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• Trade Preferences: Economic Issues and Policy Options [February 24, 2011]

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  "Since 1974, Congress has created multiple trade preference programs designed to foster economic growth and development in less developed countries. These programs give temporary, non-reciprocal, duty-free U.S. market access to select exports of eligible countries. Congress conducts regular oversight of these programs, often revising and extending them. The 112th Congress may consider two major issues relating to trade preference programs: (1) the expiration of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) on December 31, 2010; and (2) continued extension of the Andean Trade Preference Act beyond February 12, 2010. The 112th Congress may also consider broader reform of the preference programs based on comprehensive reviews in hearings held in both the House and the Senate in the 111th Congress."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Villarreal, M. Angeles; Hornbeck, J. F. (John F.); Jones, Vivian Catherine

  2011-02-24
• Trade Preferences: Economic Issues and Policy Options [January 10, 2013]

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  "Since 1974, Congress has created multiple trade preference programs designed to foster economic growth, reform, and development in less developed countries. These programs give temporary, non-reciprocal, duty-free U.S. market access to select exports of eligible countries. Congress has repeatedly revised and extended these programs. The112th Congress passed extensions to three trade preference programs: (1) the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) which expired on December 31, 2010 and was renewed retroactively from that date to July 31, 2013 (P.L. [Public Law] 112-40); (2) the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) for Colombia and Ecuador until July 31, 2013 (P.L. 112-42); and (3) a 'third-country fabric' provision in the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) until September 30, 2015 (P.L. 112-163). Since the GSP and ATPA programs were only extended until the end of July 2013, Congress may consider further renewal of these programs in the first session of the 113th Congress, along with possible trade preference reform options. Three bills in the 112th Congress, S. 105, S. 1244, and H.R. [House Resolution] 2387, propose a new trade preference program that would provide duty-free and reduced tariff treatment for certain apparel from the Philippines. Other bills in the 112th Congress proposing preference programs include S. 1443, which would provide trade preferences for selected Asian and South Pacific countries."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Jones, Vivian Catherine; Hornbeck, J. F. (John F.); Villarreal, M. Angeles

  2013-01-10
• Trade Preferences: Economic Issues and Policy Options [November 14, 2012]

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  "Since 1974, Congress has created multiple trade preference programs designed to foster economic growth, reform, and development in less developed countries. These programs give temporary, non-reciprocal, duty-free U.S. market access to select exports of eligible countries. Congress has repeatedly revised and extended these programs. The 112th Congress passed extensions to three trade preference programs: (1) the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) which expired on December 31, 2010 and was renewed retroactively from that date to July 31, 2013 (P.L. 112-40); (2) the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) for Colombia and Ecuador until July 31, 2013 (P.L. 112-42); and (3) a 'third-country fabric' provision in the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) until September 30, 2015 (P.L. 112-163). Since the GSP and ATPA programs were only extended until the end of July 2013, Congress may consider further renewal of these programs in the first session of the 113th Congress, along with possible trade preference reform options. Three bills in the 112th Congress, S. 105, S. 1244, and H.R. 2387, propose a new trade preference program that would provide duty-free and reduced tariff treatment for certain apparel from the Philippines. Other bills in the 112th Congress proposing preference programs include S. 1443, which would provide trade preferences for selected Asian and South Pacific countries. […] This report discusses the major U.S. trade preference programs, their possible economic effects, stakeholder interests, and legislative options."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Jones, Vivian Catherine; Hornbeck, J. F. (John F.); Villarreal, M. Angeles

  2012-11-14
• Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP): Implementation and Status [October 19, 2012]

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  "The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) was created by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA; P.L. 110-343) in October 2008. EESA was enacted to address an ongoing financial crisis that reached near-panic proportions in September 2008. The act granted the Secretary of the Treasury authority to either purchase or insure up to $700 billion in troubled assets owned by financial institutions. This authority was granted for up to two years from the date of enactment and was very broad. In particular, the definitions of both 'troubled asset' and 'financial institution' allowed the Secretary wide leeway in deciding what assets might be purchased or guaranteed and what might qualify as a financial firm. [...] This report provides a brief outline of the programs created under TARP, changes made by Congress, and a summary of the current status and estimated costs of the program. It also provides an Appendix that contains detailed discussions of the individual TARP programs. This report will be updated as warranted by market and legislative events."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Webel, Baird

  2012-10-19
• Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation: Background and Analysis [August 24, 2009]

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  "Commercial ties between the United States and the 27-member European Union [EU] are substantial, growing, and mutually beneficial. However, differences in regulatory approaches limit an even more integrated marketplace from developing. To deal with this situation, a variety of government-to-government efforts have been created to dismantle existing regulatory barriers and to prevent new ones from emerging. These efforts fall under the rubric of transatlantic regulatory cooperation (TRC) and are at the heart of today's U.S.-EU economic relationship. This report is intended to serve as an introduction and primer on a complicated, broad, and often highly technical set of issues. Since the mid-1990s, both U.S. and European multinational companies have viewed divergent ways of regulating markets for both goods and services as the most serious barriers to transatlantic commerce. The primary reason why these companies seek to achieve greater harmonization in standards and regulatory procedures is to reduce costs imposed by having to comply with two different sets of regulations and standards."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Ahearn, Raymond J.

