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• Industrial College of the Armed Forces: Industry Studies 2001: Construction

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  Constructed "mega-projects" are readily recognizable for their form and function, and in many cases, are awe-inspiring. Major buildings and bridges give identities to cities and nations and evoke a sense of pride in the people. The construction industry is a vast system of engineers, architects, laborers, craftsmen, material, equipment and tool suppliers, and project owners responsible for building these structures. The scope of the industry is all encompassing, including every type of facility imaginable. Roads, bridges, mass transit, airports, schools, retail and commercial buildings, industrial and manufacturing facilities, drinking water systems, wastewater treatment facilities, dams and power generation, solid waste facilities, and hazardous waste treatment and disposal projects all benefit society and bolster our national security. The construction industry seminar focused on projects and issues that have a potential mobilization involvement. At $3.4 trillion annually, construction represents a large contribution to the world's economy. Construction is a fiercely competitive industry; both domestically and internationally, reputation means everything. It is a conservative and risk-averse industry; change is gradual. Although the cConstruction iIndustry does not have a significant surge capability in healthy economic times, it is adaptable to national priorities and history verifies that that it can shift work to meet national security objectives.

  Industrial College of the Armed Forces (U.S.)

  2001
• Industrial College of the Armed Forces: Industry Studies 2001: Aircraft

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  The United States aircraft industry continues to be a critical element of economic, political, and military power. It is second to none in export dollars and fills a place that cannot be substituted by any other industry. The U.S. aircraft industry was once dominant in the global aircraft market, but Europe has now reached a level of parity in commercial transport sales and is closing the gap in military and rotorcraft sales. The mergers and reorganizations of the industry's four main sectors--commercial transport and cargo, military fixed-wing, rotorcraft, and jet engines--have slowed and companies are adjusting to these new partnerships. Aircraft manufacturers currently focus more on near term profits and stock value, as the concerns of investors and Wall Street positioning overrides research and development and long term investment. The search for greater profitability continues to drive production process streamlining. This streamlining has promoted healthy competition that has stirred innovation in airframes and engines, management practices, design and manufacturing processes, and production tooling. However, there is still uncertainty in both the commercial and military markets. Future market share and profitability for the U.S. industry hangs on the thin threads of government regulations, politics and partnerships. The correct combination of these factors will determine the future of the U.S. aircraft industry.

  Industrial College of the Armed Forces (U.S.)

  2001
• Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied Capabilities; Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination, Report to Congressional Requesters

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  Eight federal agencies now have teams that can respond to a terrorist attack involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. Each team varies in size, structure, geographical scope, and task. The teams do not duplicate one another. They have unique capabilities and functions, and many have experience dealing with different types of agents and weapons. The type of terrorist incident would determine which team would be most appropriate to respond. GAO found that federal agencies lack a coherent framework to develop and evaluate budget requirements for their response teams because there is no national strategy with clearly defined outcomes. To improve interagency cooperation, federal agencies have participated in several group activities. For example, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Interagency Steering Group, led by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, is identifying federal response teams that could respond to different terrorist scenarios. Federal, state, and local agencies have also participated in major field exercises that simulated urban terrorist acts. These efforts could go a long way toward improving the operational coordination of federal response teams.

  United States. General Accounting Office

  2000-11-30
• Coast Guard and Navy: It's Time for a 'National Fleet'

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  The U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Navy have been and will remain complementary. They are not competitors. However, the distinctiveness of their missions and functions, in practice their duties overlap. There is a zone of activity wherein the services share maritime geography and foci of concern. Because the Coast Guard operates shallow-draft warships, it can be misrepresented as the coastal or shallow-water navy of the United States. Similarly, because the Navy supports the Coast Guard when necessary and feasible, perception of naval enthusiasm for such support (and beyond) can feed ill-founded anxiety that the Coast Guard is in peril of imperial absorption by the much larger service. This article is propelled by the appreciation that even through the Coast Guard and the Navy are natural and necessary allies, trends exist today--both internal to each service and, even more, in their contexts of operation--that could strain their relationship.

