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Industrial Security Regulation
This regulation is issued under the authority of Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 5220.22, "DoD Industrial Security Program," December 8, 1980. Its purpose is to prescribe uniform procedures that ensure the safeguard and protection of classified information made available to industry. The provisions of this regulation apply to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Military Departments and the DoD Agencies (hereafter referred to collectively as "DoD Components"), and to other federal agencies.
United States. Department of Defense
1985-12-04
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Weaknesses in Screening Entrants into the United States: Statement of Robert J. Cramer, Managing Director Office of Special Investigations: Testimony Before the Committee on Finance United States Senate
This is the testimony of Robert J. Cramer before the Senate Committee on Finance. Mr. Cramer describes how easy it is to enter into the United States with fake documents: "In summary, we created fictitious driver's licenses and birth certificates using off-the-shelf computer graphic software that is available to any purchaser. In addition, we obtained and carried credit cards in the fictitious names that were used in these tests. Our agents entered the United States from Canada, Mexico, and Jamaica through ports of entry using fictitious names and these counterfeit identification documents. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and U.S. Customs Service officials never questioned the authenticity of the counterfeit documents, and our agents encountered no difficulty entering the country using them. On two occasions, INS officials did not ask for or inspect any identification documents when our agents entered the United States. On another occasion an agent was able to walk across a major border checkpoint and was not stopped or inspected by any government official."
United States. General Accounting Office
2003-01-30
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Report of the International Workshop on Technology Opportunities for Increasing the Proliferation Resistance of Global Civilian Nuclear Power Systems (TOPS)
The Office of Nuclear Energy, Science, and Technology (NE) has established a task force under the Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee (NERAC) to identify near- and long-term technical opportunities to further increase the proliferation resistance of global nuclear power systems (TOPS) and to recommend specific research areas. The TOPS Task Force (Appendix A) was asked to call upon experts and hold, as needed, a series of workshops to analyze technologies and research issues. Accordingly, a TOPS International Workshop was held on March 29-30, 2000 in Washington, D.C. to help identify the: Key factors or attributes to evaluate technology R&D opportunities, most important opportunities for relevant near- and long-term research, and areas where international collaboration can be most productive. This report contains the results of that workshop.
United States. Department of Energy
2000-03-29
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Request for Information on Near Term Deployment of Nuclear Energy Plants in the U.S.
This Request For Information (RFI) seeks input on nuclear plants that can be deployed and achieve commercial operational status in the United States by end of year (EOY) 2010. This RFI is intended to solicit responses from reactor manufacturers, architect-engineering companies (A/Es), nuclear plant owners and operating companies, energy policy experts, and others in government, industry or academia with information or views on the conditions necessary for nuclear plant orders, construction and operation by 2010. It also seeks information on any known technological, regulatory, and institutional gaps between the
current state of the art and the necessary conditions to deploy new commercial nuclear plants in the United States before EOY 2010 - e.g., the need to demonstrate the 10CFR Part 52 processes for obtaining Early Site Permits and Combined Licenses.
United States. Department of Energy
2001-03-26
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Weapons of Mass Destruction - May 2002 [bibliography]
This bibliography, compiled by the Joint Forces Staff College, contains books, documents, periodicals, laws, doctrine, and electronic resources related to weapons of mass destruction. Call numbers are provided for books and documents, and when available links are given for internet access. Several other databases are listed at the conclusion of the bibliography for further research.
Joint Forces Staff College (U.S.)
2002-05
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Computer Security [bibliography]
This bibliography, compiled by the Joint Forces Staff College Library, contains a list of books, documents, periodicals, doctrine, laws, and electronic resources pertaining to computer security and network defense. Call numbers are provided for books and documents, and links are provided for online access when available.
Joint Forces Staff College (U.S.)
2001-11
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Noncombatant Evacuation Operations [bibliography]
This bibliography, compiled by the Joint Forces Staff College Library, consists of books, documents, periodicals, doctrine, and electronic resources pertaining to noncombatant evacuation operations. Call numbers are provided for books and when possible links are given for internet access.
Joint Forces Staff College (U.S.)