  2009-08-24
• Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation: Background and Analysis [October 22, 2008]

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  "Commercial ties between the United States and the 27-member European Union [EU] are substantial, growing, and mutually beneficial. However, differences in regulatory approaches limit an even more integrated marketplace from developing. To deal with this situation, a variety of government-to-government efforts have been created to dismantle existing regulatory barriers and to prevent new ones from emerging. These efforts fall under the rubric of transatlantic regulatory cooperation (TRC) and are at the heart of today's U.S.-EU economic relationship. This report is intended to serve as an introduction and primer on a complicated, broad, and often highly technical set of policy issues. Since the mid-1990s, both U.S. and European multinational companies have viewed divergent ways of regulating markets for both goods and services as the most serious barriers to transatlantic commerce. The primary reason why these companies seek to achieve greater harmonization in standards and regulatory procedures is to reduce costs imposed by complying with two different sets of regulations and standards."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Ahearn, Raymond J.

  2008-10-22
• Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation: A Possible Role for Congress [December 1, 2009]

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  "The United States and the European Union (EU) share a comprehensive, dynamic, and mutually beneficial economic relationship. Transatlantic markets are among the most open in the world and are deeply integrated. The current global economic crisis has begun to have a significant negative impact on the transatlantic economy. Nevertheless, the great stake each side has had in the other's economy affords both sides the ability to withstand each other's current economic downturn. The key measure of the strength of the transatlantic relationship could be the ability of both sides to work with each other to weather the current financial storm. One issue that has worked against a stronger economic relationship is the existence of regulatory barriers that limit an even more integrated market from materializing. The United States and the EU have engaged in a number of attempts to reduce remaining non-tariff and regulatory barriers to trade. In the most recent effort, then President Bush and German Chancellor Merkel, serving as President of the EU, at the April 2007 U.S.-EU Summit agreed to establish the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC). The TEC was directed to 'advance the work of reducing or eliminating non-tariff barriers to transatlantic commerce and trade.' The leaders also created an advisory group to 'provide guidance and direction' to the TEC and invited the U.S. Congress, along with the European Parliament, to accept a new, more substantive role in transatlantic regulatory cooperation by becoming part of the advisory group. The Transatlantic Legislators' Dialogue (TLD) was appointed to represent the legislatures in the TEC advisory group. […]This report provides background and analysis on the TEC process, the role of the Congress, and the TLD. For additional information see CRS [Congressional Research Service] Report RL34717, 'Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation: Background and Analysis', by Raymond J. Ahearn, and CRS Report RL30608, 'EUU. S. Economic Ties: Framework, Scope, and Magnitude', by William H. Cooper."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Ahearn, Raymond J.; Morelli, Vincent L.

  2009-12-01
• Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation: A Possible Role for Congress [November 18, 2009]

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  "The United States and the European Union (EU) share a comprehensive, dynamic, and mutually beneficial economic relationship. Transatlantic markets are among the most open in the world and are deeply integrated. The current global economic crisis has begun to have a significant negative impact on the transatlantic economy. Nevertheless, the great stake each side has had in the other's economy affords both sides the ability to withstand each other's current economic downturn. The key measure of the strength of the transatlantic relationship could be the ability of both sides to work with each other to weather the current financial storm. One issue that has worked against a stronger economic relationship is the existence of regulatory barriers that limit an even more integrated market from materializing. The United States and the EU have engaged in a number of attempts to reduce remaining non-tariff and regulatory barriers to trade. In the most recent effort, then President Bush and German Chancellor Merkel, serving as President of the EU, at the April 2007 U.S.-EU Summit agreed to establish the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC). The TEC was directed to 'advance the work of reducing or eliminating non-tariff barriers to transatlantic commerce and trade.' The leaders also created an advisory group to 'provide guidance and direction' to the TEC and invited the U.S. Congress, along with the European Parliament, to accept a new, more substantive role in transatlantic regulatory cooperation by becoming part of the advisory group. The Transatlantic Legislators' Dialogue (TLD) was appointed to represent the legislatures in the TEC advisory group. […]This report provides background and analysis on the TEC process, the role of the Congress, and the TLD. For additional information see CRS [Congressional Research Service] Report RL34717, 'Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation: Background and Analysis', by Raymond J. Ahearn, and CRS Report RL30608, 'EUU. S. Economic Ties: Framework, Scope, and Magnitude', by William H. Cooper."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Ahearn, Raymond J.; Morelli, Vincent L.

  2009-11-18
• Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation: A Possible Role for Congress [August 25, 2009]

