Advanced search Help
Clear all search criteria
Only 2/3! You are seeing results from the Public Collection, not the complete Full Collection. Sign in to search everything (see eligibility).
-
Aerosol Optical Depth Retrieval by NPS Model Modified for SEAWIFS Input
Using visible wavelength radiance data obtained from the spaceborne Sea-viewing Wide Field of-view Sensor (SeaWiFS), during the Aerosol Characterization Experiment-Asia (ACE-Asia), an analysis of aerosol optical depth (AOD) was completed by modification to the NPS AOD Model previously compiled for NOAA geosynchronous- and polar-orbiting satellites. The objective of the analysis was to calibrate the linearized, single-scatter algorithm, estimated bi-directional surface reflectance, and phase function parameters. The intent of the study was to provide enhanced temporal AOD coverage with the addition of the orbiting SeaWiFS eight-channel radiometer to the established NOAA constellation of five-channel AVHRR-equipped satellites. The work has operational significance in providing timely, accurate remote information to military operators of identification and targeting systems. Possible applications include detection and warning of international treaty violation of reducing the adverse public health effects by weapons of mass destruction of pollution advection on global weather patterns.
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
Brown, Brady A.
2002-03
-
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons: A Snapshot
Provides a snapshot of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) stating that OPCW is the international body created to implement the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). It further defines their basic organization, verification division, inspectorate Division, and the inspectors involved with industry verification.
United States. Bureau of Industry and Security
2002-09
-
Chemical Weapons Convention: A Quick Guide
The Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security provides an overview of the chemicals monitored by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and components of the CWC verification regime. These components include declaration and reporting requirements, and on-site inspections that are triggered when quantitative threshold activity levels are exceeded. The CWC further defines and divides chemicals into three "schedules" and "unscheduled discrete organic chemicals."
United States. Bureau of Industry and Security
2002-09
-
Chlordane (C10 H6 Cl8) Chemical Protocol
Very comprehensive description of the chemical agent, with coverage on many important aspects, including information on routes of exposure, sources and uses, exposure limits, physical characteristics, patient management, decontamination and treatment, incident reporting. Synonyms include a wide variety of trade names: Chlordan, Chlor-Kil, CD-68, Octachlor, Termi-Ded,
Toxichlor, Topichlor, and Velsicol 1068.
United States. Department of Health and Human Services
2000
-
Calcium Hypochlorite (CaCl2O2)/Sodium Hypochlorite (NaOCl) Chemical Protocol
Very comprehensive description of the chemical agent, with coverage on many important aspects, including information on routes of exposure, sources and uses, exposure limits, physical characteristics, patient management, decontamination and treatment, incident reporting. Synonyms of calcium hypochlorite include Losantin, hypochlorous acid, calcium salt, BK powder, Hy-Chlor, chlorinated lime, lime chloride, chloride of lime, calcium oxychloride, HTH, mildew remover X-14, perchloron, and pittchlor.
United States. Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
2000
-
Carbon Disulfide (CS2) Chemical Protocol
Very comprehensive description of the chemical agent, with coverage on many important aspects, including information on routes of exposure, sources and uses, exposure limits, physical characteristics, patient management, decontamination and treatment, incident reporting. Synonyms include carbon bisulfide, carbon sulfide, and dithiocarbonic anhydride.
United States. Department of Health and Human Services
2000
-
Crotonaldehyde (C4 H6 O) Chemical Protocol
Very comprehensive description of the chemical agent, with coverage on many important aspects, including information on routes of exposure, sources and uses, exposure limits, physical characteristics, patient management, decontamination and treatment, incident reporting. Synonyms include beta-methylacrolein; propylene aldehyde; ethylene propionate; crotonic aldehyde; but-2-enal; 2-butenal; crotonal; topanel; methyl acrolein; butenal; crotonaldehyde inhibited; (E)-crotonaldehyde;
(E)-2-butenal; trans-2-butenal.