2001-06-21
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Letter to the Honorable Thomas Daschle Regarding Potential Costs of National Missile Defense Systems
"The cost estimates that CBO has prepared for individual systems should not
be added together to yield an estimate of the total potential costs of national missile defense. For example, the sum of the estimates for the ground- and sea-based midcourse missile defense systems does not reflect the costs of a single combined system. If they were part of a combined system, the ground- and sea-based systems could draw on some of the same research and development activities and share some of the same sensors, command and control facilities, and components. In addition, as you requested, CBO's assumptions about the architecture and components of the sea-based system reflect its use as a stand-alone system, not as an adjunct to a ground-based system. Finally, in many cases substantial uncertainty exists about the relationship between the system descriptions available to CBO and whatever missile defenses might ultimately be deployed as a result of the programs being planned by the Bush Administration."
United States. Congressional Budget Office
2002-01
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Letter to the Honorable Kent Conrad and John M. Spratt, Jr. Regarding Estimated Costs of a Potential Conflict with Iraq
Estimates of the total cost of a military conflict with Iraq and the conflict's aftermath are highly uncertain and depend on many unknown factors including the actual force size deployed, the duration of the conflict, the strategy employed, the number of casualties, the equipment lost, and the need for reconstruction of Iraq's infrastructure. Of the many forcelevel options being discussed, CBO examined two representative examples. Both alternatives are based to some extent on the forces that the Department of Defense (DoD) had previously indicated it would require for a major theater war. Using those forces, CBO employed various methods to develop its estimates. As appropriate, it used cost data from prior and current military operations--most notably, the operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Desert Shield/Desert Storm. In addition, CBO estimated costs using categories similar to those in DoD's annual reports on the Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund--personnel and personnel support, operations support, and transportation. CBO's estimates represent the incremental costs that DoD could incur above the budgeted cost of routine operations. As a result, the estimate excludes items such as the basic pay of active-duty military personnel but includes the monthly pay for reservists recalled to full-time duty. Similarly, the estimates reflect only the costs of aircraft flying hours and ship steaming days above those normally provided in DoD's regular appropriations. CBO has no basis for estimating the number of casualties from the conflict or for analyzing the effects of Iraq's possible use of weapons of mass destruction; thus, the estimates in this report exclude those considerations. Neither is there a basis for estimating the costs associated with activities conducted under the National Foreign Intelligence Program because the details of its activities are highly classified.
United States. Congressional Budget Office
2002-09-30
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U.S. Nuclear Policy in the 21st Century: A Fresh Look at National Strategy and Requirements: Final Report
The participants in this report examined the broader trends in the international environment and considered how the United States could both shape and respond to them. A forward-looking paradigm for the nuclear dimension of U.S. security policy emerged that builds on the lessons of the past while addressing the opportunities and challenges of the future. The core of this paradigm is that nuclear weapons will continue indefinitely to play an indispensable role as a hedge against uncertainties, to deter potential aggressors who are both more diverse and less predictable than in the past, and to allow the United States to construct a more stable security environment. Thus, the United States needs a credible nuclear deterrent posture, broadly defined to include forces-in-being; capabilities for weapon system design and production; and the ability to assure the safety and reliable performance of the nuclear stockpile- a fundamental challenge in the absence of underground testing. Because this posture must be both adaptable and responsive to new threats, the national deterrent infrastructure must be treated as a strategic resource. The posture must also integrate the growing role of defenses in our deterrence calculations. All of this requires trained and motivated people, as well as new ways of thinking and considerable agility and foresightedness on the part of U.S. leaders. The more than forty study participants and government observers included present and former policymakers, military officers, scientists, and academics. The Project Report reflects their research, analysis, and intensive discussions that took place during the winter and spring of 1998. This Executive Report contains the key judgments of the study. The individual subgroup papers included in the Project Report -- policy, operations, infrastructure, and stockpile -- provided the foundation for these judgments.
National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies
1998-07
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Field Management of Chemical Casualties: Second Edition (U.S.Army)
"The purpose of this Handbook is to provide concise, supplemental reading
material for attendees of the Field Management of Chemical Casualties Course. As a consequence of the unprecedented world challenges, the threat spectrum faced by the U.S. into the next century has broadened. It now includes formerly democratic governments, members of regional cooperation alliances, and terrorists of all persuasions. Let's narrow our gaze somewhat and look at examples of threats within the chemical and biological (C/B) threat spectrum."