  Naval War College (U.S.)

  Gray, Colin S.

  2001
• Has It Worked?: The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act

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  The overall report card is mixed. In the operational dimension of the Defense Department, which its original sponsors considered most pressing, the Goldwater-Nichols Act has been very successful. The act's "business" reforms, however, have not worked. These concerns, which may have been secondary fifteen years ago, are urgent now.

  Naval War College (U.S.)

  Locher, James R., 1946-

  2001
• Sandia Technology: Quarterly Research & Development Journal (Summer 2001, Entire Journal)

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  This is the entire Journal from Sandia National Laboratories for Summer 2001. This issue of Sandia Technology outlines some of those technologies, which encompass Sandia's work in robotics, computing, integrated microsystems, and biotechnology. Integrating disparate technologies into practical, effective systems that bolster America's national security is Sandia's strength. Included are the following 5 different articles: "Countering Emerging Threats: Technologies for Asymmetrical Warfare, Protection of our Homeland and Future Warfighting", "Developing Technologies for Asymmetrical Warfare and Homeland Defense", "Fielding New Systems for Countering Terrorism", "Meeting the Logistics and Demilitarization Challenges", and "Modeling and Simulation: Who knows what evils lurk in the paths of robots?".

  United States. Department of Energy

  2001
• Defense Against Toxin Weapons

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  The purpose of this manual is to provide basic information on biological toxins to military leaders and health-care providers at all levels to help them make informed decisions on protecting their troops from toxins. Much of the information contained herein will also be of interest to individuals charged with countering domestic and international terrorism. We typically fear what we do not understand. Although understanding toxin poisoning is less useful in a toxin attack than knowledge of cold injury on an Arctic battlefield, information on any threat reduces its potential to harm. I hope that by providing information about the physical characteristics and biological activities of toxins, the threat of toxins will actually be reduced. I did not intend to provide detailed information on individual threat toxins or on medical prevention or treatment. This primer puts toxins in context, attempts to remove the elements of mystery and fear that surround them, and provides general information that will ultimately help leaders make rational decisions, protect their soldiers and win battles.

  United States. Department of Defense

  Franz, David R.

  2001
• Medical Disaster Preparedness and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Operations (Chapter 23)

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  On October 23, 1983, the terrorist bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut took the lives of 241 U.S. military personnel and wounded 112 others. This terrorist action severely stressed the peacetime military health care system in Europe and directed worldwide attention to the ability of our armed forces to respond to a wartime medical contingency. A major emergency affecting a large number of people may occur anytime and anywhere. Whether a peacetime disaster or an enemy attack, lives can be saved if one is prepared for either contingency. To do this requires one to be ready by planning and preparing for just such an event. Planning requires an awareness of: the range of disasters which can occur, possible preventive measures, types of injuries, measures to prevent further casualties, and special problems and requirements. The principles of disaster management may be summarized as follows: a. Prevent the occurrence, b. Minimize the number of casualties, c. Prevent further casualties, d. Rescue, e. Provide first aid, f. Evacuate the injured, g. Provide definitive care, h. Facilitate reconstruction-recovery. The intent of this chapter is to provide the field flight surgeon an updated information resource on the planning, operations, and readiness of disaster preparedness within the Air Force. It will cover primarily operations involving nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons. The flight surgeon will know where to find specific information from Air Force regulations, manuals, pamphlets, and technical orders. Additionally, certain Army publications will be included. Another chapter will cover specific personnel, equipment, and planning issues in remote environments and should be used in conjunction with this chapter.

  United States. Department of Defense

  Tedesco, Mark J.