United States. Department of Health and Human Services
2000
-
Chlorine (Cl2) Chemical Protocol
Very comprehensive description of the chemical agent, with coverage on many important aspects, including information on routes of exposure, sources and uses, exposure limits, physical characteristics, patient management, decontamination and treatment, incident reporting. Synonyms include molecular chlorine.
United States. Department of Health and Human Services
2000
-
Diborane (B2 H6) Chemical Protocol
Very comprehensive description of the chemical agent, with coverage on many important aspects, including information on routes of exposure, sources and uses, exposure limits, physical characteristics, patient management, decontamination and treatment, incident reporting. Synonyms include boroethane, boron hydride, diboron hexahydride.
United States. Department of Health and Human Services
2000
-
Bank Tying: Additional Steps Needed to Ensure Effective Enforcement, Report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Financial Services, House of Representatives
Investment affiliates of large commercial banks have made competitive inroads in the annual $1.3 trillion debt-underwriting market. Some corporate borrowers and officials from an unaffiliated investment bank have alleged that commercial banks helped their investment affiliates gain market share by illegally tying and underpricing corporate credit. This report discusses these allegations, the available evidence related to the allegations, and federal bank regulatory agencies' efforts to enforce the antitying provisions. Section 106 of the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970 prohibits commercial banks from "tying," a practice which includes conditioning the availability or terms of loans or other credit products on the purchase of certain other products and services. The law permits banks to tie credit and traditional banking products, such as cash management, and does not prohibit banks from considering the profitability of their full relationship with customers in managing those relationships. GAO's review found that some corporate customers' claims involved lawful ties between traditional banking products rather than unlawful ties. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) recently reviewed antitying policies and procedures of several large commercial banks. The agencies generally found no unlawful tying arrangements but found variation among the banks in interpretation of the tying law and its exceptions. As a result, in August 2003, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, working with OCC, released new draft guidance, with a goal of better informing banks and their customers about the requirements of the antitying provision.
United States. General Accounting Office
2003-10-10
-
Military Personnel: DFAS Has Not Met All Information Technology Requirements for Its New Pay System
In early January 2003, GAO initiated a review of the Defense Integrated Military Human Resource System (DIMHRS). In April 2003 the Department of Defense (DOD) authorized the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) to initiate a pilot project to demonstrate its ability to develop an interim military pay system, called Forward Compatible Military Pay, before DIMHRS is fully operational. DFAS maintains that an interim system should be developed as soon as possible for two reasons: (1) the planned personnel and pay system that DOD is currently developing as part of the larger DIMHRS will be implemented later than its projected target date of December 2006 and (2) the current military pay system--the Defense Joint Military Pay System--is aging, unresponsive, and fragile and has become a major impediment to efficient and high quality customer service. Since the planned interim Forward Compatible Military Pay system is considered an information technology acquisition program under DOD Acquisition Regulations, DFAS must comply with specific legal and administrative requirements before moving forward with the development of this project. DFAS has not complied with specific legal and administrative requirements applicable to DOD's information technology investments. Because DFAS has not submitted the forward pay proposal to the responsible domain, the DOD Comptroller has not met its responsibility under the authorization act to ensure compliance with the Business Enterprise Architecture. By failing to complete all required studies and analyses, DOD lacks assurance that it is meeting its goal of making quality information technology investments, as required.