United States. Department of Defense
2000-07
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Field Management of Biological Warfare Agent Casualties (All Services)
This publication serves as a guide and a reference for trained members of the Armed Forces Medical Services and other medically qualified personnel on the recognition and treatment of biological warfare (BW) agent casualties. Information contained in this publication may also be relevant for the diagnosis and
treatment of patients with naturally acquired diseases or illnesses due to pathogens with BW potential. This publication classifies and describes potential BW agents; provides procedures for collecting, handling and labeling, shipping, and identifying potential BW agents; describes procedures for medical diagnosing, treating, and management of BW casualties; describes medical management and treatment in BW operations.
United States. Department of Defense
2000-07-17
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Sandia Technology: Quarterly Research & Development Journal (Summer 2001, Entire Journal)
This is the entire Journal from Sandia National Laboratories for Summer 2001. This issue of Sandia Technology outlines some of those technologies, which encompass Sandia's work in robotics, computing, integrated microsystems, and biotechnology. Integrating disparate technologies into practical, effective systems that bolster
America's national security is Sandia's strength. Included are the following 5 different articles: "Countering Emerging Threats: Technologies for Asymmetrical Warfare, Protection of our Homeland and Future Warfighting", "Developing Technologies for Asymmetrical Warfare and Homeland Defense", "Fielding New Systems for Countering Terrorism", "Meeting the Logistics and
Demilitarization Challenges", and "Modeling and Simulation:
Who knows what evils lurk in the paths
of robots?".
United States. Department of Energy
2001
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America's Information War on Terrorism: Winning Hearts and Minds in the Muslim World
This paper examines America's struggle to win hearts and minds in the Muslim World. The US may win the military fight on terrorism but thus far is losing the public opinion fight in Muslim countries. Although the US may be able to eradicate many of today's terrorists, many in fact welcome the chance to die for their cause, and there are thousands ready to fill the ranks of the fallen. The US must find a way to build bridges to Muslims while simultaneously discrediting and then isolating bin Laden (or his successor) and other Islamic terrorist organizations from the Muslim masses. America's most daunting and important fight is the information war in the Muslim World. If we fail in the struggle to win the hearts and minds there, we'll be locked into an interminable struggle of strike and counterstrike while American civilian casualties mount and US domestic life is changed forever. This paper describes a proposed overarching strategic information campaign to restore favorable perceptions of the US in the Muslim World.
Army War College (U.S.)
McClanahan, Jack R., Jr.
2002-03-27
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Defeating Militant Islamic Extremists
President Bush proclaimed America will win the war against terrorism. This war is further defined as a war against terrorists, specifically Militant Islamic Extremists. The September 11th terrorist attack elevated a new world-organizing ideology, Militant Islamic Extremism. The paper is limited to analyzing only the dominant capabilities of the Osama bin Laden -- Al Qaeda brand of Militant Islamic Extremism. The focus is on determining the centrally dominant capability from which these terrorists derive their will-desire-ability to fight. The methodology sets the analysis in a national strategic context.
Army War College (U.S.)
Pedersen, Dick
2002-04-09
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Influence Management: A Tool for the War on Terrorism
On September 20, 2001, President George W. Bush said, "We will direct every resource at our command -- every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war -- to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network." This paper explores the use of influence management, at the strategic level, to defeat terrorism. It examines how the U.S. government must use one of the elements of national power, information, to both protect the friendly center of gravity and should be used to attack decisive points to topple the enemy's center of gravity.
Army War College (U.S.)
Mateer, Shawn M.
2002-04-09
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Agricultural Terrorism: Breaking New Ground
The threat of agricultural terrorism is real. The consequences of an attack on our agricultural infrastructure may have a devastating impact on our economy while threatening the survival of our citizenry and the very existence of our nation. Our preparations to prevent and respond to such an attack will determine whether the impact of an agricultural terrorism incident is contained or if it has catastrophic results. How critical is our agriculture infrastructure to our way of life? What is the nature of the threat to our agricultural industry? Are present security methods capable of handling the threat? If not, what steps should the Executive Branch and the Department of Defense take to address the threat? This study seeks to answer these questions while providing a framework using an ends, ways and means analysis to address the development of an agricultural protection policy and identify the role the Department of Defense should play in combating the threat.
Army War College (U.S.)
McNeely, Kurt A.
