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• Combating Terrorism: How Five Foreign Countries Are Organized to Combat Terrorism, Report to Congressional Requesters [audio]

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  The federal government spent about $10 billion last year to combat terrorism. More than 40 federal departments, agencies, and bureaus have a role in fighting terrorism. Some Members of Congress have questioned who is in charge of U.S. efforts to combat terrorism, how the federal government is organized to prevent and respond to a terrorist attack on U.S. soil, and how resources are being allocated. This report provides information on (1) how other governments are organized to combat terrorism and (2) how they allocate their resources. GAO focuses on Canada, France, Germany, Israel, and the United Kingdom. QuickTime is required to listen to this file on your computer. Click here to download QuickTime 7: http://www.apple.com/quicktime/download/win.html

  United States. Government Accountability Office

  2000-04-07
• Combating Terrorism: How Five Foreign Countries Are Organized to Combat Terrorism, Report to Congressional Requesters - Appendix V [audio]

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  The federal government spent about $10 billion last year to combat terrorism. More than 40 federal departments, agencies, and bureaus have a role in fighting terrorism. Some Members of Congress have questioned who is in charge of U.S. efforts to combat terrorism, how the federal government is organized to prevent and respond to a terrorist attack on U.S. soil, and how resources are being allocated. This report provides information on (1) how other governments are organized to combat terrorism and (2) how they allocate their resources. GAO focuses on Canada, France, Germany, Israel, and the United Kingdom. Appendix V provides GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments. QuickTime is required to listen to this file on your computer. Click here to download QuickTime 7: http://www.apple.com/quicktime/download/win.html

  United States. Government Accountability Office

  2000-04-07
• Combating Terrorism: How Five Foreign Countries Are Organized to Combat Terrorism, Report to Congressional Requesters - Appendix I [audio]

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  The federal government spent about $10 billion last year to combat terrorism. More than 40 federal departments, agencies, and bureaus have a role in fighting terrorism. Some Members of Congress have questioned who is in charge of U.S. efforts to combat terrorism, how the federal government is organized to prevent and respond to a terrorist attack on U.S. soil, and how resources are being allocated. This report provides information on (1) how other governments are organized to combat terrorism and (2) how they allocate their resources. GAO focuses on Canada, France, Germany, Israel, and the United Kingdom. Appendix I provides security-related policy development and incident leadership in Canada, France, Germany, Israel, and the United Kingdom. QuickTime is required to listen to this file on your computer. Click here to download QuickTime 7: http://www.apple.com/quicktime/download/win.html

  United States. Government Accountability Office

  2000-04-07
• Combating Terrorism: How Five Foreign Countries Are Organized to Combat Terrorism, Report to Congressional Requesters - Appendix III [audio]

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  The federal government spent about $10 billion last year to combat terrorism. More than 40 federal departments, agencies, and bureaus have a role in fighting terrorism. Some Members of Congress have questioned who is in charge of U.S. efforts to combat terrorism, how the federal government is organized to prevent and respond to a terrorist attack on U.S. soil, and how resources are being allocated. This report provides information on (1) how other governments are organized to combat terrorism and (2) how they allocate their resources. GAO focuses on Canada, France, Germany, Israel, and the United Kingdom. Appendix III provides principal terrorism laws, definitions, and other legal information in Canada, France, Germany, Israel, and the United Kingdom. QuickTime is required to listen to this file on your computer. Copy this link into your browser to download QuickTime 7: http://www.apple.com/quicktime/download/win.html

  United States. Government Accountability Office

  2000-04-07
• Combating Terrorism: How Five Foreign Countries Are Organized to Combat Terrorism, Report to Congressional Requesters - Appendix IV [audio]

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  The federal government spent about $10 billion last year to combat terrorism. More than 40 federal departments, agencies, and bureaus have a role in fighting terrorism. Some Members of Congress have questioned who is in charge of U.S. efforts to combat terrorism, how the federal government is organized to prevent and respond to a terrorist attack on U.S. soil, and how resources are being allocated. This report provides information on (1) how other governments are organized to combat terrorism and (2) how they allocate their resources. GAO focuses on Canada, France, Germany, Israel, and the United Kingdom. Appendix IV provides security-related oversight organizations and functions in Canada, France, Germany, Israel, and the United Kingdom. QuickTime is required to listen to this file on your computer. Click here to download QuickTime 7: http://www.apple.com/quicktime/download/win.html

