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• Information Security: IRS Electronic Filing Systems, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate

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  "Information security is an important consideration for any organization that depends on information systems and computer networks to carry out its mission or business. The dramatic expansion in computer interconnectivity and the rapid increase in the use of the Internet are changing the way our government, the nation, and much of the world communicate and conduct business. However, without proper safeguards, these developments pose enormous risks that make it easier for individuals and groups with malicious intent to intrude into inadequately protected systems and use such access to obtain sensitive information, commit fraud, disrupt operations, or launch attacks against other computer networks and systems. Further, the number of individuals with computer skills is increasing, and intrusion, or hacking, techniques are readily available and relatively easy to use. The rash of cyber attacks launched in February 2000 against major U.S. firms illustrates the risks associated with this new electronic age. Computer-supported federal operations are also at risk. Our previous reports, and those of agency inspectors general, describe persistent computer security weaknesses that place a variety of critical federal operations, including those at IRS [Internal Revenue Service], at risk of disruption, fraud, and inappropriate disclosure. This body of audit evidence led us, in 1997 and again in 1999 reports to the Congress, to designate computer security as a governmentwide high-risk area. It remains so today."

  United States. General Accounting Office

  2001-02
• Health Hazard Evaluation Report 99-0252-2831; State of Iowa Division of Narcotics Enforcement Des Moines, Iowa

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  "In June 1999, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) received a confidential employee request for a health hazard evaluation (HHE) of the narcotics evidence holding room at the State Police Division of Narcotics Enforcement facility in Des Moines, Iowa. The HHE requesters expressed concern over employees' exposures to materials collected from clandestine methamphetamine laboratories and other drug cases that were stored at the facility. They also reported that there were three recently diagnosed cancer cases among narcotics enforcement staff, and several employees had severe headaches which they associated with the workplace. In response, NIOSH personnel conducted a site visit at the office on July 26 and 27, 1999. Area air samples were collected for volatile organic compounds (VOCs), ethyl ether, inorganic acids, and cocaine in the evidence room and surrounding areas. Wipe samples for cocaine were collected in the evidence room. Two samples of debris were gathered from the shelves and examined for fungal contamination. [...] The monitoring data collected during this evaluation indicated that there is a need to improve general ventilation within the building. Recommendations for improving and repairing the general ventilation systems, cleanup of the evidence room, and the addition of chemical storage cabinets are included in the report. The three cancer cases were of two different types, and their timing did not suggest an occupational origin."

  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.); National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

  Burton, Nancy Clark

  2001-02
• U.S. Strategic Posture Review: Issues for the New Administration

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  "In the past, U.S. decisionmakers have addressed strategic nuclear force and national missile defense issues in an incremental and uncoordinated manner. Too often, force structure decisions have been driven by near-term programmatic, budgetary, arms control, and political pressures rather than by long-term strategy and objectives. The forthcoming Strategic Posture Review (SPR) needs to fundamentally reassess the purposes of nuclear weapons, missile defenses, and the requirements of deterrence and stability in the new security environment. The Bush administration should develop a comprehensive conceptual framework to decide on the size, composition, and posture of strategic offensive and defensive forces. Such a framework should integrate new assessments of deterrence and stability over the next 10-20 years, in light of the much more diverse threats facing the United States. It will not be easy to come up with solutions that balance competing and often contradictory objectives. Improving U.S. capabilities to deal with one set of strategic concerns may complicate efforts to address others. SPR should include a reassessment of U.S. strategic force levels and targeting requirements; consideration of different hedges and reconstitution options against greater-than-expected threats, such as maintaining production capabilities or making unilateral strategic force reductions outside a formal treaty framework; and development of a broad calculus to assess the impact of national missile defense and other strategic developments on deterrence and stability."