  2001
• Chemical and Biological Systems Technology

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  This section addresses technologies for: Bioprocessing; Chemical Manufacturing; Chemical and Biological Defense Systems; Detection, Warning and Identification; Battlefield Environment; and Human Factors. The technology areas identified in the above box contain militarily critical technologies. The other technology areas do not currently include technologies that are militarily critical. The Chemical and Biological Defense Systems section includes technologies that are designed to protect forces when contamination cannot be avoided and provide prophylaxis and therapy from threat agents to any affected forces. These Chemical and Biological Defense Systems technologies also cover decontamination to ensure rapid force reconstitution. Detection, Warning and Identification technologies covered in this section can provide real-time capability to detect, identify, locate, and quantify chemical and biological threats. Sensors must be integrated with an information processing system to analyze the threat, identify potentially affected units, and pass on alarms and warnings to implement protective measures. Both detection and protection apply to personnel operating on the ground, at sea, in the air, and in shelters and large enclosures. Although many sensor and defense technologies have commercial applications, military requirements are much more stringent. Selected toxic chemicals and biological agents which are of concern for defense and detection are presented in tabular form. Toxic chemicals are extracted from the Chemical Weapons Convention. Biological agents are extracted from the Australia Group list.

  United States. Department of Defense

  2001
• Vesicants (USAMRICD Presentation)

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  The objectives in this presentation on vesicants are to: know the mechanism of action (pathophysiology); identify signs and symptoms for all routes of exposure and the clinical time course; know specific pre and post exposure treatment regimens; understand the specific pharmacology of each treatment regimen; and to understand the prognosis and triage for mild, moderate, and severe exposure. Mustard phosgene and lewisite are outlined in detail along with a history.

  United States. Department of Defense

  2001
• Testimony of Department of Health and Social Services Secretary, Tommy G. Thompson

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  Bioterrorism presents unique challenges since it differs dramatically from other forms of terrorism and national emergencies. While explosions or chemical attacks cause immediate and visible casualties, an intentional release of a biological weapon would unfold over the course of days or weeks, culminating potentially in a major epidemic. Until sufficient numbers of people arrive in emergency rooms, doctors' offices and health clinics with similar illnesses, there may be no sign that a bioterrorist attack has taken place. Individuals with symptoms may be at considerable distance from the site of initial exposure, both in terms of onset of disease and geographic location. Moreover, the bioweapons most likely to be used are pathogens not routinely seen by health care providers. Medical providers generally are not familiar with the diagnosis and treatment of these disorders and may even fail initially to recognize symptoms. These scenarios underscore the importance of preparing for the possibility of bioterrorism. Our efforts include preparing the medical and public health response to mass casualty events, working to improve our infectious disease surveillance capabilities, managing and securing the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile and investing in necessary research and development to improve our capability to respond to an emergency. Because of the potential for widespread damage a bioterrorist attack could bring, I will focus on what I consider HHS's main priorities as the coordinator of medical assistance and the surveillance efforts CDC would undertake to identify the pathogen used.

  United States. Department of Health and Human Services

  2001
• Radiological Emergency Management

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  This independent study course is intended to provide members of the general public with an overview of several types of radiological emergencies: radiological transportation accidents, nuclear power plant accidents, nuclear terrorism threat, and other radiological hazards. This overview introduces the nature, degree of hazard, and general emergency response strategies associated with each type of emergency. Specific emergency response guidance, such as how to operate radiation detection equipment or how to respond to a radiation incident, is presented in other courses. For optimal results, study this course carefully at your own pace. Learning from these materials is different than learning from a traditional textbook. The course is self-instructional and contains all of the information you need to increase your knowledge of radiological hazards. The course contains a pretest, five units, a final examination and a glossary. You should take the pretest to test your knowledge before you begin studying. You can score the pretest yourself, using the pretest answer key (located after the pretest questions), to determine units requiring additional emphasis. The glossary, located before the final exam, contains definitions of terms related to radiological hazards. The glossary may be consulted while you are reading the units or may be read separately.

  United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency

  2001
• Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS)

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  The Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS) is one of the emergency response resources, or assets, administered by DOE. REAC/TS focuses on providing rapid medical attention to people involved in radiation accidents. REAC/TS is on call 24 hours a day to provide direct or consultative help with medical and health physics problems from local, national, and international incidents. REAC/TS also provides medical support to other DOE emergency response assets. REAC/TS' mission is to maintain an around the clock response center to provide direct support, including deployable equipment and personnel trained and experienced in the treatment of radiation exposure, to assist Federal, state, Tribal and local organizations, and DOE Radiological Emergency Response Assets. REAC/TS provides medical advice, specialized training, and the unique capability of onsite assistance for the treatment of all types of radiation exposure accidents.