  United States. Government Accountability Office

  2000-04-07
• Key Logistics Issues from Kosovo, Can the United States Achieve Strategic Velocity

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  This case study of the recent intervention in Kosovo by the United States and NATO, defines strategic velocity, and offers strategic planners a formula for its use. Planners should focus on the three logistics lessons in the paper: 1. The need for strategic lift. 2. The requirements for aerial refuel assets. 3. The limitation port throughput capacity imposes on deploying forces. The U.S. Army deployment to Albania in April 1999 was chaotic--as combatant commanders insisted on a rapid deployment by air. In the aftermath of Kosovo, problems with aerial refueling, availability of strategic lift, throughput capacity, and deploying U.S. Army Apache helicopters in a timely fashion have reverberated throughout the Department of Defense. This study suggests a new look at the entire deployment process, and emphasis on the overarching concept of strategic velocity. Strategic Velocity is the ability of a force to project itself from the homeland or other strategic points to arrive at an operational theater ready to fight and sustain itself--it is more than the speed of movement from point A to B. Instead, for the power projection of military forces, strategic velocity is a function of forces required, distance, strategic lift, aerial refuel capability, and port throughput capacity. The result of combining these seemingly disparate components under one concept is a synergy that will improve force projection planning and execution. Strategic Velocity is innovative--it is not covered in U.S. joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, or procedures.

  Army War College (U.S.)

  Leonard, Kevin

  2000-04-07
• Customs Directive No. 2310-008A: Trademark and Tradename Protection, April 7, 2000

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  "To provide relevant information and guidelines on Customs policies and procedures with respect to trademark and trade name protection. [...] In order to fulfill its statutory, regulatory, and treaty-based obligations of preventing the importation of merchandise which violates certain trademark and trade name rights which have been registered with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, U.S. Customs is vested with the authority to: (1) exclude from entry, (2) detain, and/or (3) seize, violative trademarked goods. In order to most effectively provide protection against such violative imports, Customs has established an intellectual property rights (IPR) enforcement regime which offers rights holders a two-tiered enforcement option, while providing Customs officers with up-to-date, detailed information about the rights being protected."

  U.S. Customs and Border Protection

  2000-04-07
• Combating Terrorism: Issues in Managing Counterterrorist Programs Statement of Norman J. Rabkin, Director, National Security Preparedness Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Emergency Management, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives

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  One of the major shortcomings in federal efforts to combat terrorism is the lack of linkage among the terrorist threat, a national strategy, and agency resources. Improvements are also needed in intergovernmental relations at the federal, state, and local levels. The reality is that the federal government cannot respond on its own to terrorist attacks involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. The Gilmore Panel, which issued its first report last year, found may of the same problems that GAO has cited, including the need for (1) more rigorous analyses of the threat, (2) better management of federal programs, (3) stronger coordination with state and local officials, and (4) a national strategy to combat terrorism.

  United States. General Accounting Office

  2000-04-06
• Inside Look at a Cartel at Work: Common Characteristics of International Cartels

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  This document was presented by James M. Griffin at the 48th Annual American Bar Association Spring Meeting in Washington, D.C. on April 6, 2000. "I would like to talk to you this afternoon about some of the common characteristics of international cartels -- how cartels are initiated; how they operate; and how they attempt to conceal their activity from law enforcement. In order to do this, I am going to rely on some audio and video tapes of actual meetings involving members of the lysine cartel. These tapes were, of course, made covertly by the FBI with the consent and assistance of a cooperating witness. They were first shown publicly at the trial of three former top executives from Archer Daniels Midland Company (ADM). ADM and its co-conspirators from Europe and Asia conspired to fix prices and allocate sales volumes of the food additive citric acid and the feed additive lysine. ADM plead guilty before trial and was sentenced to pay a $100 million fine - which at the time was nearly seven times larger than the previous record fine in an antitrust case in the United States. The ADM executives were convicted at trial and were recently sentenced to fines of up to $350,000 and lengthy prison sentences ranging from 24 to 30 months."

  United States. Department of Justice

  2000-04-06
• Joint Publication 4-0: Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations, 6 April 2000

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  "This publication is the keystone document of the logistic support of joint operations series. It provides doctrine for logistic support of joint and multinational (allied and coalition) operations. This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders and prescribes doctrine for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the joint force commander (JFC)from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission. Doctrine and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, sub-unified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service."