  National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies

  Bunn, M. Elaine; Sokolsky, Richard

  2001-02
• Executive Summary of U.S. Commission on National Security Report

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  Included in the report released January 31 by the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century are a proposal for a new, cabinet-level National Homeland Security Agency that would combine the Federal Emergency Management Agency with several other agencies, and a prescription for recasting a "crippled" State Department and the Department of Defense. The combination of unconventional weapons proliferation with the persistence of international terrorism will end the relative invulnerability of the U.S. homeland to catastrophic attack. A direct attack against American citizens on American soil is likely over the next quarter century. The risk is not only death and destruction but also a demoralization that could undermine U.S. global leadership. In the face of this threat, our nation has no coherent or integrated governmental structures. We therefore recommend the creation of a new independent National Homeland Security Agency (NHSA) with responsibility for planning, coordinating, and integrating various U.S. government activities involved in homeland security. NHSA would be built upon the Federal Emergency Management Agency, with the three organizations currently on the front line of border security -- the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, and the Border Patrol -- transferred to it. NHSA would not only protect American lives, but also assume responsibility for overseeing the protection of the nation's critical infrastructure, including information technology.

  United States Commission on National Security/21st Century

  2001-01-31
• Conventional Deterrence in the First Quarter of the New Century - A Strategic Workshop (February 20-22, 2001)

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  The purpose of the Workshop was to answer broad questions of how U.S. national power should be postured to remain an effective deterrent force in support of U.S. national security objectives in the 21st Century. The participants considered the future challenges of an evolving geostrategic environment, U.S. national interests, alternative options and ways to employ the elements of national power (political-military-diplomatic-information-economic) and identified critical means (capabilities) needed for effective deterrence.

  Army War College (U.S.). Center for Strategic Leadership

  Menk, Peter D.

  2001-02
• Test Results of Phase 2 Level B Suits to Challenge by Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents and Simulants: Executive Summary

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  Swatches from seven commercially available Level B protective suits were challenged with liquid droplets of Sarin (GB) and mustard (HD) using modifications of the static diffusion procedure described in TOP 8-2-501. The cumulative mass of each agent that permeated each swatch was determined over time, and the results for all swatches were used to determine a weighted-average cumulative mass for each suit. From this data, a break-through time was calculated for each suit for the purposes of comparison. In addition, intact suits were challenged with corn-oil aerosol to simulate a biological or chemical aerosol. Protection factors were determined for each suit.

  U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command

  Lindsay, Robert S.

  2001-02
• Nuclear Deterrence and Defense: Strategic Considerations: New Answers and New Issues in the Arena of Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Policy and Posture Entering the Twenty-First Century

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  "This publication represents the INSS vision. It emphasizes both the product of research, the papers produced, and the process of national security education and expertise development. Each of the authors presented here is a 'military-academic,' more traditionally a 'soldier-scholar,' and most are associated with the faculties of either the United States Air Force Academy or of its parent United States Military Academy. The results of their research are distributed by INSS to reach an audience that includes the military policy community. But of equal importance, these same results find their way into the classroom, educating the next generation of military leaders. The messages of these researchers and their enthusiasm for their subjects also reach the military faculties, particularly the junior faculty that many of these authors mentor in both career and academic pursuits. In short, these papers and authors combine the product and the process goals of INSS, thus magnifying the significance of their research efforts. Therefore, INSS presents the following four papers on post-Cold War deterrence and strategic defense, nuclear strategy, and regional considerations both for their content (product) and in furtherance of education and inquiry (process) in this critical arena of high-end national security policy."

  USAF Institute for National Security Studies

  Smith, James M.

  2001-02
• Test Results of Phase 2 Level A Suits to Challenge by Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents and Simulants: Summary Report

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  Swatches from six commercially-available Level A protective suites were challenged with liquid droplets of Sarin (GB) and mustard (HD) using modifications of the static diffusion procedure described in TOP 8-2-501. The cumulative mass of each agent that permeated each swatch was determined over time, and the results for all swatches were used to determine a weighted-average cumulative mass for each suit. From this data, a breakthrough time was calculated for each suit for the purposes of comparison. In addition, intact suits were challenged with corn-oil aerosol to stimulate biological and chemical aerosols. Protection factors were determined for each suit.