2001-04-03
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Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate: S. 1729: Post Terrorism Mental Health Improvement Act
"The Post Terrorism Mental Health Improvement Act would amend the Public Health Service Act to authorize the Secretary of Health and Human Services to engage in a number of activities to improve resources pertaining to mental health needs in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. The act would provide grants to enable state and local governments and other public entities to respond to the long-term mental health needs arising from the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. It also would require establishment of a mental health disaster
response clearinghouse, development of coordinated response plans to respond to the mental health needs that arise from a disaster, and specialized training of mental health professionals with regard to the treatment of victims of disaster."
United States. Congressional Budget Office
2002-01-08
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Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate: H.R. 3253: Department of Veterans Affairs Emergency Preparedness Research, Education, and Bio-Terrorism Prevention Act of 2002
"H.R. 3253 would establish at least four medical emergency centers that would carry out research and development, provide education and training, and provide assistance in the case of a national emergency with regard to chemical, biological, and radiological threats. These emergency centers would be located in hospitals operated by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). H.R. 3253 would authorize appropriations of $20 million a year over the 2003-2007 period to operate these centers. As part of the requirement to provide education
and training, the bill would require VA to carry out a joint program with the Department of Defense (DoD) to develop and disseminate a series of training programs on the medical responses to terrorist activities. Finally, H.R. 3253 would increase the number of Assistant Secretaries within the VA from six to seven with the new assistant secretary being responsible for operations, preparedness, security, and law enforcement functions."
United States. Congressional Budget Office
2002-05-10
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Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate: H.R. 3209: Anti-Hoax Terrorism Act of 2001
"H.R. 3209 would establish a new federal crime for the perpetration of hoaxes involving the threat of biological agents or other weapons of mass destruction. Offenders would be subject to imprisonment and criminal and civil fines.
Under the provisions of H.R. 3209, the government would be able to pursue cases involving hoaxes that it otherwise would not be able to prosecute. Because there are similar prohibitions on hoaxes in current law, however, CBO expects that the bill's provisions would probably affect a small number of additional cases. Thus, any increase in costs for law enforcement, court proceedings, or prison operations would not be significant."
United States. Congressional Budget Office
2001-11-21
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Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001
This report was submitted in compliance with Title 22 of the United States Code, which requires the Department of State to provide Congress a full and complete annual report on terrorism for those countries and groups meeting the criteria of Section (a)(1) and (2) of the Act. As required by legislation, the report includes detailed assessments of foreign countries where significant terrorist acts occurred, and countries about which Congress was notified during the preceding five years. In addition, the report includes all relevant information about the previous year's activities of individuals, terrorist organizations, or umbrella groups known to be responsible for the kidnapping or death of any US citizen during the preceding five years and groups known to be financed by state sponsors of terrorism.
United States. Department of State
2002-05
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Smallpox: An Attack Scenario
"Smallpox virus, which is among the most dangerous organisms that might be used by bioterrorists, is not widely available. The international black market trade in weapons of mass destruction is probably the only means of acquiring the virus. Thus, only a terrorist supported by the resources of a rogue state would
be able to procure and deploy smallpox. An attack using the virus would involve relatively sophisticated strategies and would deliberately seek to sow public panic, disrupt and discredit official institutions, and shake public confidence in government. The following scenario is intended to provoke thought and dialogue that might illuminate the uncertainties and challenges of bioterrorism and stimulate review of institutional capacities for rapid communication and coordinated action in the wake of an attack."
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.)
O'Toole, Tara Jeanne, 1951-
1999-07
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Bioterrorism as a Public Health Threat
The threat of bioterrorism, long ignored and denied, has heightened over the past few years. Recent events in Iraq, Japan, and Russia cast an ominous shadow. Two candidate agents are of special concern--smallpox and anthrax. The magnitude of the problems and the gravity of the scenarios associated with release of these organisms have been vividly portrayed by two epidemics of smallpox in Europe during the 1970s and by an accidental release of aerosolized anthrax from a Russian bioweapons facility in 1979. Efforts in the United States to deal with possible incidents involving bioweapons in the civilian sector have only recently begun and have made only limited progress. Only with substantial additional resources at the federal, state, and local levels can a credible and meaningful response be mounted. For longer-term solutions, the medical community must educate both the public and policy makers about bioterrorism and build a global consensus condemning its use.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.)
Henderson, D. A.