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  "The United States and the European Union (EU) share a comprehensive, dynamic, and mutually beneficial economic relationship. Transatlantic markets are among the most open in the world and are deeply integrated. The current global economic crisis has begun to have a significant negative impact on the transatlantic economy. Nevertheless, the great stake each side has had in the other's economy affords both sides the ability to withstand each other's current economic downturn. The key measure of the strength of the transatlantic relationship could be the ability of both sides to work with each other to weather the current financial storm. One issue that has worked against a stronger economic relationship is the existence of regulatory barriers that limit an even more integrated market from materializing. The United States and the EU have engaged in a number of attempts to reduce remaining non-tariff and regulatory barriers to trade. In the most recent effort, then President Bush and German Chancellor Merkel, serving as President of the EU, at the April 2007 U.S.-EU Summit agreed to establish the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC). The TEC was directed to 'advance the work of reducing or eliminating non-tariff barriers to transatlantic commerce and trade.' The leaders also created an advisory group to 'provide guidance and direction' to the TEC and invited the U.S. Congress, along with the European Parliament, to accept a new, more substantive role in transatlantic regulatory cooperation by becoming part of the advisory group. The Transatlantic Legislators' Dialogue (TLD) was appointed to represent the legislatures in the TEC advisory group. […]This report provides background and analysis on the TEC process, the role of the Congress, and the TLD. For additional information see CRS [Congressional Research Service] Report RL34717, 'Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation: Background and Analysis', by Raymond J. Ahearn, and CRS Report RL30608, 'EUU. S. Economic Ties: Framework, Scope, and Magnitude', by William H. Cooper."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Ahearn, Raymond J.; Morelli, Vincent L.

  2009-08-25
• Trade Promotion Authority (Fast-Track Authority for Trade Agreements): Background and Developments in the 107th Congress [Updated April 10, 2002]

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  "One of the major trade issues in the 107th Congress is whether or not Congress approves trade promotion authority (formerly called fast-track authority) for the President to negotiate trade agreements with expedited procedures for implementing legislation. Under this authority, Congress agrees to consider legislation to implement the trade agreements (usually nontariff trade agreements) under a procedure with mandatory deadlines, no amendment, and limited debate. The President is required to consult with congressional committees during negotiation and notify Congress before entering into an agreement. The President was granted this authority almost continuously from 1974 to 1994, but the authority lapsed and has not been renewed. A major issue has been the role of labor and the environment as objectives in trade agreements. Differences have been largely along party lines. […] In a speech on April 4, the President called for the Senate to bring TPA [Trade Promotion Authority] legislation to the floor by April 22. Days later, Senate Majority Leader Daschle said that the Senate would not meet that deadline but might consider the bill before the Memorial Day recess. In an address on February 12, 2002, Senate Finance Committee Chairman Baucus said that trade adjustment assistance would be considered in the Senate together with fast-track (TPA), Andean trade preferences, and the Generalized System of Preferences. On December 18, 2001, the Senate Finance Committee ordered H.R. 3005 to be reported with an amendment in the nature of a substitute. On December 12, the Committee had marked up the bill and had approved it subject to further amendment on an 18-3 vote. The House approved TPA bill H.R. 3005 along party lines by a vote of 215-214, on December 6, 2001."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Sek, Lenore

  2002-04-10
• Trade Preferences for Developing Countries and the WTO [Updated September 25, 2006]

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  "World Trade Organization (WTO) Members must grant immediate and unconditional most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment to the products of other Members with respect to tariffs and other trade-related measures. Programs such as the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), under which developed countries grant preferential tariff rates to developing country products, are facially inconsistent with this obligation because they accord goods of some countries more favorable tariff treatment than that accorded to goods of other WTO Members. Because such programs have been viewed as trade-expanding, however, Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) provided a legal basis for one-way tariff preferences and certain other preferential arrangements in a 1979 decision known as the Enabling Clause. In 2004, the WTO Appellate Body ruled that the Clause allows developed countries to offer different treatment to developing countries, but only if identical treatment is available to all similarly situated GSP beneficiaries. Where WTO Members' preference programs have provided expanded benefits, the WTO has on occasion waived Members' WTO obligations. A number of trade preference bills have been introduced in the 109th Congress, including proposed extensions of the GSP and Andean preference programs, each of which is set to expire in 2006. Among these are H.R. 5070, which would extend the GSP and Andean preferences for one year and expand and extend textile benefits under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA); H.R. 6076 and S. 3904, which would extend until 2008 the GSP, Andean preferences, and a third-country fabric provision for lesser-developed beneficiaries expiring in 2007; and H.R. 6142, which would extend the GSP and the AGOA third-country fabric provision until 2008 and expand textile and apparel benefits for Haiti. This report will be updated."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Grimmett, Jeanne J.

  2006-09-25
• Trade Preferences for Developing Countries and the WTO [Updated January 8, 2007]

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  "World Trade Organization (WTO) Members must grant immediate and unconditional most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment to the products of other Members with respect to tariffs and other trade-related measures. Programs such as the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), under which developed countries grant preferential tariff rates to developing country products, are facially inconsistent with this obligation because they accord goods of some countries more favorable tariff treatment than that accorded to goods of other WTO Members. Because such programs have been viewed as trade-expanding, however, Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) provided a legal basis for one-way tariff preferences and certain other preferential arrangements in a 1979 decision known as the Enabling Clause. In 2004, the WTO Appellate Body ruled that the Clause allows developed countries to offer different treatment to developing countries in a GSP program, but only if identical treatment is available to all similarly situated GSP beneficiaries. Where WTO Members' preference programs have provided expanded benefits, Members (including the United States) have in many instances obtained WTO waivers. With the GSP and Andean preference programs set to expire at the end of 2006, Congress enacted legislation in December 2006 (P.L. 109-432) extending the GSP for two years and extending Andean preferences until June 30, 2007, with the possibility of conditional extension thereafter. The statute also extends until September 30, 2012, with amendments, a provision in the African Growth and Opportunity Act allowing lesserdeveloped beneficiary countries to receive duty-free benefits for apparel made with third country fabric or yarn and expands textile and apparel benefits for Haiti. This report will be updated."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Grimmett, Jeanne J.