  U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command

  Lindsay, Robert S.; Pappas, Alex G.

  2001-02
• Swatch Test Results of Commercial Chemical Protective Gloves to Challenge by Chemical Warfare Agents: Summary Report

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  Swatches from eleven commercially available chemical protective gloves were challenged with liquid droplets of Sarin (GB) and mustard (HD) using modifications of the static diffusion procedure described in TOP 8-2-501. The cumulative mass of each agent that permeated each swatch was determined over time, and the results for all swatches were used to determine a weighted-average cumulative mass for each suit. From this data, a break-through time was calculated for each glove. From this data, a breakthrough time was calculated for each glove/agent combination for the purposes of comparison.

  U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command

  Lindsay, Robert S.

  2001-02
• Swatch Test Results of Commercial Chemical Protective Boots to Challenge by Chemical Warfare Agents: Summary Report

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  Swatches from nine commercially available chemical protective boots were challenged with liquid droplets of Sarin (GB) and mustard (HD) using modifications of the static diffusion procedure described in TOP 8-2-501. The cumulative mass of each agent that permeated each swatch was determined over time, and the results for all swatches were used to determine a weighted-average cumulative mass for each boot. From this data, a break-through time was calculated for each glove. From this data, a breakthrough time was calculated for each boot/agent combination for the purposes of comparison.

  U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command

  Lindsay, Robert S.

  2001-02
• Swatch Test Results of Commercial Chemical Protective Gloves to Challenge by Chemical Warfare Agents: Executive Summary

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  Swatches from eleven commercially available chemical protective gloves were challenged with liquid droplets of Sarin (GB) and mustard (HD) using modifications of the static diffusion procedure described in TOP 8-2-501. The cumulative mass of each agent that permeated each swatch was determined over time, and the results for all swatches were used to determine a weighted-average cumulative mass for each suit. From this data, a break-through time was calculated for each glove. From this data, a breakthrough time was calculated for each glove/agent combination for the purposes of comparison.

  U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command

  Lindsay, Robert S.

  2001-02
• Swatch Test Results of Commercial Chemical Protective Boots to Challenge by Chemical Warfare Agents: Executive Summary

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  Swatches from nine commercially available chemical protective boots were challenged with liquid droplets of Sarin (GB) and mustard (HD) using modifications of the static diffusion procedure described in TOP 8-2-501. The cumulative mass of each agent that permeated each swatch was determined over time, and the results for all swatches were used to determine a weighted-average cumulative mass for each boot. From this data, a break-through time was calculated for each glove. From this data, a breakthrough time was calculated for each boot/agent combination for the purposes of comparison.

  U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command

  Lindsay, Robert S.

  2001-02
• Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change: The Phase III Report of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century

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  The third final report of the Hart / Rudman Commission, titled "Roadmap for National Security", examines the multiple potential threats to homeland security. The document also emphasizes the need to capitalize on America's strengths in the sciences / education, recommends a series of institutional designs, and suggests some of the human requirements for national security (HUMINT) are not being met. They stress the key to success will be coordinated strategic planning which reaches all levels of U.S. national security institutions.

  United States Commission on National Security/21st Century

  2001-01-31
• Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents Since 1900 (February 2001 Revision)

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  This is the eighth revision of a working paper on biological terrorism first released in August 1998. The last version was released in April 2000. As with the earlier versions, it is an interim product of the research conducted by the author into biological terrorism at the National Defense University's Center for Counterproliferation Research. It incorporates new cases identified through December 31, 2000, as well as a considerable amount of new material on older cases acquired since publication of the previous revision. The working paper is divided into two main parts. The first part is a descriptive analysis of the illicit use of biological agents by criminals and terrorists. It draws on a series of case studies documented in the second part. The case studies describe every instance identifiable in open source materials in which a perpetrator used, acquired, or threatened to use a biological agent. While the inventory of cases is clearly incomplete, it provides an empirical basis for addressing a number of important questions relating to both biocrimes and bioterrorism. This material should enable policymakers concerned with bioterrorism to make more informed decisions.