  United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff

  2000-04-06
• DoD Personnel: Weaknesses in Security Investigation Program Are Being Addressed, Statement of Carol R. Schuster, Associate Director, National Security Preparedness Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, Testimony before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate

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  "The Department of Defense uses a two-part process to determine whether an individual should be granted a security clearance. The first phase is the personnel security investigation, in which Defense Security Service investigators corroborate information provided by the applicant, interview character references, and review federal and local records for financial vulnerabilities and criminal activity. The second phase is the adjudication, which is conducted by eight DOD components. Adjudicators weigh favorable and unfavorable information with regard to a number of factors (such as the nature, extent, and seriousness of any conduct). If, on balance, the evidence suggests the individual is a good security risk, the clearance can be granted."

  United States. General Accounting Office

  2000-04-06
• Serial No. 106-154: H.R. 3680, To Amend the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 with Respect to the Adjustment of Composite Theoretical Performance Levels of High Performance Computers: Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives One Hundred Sixth Congress, Second Session, April 6, 2000

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  On April 6th, 2000, the House of Representatives Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade of the Committee on International Relations convenes to "markup" HR 3680, a bill to amend the National Defense Authorization Act for the fiscal year 1998 with respect to the adjustment of composite theoretical performance levels with high performance computers. There is no outside testimony to this markup session. Chairwoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen explains the related piece of legislation, H.R. 3680, as "a bipartisan bill which provides immediate relief for the computer industry, an industry which is conducting landmark, cutting edge work to maintain U.S. technological leadership. H.R. 3680 maintains the delicate balance between national security and market considerations while providing a more responsive, realistic approach to export controls on supercomputers." Ranking minority member Menendez emphasizes that "America's industry deserves laws that are responsive to today's global economy and not laws that were created over two decades ago to respond to Cold War era threats." In particular, the bill in question "reduce(s) the waiting period for the export of computers from 180 days to 30 days" according to Congressman Crowley, who also argues that "we should concentrate our resources on controlling real supercomputers and not waste them on controlling widely available business computers." The Subcommittee agrees unanimously to send the bill onto the full committee.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2000-04-06
• Serial No. 106-96: The Wireless Telecommunications Sourcing and Privacy Act: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the Committee on Commerce, House of Representatives, One Hundred Sixth Congress, Second Session on H.R. 3489, April 6, 2000

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  On April 6, 2000, House of Representatives Subcommittee on Health and Environment of the Committee on Commerce convenes to discuss and hear testimony on the Wireless Telecommunications Sourcing and Privacy Act. Testifying are Councilman Joseph Brooks of the City of Richmond, Dan Bucks of the Multistate Tax Commission, Raymond Scheppach of the National Governor's Association, and Thomas Wheeler of the Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association. Chairman Tauzin explains that "Mobility Wireless Telecomm has always made the determination of which State and local taxes apply to any particular wireless call, a very complicated and expensive task. The problem is that there are many methodologies--originating cell site, billing addresses, location and others, which give rise to multiple claims on the tax revenue. Double taxation and other administration problems obviously arise." Congressman Pickering describes the legislation in question: "At its core, this bill offers a new framework to simplify how State and local jurisdictions administer existing taxes on wireless calls. Under this legislation, all of the customers' State and local wireless taxes would be assigned to one address--the customer's place of primary use, which must either be the customer's home or business address." Industry representative Thomas Wheeler emphasizes that there is nothing in this legislation that changes any jurisdiction's taxation powers." He describes the concept of "place of primary use" in relation to the tax system of the telecommunications industry.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2000-04-06
• S. Hrg. 106-784: Interstate Shipment of State-Inspected Meat and Poultry: Hearing before the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, United States Senate, One Hundred Sixth Congress Second Session, April 6, 2000