1998-07
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Anthrax: A Possible Case History
This is a fictional account of what could potentially happen in the event of an anthrax attack, presented at the First National Symposium on the Medical and Public Health Response to Bioterrorism, in Virginia, in 1999. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) offices in five U.S. cities have received warnings of an imminent bioterrorist attack. Each threat indicated that a 'shower of anthrax would rain on U.S. cities,' unless certain demands were met immediately. One of these calls was in Northeast, a large city on the Eastern Seaboard
with a metropolitan population of 2 million. The threats were credible, but no information was relayed to city officials in Northeast or elsewhere. This scenario is ominous. Such an epidemic would create extraordinary challenges for a
modern American city. However, there is no need to give in to the ending of this story. Practical, modest preparedness efforts could
make a difference and change the outcome. Many of the most useful efforts may be the result of ingenuity and depend on collaboration of experts from many disciplines.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.)
Inglesby, Thomas V.
1999-07
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Countering Terrorism: Security Suggestions for U.S. Business Representatives Abroad
The likelihood of terrorist incidents
occurring varies from country to
country depending, at least in part,
upon the stability of the local government and the degree of frustration felt by indigenous groups or individuals. Alert individuals, prepared for possible terrorist acts, can minimize the likelihood that these acts will be successfully carried out against them. American businesses and their
employees living and traveling
abroad often have been singled
out as targets of terrorists. In fact, recent statistics show that American business interests have been
targeted more frequently than
those of the Federal government.
While there is no absolute protection
against terrorism, there are a
number of reasonable and
commonsense precautions that
can provide some degree of individual
protection and can serve as
psychological and practical deterrents to would-be terrorists.
United States. Department of State
1999-06
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Cost Estimating Methodology for Operation Enduring Freedom & Post-September 11th Counter-Terrorism/Force Protection & Homeland Security Initiatives
Briefing to Department of Defense
Cost Analysis Symposium (DODCAS) on the cost estimating methodology for counter-terrorism and homeland security.
United States. Department of Defense
2002-01-30
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Army Manual: Field Hygiene and Sanitation
This publication supersedes FM 21-10, 22 November 1988. The purpose of this publication is to assist individual service members, unit commanders,
unit leaders, and field sanitation teams (FSTs) in preventing disease and nonbattle injury (DNBI). The publication provides information on preventive medicine measures (PMM) for the individual service member as well as essential information for the unit commander, unit leaders, and the FST on applying unit-level PMM. The medical threats covered here are heat, cold, arthropods and other animals, poisonous plants and toxic fruits, food and waterborne diseases, toxic industrial chemicals and materials, noise, nonbattle injury, and the unfit service member.
United States. Department of Defense
2000-06-21
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Defense Against Toxin Weapons
The purpose of this manual is to provide basic information on biological toxins to military leaders and health-care providers at all levels to help them make informed decisions on protecting their troops from toxins. Much of the information contained herein will also be of interest to individuals charged with countering domestic and international terrorism. We typically fear what we do not understand. Although understanding toxin poisoning is less useful in a toxin attack than knowledge of cold injury on an Arctic battlefield, information on any threat reduces its potential to harm. I hope that by providing information about the physical characteristics and biological activities of toxins, the threat of toxins will actually be reduced. I did not intend to provide detailed information on individual threat toxins or on medical prevention or treatment. This primer puts toxins in context, attempts to remove the elements of mystery and fear that surround them, and provides general information that will ultimately help leaders make rational decisions, protect their soldiers and win battles.
United States. Department of Defense
Franz, David R.
2001
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Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments
This publication: describes the international security environment and the threat posed by adversaries armed with Nuclear, Biological,
and Chemical (NBC) Weapons; provides principles for planning and conducting operations in NBC environments across the range of military operations; describes the role of NBC defense and other offensive and defensive capabilities in sustained operations; provides considerations for sustaining logistic and health service support; and addresses requirements for conflict termination and military operations other than war.
United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff
2000-07-11
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Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP) - Operational Plan
The objective of the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP) is to establish an organized and integrated capability for timely, coordinated response by Federal agencies to peacetime radiological emergencies. The FRERP: provides the Federal Government's concept of operations based on specific authorities for responding to radiological emergencies; outlines Federal policies and planning considerations on which the concept of operations of this Plan and Federal agency specific response plans are based; and specifies authorities and responsibilities of each Federal agency that may have a significant role in such emergencies. There are two Sections in this Plan. Section I contains background, considerations, and scope. Section II describes the concept of operations for response.
United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency
1996