  National Defense University. Center for Counterproliferation Research

  Carus, W. Seth

  2001-02
• Most Allegations of Irregularities in Nonproliferation Export Control Cooperation Program Could Not be Supported

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  "In December 1999, the Inspectors General of the Commerce and State Departments received an anonymous letter containing numerous allegations of irregularities in the Nonproliferation Export Control Cooperation (NEC) program, including alleged mismanagement by senior BXA officials. The letter alleged that BXA did not have legal authority for the NEC program; was improperly using State Department funds; may have risked national security in its contacts with foreign nationals; and, may have failed to adequately share the results of its export control policy discussions held during overseas trips with other national security agencies. The letter also claimed that BXA had set up an unauthorized unit to manage the NEC program, engaged in a number of illegal or inappropriate personnel practices in staffing this unit, hired personal services contractors in violation of the intent of Congress, and contrived to evade audit and program review by both the State and Commerce Department Inspectors General. The NEC program was set up to help Russia and the New Independent States of the former Soviet Union, Central Europe, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Asia develop export control programs by providing training and technical assistance on export controls and advice on drafting export control laws and regulations. BXA began the program in 1993 with Defense Department funding to assist the four former Soviet republics that have nuclear weapon capabilities (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine) in dismantling their nuclear missiles, establishing secure communications and a hotline, and promoting export control cooperation. The overall Defense Department program also emphasized encouraging conversion of the defense industry and its scientists. Since its initial work with these independent states of the former Soviet Union, BXA has expanded its original effort into what is now called the NEC program, principally supported by State Department funding under the authority of the FREEDOM Support Act of 1992, to establish programs for safeguarding against the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and preventing the diversion of weapons-related scientific and technical information and expertise of the independent states to terrorist groups or third countries. The State Department funds the bulk of the NEC program's work through its appropriation under the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, De-mining, and Related Programs account. BXA attempts to accomplish this nonproliferation mission by conducting technical exchanges with these countries in the areas of export control policy, automation, licensing, legislation, regulations, and preventive enforcement. Although the State Department is now BXA's principal funding source for the program, the Defense Department and the U.S. Customs Service have also provided funding to BXA. Under interagency agreements, these agencies transfer funds to BXA, based on BXA's funding proposals, to carry out technical exchanges with the foreign governments."

  United States. Department of Commerce. Office of the Inspector General

  2001-02
• Management of National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams, Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense, Audit Report No. D-2001-043, January 31, 2001

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  This report is part one in a series of audit reports on U.S. forces' management of chemical and biological (CB) defense resources and their readiness to operate in a CB warfare environment. The Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Counterproliferation and Chemical/Biological Defense requested the audit. The Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Team (WMD-CST) Program is intended to help prepare the United States against terrorist use of a weapon of mass destruction and is commonly referred to as a homeland defense measure. Originally, 10 WMD-CSTs were established with a planned initial operational capability date of January 2000. In FY 2000 and FY 2001, Congress authorized an additional 17 and 5 WMD-CSTs, respectively. In FY 1999 Congress established Secretary of Defense certification requirements for the WMD-CSTs. The overall audit objective was to evaluate the program management of chemical and biological defense resources in the National Guard and Reserve forces. This segment of the audit evaluated the program management of National Guard units charged with chemical and biological defense responsibilities for homeland defense. Subsequent segments of the audit will address the financial management of the CoMPIO and the management of CB defense resources in the National Guard and Reserve forces in support of deployed forces. For part two of the draft, go to /homesec/docs/dodig01-043pt2.pdf.