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  April 6, 2000, the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry convenes to discuss and hear testimony regarding Interstate Shipments of State-Inspected Meat and Poultry. Testifying are Richard Rominger, Margaret Glavin, and Caren Wilcox of the US Department of Agriculture; Patrick Boyle of the American Meat Institute, Fred Daily of the Ohio Department of Agriculture, Michael Eikman representing the American Association of Meat Producers, the Illinois Association of Meat Producers, and 18 other state meat procession associations; Carol Foreman of the Food Policy Institute Consumer Federation of America, Jolene Heikens of the American Association of Meat Processors, the Iowa Association of Meat Processors, and 18 other state meant processing associations, Richard Nielson of the Utah Cattlemen's Association and representing the National Cattlemen's Been Association, and Harry Pearson of the Indiana Farm Bureau and representing the Farm Bureau Federation. Chairman Richard Lugar explains that "We have the opportunity today before this committee to hear of support for this legislation and to air concerns about this approach to allow interstate shipment of State-inspected meat and poultry." Orin Hatch argues that "the American economic system should reward excellence, hard work, effort, and investment, yet current policy concerning State-inspected meat is holding Americans back for no justifiable reason." However, Ranking Minority Member Tom Harkin states that "I think what we have here is a good approach on this to ensure that these plants meet all of the requirements of HACCP and meet the requirements of Federal inspection, even though we can deputize the State inspectors. So I think we have a good seamless system here now that we can bring these small plants into the national system."

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2000-04-06
• S. Hrg. 106-634: China in the WTO: What Will it Mean for the U.S. High Technology Sector?: Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, Export and Trade Promotion and the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Sixth Congress, Second Session, April 6, 2000

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  S. Hrg. 106-634: This hearing will focus on what China's accession into the World Trade Organization might mean for the United States' hightech industry. The United States and China signed a bilateral trade agreement last November as part of China's WTO accession process. China has yet to sign bilateral agreements with the European Union and a handful of other countries. Once that process is complete, China's accession protocol and the working party report will be issued, and China will be ready to accede to the WTO. The U.S. Congress will soon face a vote on whether to grant China permanent normal trade relations, [PNTR]. The purpose of this hearing is to consider what China's accession to the WTO might mean for our high-technology industry if we grant China PNTR, especially as Congress moves closer to voting on this issue. Statements, witnesses and submissions for the record include those of Frank Carlucci, Stuart Eizenstat, Craig Thomas, Richard Younts, and Chuck Hagel.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2000-04-06
• Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities Still Exist in the Aviation Security System, Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham, Associate Director, Transportation Issues, Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate

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  "We appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss the security of the nation's air transport system. The air transport system is vital to our nation's prosperity, and protecting this system from terrorist attacks or other dangerous acts remains an important national issue. Events over the past decade have shown that the threat of terrorism against the United States is an ever-present danger and, coupled with the fact that aviation is an attractive target for terrorists, indicate that the security of the air transport system remains at risk. Protecting this system demands a high level of vigilance because a single lapse in aviation security can result in hundreds of deaths, destroy equipment worth hundreds of millions of dollars, and have immeasurable negative impacts on the economy and the public's confidence in air travel. Our testimony today discusses the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) efforts to implement and improve security in two key areas: air traffic control computer systems and airport passenger screening checkpoints. Computer systems--and the information within--are the crucial link for providing information to air traffic controllers and aircraft flight crews to ensure the safe and expeditious movement of aircraft. Screening checkpoints and the screeners who operate them provide the means to ensure that passengers and others do not bring dangerous items aboard aircraft. Our testimony is based on issued reports on computer security and on work that we have under way on checkpoint screeners that we are conducting at this Subcommittee's request. Our report on checkpoint screeners will be issued shortly."

  United States. General Accounting Office

  2000-04-06
• America's 100-Year War 'An Historical Analysis of Counterdrug Strategy'

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  The United States federal government has waged "the war on drugs" since 1914. The cost to the American people has exceeded 100 billion dollars in just the past 20 years. Yet the flow of illegal drugs continues to enter our nations borders without an end in sight. Drug producing countries continue to produce cocaine, marijuana, and heroin at an immeasurable rate. The demand for illegal drugs in this country is high in comparison to other nations, and the demand base continues to get younger each year. This paper examines the historical background of the counterdrug effort and current national and military counterdrug strategies. This paper analyzes the effectiveness of the organizational and operational control of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) with regard to interagency operations and the use of military forces. Finally, this paper recommends organizational changes to the ONDCP, a possible increased role for the military, and a re-examination of the applicability of Posse Comitatus for the fight against illegal drug trafficking.

  Army War College (U.S.)

  Potts, Curtis D.

