topics: "Ideological and Psychological Factors in International Terrorism, Goals and Objectives of International Terrorists, Methodologies for the Analysis of Oppositional Terrorism, State Supported Terrorism, Support Mechanisms for International Terrorism, State Response to International Terrorism, [and] Future Trends in International Terrorism."

  Defense Intelligence College (U.S.)

  Jenkins, Brian Michael; Schmid, Alex Peter; Crenshaw, Martha . . .

  1985-12-03
• Combating Terrorism: A Guide for U.S. Naval Forces Afloat

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  From the thesis abstract: "The United States Navy's forces afloat do not have a single source document that addresses anti-terrorism and counterterrorism. The increase in terrorism world-wide has stimulated the concern that vulnerable maritime vessels will become terrorist targets. U. S. Navy ships in a restricted maneuvering situation, at anchor in a harbor, or moored pier side may offer an attractive target to a terrorist group. To deal with this potential terrorist threat, personnel manning U. S. Navy ships must be educated in the fundamentals of terrorism; the ships' security program must be evaluated and modified accordingly; various watches, sentries, and teams must be trained in new anti- and counterterrorist procedures; and contingency plans must be developed to deal with potential terrorist incidents. This study provides a guide for the development of effective anti-terrorist and counterterrorist programs for any ship type in the U. S. Navy."

  Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)

  Broughton, Hubert L.

  1985-12
• Health Hazard Evaluation Report HETA 84-006-1639; First National Bank Chicago, Illinois

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  "On September 28, 1983, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) was contacted by the Chicago Fire Department, requesting technical assistance concerning potential toxic effects of a fire then in progress in a Commonwealth Edison transformer vault beneath the First National Bank Building, Chicago, Illinois. The fire resulted in the loss of 15 gallons of oil, composed of 65% Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCB - Arochlor 1260), and 35% trichlorobenzene, from one of four transformers in the vault. During the next 24 hours representatives from the utility company and the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency collected environmental wipe samples, air samples, and air filters from the ventilation system to determine the areas of PCB contamination. NIOSH investigators interviewed and drew blood samples for PCB, Polychlorinated Dibenzofurans (PCDF), and Polychlorinated Dibenzodioxins (PCDD) analysis from 2 firefighters who were hospitalized for smoke inhalation after a 15 minute exposure, and 2 maintenance workers who were in areas adjacent to the vault for 3 and 12 hours following the fire. None of these exposed individuals wore respiratory protection at that time. [...] Based on the results, of this study it has been determined that a potential health hazard existed due to exposure to PCB, PCDD, and PCDF at this Chicago transformer fire. Despite this potential, no absorption of PCB, PCDF, nor PCDD could be detected in the blood of four exposed individuals."

  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.); National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

  Orris, Peter; Kominsky, John

  1985-12
• Policy, Intelligence, and the Billion-Dollar Petroglyph

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  The pressure for corporate intelligence consensus is as great as the pressure for corporate policy consensus. The policy and intelligence processes are different but not separate. Intelligence is defined through analysis, and policy is defined through implementation. New policy can focus intelligence analysis, and new intelligence may influence policy changes. The relationship is dynamic, and exchanges are not necessarily sequential but invariably interactive. This interaction is not always harmonious; indeed, often it is a troubled road characterized by the need for reduction, the intrusion of bias, and the vagaries of a vast collection and processing subculture. Too often the policy/intelligence relationship, particularly in the defense establishment, is viewed idealistically, and this romantic view undermines the very process of effective interaction. Ideally, policy and intelligence are collegial partners in pursuit of larger national security goals. In practice, intelligence is somewhat of a junior partner with, what may be, a self-imposed image problem. Traditional suggestions for improving the quality of military intelligence support to the national security debate have focused on resource augmentation. Improved outcomes are inexorably, and often inexplicably, tied to more dollars and more sophisticated collection technology. This document discusses what would improve intelligence most in the defense arena. There are three shifts in emphasis that require little or no new resources: a better understanding of the corporate personality of policymakers; a recognition of the role that bias plays in policy formulation and intelligence analysis; and a change in the image of the intelligence process, coupled to an upgrade in the stature of intelligence managers.

  Air University (U.S.). Press

  Donovan, G. Murphy

  1986
• Civil Disturbances

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  The purpose of this field manual is to provide guidance for the commander and his staff in preparing for and providing assistance to civil authorities in civil disturbance control operations. It discusses the principles, policies, and legal considerations that govern the commitment of federal forces to civil disturbance control operations, the principles of civil disturbance control operations, planning and training for such operations, and the operational tasks and techniques employed to control civil disturbances and neutralize special threats. This guidance is intended for use of both active and reserve component US Armed Forces. Commanders of federal installations that use nonmilitary personnel, such as DOD police or contract security guards, for security must consult current DOD policy on the use of such personnel in civil disturbance control operations.

  United States. Department of the Army

  1985-11-25
• Keeping the Nation's Secrets: A Report to the Secretary of Defense By the Commission to Review DOD Security Policy and Practices

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  "Each year thousands of classified programs and projects are carried out by the Department of Defense, through its components and its contractual base, in a wide variety of operational and geographical settings. These activities generate millions of items of classified information, ultimately disseminated to almost four million individuals who require such information to perform their assigned tasks. This classified information is not only in the form of documents. An enormous inventory of classified equipment, both end items and components, must be safeguarded; and, increasingly, classified data is being processed, transmitted and stored electronically, posing serious new problems of protection. Arrayed against this vast and immensely important target are the intelligence services of the Soviet Union, its surrogates and other countries with interests hostile to the United States and its allies. In combination, those services conduct massive and highly organized collection operations to acquire all information, classified and unclassified, of military value. Although a variety of means, both human and technical, are employed, human collection constitutes the more significant threat within the continental United States today."

  United States. Department of Defense

  United States. Commission to Review DoD Security Policies and Practices

  1985-11-19
• National Security Decision Directive 197: Reporting Hostile Contacts and Security Awareness

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  National Security Decision Directive 197 makes provisions for measures to "enhance overall government efforts to protect against illegal or unauthorized acquisition by hostile intelligence services of information and technology vital to our national interest."

  United States. White House Office

  1985-11-01