  United States. Department of Defense. Office of the Inspector General

  2001-01-31
• U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy

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  "The purpose of this volume is to present the Army War College's strategy formulation model to students and practitioners. This book serves as a guide to one method for the formulation, analysis and study of strategy--an approach which we have found to be useful in providing generations of strategists with the conceptual tools to think systematically, strategically, critically, creatively and big." Each chapter presents a major concept from the strategy formulation model. The chapters are as follows: A Primer in Strategy Development; Ethical Issues in War: An Overview; Some Basic Concepts and Approaches to the Study of International Politics; Persistence of Credibility: Interests, Threats and Planning for the Use of American Military Power; National Interest: From Abstraction to Strategy; Regional Studies and Global Strategy; National Power; National Security and the Interagency Process: Forward into the 21st Century; National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision; Why is Strategy Difficult?; Force Planning and U.S. Defense Policy; Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy; Strategic Risk; and Strategic Art: The New Discipline for 21st Century Leaders.

  Army War College (U.S.)

  Cerami, Joseph R.; Holcomb, James F., Jr.

  2001-02
• Guide to the Technologies of Concealed Weapon and Contraband Imaging and Detection

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  The purpose of the Guide is to provide information that will help members of the law enforcement and corrections community, who are present or potential users and operators of CWCIDSs, better understand the operation, limitations, and applicability of CWCIDS technology to their specific application and to provide an overview of the state of development in the CWCIDS for the mutual benefit of all interested parties. Some of the CWCIDSs are still under development and are included here for completeness. This Guide focuses on CWCIDSs that are intended for use on humans; that is, for detection of contraband and weapons concealed on human bodies. Accordingly, this Guide contains a technical review and discussion only of the various technologies that are being used or developed for concealed weapon and contraband imaging and detection on humans. A discussion of the limitations of these systems is provided, as are potential applications and general application-specific considerations. This discussion is also limited to the CWCIDS that use electromagnetic or acoustic phenomena for detection.

  National Institute of Justice (U.S.)

  Paulter, Nicholas G.

  2001-02
• Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2000

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  As required by Section 721 of the FY 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act, this report, submitted by the Director of the Central Intelligence, outlines the acquisition by foreign countries during the preceding 6 months of dual-use and other technology useful for the development or production of weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and biological weapons) and advanced conventional munitions. This report provides country summaries of acquisition activities (solicitations, negotiations, contracts, and deliveries) related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and advanced conventional weapons (ACW) that occurred from 1 July through 31 December 2002. Countries that already have established WMD programs, as well as countries that demonstrated little WMD acquisition activity of concern are not discussed. Countries covered in this report include Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, Syria, Sudan, India, Pakistan, and Egypt. Countries reported as key suppliers include Russia, North Korea, and China. The report also includes information on the role western European countries play in the proliferation of WMD- and missile-related information and training, and a brief discussion of trends in the acquisition of such technology by such countries.

  United States. Central Intelligence Agency

  2001-02
• Renovating U.S. Strategic Arms Control Policy

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  "Decisions on the next phase of strategic force reductions and how to achieve them will have to await the resolution of larger issues related to the future of the U.S. strategic force posture and national missile defense. Once the Bush administration completes its Nuclear Posture Review, however, it will need to decide whether to continue the Cold War-style strategic arms reduction process or explore alternatives for reducing nuclear threats to national security and transforming the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship. The traditional arms control process of negotiating legally binding treaties that both codify numerical parity and contain extensive verification measures has reached an impasse and outlived its utility. Moreover, new U.S. strategic priorities will require changes in the ends and means of arms control policy. The United States and Russia should embrace a radically new framework to achieve deeper reductions in strategic nuclear forces. The centerpiece of such a reform agenda should be arms control through unilateral and parallel unilateral measures. jump-start this process, the administration should give top priority to repealing legislation that prohibits the Nation from unilaterally reducing strategic forces until START II enters into force. Unless the United States embraces a more flexible and innovative approach to strategic arms control, progress will be stymied in developing a nuclear weapons posture for the new security environment."