United States. General Accounting Office
2003-10-20
-
Policy, Intelligence, and the Billion-Dollar Petroglyph
The pressure for corporate intelligence consensus is as great as the pressure for corporate policy consensus. The policy and intelligence processes are different but not separate. Intelligence is defined through analysis, and policy is defined through implementation. New policy can focus intelligence analysis, and new intelligence may influence policy changes. The relationship is dynamic, and exchanges are not necessarily sequential but invariably interactive. This interaction is not always harmonious; indeed, often it is a troubled road characterized by the need for reduction, the intrusion of bias, and the vagaries of a vast collection and processing subculture. Too often the policy/intelligence relationship, particularly in the defense establishment, is viewed idealistically, and this romantic view undermines the very process of effective interaction. Ideally, policy and intelligence are collegial partners in pursuit of larger national security goals. In practice, intelligence is somewhat of a junior partner with, what may be, a self-imposed image problem. Traditional suggestions for improving the quality of military intelligence support to the national security debate have focused on resource augmentation. Improved outcomes are inexorably, and often inexplicably, tied to more dollars and more sophisticated collection technology. This document discusses what would improve intelligence most in the defense arena. There are three shifts in emphasis that require little or no new resources: a better understanding of the corporate personality of policymakers; a recognition of the role that bias plays in policy formulation and intelligence analysis; and a change in the image of the intelligence process, coupled to an upgrade in the stature of intelligence managers.
Air University (U.S.). Press
Donovan, G. Murphy
1986
-
NSA/CSS Strategic Plan 2001-2006
Intelligence and information systems security complement each other. Intelligence gives the Nation an information advantage over its adversaries. Information systems security prevents others from gaining advantage over the Nation. Together the two functions promote a single goal: information superiority for America and its allies. NSA/CSS used technology to help win the Cold War, building a stable, well-funded, focused organization that provided a unique product to decision makers. As the preeminent information organization in the Industrial Age, they provided and protected the Nation's secrets. But the proliferation of information technologies and the emergence of the global network have begun to transform the world, altering fundamental ways of thinking and communicating. Old patterns are giving way to agile and collaborative processes and technologies. Old methods of behavior and communication still exist, but the future is clear. If NSA/CSS is to continue to serve the Nation by providing and protecting vital information, they must embrace change and resume our place on the forward edge of technology. NSA/CSS must master and operate in the global net of tomorrow. This plan outlines the goals of the NSA/CSS up to the year 2006.
United States. National Security Agency
-
Elemental Mercury (HG) Chemical Protocol
Very comprehensive description of the chemical agent, with coverage on many important aspects, including information on routes of exposure, sources and uses, exposure limits, physical characteristics, patient management, decontamination and treatment, incident reporting. Synonyms include colloidal mercury, quicksilver, liquid silver, metallic mercury, and hydrargyrum.
United States. Department of Health and Human Services
2000
-
Formaldehyde (HCHO) Chemical Protocol
Very comprehensive description of the chemical agent, with coverage on many important aspects, including information on routes of exposure, sources and uses, exposure limits, physical characteristics, patient management, decontamination and treatment, incident reporting. Synonyms include formalin, formic aldehyde, methanal, methyl aldehyde, methylene oxide, oxomethane,and paraform.
United States. Department of Health and Human Services
2000
-
Ethylene Glycol (C2 H6 O2) Chemical Protocol
Very comprehensive description of the chemical agent, with coverage on many important aspects, including information on routes of exposure, sources and uses, exposure limits, physical characteristics, patient management, decontamination and treatment, incident reporting. Synonyms include 1,2-dihydroxyethane, 1,2-ethanediol, 2-hydroxyethanol, ethylene alcohol, glycol,
glycol alcohol, monoethylene glycol, and ethylene dihydrate. Ethylene glycol is sold under a variety of brand names as automobile radiator antifreeze. It should not be confused with ethylene glycol ethers,which are a different group of chemicals.
United States. Department of Health and Human Services
2000
-
Gasoline (Mixture) Chemical Protocol
Very comprehensive description of the chemical agent, with coverage on many important aspects, including information on routes of exposure, sources and uses, exposure limits, physical characteristics, patient management, decontamination and treatment, incident reporting. Synonyms include gas, petrol, casing head gasoline, motor spirit, natural gasoline, and motor fuel.