  United States. Department of Energy

  2001
• FEMA Fact Sheet: Nuclear Power Plant Emergency

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  Although construction and operation of nuclear power plants are closely monitored and regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, accidents, though unlikely, are possible. The most immediate danger from an accident at a nuclear power plant is exposure to high levels of radiation. Distance, shielding and time are the three ways to minimize risk of exposure. This fact sheet discusses planning and identifies terms to be familiar with in the event of an emergency.

  United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency

  2001
• Chemical Weapons Improved Response Program (CWIRP) Playbook: Guidelines for Responding to and Managing a Chemical Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorist Event

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  This Playbook, one of several products of the Chemical Weapons Improved Response Program (CWIRP) process, serves to identify the key issues that the program studied and provides basic recommendations and guidelines for enhancing response and management of a chemical incident. This document, along with the referenced material in Part VII, provides a comprehensive collection of knowledge of the CWIRP. The Playbook and other referenced documents are designed to build upon the DPP WMD training program awareness and operations training. The issues covered in the Playbook are intended to be applicable to the majority of jurisdictions across the country (large, small, metropolitan, rural). Jurisdictions and agencies using the Playbook to assist in preparation of plans, policies, and procedures for response to a chemical WMD incident are expected to adapt these recommendations to fit their current level of preparedness and staffing.

  U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command

  2001
• Incapacitating Agents: U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense: Chemical Casualty Care Division

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  The U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense (USAMRICD) presentation of incapacitating agents describes the history and definition of incapacitating agents. The series of slides cover representative compounds and glycolate anticholinergics, namely, BZ and Agent 15; moreover, it details its history, physiochemical properties, pharmacokinetics (ADBE), mechanism of action (pharmacodynamics), clinical presentation of casualties and treatment. The term 'incapacitating' is ambiguous. Three definitions are offered here, one of which is specifically applicable. CW agents designed not to injure or kill but to induce disorientation or other temporary effects leading to impaired performance is the definition given for incapacitating agents.

  United States. Department of Defense

  2001
• Product Manager Obscuration and Decontamination Systems

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  This collection of detailed mission statement sheets from specialty branches, covers a wide-range of areas regarding chemical threats. Topics include Product Manager Obscuration and Decontamination Systems; Product Director Detection Systems; Product Director Respiratory Protection Systems; Project Manager NBC Defense Systems, and Product Manager NBC Reconnaissance Systems. Each sheet describes responsibilities, equipment, and capabilities such as the M56 "Coyote" Motorized Smoke Obscurant System, the Light Vehicle Obscuration Smoke System (LVOSS), and the M157 "Lynx" Smoke Generator System.

  United States. Department of Defense

  2001
• Guidelines for Responding to a Chemical Weapons Incident

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  This "Guidelines for Responding to a Chemical Weapons Incident" document has been developed by the Domestic Preparedness Program (DPP). Through the U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM), Chemical Weapons Improved Response Program (CWIRP), members of the Law Enforcement, Health and Safety, and the Emergency Response Functional Groups designed these guidelines with the intent to give assistance to all response personnel in dealing with critical incident management decisions consistent with an actual chemical weapons (CW) emergency response. These guidelines are neither mandated nor required procedures for response to the scene of a chemical terrorism incident. Rather, they are presented to provide technical and operational guidance for those agencies wishing to improve their response and related operations should a CW incident occur in their community. The focus of these guidelines was to validate the procedures and recommendations developed through the series of emergency response technical reports that have already been published by the CWIRP. That validation process was conducted via a forum consisting of representatives from the fire, Emergency Medical Services (EMS), police, and health and safety communities.