  2007-01-08
• Trade Preferences for Developing Countries and the WTO [Updated January 18, 2007]

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  "World Trade Organization (WTO) Members must grant immediate and unconditional most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment to the products of other Members with respect to tariffs and other trade-related measures. Programs such as the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), under which developed countries grant preferential tariff rates to developing country products, are facially inconsistent with this obligation because they accord goods of some countries more favorable tariff treatment than that accorded to goods of other WTO Members. Because such programs have been viewed as trade-expanding, however, Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) provided a legal basis for one-way tariff preferences and certain other preferential arrangements in a 1979 decision known as the Enabling Clause. In 2004, the WTO Appellate Body ruled that the Clause allows developed countries to offer different treatment to developing countries in a GSP program, but only if identical treatment is available to all similarly situated GSP beneficiaries. Where WTO Members' preference programs have provided expanded benefits, Members, including the United States, have in many instances obtained WTO waivers. With the GSP and Andean preference programs expiring at the end of 2006, Congress enacted legislation late in the 109th Congress (P.L. 109-432) extending the GSP for two years and extending Andean preferences until June 30, 2007, with conditional extension thereafter. The new statute also extends a third-country fabric provision in the African Growth and Opportunity Act and expands textile benefits for Haiti. As the GSP and Andean programs are now set to expire within the next two years, Congress may consider these programs as well as other preference proposals in the 110th Congress. This report will be updated."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Grimmett, Jeanne J.

  2007-01-18
• Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Issues for Congress [January 24, 2013]

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  "The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a potential free trade agreement (FTA) among 11, and perhaps more, countries. The United States and 10 other countries of the Asia-Pacific region-- Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam--are negotiating the text of the FTA. Canada and Mexico participated for the first time in the Auckland round of negotiations in December 2012, and Japan and Thailand are also considering the possibility of joining. With 29 chapters under negotiation, the TPP partners envision the agreement to be 'comprehensive and high-standard,' in that they seek to eliminate tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade in goods, services, and agriculture, and to establish rules on a wide range of issues including foreign direct investment and other economic activities. They also strive to create a '21st-century agreement' that addresses new and cross-cutting issues presented by an increasingly globalized economy. […] This report examines the issues related to the proposed TPP, the state and substance of the negotiations (to the degree that the information is publically available), the specific areas under negotiation, the policy and economic contexts in which the TPP would fit, and the issues for Congress that the TPP presents. The report will be revised and updated as events warrant."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Williams, Brock R.; Jurenas, Remy; Cooper, William H., 1949- . . .

  2013-01-24
• Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Issues for Congress [November 21, 2012]

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  "The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a potential free trade agreement (FTA) among 11, and perhaps more, countries. The United States and eight other countries of the Asia-Pacific region-- Australia, Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam--are negotiating the text of the FTA. Canada and Mexico will join the negotiations in the fall of 2012, and Japan and Thailand are also considering the possibility of joining. With 29 chapters under negotiation, the TPP partners envision the agreement to be 'comprehensive and high-standard,' in that they seek to eliminate tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade in goods, services, and agriculture, and to establish rules on a wide range of issues including foreign direct investment and other economic activities. They also strive to create a '21st-century agreement' that addresses new and crosscutting issues presented by an increasingly globalized economy. The TPP draws congressional interest on a number of fronts. Congress would have to approve implementing legislation for U.S. commitments under the agreement to enter into force. In addition, under long-established executive-legislative practice, the Administration notifies and consults with congressional leaders, before, during, and after trade agreements have been negotiated. Furthermore, the TPP will likely affect a range of sectors and regions of the U.S. economy of direct interest to Members of Congress and could influence the shape and path of U.S. trade policy for the foreseeable future. This report examines the issues related to the proposed TPP, the state and substance of the negotiations (to the degree that the information is publically available), the specific areas under negotiation, the policy and economic contexts in which the TPP would fit, and the issues for Congress that the TPP presents. The report will be revised and updated as events warrant."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Fergusson, Ian F.; Cooper, William H., 1949-; Jurenas, Remy

  2012-11-21
• Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations [January 17, 2012]

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  "Congress has an active role to play in shaping and overseeing U.S. relations with Turkey, and several Turkish domestic and foreign policy issues have significant relevance for U.S. interests. This report provides background information on Turkey and discusses possible policy options for Members of Congress and the Obama Administration. U.S. relations with Turkey--a longtime North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ally--have evolved over time as global challenges to U.S. interests have changed. Turkey's economic dynamism and geopolitical importance--it straddles Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia and now has the world's 16th-largest economy--have increased its influence regionally and globally. Although Turkey still depends on the United States and other NATO allies for political and strategic support, growing economic diversification and military self-reliance allows Turkey to exercise greater leverage with the West. These trends have helped fuel continuing Turkish political transformation led in the past decade by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which has Islamist roots. Future domestic political developments may determine how Turkey reconciles respect for democratic views that favor Turkish nationalism and traditional Sunni Muslim values with protection of individual freedoms, minority rights, rule of law, and the principle of secular governance. Debate on issues such as the status of Turkey's ethnic Kurdish population, the civil-military balance, the role of religion in public life, and heightened concern over press freedom could coalesce in 2012 around a proposal for a new constitution. Congressional interest in Turkey is high with respect to the following issues: [1] Addressing ongoing change in the Middle East by coordinating policies and using Turkey's regional example to influence political outcomes in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere; counter Iranian influence; and preserve stability; [2] The decline in Israel-Turkey relations and how that might affect U.S.-Turkey defense cooperation, including arms sales to counter the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization; and [3] A potential congressional resolution or presidential statement on the possible genocide of Armenian"