  National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies

  Sokolsky, Richard

  2001-02
• Integrity Oversight Review of the United States Secret Service Inspection Division

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  According to this February 2001 Department of the Treasury Office of Inspector General [OIG] Report, the OIG "found that the USSS [United States Secret Service] has no centralized tracking or reporting system for employee misconduct allegations and they are, therefore, unable track misconduct allegations that were handled as management issues. Also, the decision to refer misconduct matters to the INS for investigation is at the discretion of the Assistant Director's (AD) Office to which the employee is assigned. Of the 75 discipline files reviewed, we found four instances in which discipline was not administered consistent with penalties imposed for similar offenses of misconduct. We also found that in 13 instances, discipline was not administered in a timely manner. In addition, the USSS did not always follow official grievance procedures and the discipline log used by ERB [Employee Relations Branch] staff to track discipline actions contained numerous errors."

  United States. Department of the Treasury. Office of Inspector General

  2001-02
• To Be or Not To Be: Alternative Funding

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  "The problem that motivated this research is the Plainview Fire/EMS [Emergency Medical Services] Department's significant increase in fire and EMS services without a concurrent increase in monetary resources. Because of changes being implemented with Medicare and Medicaid, EMS collections have dropped. The City of Plainview has a large number of elderly in the population, and, to compound this situation, a large percentage of the total population of Plainview is of a low-income nature (Appendix G). If Medicare and Medicaid do not pay for some reason, then many of the elderly and low income individuals can't pay as well, meaning low collection rates (Appendix E). The purpose of this applied research project is to determine what alternative funding sources are available to the Plainview Fire/EMS Department and how they may be implemented. The action research method was used. The following research questions were asked: 1. What types of funding sources are being used by departments with similar services? 2. What legal requirements will have to be met to implement alternative funding sources within the Plainview Fire/EMS Department? 3. What are the advantages and disadvantages that are associated with any funding sources? 4. What specific alternate funding programs appear to be relevant for the Plainview Fire/EMS Department? The procedures used in this paper included research of current literature, surveys and interviews of some chief officers. The literature review looked at and examined different alternative funding methods being used in the fire service. Some of the funding sources discussed included stand-by fees, subscription fees, inspection and permit fees, and cost recovery programs. A survey was sent out to 15 fire departments in Texas by postal mail."

  National Fire Academy

  Glass, H. Gary

  2001-01-31
• Emerging Issues On Privatized Prisons

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  "The state of corrections has come under attack by many during the past decade. Many contend that the current state of affairs will not work in the 21st century. Some argue that the public sector is incapable of handling the complex and changing dynamics associated with corrections, and therefore more prisons need to be handed over to the private sector; others argue that private industry should not be a part of the public matter of penalizing offenders of crime. Although the private sector has had a long history of involvement in corrections, private prisons make up less than 5 percent of the current market. This study offers a review of the history of privatization, presents a review of relevant research on the issues involved, and compares some of the major findings from the National Survey of State Prison Privatization, 1997, conducted by the National Council on Crime and Delinquency (1998) and the Census of State and Federal Correctional Facilities, 1995, conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (1997a), on the benefits and costs associated with private- and public-managed prison facilities. Although private prisons tend to house mostly minimum-security inmates, the findings from this report suggest that private prisons operate much the same as public facilities. Private prisons offer only modest cost savings, which are basically a result of moderate reductions in staffing patterns, fringe benefits, and other labor-related costs. No evidence was found to show that the existence of private prisons will have a dramatic effect on how non-private prisons operate."

  United States. Office of Justice Programs

  Austin, James; Coventry, Garry

  2001-02
• California's Electricity Crisis: Hearing Before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources United States Senate One Hundred Seventh Congress First Session, January 31, 2001