  2000-04-06
• Analysis of Current United States Homeland Defense Policies

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  This research paper argues that or the first time in many years the United States must re-consider its homeland defense policies. Technological advances coupled with rapid globalization provide potential enemies a myriad of capabilities to either directly attack the United States homeland or to use the threat of attack to shape its policies. Among the capabilities potential enemies may use are terrorism, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, WMD, and cyber attacks. The United States currently has or is in the process of developing numerous policies and programs in an effort to counter these threats yet the end result is that currently the United States has no overarching policy to ensure the protection of its homeland and its citizens. Failure to develop a coherent, synchronized homeland defense policy will result, at best in the wasting of billions of dollars, and at worst in the loss of many lives. This paper looks at the potential threats to the homeland of the United States; reviews current laws and polices designed to counter these threats; and examines the role the armed forces play in executing these policies. This analysis is followed by a discussion on what is needed to develop a viable homeland defense policy and the role the military should play in that policy.

  Army War College (U.S.)

  Mayes, Kelly L.

  2000-04-06
• Battle of Kursk: An Analysis of Strategic and Operational Principles

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  "This paper begins with an analysis of Field Marshal von Manstein's counterstroke at Kharkov - the prelude of Kursk - in February/March 1943. Kharkov serves as an outstanding example of a battle in which principles of war were masterly applied. This battle serves as a yardstick for analyzing the battle of Kursk, a battle where Hitler rather than Manstein dominated operations. In the east, Manstein's strategic objective was to reach a separate political settlement with the Soviets in 1943. Operations like his counterstroke were the way towards this end. His ideas, however, failed because of Hitler's resistance. Beside the potential strategic consequences of counterstroke-like operations, the example of Kharkov shows on the operational level how an Army can succeed, even when badly outnumbered. In contrast, planning, the conduct of operations and outcome of the battle of Kursk shows, that a viable strategic objective, like Manstein envisioned, could not be achieved, even if the battle had been successfully concluded. For that very reason Kursk was not a decisive battle. In addition, Kursk shows the neglect of basic principles of warfare by the German supreme command. Studying the battle of Kursk or comparing Kursk to Kharkov shows a student of military affairs how through inappropriate strategy and ignoring basic principles of war only poor results can be produced."

  Army War College (U.S.)

  Kasdorf, Bruno

  2000-04-06
• Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate: S. 2382, Technical Assistance, Trade Promotion, and Anti-Corruption Act of 2000

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  This is the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) Cost Estimate as ordered reported by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on March 23, 2000. From the Summary: "CBO estimates that the Technical Assistance, Trade Promotion, and Anti-Corruption Act of 2000 would authorize appropriations of $7.3 billion over the 2000-2005 period for economic and security assistance programs. (About $5.2 billion of the total would be for appropriations in 2001.) Assuming the appropriation of the authorized amounts, CBO estimates that implementing the bill would cost about $6.4 billion over the 2000-2005 period. In addition to affecting discretionary spending, the bill would amend laws governing sales of military equipment that would lower offsetting receipts (a form of direct spending) by about $45 million a year. The bill also would affect governmental receipts (i.e., revenues), but by less than $500,000 a year. Because it would affect direct spending and receipts, the bill would be subject to pay-as-you-go procedures. The bill would authorize $3.9 billion for foreign military financing and other security assistance programs in 2001. It would authorize $600 million over the 2000-2003 period for a contribution to a trust fund to pay for a portion of the cost of reducing the debts of highly indebted poor countries (HIPC) by multilateral development banks. The bill would authorize $150 million for contributions to new trust funds within the World Bank to help developing countries fight HIV/AIDS and to educate orphans in sub-Saharan Africa. It would authorize $420 million for bilateral and multilateral programs to fight infectious diseases and additional amounts for other programs. It would authorize the transfer of 17 naval vessels to foreign countries, authorize new assistance programs, reform procedures for imposing bilateral trade sanctions, and otherwise address foreign policy."

  United States. Congressional Budget Office

  2000-04-06
• Preparedness Against Terrorist Attacks, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations and Emergency Management of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives, One Hundred Sixth Congress, Second Session, April 6, 2000