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Zanotti, Jim

  2012-01-17
• Terrorism, the Future, and U.S. Foreign Policy [December 17, 2001]

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  "International terrorism has long been recognized as a foreign and domestic security threat. The tragic events of September 11 in New York, the Washington, D.C., area, and Pennsylvania have dramatically re-energized the nation's focus and resolve on terrorism. This issue brief examines international terrorist actions and threats and the U.S. policy response. Available policy options range from diplomacy, international cooperation and constructive engagement to economic sanctions, covert action, physical security enhancement, and military force. The September 11th terrorist incidents in the United States, the subsequent anthrax attacks, as well as bombings of the U.S.S. Cole, Oklahoma City, World Trade Center in 1993, and the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, have brought the issue of terrorism to the forefront of American public interest. Questions relate to whether U.S. policy and organizational mechanisms are adequate to deal with both state sponsored or abetted terrorism and that undertaken by independent groups. Formal definitions of terrorism do not include terrorist activity for financial profit or terrorists motivated by religious goals. Non-traditional harm such as computer 'violence' may not be included as well. Such activity may well be on the rise."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Perl, Raphael

  2001-12-17
• Terrorism, the Future, and U.S. Foreign Policy [April 11, 2003]

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  "International terrorism has long been recognized as a foreign and domestic security threat. The tragic events of September 11 in New York, the Washington, D.C., area, and Pennsylvania have dramatically re-energized the nation's focus and resolve on terrorism. This issue brief examines international terrorist actions and threats and the U.S. policy response. Available policy options range from diplomacy, international cooperation, and constructive engagement to economic sanctions, covert action, physical security enhancement, and military force. The September 11th terrorist incidents in the United States, the subsequent anthrax attacks, as well as bombings of the U.S.S. Cole, Oklahoma City, World Trade Center in 1993, and of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, have brought the issue of terrorism to the forefront of American public interest. Questions relate to whether U.S. policy and organizational mechanisms are adequate to deal with both state-sponsored or -abetted terrorism and that undertaken by independent groups. Terrorist activities supported by sophisticated planning and logistics as well as possible access to unconventional weaponry raise a host of new issues. Some analysts' long-held belief that a comprehensive review of U.S. counterterrorism policy, organizational structure, and intelligence capabilities is needed has now become a mainstream view. […]The Department of State's 'Annual Patterns of Global Terrorism', 2002 report is expected to be released at the end of April. The annual report to Congress provides a snapshot of international terrorism related activity and trends during the previous calendar year as well as background on terrorist organizations and the terrorism situation in various countries. The report is also expected to describe efforts to counter Al Qaeda and other international terrorist groups as well as the U.S. efforts to respond to state sponsors of terrorism. In a meeting with reporters on April 9, Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge expressed concern over the danger of surface to air missiles to commercial aviation and suggested the federal government may have to pay for the installation of anti-missile devises on commercial aircraft.. The Secretary's remarks come in the wake of rising calls for stricter international efforts aimed at regulation and accountability of 'shoulder fired' missiles, of which as many as 700,000 may exist. (See CRS [Congressional Research Service] Report RL31741.)"

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Perl, Raphael

  2003-04-11
• Terrorism, the Future, and U.S. Foreign Policy [March 6, 2003]

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  "International terrorism has long been recognized as a foreign and domestic security threat. The tragic events of September 11 in New York, the Washington, D.C., area, and Pennsylvania have dramatically re-energized the nation's focus and resolve on terrorism. This issue brief examines international terrorist actions and threats and the U.S. policy response. Available policy options range from diplomacy, international cooperation, and constructive engagement to economic sanctions, covert action, physical security enhancement, and military force. The September 11th terrorist incidents in the United States, the subsequent anthrax attacks, as well as bombings of the U.S.S. Cole, Oklahoma City, World Trade Center in 1993, and of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, have brought the issue of terrorism to the forefront of American public interest. Questions relate to whether U.S. policy and organizational mechanisms are adequate to deal with both state-sponsored or -abetted terrorism and that undertaken by independent groups. Terrorist activities supported by sophisticated planning and logistics as well as possible access to unconventional weaponry raise a host of new issues. Some analysts' long-held belief that a comprehensive review of U.S. counterterrorism policy, organizational structure, and intelligence capabilities is needed has now become a mainstream view. U.S. policy toward international terrorism contains a significant military component, reflected in current U.S. operations in Afghanistan and (on a smaller scale) the Philippines and in planned deployments of U.S. forces to Yemen and the former Soviet republic of Georgia. President Bush has expressed a willingness to provide military aid to 'governments everywhere' in the fight against terrorism. Important issues for Congress include whether the Administration is providing sufficient information about the long-term goals and costs of its military strategy and whether military force is necessarily an effective anti-terrorism instrument in some circumstances."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Perl, Raphael