United States. Department of Health and Human Services
2000
-
Ethylene Dibromide (C2H4Br2) Chemical Protocol
Very comprehensive description of the chemical agent, with coverage on many important aspects, including information on routes of exposure, sources and uses, exposure limits, physical characteristics, patient management, decontamination and treatment, incident reporting. Synonyms include 1,2-dibromoethane, glycoldibromide, and bromofume.
United States. Department of Health and Human Services
2000
-
Nuclear Security: Federal and State Action Needed to Improve Security of Sealed Radioactive Sources, Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Financial Management, the Budget, and International Security, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate
Sealed radioactive sources, radioactive material encapsulated in stainless steel or other metal, are used worldwide in medicine, industry, and research. These sealed sources could be a threat to national security because terrorists could use them to make "dirty bombs." GAO was asked to determine (1) the number of sealed sources in the United States, (2) the number of sealed sources lost, stolen, or abandoned, (3) the effectiveness of federal and state controls over sealed sources, and (4) the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and state efforts since September 11, 2001, to strengthen security of sealed sources. The number of sealed sources in the United States is unknown because NRC and states track numbers of licensees instead of individual sealed sources. In addition, since 1998, more than 1,300 incidents have taken place in the United States where sealed sources have been lost, stolen, or abandoned. Users of certain devices containing sealed sources are not required to apply to NRC for a license. Security for sealed sources varied among the facilities GAO visited in 10 states. Also, a potential security weakness exists in NRC's licensing process to obtain sealed sources. NRC has been developing additional security measures since the attacks, and issued the first security order to large facilities that irradiate such items as medical supplies and food. NRC and states disagree over the appropriate role of states in efforts to improve security. Over 80 percent of states responding to our survey feel they should be given responsibility to inspect and enforce security measures.
United States. General Accounting Office
2003-08-06
-
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges for Selected Agencies and Industry Sectors, Report to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives
"The explosive growth of computer interconnectivity is transforming the workings of our nation, its government, and its critical infrastructures. But with the enormous benefits of this interconnectivity comes a threat: both physical and cyber assets are potentially vulnerable to computerbased attack. In response, Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD 63, May 1998) called for a range of actions to improve the nations ability to detect and respond to serious infrastructure attacks. For specific agencies under the Committee on Energy and Commerces jurisdiction and for private-sector organizations for which these agencies have responsibilities, GAO was asked, among other things, to assess their progress and challenges in undertaking critical infrastructure protection (CIP) activities. GAO recommends that the agencies take steps to complete the identification and analysis of their critical assets, including setting milestones and developing plans to address vulnerabilities. GAO also recommends that selected sectors lead agencies assess the need for public policy tools to encourage increased private-sector CIP activities. In its comments on a draft of this report, HHS concurred with recommended agency activities. Technical comments by other agencies and private-sector entities were also addressed, as appropriate."
United States. General Accounting Office
2003-02
-
Invasive Species: State and Other Nonfederal Perspectives on Challenges to Managing the Problem
Invasive species--harmful, nonnative plants, animals, and microorganisms--are found throughout the United States and cause damage to crops, rangelands, waterways, and other ecosystems that is estimated to cost in the billions of dollars annually. In addition to their economic costs, invasive species are the second most serious threat to endangered species after habitat destruction. This report provides the final results of GAO's spring 2003 survey of state agencies involved in efforts to address invasive species and members of the Invasive Species Advisory Committee (ISAC). The report focuses on state perspectives on (1) gaps in, or problems with, federal legislation addressing invasive species, (2) barriers to managing invasive species, (3) effective leadership structures for addressing invasive species, and (4) integrating federal aquatic and terrestrial invasive species legislation and the potential gains and drawbacks of such legislation. State officials identified several legislative gaps or problems with existing legislation intended to address invasive species: the lack of requirements for controlling invasive species that are already established or widespread; the lack of consideration of invasive species in international trade agreements; and the lack of federal funding for state invasive species efforts. State officials' opinions on effective federal leadership structures for managing invasive species varied. Many state officials indicated that the possible gains of integrated legislative authority would be an increased focus on invasive species pathways, as opposed to specific species, and increased coordination between federal agencies and states.