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  From the opening statement of Fowler: "I want to just go back with a little history and set a basis for why we're here today. In looking back, in April, this very month, of 1915, the German army initiated the first large scale use of chemical gas as a weapon, by releasing thousands of cylinders of chlorine gas over a four mile front near Ypres, France. Over 5,000 unprepared French and Algerian troops were killed or wounded in that attack. Many more of them, terrified, deserted their trenches. Fortunately for the French, the Germans did not exploit this sudden break in the lines and the Allies learned some valuable lessons that helped them better prepare for future gas attacks. So here we are, 85 years later, and we live in a very different world, except the threat of a chemical attack has not changed. Today, civilians, not troops, may be at the greatest risk from a gas attack. And the battlefield is not some well defined war zone, it could be a shopping mall, an office building or the subway. And the threat is not just from chemicals, but from biological and radiological weapons as well. So at our first hearing that we had last June, we learned that this country is not prepared for a terrorist attack involving a weapon of mass destruction. More troubling, we learned that the Federal Government is engaged in a turf battle over trying to help people get prepared. In the process, then, we have fragmented and overlapping Federal programs that in some cases are making people more confused about what to do and when to do it. I vividly remember at our last hearing, Chicago's fire chief John Eversole, who's with us here today, too, and I want to quote from him, he said 'There is so much confusion and competition between Federal agencies that they are sometimes more interested in what they are doing than in what's getting done on the general end of it.'" Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Brett A. Burdick, James R. Clapper Jr., John M. Eversole, Michael P. Freeman, Robert Neal Fudge, Norman J. Rabkin, James L. Obserstar and James A. Traficant.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2000-04-06
• Audit Report: Security Clearance Investigative Priorities

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  "This report is the second in a series of audit reports addressing security clearance and access issues. During our audit to determine the status of actions taken within DoD relating to access reciprocity between special access programs, we identified problems with obtaining security clearances that affected the execution of special access programs and other DoD operations. This report addresses the overall issue of whether security clearances were being obtained and updated for personnel in the most critical and high-risk positions. We addressed the impact of obtaining background investigations for security clearances on three special access programs in Inspector General, DoD Report No. D-2000-072, Expediting Security Clearance Background Investigations for Three Special Access Programs (U), January 3 1, 2000 (SECRET). Future audit reports will cover the mechanisms for tracking the status of requested clearances, the adjudication processes, the impact of security clearance issues on special access programs, access reciprocity, and the acquisition of the Case Control Management System."

  United States. Department of Defense. Office of the Inspector General

  2000-04-05
• S. Hrg. 106-573: United Nations Peacekeeping Missions and Their Proliferation: Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate One Hundred Sixth Congress Second Session, April 5, 2000

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  S. Hrg. 106-573: This hearing addresses the issue of the peacekeeping missions of the United Nations. Senator Grams, in his opening statement remarked, "In our desire to do something, the administration is agreeing to endorse, what is in effect, an indefinite U.N. commitment to govern distressed nations when we commit to supporting peacekeeping operations. In short, the pursuit of the United States' national interest is once again being obscured by a proliferation of multilateral action in the service of overly ambitious and vague aims." This hearing addresses the concern that peacekeeping missions not only seem to lack an exit strategy but an entry strategy as well, and consider the credibility of the U.N. as a mechanism for peacekeeping, could be undermined it the U.N. fails in its new missions. Statements, witnesses and submissions for the record include those of: Kenneth Allard, John Bolton, Rod Grams, John Hillen, Michael O'Hanlon, and Sam Brownback.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2000-04-05
• Impact of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 on Civilian/Military Relations

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  "This paper will examine the impact of this historic piece of legislation, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act (GNA) of 1986, upon the relationship between civilian and military leaders. To provide some necessary background, it will first look at the historic evolution of U.S. civilian/military relations and the changing roles of defense leadership. Then, using the comparison and contrast method, it will examine two periods on opposite sides of the law's passage - the Vietnam War and the Gulf War - to see whether the relationship between top civilian and military leaders was helped or hindered by this legislation. It will specifically conduct a detailed examination of the relationship between the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), along with a brief look at the roles of the Service Secretaries and the Service Chiefs. A major thesis of this paper was that the success or failures of most of these regional conflicts were driven not only by the personalities of the civilian and military leaders of each period but also by the evolving defense organizational structure. The realignment of making the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the single military adviser did prove far more successful in the Gulf War than the diversified advisory role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Vietnam War. However, primary credit for the different outcomes in the Vietnam War and the Gulf War must be given to the leaders in each period."

  Army War College (U.S.)

  McDonald, Con

  2000-04-05
• Continuation of Federal Prisoner Detention Efforts in the Face of a USMS Appropriation Deficiency, Memorandum for the General Counsel, United States Marshals Service [April 5, 2000]

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  "It is doubtful that the 'authorized by law' exception to the Antideficiency Act would allow the United States Marshals Service to continue to provide prisoner detention-related functions during a deficiency in its FPD [Federal Prisoner Detention] budget, but it is likely that the 'emergency' exceptions set forth in § 1342 and § 1515 of that statute would apply, in many, if not all, circumstances."