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  This hearing addresses the California energy crisis, in particular the following issues: building of new energy facilities, reliance on out-of-state energy, and deregulation and restructuring of the power markets in California. The first panel consists of industry experts and a Wall Street analyst. The second panel consists of three California investor-owned utilities, followed by those in the generation of electricity in California, and the marketers who sell power, and lastly, the second largest municipally owned utility in California. The third panel consists of public and private utilities and others who are located outside of California. Statements, witnesses and submissions: Keith Bailey, Jeff Bingham, Barbara Boxer, Conrad Burns, Ben Campbell, Maria Cantwell, Larry Craig, Mark Crisson, Byron Dorgan, Dianne Feinstein, Richard Ferreira, Peter Fox-Penner, Stephen Frank, John Gale, Curtis Hildebrand, Judi Johansen, Frederick John, Tom Karier, Steven Kean, Steven Kline, Kit Konolige, Mary Landrieu, Lawrence Makovich, Frank Murkowski, Don Nickles, Joe Perkins, Charles Schumer, Craig Thomas, and Brett Wilcox.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2001-01-31
• Statement by the Press Secretary on Guilty Verdict in Pan Am Flight 103 Bombing Trial [Janrary 31, 2001]

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  This statement summarizes the White House's response to the guilty verdict of Abdel Basset al-Megrahi for the detonation of an explosive device aboard Pan Am flight 103 over Scotland on December 21, 1988. It also expresses the United States' and United Kingdom's attitude towards the government of Libya regarding this terrorist incident.

  United States. Office of the White House Press Secretary

  2001-01-31
• Rollback of South Africa's Biological Warfare Program

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  "This monograph analyzes the origins and development of the South African CBW program, as well as its rollback. It concludes with a profile of South Africa as a state that produced weapons of mass destruction and with a list of outstanding questions. More than twenty policy lessons, based on the South African case, are presented, which should be considered in future CBW non-proliferation studies."

  USAF Institute for National Security Studies

  Burgess, Stephen Franklin; Purkitt, Helen E., 1950-

  2001-02
• Earthquakes in and near the Northeastern United States, 1638-1998

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  "Earthquakes occur on geologic faults. However, in nearly all parts of the northeastern U.S., we do not yet know how to tell which fault caused an individual earthquake. Geologic maps show faults that are exposed at the Earth's surface, and maps like this one show the locations of earthquakes, but there is no reliable map of 'earthquake faults' for the northeastern U.S. The most common way to measure an earthquake's size is its magnitude. There are many different magnitude scales, or ways to measure magnitude. Use of different scales can give slightly different values for the magnitude of the same earthquake. Therefore, your favorite earthquake might be shown here with a magnitude slightly different from what you have seen reported elsewhere."

  United States. Department of the Interior; Geological Survey (U.S.)

  2001-02
• International Sharing Program: Fostering International Cooperation

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  During the past few years, the DEA has received numerous requests from foreign countries through their respective investigative and prosecutorial agencies to participate in the U.S. Department of Justice's sharing program. This article presents an introduction to the substantive and procedural aspects of the international forfeiture and sharing program.

  United States. Federal Bureau of Investigation

  Kash, Douglas; Gorman, Jennifer A.

  2001-02
• Improved Response Program

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  "The Improved Response Program (IRP) is a multiyear analytical program designed to identify and demonstrate the best practical approaches to improve the overall preparedness of the United States to respond to domestic acts of terrorism involving chemical ad biological (CB) or CBrelated materials. This article describes the IRPs mission, major products, and future."

  Edgewood Chemical Biological Center

  Mughal, Mohamed Athher; Fedele, Paul David

  2001-02
• Drinking Water Infrastructure Needs Survey: Second Report to Congress

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  "In 1999, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency conducted the second survey of the nation's infrastructure needs. The survey covers the nation's approximately 55,000 community water systems and 21,400 not-for-profit noncommunity water systems. The total national need for drinking water investments is large--$150.9 billion for the next 20 years. Of this total, $102.5 billion is needed now to ensure the continued provision of safe drinking water. Large and medium-sized systems account for most of the total need, although small systems have the greatest needs on a per-household basis. American Indian and Alaska Native Village systems represent $2.2 billion of the total national need. The results of this survey support the findings of the first survey, conducted in 1995, by documenting the continued need to install, upgrade, and replace the infrastructure on which the public relies for safe drinking water."

  United States. Environmental Protection Agency. Office of Ground Water and Drinking Water

  2001-02