  2003-03-06
• Terrorism, the Future, and U.S. Foreign Policy [January 8, 2003]

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  "International terrorism has long been recognized as a foreign and domestic security threat. The tragic events of September 11 in New York, the Washington, D.C., area, and Pennsylvania have dramatically re-energized the nation's focus and resolve on terrorism. This issue brief examines international terrorist actions and threats and the U.S. policy response. Available policy options range from diplomacy, international cooperation, and constructive engagement to economic sanctions, covert action, physical security enhancement, and military force. The September 11th terrorist incidents in the United States, the subsequent anthrax attacks, as well as bombings of the U.S.S. Cole, Oklahoma City, World Trade Center in 1993, and of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, have brought the issue of terrorism to the forefront of American public interest. Questions relate to whether U.S. policy and organizational mechanisms are adequate to deal with both state-sponsored or -abetted terrorism and that undertaken by independent groups. Terrorist activities supported by sophisticated planning and logistics as well as possible access to unconventional weaponry raise a host of new issues. Some analysts' long-held belief that a comprehensive review of U.S. counterterrorism policy, organizational structure, and intelligence capabilities is needed has now become a mainstream view."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Perl, Raphael; Lee, Rensselaer W., 1937-

  2003-01-08
• Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) and the Role of Congress in Trade Policy [April 7, 2011]

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  "On July 1, 2007, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA--previously fast track), expired. TPA is the authority Congress grants to the President to enter into certain reciprocal (free) trade agreements (FTAs), and to have their implementing bills considered under expedited legislative procedures, provided he observes certain statutory obligations in negotiating them. TPA defines how Congress has chosen to exercise its constitutional authority over a particular aspect of trade policy, while presumably giving the President added leverage to exercise his authority to negotiate trade agreements by effectively assuring U.S. trade partners that final agreements will be given swift and unamended consideration. [...] The prospects for renewing TPA are unclear and depend on one's perspective as to whether having TPA in place benefits the U.S. negotiation position. Technically, TPA is not necessary to begin or even conclude trade negotiations, but it is widely understood to be a key element of getting a trade implementing bill passed in Congress, and so its renewal can be construed as signaling U.S. support for moving ahead with trade negotiations. When Congress decides to consider the issue, it has many options including: take no action; extend temporarily; revise and renew; grant permanent authority; or devise some hybrid solution. How this issue plays out depends on a host of political and economic variables, including congressional action on restoring a 'political compact' that sits at the center of a well functioning TPA process."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Hornbeck, J. F. (John F.); Cooper, William H., 1949-

  2011-04-07
• Transportation Security: Issues for the 113th Congress [January 11, 2013]

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  "The nation's air, land, and marine transportation systems are designed for accessibility and efficiency, two characteristics that make them highly vulnerable to terrorist attack. While hardening the transportation sector from terrorist attack is difficult, measures can be taken to deter terrorists. The dilemma facing Congress is how best to construct and finance a system of deterrence, protection, and response that effectively reduces the possibility and consequences of another terrorist attack without unduly interfering with travel, commerce, and civil liberties. Aviation security has been a major focus of transportation security policy following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In the aftermath of these attacks, the 107th Congress moved quickly to pass the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA; P.L. [Public Law] 107-71) creating the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and mandating a federalized workforce of security screeners to inspect airline passengers and their baggage."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Peterman, David Randall; Elias, Bartholomew; Frittelli, John

  2013-01-11
• Terrorism Risk Insurance: Issue Analysis and Overview of Current Program [February 26, 2013]

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  "Prior to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, insurance coverage for losses from such attacks was normally included in general insurance policies without specific cost to the policyholders. Following the attacks, such coverage became very expensive if insurers offered it at all. Because insurance is required for a variety of economic transactions, it was feared that the absence of insurance against terrorism loss would have a wider economic impact. Private terrorism insurance was largely unavailable for most of 2002, and some have argued that this adversely affected parts of the economy. Congress responded to the disruption in the terrorism insurance market by passing the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA; P.L. [Public Law] 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322). TRIA created a temporary three-year Terrorism Insurance Program in which the government would share some of the losses with private insurers should a foreign terrorist attack occur. This program was extended in 2005 (P.L. 109-144, 119 Stat. 2660) and 2007 (P.L. 110-160, 121 Stat. 1839). The amount of government loss sharing depends on the size of the insured loss. In general terms, for a relatively small loss, private industry covers the entire loss. For a medium-sized loss, the federal role is to spread the loss over time and over the entire insurance industry; the government assists insurers initially but then recoups the payments through a broad levy on insurers afterwards. For a large loss, the federal government would cover most of the losses, although recoupment is possible in these circumstances as well. Insurers are required to make terrorism coverage available to commercial policyholders, but TRIA does not require policyholders to purchase terrorism coverage. The prospective government share of losses has been reduced over time compared with the initial act, but the 2007 reauthorization expanded the program to cover losses stemming from acts of domestic terrorism. The TRIA program is currently slated to expire at the end of 2014."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Webel, Baird

  2013-02-26
• Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) and the Role of Congress in Trade Policy [August 2, 2013]