  U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command

  2001
• Two Test Methods for Personal Protective Clothing Systems in Chemical Environments

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  Infiltration tests tell us if personal protective clothing (PPC) systems leak. They also show how much leakage occurs when the individual moves around and conducts normal activity. Infiltration tests best apply to fully encapsulating, Level-A, protective systems, because these tests measure overall system leakage and show how long it takes the leakage to infiltrate the system. For fully protective, Level-A systems, the aerosol infiltration test should give a high protection factor, indicating very little leakage. When leakage is small enough, hazards are precluded. MIS tests tell us if leakage creates a toxic hazard to the wearer. MIS tests are best suited for systems that are not fully encapsulating. These protective systems do not provide protection factors as high as Level-A systems. We use MIS tests with these systems to evaluate the toxic hazard associated with using the system in a contaminated environment. For protective systems receiving MIS testing, protection factors are not as large as those for Level A systems, however protection factors should be large enough to reduce toxic hazards to an acceptable level for the given emergency situation.

  U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command

  Fedele, Paul D.

  2001
• U.S.Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense (USAMRICD): Protect, Project, Sustain

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  The mission of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense (USAMRICD) is to preserve combat effectiveness by timely provision of medical countermeasures in response to Joint Service Chemical Warfare Defense Requirements. This mission encompasses fundamental and applied research on the pharmacology, physiology, toxicology, pathology, and biochemistry of chemical warfare (CW) agents and their medical countermeasures. The Institute also researches, as part of its mission, pharmacological countermeasures for biological warfare (BW) agents. Through its research efforts, the Institute builds a science and technology base from which it transitions new pharmaceutical, materiel, and information products for the prevention, diagnosis, treatment, resuscitation, and medical management of casualties in a CW environment. The USAMRICD also provides scientific support for the advanced development and subsequent acquisition of the products of its research, and works with Army combat developers to formulate doctrine on their use. In addition to research, the Institute conducts a clinical training mission. The USAMRICD instructs Department of Defense (DOD) health care providers in the medical management of chemical casualties to save lives, minimize injury, maximize return to duty, and conserve fighting strength.

  United States. Department of Defense

  2001
• Chemical-Warfare Agents: An Overview

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  This presentation gives an overview of various chemical warfare agents and their relevance. Agent characteristics and effects as well as patient presentation and management are among the topics covered. According to chemical agent definition (FM 8-285)a chemical agent is: "A chemical substance...intended for use in military operations to kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate humans (or animals) through its toxicological effect." A compare and contrast is given for chemical agents (chemical warfare agents), biological agents (biological warfare agents) toxins, and "toxicants". Riot control agents are among the excluded agents, as are herbicides and smokes. Among the official chemical agents are toxic agents such as lung damaging agents (choking agents), blood agents (cyanogens), blister agents (vesicants), and nerve agents (anticholinesterases). An overview of the effects of these agents, with diagrams is included.

  United States. Department of Defense

  2001
• Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center: 'Bringing the CB Defense Community Together' A Department of Defense Sponsored Information Analysis Center

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  THE CBIAC is a Department of Defense (DoD)- sponsored Information Analysis Center (IAC) operated under contract to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and administered by the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), under the DoD IAC Program Office (Contract No. SPO700-00-D-3180). The technical scope of the CBIAC has expanded to include the following aspects of Chemical Warfare (CW) and Chemical and Biological Defense (CBD): Analysis of Manufacturing Processes for NBC Defense Systems; Chemical and Physical Properties of CW/CBD Materials; Chemical Identification Combat Effectiveness; Counter Proliferation; Counter Terrorism; Decontamination; Defense Conversion and Dual-User Technology Transfer; Demilitarization; Domestic Preparedness; Environmental Fate and Effects; Force Protection; Individual and Collective Protection; International Technology, Proliferation and Arms Control; Medical Effects and Treatment; Modeling and Simulation; NBC Survivability; Smoke and Obscurants; Toxic Industrial Chemicals and Toxic Industrial Materials; Toxicology; Treaty Verification and Compliance; Warning and Identification. The CBIAC homepage can be found at the following site: www.cbiac.apgea.army.mil/ for further information.