United States. General Accounting Office
2003-09-05
-
Information Security: Challenges in Using Biometrics: Testimony by Keith A. Rhodes, Chief Technologist, Applied Research and Methods, before the Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations, and the Census, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
One of the primary functions of any security system is the control of people into or out of protected areas, such as physical buildings, information systems, and our national border. Technologies called biometrics can automate the identification of people by one or more of their distinct physical or behavioral characteristics. Last year, GAO conducted a technology assessment on the use of biometrics for border security. GAO was asked to testify about the issues that it raised in the report on the use of biometrics in the federal government, and the current state of the technology. Biometric technologies are available today that can be used in security systems to help protect assets. However, technology and people must work together as part of an overall security process. GAO found that three key considerations need to be addressed before a decision is made to design, develop, and implement biometrics into a security system: (1) decisions must be made on how the technology will be used; (2) a detailed cost-benefit analysis must be conducted to determine that the benefits gained from a system outweigh the costs; and (3) a trade-off analysis must be conducted between the increased security, which the use of biometrics would provide, and the effect on areas such as privacy and convenience. Security concerns need to be balanced with practical cost and operational considerations as well as political and economic interests.
United States. General Accounting Office
2003-09-09
-
Electronic Government: Challenges to the Adoption of Smart Card Technology Testimony by Joel C. Willemssen, Managing Director, Information Technology Issues before the Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations and the Census, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
"The federal government is increasingly interested in the use of smart cards--credit-card-like devices that use integrated circuit chips to store and process data--for improving the security of its many physical and information assets. GAO was asked to testify on the results of implementing the use of smart cards across the federal government, including the challenges to successful adoption of smart cards throughout the federal government, as well as the government's progress in promoting this smart card adoption. To successfully implement smart card systems, agency managers have faced a number of substantial challenges: sustaining executive-level commitment in the face of organizational resistance and cost concerns; obtaining adequate resources for projects that can require extensive modifications to technical infrastructures and software; integrating security practices across agencies; achieving smart card interoperability across the government; and maintaining the security of smart card systems and the privacy of personal information. GSA assists agencies in assessing the potential of smart cards and in implementation. OMB is beginning to develop a framework of policy guidance for governmentwide smart card adoption. In a July 2003 memorandum, OMB described a three-part initiative on authentication and identity management in the government, consisting of (1) developing common policy and technical guidance; (2) executing a governmentwide acquisition of authentication technology, including smart cards; and (3) selecting shared service providers for smart card technology. These efforts address the need for consistent, up-to-date standards and policy on smart cards, but much work remains before common credentialing systems can be successfully implemented across government agencies."
United States. General Accounting Office
2003-09-09
-
Information Security: Effective Patch Management is Critical to Mitigating Software Vulnerabilities, Statement of Robert F. Dacey, Director, Information Security Issues, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Technology Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations, and the Census, House Committee on Government Reform
"Attacks on computer systems--in government and the private sector--are increasing at an alarming rate, placing both federal and private-sector operations and assets at considerable risk. By exploiting software vulnerabilities, hackers can cause significant damage. While patches, or software fixes, for these vulnerabilities are often well publicized and available, they are frequently not quickly or correctly applied. The federal government recently awarded a contract for a government wide patch notification service designed to provide agencies with information to support effective patching. Forty-one agencies now subscribe to this service. At the request of the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations, and
the Census, GAO reviewed (1) two recent software vulnerabilities and related responses; (2) effective patch management practices, related federal efforts, and other available tools; and (3) additional steps that can be taken to better
protect sensitive information systems from software vulnerabilities."