  United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legal Counsel

  2000-04-05
• Final Report: Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Drill, Annual Medical Drill, Diablo Canyon Power Plant [June 16 and August 18, 1999]

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  From the Executive Summary: "The Off-site Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Drill at El Chorro Regional Park on June 16, 1999 and the Off-site Medical Drill on August 18, 1999, were evaluated for the emergency planning zone (EPZ) around the Diablo Canyon Power Plant by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Region IX. The purpose of the drills was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency. These drills was held in accordance with FEMA's policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local radiological emergency response plans (RERP) and procedures. [...] The local organizations, except where noted in this report, demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and adequately implemented them. There were six Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA) identified as a result of these drills. Ten ARCAs from previous drills were corrected and one ARCA remains unresolved."

  United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency

  2000-04-05
• Cyber Attack Response: The Military in a Support Role

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  "Assuming a foe launched a cyber attack on the U.S., what role should the military take in response? Should the military take the lead because others view cyber attack as both an act of warfare and a national defense issue? Both cyber and biological agent attacks cross this difficult line. What makes these attacks different from a nuclear warhead delivered by a missile? The distinction seems to hinge on whether the issue is 1) to defend against a cyber attack, or 2) to deal with the domestic consequences of the attack. This article examines the military support role regarding cyber attacks to the U.S., the consequences and implications, and offer possible alternatives to strengthen our homeland defense against cyber attack. It contends that the DOD should not lead the counter cyber attack efforts based on three likely scenarios: 1) transportation infrastructure; 2) financial institutions; and 3) public services."

  Air University (U.S.). Press

  Cabana, Nonie C.

  2000-04-04
• Accessing the Reserve Components in Response to Attacks Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction

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  "The threat of terrorist attacks against United States (US) interests has become a high-priority national security concern. These threats come from unconventional, asymmetrical, and transnational sources. The objective of these attacks is to inflict the greatest amount of death and destruction for the least investment in materials and manpower. The terrorists employ weapons of mass destruction because of their effectiveness in achieving this end. The US government has enacted legislation to meet this threat and placed the Department of Defense (DoD) at the forefront of these measures. One of DoD's most significant actions was the decision to integrate the Reserve Components (RC) into the domestic response of managing the consequences of attacks involving weapons of mass destruction. Many challenging issues arise related to accessing the Reserve Components for employment in this mission. These issues involve all of the force integration functional areas. This paper investigates structuring, training, and deploying. Also discussed is the fundamental issue of missioning of RC forces for CoM [Consequence Management] requirements. This paper will explore these issues and present some recommendations for changes in these force integration functional areas. These changes will facilitate the ultimate objective of accessing and employing trained and ready RC forces in this new and vital aspect of military assistance to civilian authorities."

  Army War College (U.S.)

  Threat, Cary T.

  2000-04-04
• Cyber Attack Response: The Military in a Support Role

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  "This article will examine the military support role regarding cyber attack to the U.S., the consequences and implications, and offer possible alternatives to strengthen our homeland defense against cyber attack. It contends that the DOD should not lead the counter cyber attack efforts based on three likely scenarios: 1) transportation infrastructure; 2) financial institutions; and 3) public services."

  United States. Department of the Air Force

  Cabana, Nonie

  2000-04-04
• Kwantung Army and the Nomonhan Incident: Its Impact on National Security

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  From May to September 1939 Japan and the Soviet Union engaged in what started out as a small border clash but quickly escalated into a large undeclared war in the Mongolian plains near the city of Nomonhan. The Soviets won by employing over 1,000 tanks against the Kwantung Army's predominately infantry force by executing a near perfect double envelopment. However, the isolation of the battlefield, combined with the outbreak of World War II in September 1939, overshadowed the conflict. But today, both the Soviets and the Japanese examine the Nomonhan Incident in minute detail. It even serves as a case study at the advanced tactical schools of the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force. The intent of this paper is to look at the development of the Kwantung Army from a strategic perspective using the Nomonhan Incident as a backdrop. Specific emphasis will be placed on identifying and analyzing the Kwantung Army's relationship with Imperial Japanese Army and the civilian authorities located in Tokyo. In the final analysis, the incident was a major contributor to the Japanese strategic decision to pursue a southern axis of advance in 1941, rather than joining the German attack on Russia.

  Army War College (U.S.)

  Otterstedt, Charles

  2000-04-04