  United States. Department of Defense

  2001
• History of Biological Warfare

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  This document provides a brief history of biological warfare from 1346 to 1992. The use of bacteriological agents in an armed conflict can be dated back to 1346, at Kaffa (now Feodossia) where the bodies of Tartar soldiers who succumbed to the plague were thrown over the walls of the besieged city. It is hypothesized by some medical historians that the action resulted in the infamous pandemic that spread over the entire continent of Europe from Genoa, via the Mediterranean ports. 1710 During the war between Russia and Sweden, Russian troops are said to have used the cadavers of plague victims to provoke an epidemic with the enemy. 1767 The French and Indian War was fought in North America between France and England during the period of 1754- 1767. Both sides relied heavily on the support of Indian allies. The English attacked Ft. Carillon twice and were repulsed with heavy losses. An English general, Sir Jeffery Amherst, surreptitiously provided the Indians loyal to the French with blankets infected with smallpox virus. The resulting epidemic decimated the Indians. Shortly thereafter, General Amherst successfully attacked Ft. Carlillon and renamed it Ft. Ticonderoga. By deduction, the small pox epidemic played a significant role in the victory. The timeline continues with World War I through 1991.

  United States. Department of Defense

  2001
• Biological Agent Information Papers: United States Army Institute of Infectious Diseases

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  This is a collection of informative papers on a range of different biological agents. The papers read almost like a Material Safety Data Sheet for each agent. The following is an index of the different agents described in this document: Anthrax, Botulism, Brucellosis, Cholera, Plague, Q Fever, Ricin Intoxication, Staphylococcal Enterotoxin B Disease, Tricothecene Mycotoxicosis, Tularemia, Variola (Smallpox),and Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis. Each document contains a description of the agent, signs and symptoms, diagnosis, treatment, prophylaxis, decontamination and isolation procedures, and outbreak control.

  United States. Department of Defense

  2001
• Fiscal Year 2001 Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Equipment Program Application (Cities 69-105)

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  The Office of the Assistant Attorney General, Office of Justice Programs (OJP), U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) is providing funds for the purchase of specialized training equipment for fire, emergency medical, hazardous materials response services, and law enforcement agencies as part of the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici (NLD) Domestic Preparedness Program (DPP). These funds represent the equipment component of a broader initiative designed to enhance the response capability of designated cities to respond to acts of terrorism involving the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program was created under Title XIV of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-201, September 23, 1996), which authorized funding for the Department of Defense (DoD) to develop a domestic preparedness training and equipment program. The law directed that the Secretary of Defense act as the interagency lead to develop this program. However, under Sec. 1412(a)(2) and 1415(d)(1) of the legislation, the President was given authority to designate the head of another agency to assume responsibility for carrying out the program on or after October 1, 1999. On April 6, 2000, the President designated the Attorney General to assume programmatic and funding responsibilities for several elements of the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program as of October 1, 2000. Funding was subsequently appropriated for this purpose under the Fiscal Year 2001 Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act (Public Law 106-553). As part of this transfer, direct equipment grant awards are being provided for the procurement of personal protection, detection, and decontamination training equipment. As noted, OJP, under the auspices of the Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support (OSLDPS), will administer these grants.

  United States. Office of Justice Programs. Office for Domestic Preparedness

  2001
• Domestic Preparedness Program: Testing of M90-D1-C Chemical Warfare Agent Detector Against Chemical Warfare Agents: Summary Report

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  This report characterizes the chemical warfare (CW) agent detection potential of the commercially available M90-D1-C Chemical Agent Detector. These detectors were tested against HD, GB, and GA vapor at various conditions. This report is intended to provide the emergency responders concerned with CW agent detection an overview of the detection capabilities of these detectors.

  U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command

  Longworth, Terri L.; Ong, Kwok Y.; Barnhouse, Jacob L.