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  "On July 1, 2007, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA--previously known as fast track) expired. TPA is the authority Congress grants to the President to enter into certain reciprocal trade agreements, and to have their implementing bills considered under expedited legislative procedures, provided the President observes certain statutory obligations. TPA defines how Congress has chosen to exercise its constitutional authority over a particular aspect of trade policy, while giving the President added leverage to negotiate trade agreements by effectively assuring U.S. trade partners that final agreements will be given timely and unamended consideration. Members of Congress have advocated for renewal of TPA and on July 30, 2013, President Obama requested in a speech that Congress provide this renewed authority in light of four trade agreements currently being negotiated: 1) the multilateral Doha Development Round of the World Trade Organization (WTO); 2) the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); 3) the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP); and 4) the Trade in Services Agreement (TISA). President Obama also linked renewal of TPA and trade adjustment assistance (TAA) programs, which are scheduled to expire on December 31, 2013. […] Although there appears to be support for renewal of TPA in Congress, the details of the legislation are likely to be subject to considerable debate, including the specific treatment of any related TAA program reauthorization. This report presents background and analysis on the development of TPA, a summary of the major provisions under the expired authority, and a discussion of the issues that have arisen in the debate over TPA renewal. It also explores some of the policy options available to Congress."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Hornbeck, J. F. (John F.); Cooper, William H., 1949-

  2013-08-02
• Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) and Its Role in U.S. Trade Policy [August 5, 2013]

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  "When Congress passed the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) of 1934, it reflected an important transition in national trade policy away from 'protectionism' toward greater 'trade liberalization.' This shift continues to be the dominant, but hardly uncontested, trade policy of the United States. The substantial national gains from trade have long been recognized, yet trade liberalizing legislation often faces strong political opposition because related costs, although much smaller, affect a vocal and concentrated constituency. Congress first addressed this inherent tension with legislation that allowed higher tariffs and other trade barriers to be reimposed when domestic industries were threatened or hurt by imports. In 1962, however, Congress adopted an additional approach by providing trade adjustment assistance (TAA) directly to trade-affected firms and workers. It remains a much-debated, but enduring pillar of U.S. trade policy today. TAA program authorizations are scheduled to expire on December 31, 2013, and the Trade Adjustment Assistance Extension Act of 2013 (S. 1357) would extend them through 2020. President Obama also has supported TAA reauthorization, linking it to renewal of Trade Promotion Authority (TPA). This report discusses the role of TAA in U.S. trade policy, from its inception as a legislative option in the early 1950s, to its core role as a cornerstone of modern trade policy that many argue has served to promote the long-term U.S. trade liberalization agenda. It will also consider the extent to which TAA has been linked to both renewal of trade agreements authority (now TPA) and trade agreement implementing legislation. Understanding the origins of TAA, the historical economic and congressional debate, and legislative options considered by Congress over the past 50 years may help inform the recurring discussion on TAA reauthorization."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Hornbeck, J. F. (John F.)

  2013-08-05
• Transportation Security: Issues for the 109th Congress [December 7, 2005]

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  "The nation's air, land, and marine transportation systems are designed for accessibility and efficiency, two characteristics that make them highly vulnerable to terrorist attack. While hardening the transportation sector from terrorist attack is difficult, reasonable measures can be taken to deter terrorists. The focus of this issue brief is how best to construct and finance a system of deterrence, protection, and response that effectively reduces the possibility and consequences of another terrorist attack without unduly interfering with travel, commerce, and civil liberties. Aviation security has been a major focus of transportation security policy following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In the aftermath of these attacks, the 107th Congress moved quickly to pass the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA; P.L. 107-71) creating the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and mandating a federalized workforce of security screeners to inspect airline passengers and their baggage. The act gave the TSA broad authority to assess vulnerabilities in aviation security and take steps to mitigate these risks. The TSA's progress on aviation security has been the subject of considerable congressional oversight over the past four years. Aviation security policy and programs continue to be of considerable interest in the 109th Congress. The July 2005 bombing of trains in London and the bombings of commuter trains and subway trains in Madrid and Moscow in 2004 highlighted the vulnerability of passenger rail systems to terrorist attacks. The volume of ridership and number of access points make it impractical to subject all rail passengers to the type of screening airline passengers undergo. Nevertheless, there are prudent steps that can be taken to reduce the risks, and consequences, of an attack. These include vulnerability assessments; emergency planning; and emergency response training and drilling of transit personnel, ideally in coordination with police, fire, and emergency medical personnel, as well as purchase of communication and safety equipment. Additional options include increasing the number of transit security personnel, installing video surveillance equipment in vehicles and stations, and conducting random inspections of platforms and trains using bomb-sniffing dogs."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Frittelli, John

  2005-12-07
• Trade Promotion Authority (Fast-Track Authority for Trade Agreements): Background and Developments in the 107th Congress [Updated June 24, 2002]