  2000-12
• Final Report of the Biological Warfare Improved Response Program (BW-IRP): NDPO/DoD Criminal and Epidemiological Investigation Workshop, January 19-21, 2000: to U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM)

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  This report is divided into three primary sections. The first section discusses the process used to arrive at the conclusions in this report. The second section briefly discusses the core issues that drove the discussions among the respective panelists. The final section contains the panelists' conclusions and suggestions to facilitate improved coordination between the law enforcement and the medical/public health communities. The conclusion addresses four key areas: WHAT - What information is necessary for each investigation?; WHO/WHEN - Who gets this information? When should the individual or group get the information?; HOW - Understanding that there are barriers to free exchange of some information, how can the law enforcement and medical/public health communities work to improve the exchange?; DECISIONS - What are the critical decision points in each investigation?. The effective use of all resources during a mass casualty incident will be critical to an efficient and appropriate response. The use of biological agents in a terrorist attack is likely to stretch a jurisdiction's resources to the limit. Both law enforcement and medical/public health communities will be tasked with a variety of duties, including their respective investigations. Accordingly, it is important to maximize the use of all available resources. The Workshop participants were asked to develop a list of the types of information or questions that each group could obtain for the other while conducting their respective investigations. Medical/public health personnel could obtain and provide information from their epidemiological investigation to benefit a criminal investigation. Conversely, the law enforcement community could provide data that would benefit an epidemiological investigation. The identified information may be data that is currently collected or may be additional information that must be collected.

  U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command

  2000-12
• Strategy Essay Competition (2001)

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  The winners of this 20th annual Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Essay Competition join an impressive line of gifted men and women who have made significant academic contributions to U.S. national security. Each year the competition challenges students attending professional military education institutions to analyze key elements of defense strategy and recommend areas in which changes or improvements are needed. As in past years, the winning essays are remarkable for their insight and wisdom. Each author provides fresh ideas and thoughtprovoking suggestions that will stimulate the ongoing debate over defense strategy and priorities during this year of the Quadrennial Defense Review.

  National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies

  2001
• Industrial College of the Armed Forces: Industry Studies 2001: Agribusiness

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  Agribusiness is big business in the United States, representing approximately 15% of the nation's GDP. No longer limited to the family farm, today's agribusiness industry encompasses the spectrum from primary production of commodities through value added transformation of products and finally wholesale and retail distribution to the consumer. Globalization is an important aspect of the industry; technology has led to tremendous increases in productivity and an expanding export sector. To remain vibrant, however, the industry must deal with challenges such as consumer acceptance of GMOs, attention to environmental considerations, and threats such as agroterrorism.

  Industrial College of the Armed Forces (U.S.)

  2001
• Middle East and Persian Gulf

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  U.S. foreign, commercial, security, and defense interests have long been intertwined with the stability of the Middle East region. The collapse of the Arab-Israeli peace process and the current delicate balance in the oil market pose grave concerns, but these developments will not be the main drivers of U.S. strategy and defense policy in the region. The key security issues that will confront the next administration in this region relate to the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, Iraq, Iran, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Dual containment as an effective and enforceable policy has run its course. U.S. foreign, commercial, security, and defense interests have long been intertwined with the stability of the Middle East region. The collapse of the Arab-Israeli peace process and the current delicate balance in the oil market pose grave concerns, but these developments will not be the main drivers of U.S. strategy and defense policy in the region. The key security issues that will confront the next administration in this region relate to the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, Iraq, Iran, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Dual containment as an effective and enforceable policy has run its course. Political change in Iran may come smoothly or violently, but it will not alter a defense strategy based on acquiring a nuclear capability. Regardless of the means, change is unlikely to lead to major reversals in Tehran's foreign and security policies. U.S. policy in the region, including the defeat of Iraq, the liberation of Kuwait, and the successes of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspectors, has achieved impressive results, but it may also be a victim of its success. Ten years after Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait, and 20 years after the Iranian revolution that threatened to disrupt the Gulf by exporting its revolution, the Gulf states are trying to resume the balance of power as it existed more or less before August 2, 1990. This transition paper will examine these issues and discuss options policymakers may want to consider.

  National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies

  Yaphe, Judith Share, 1944-

  2001