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  "One of the major trade issues in the 107th Congress is whether or not Congress approves trade promotion authority (formerly called fast-track authority) for the President to negotiate trade agreements with expedited procedures for implementing legislation. Under this authority, Congress agrees to consider legislation to implement the trade agreements (usually nontariff trade agreements) under a procedure with mandatory deadlines, no amendment, and limited debate. The President is required to consult with congressional committees during negotiation and notify Congress at major stages. The President was granted this authority almost continuously from 1974 to 1994, but the authority lapsed and has not been renewed. […] On June 19, 2002, the House Rules Committee reported out a rule (H.Res. 450) recommended by Ways and Means Committee Chairman Thomas for consideration of the Senate-passed TPA [Trade Promotion Authority] bill (H.R. 3009). On May 23, 2002, the Senate passed comprehensive trade bill H.R. 3009 by a 66-30 vote. Title XXI of H.R. 3009 includes TPA provisions similar, but not identical, to the House-approved TPA provisions. The House approved TPA bill H.R. 3005 along party lines by a vote of 215-214, on December 6, 2001."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Sek, Lenore

  2002-06-24
• Trade Promotion Authority (Fast-Track Authority for Trade Agreements): Background and Developments in the 107th Congress [Updated February 15, 2002]

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  "One of the major trade issues in the 107th Congress is whether or not Congress approves trade promotion authority (formerly called fast-track authority) for the President to negotiate trade agreements with expedited procedures for implementing legislation. Under this authority, Congress agrees to consider legislation to implement the trade agreements (usually nontariff trade agreements) under a procedure with mandatory deadlines, no amendment, and limited debate. The President is required to consult with congressional committees during negotiation and notify Congress before entering into an agreement. The President was granted this authority almost continuously from 1974 to 1994, but the authority lapsed and has not been renewed. A major issue has been the role of labor and the environment as objectives in trade agreements. Differences have been largely along party lines. […] In an address on February 12, 2002, Senate Finance Committee Chairman Baucus said that trade adjustment assistance would be considered in the Senate together with fast-track (TPA [Trade Promotion Authority]), Andean trade preferences, and the Generalized System of Preferences. On December 18, 2001, the Senate Finance Committee ordered H.R. 3005 to be reported with an amendment in the nature of a substitute. On December 12, the Committee had marked up the bill and had approved it subject to further amendment on an 18-3 vote. The House approved TPA bill H.R. 3005 along party lines by a vote of 215-214, on December 6, 2001."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Sek, Lenore

  2002-02-15
• Trade Promotion Authority (Fast-Track Authority for Trade Agreements): Background and Developments in the 107th Congress [Updated January 18, 2002]

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  "One of the major trade issues in the 107th Congress is whether or not Congress approves trade promotion authority (formerly called fast-track authority) for the President to negotiate trade agreements with expedited procedures for implementing legislation. Under this authority, Congress agrees to consider legislation to implement the trade agreements (usually nontariff trade agreements) under a procedure with mandatory deadlines, no amendment, and limited debate. The President is required to consult with congressional committees during negotiation and notify Congress before entering into an agreement. The President was granted this authority almost continuously from 1974 to 1994, but the authority lapsed and has not been renewed. A major issue has been the role of labor and the environment as objectives in trade agreements. Differences have been largely along party lines. […] On December 18, the Senate Finance Committee ordered H.R. 3005 to be reported with an amendment in the nature of a substitute. Full Senate action is expected early in the second session. A week earlier (December 12), the Committee had marked up the bill and had approved it subject to further amendment on an 18-3 vote. The House approved TPA [Trade Promotion Authority] bill H.R. 3005 along party lines by a vote of 215-214, on December 6, 2001."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Sek, Lenore

  2002-01-18
• Trade Promotion Authority (Fast-Track Authority for Trade Agreements): Background and Developments in the 107th Congress [Updated July 26, 2002]

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  "One of the major trade issues in the 107th Congress is whether or not Congress approves trade promotion authority (formerly called fast-track authority) for the President to negotiate trade agreements with expedited procedures for implementing legislation. Under this authority, Congress agrees to consider legislation to implement the trade agreements (usually nontariff trade agreements) under a procedure with mandatory deadlines, no amendment, and limited debate. The President is required to consult with congressional committees during negotiation and notify Congress before entering into an agreement. The President was granted this authority almost continuously from 1974 to 1994, but the authority lapsed and has not been renewed. A major issue has been the role of labor and the environment as objectives in trade agreements. Differences have been largely along party lines. […] According to the press reports on July 26, 2002, conferees reached agreement on a conference report late July 25. It is possible that the House might vote on the conference report on July 25 or 26, and that the Senate might vote during the week of July 29. For more information on topics covered in the conference report, see the following CRS [Congressional Research Service] products: CRS Report 97-817 (agriculture); CRS Report RL31450 (Andean trade preferences);CRS Report RS21078 (trade adjustment assistance); CRS Report RL31178 (labor issues); CRS Report RL31192 (expedited procedures); and CRS Report 97-389 (Generalized System of Preferences). On June 19, 2002, the House Rules Committee reported out a rule (H.Res. 450) recommended by Ways and Means Committee Chairman Thomas for consideration of the Senate-passed TPA [Trade Promotion Authority] bill (H.R. 3009). The House approved H.Res. 450 on June 26 by a vote of 216-215. On May 23, 2002, the Senate passed comprehensive trade bill H.R. 3009 by a 66-30 vote. Title XXI of H.R. 3009 includes TPA provisions similar, but not identical, to the House-approved TPA provisions. The House approved TPA bill H.R. 3005 along party lines by a vote of 215-214, on December 6, 2001."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Sek, Lenore

  2002-07-26