United States. General Accounting Office
2003-09-10
-
Security: Counterfeit Identification and Identification Fraud Raise Security Concerns, Testimony by Robert J. Cramer, Managing Director, Office of Special Investigations, before the Senate Committee on Finance
This testimony summarizes some of our recent investigations that demonstrate security vulnerabilities that exist because counterfeit identification can be easily produced and used to create fraudulent identities. It is based in part on the recently issued restricted report Security: Vulnerabilities Found in Driver's License Applications Process. This also encompasses results from security tests GAO has performed over the past 3 years. These tests revealed security weaknesses at federal buildings and other facilities, airports and our nation's borders, and exposed identity fraud vulnerabilities in both the Social Security number (SSN) application process and in the administration of federal gun control laws. A number of these problems have been addressed by the responsible agencies. In summary, GAO found that (1) government officials generally did not recognize the documents presented as counterfeits, (2) some government officials failed to follow security procedures and were not alert to the possibility of identity fraud, and (3) identity verification procedures are inadequate. GAO's investigations revealed that homeland security is vulnerable to identity fraud and, unless action is taken, individuals who intend to cause harm can easily exploit these vulnerabilities. Additionally, identify fraud has a range of other consequences including potential fraud in voting, obtaining credit and federal benefits, and in many other areas.
United States. General Accounting Office
2003-09-09
-
Homeland Security at the FCC
At the July 10, 2003, Commission meeting, HSPC Director, Marsha MacBride, presented a report on the Commission's homeland security efforts, accomplishments, and plans.]
United States. Federal Communications Commission
MacBride, Marsha
2003-07-10
-
Energy Markets: Additional Actions Would Help Ensure That FERC's Oversight and Enforcement Capability is Comprehensive and Systematic
In June 2002, GAO reported that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) had not yet adequately revised its regulatory and oversight approach for the natural gas and electricity industries' transition from regulated monopolies to competitive markets. GAO also concluded that FERC faced significant human capital challenges to transform its workforce to meet such changes. In responding to the report, FERC said that the new Office of Market Oversight and Investigations OMOI) it was creating and human capital improvements under way would address these concerns. GAO was asked to report on FERC's progress in (1) establishing an oversight and enforcement capability for competitive energy markets and (2) improving agency-wide human capital management
United States. General Accounting Office
Haas, Dan; Wells, Jim
2003-08-15
-
Steganographic Computer Warfare
Computer technology permeates every aspect of our daily operations. As this dependence increases, users become more susceptible to attacks. This threat comes largely from computer viruses, which fall under the Information Warfare domain. Steganography's goal is to conceal information, in plain sight. Although steganography tools have been around for several years, their true potential continues to be explored. This resurgence in steganography combined with the aforementioned computer virus threat raises potential risks. This research attempts to determine strategies that can be used automatically to decode a steganography file. Emphasis is placed on automated techniques and is not specific to any steganography application. The primary objective of this thesis is to explore and assess computer systems' vulnerability to steganographic virus attacks. The results indicate that steganography tools are not conducive to be sole attack weapons. However, the tools combined with other applications could be used to automatically extract the hidden information with minimal user intervention. The research examined the current state of steganography tool capabilities with regard to computer virus implementations. Coupling these two technologies can result in a very deceptive and powerful IW attack and pose a significant risk to the United States government and our national information infrastructure.
Air Force Institute of Technology (U.S.)
Cochran, Jordon T.
2000-03
-
Nuclear Weapons: Opportunities Exist to Improve the Budgeting, Cost, Accounting, and Management Associated with Stockpile Life Extension Program
As a separately organized agency within the Department of Energy (DOE), the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) administers the Stockpile Life Extension Program, whose purpose is to extend, through refurbishment, the operational lives of the weapons in the nuclear stockpile. NNSA encountered significant management problems with its first refurbishment. NNSA has begun three additional life extensions. This study was undertaken to determine the extent to which budgetary, cost accounting, and other management issues that contributed to problems with the first refurbishment have been adequately addressed.
United States. General Accounting Office
2003-07
-
Contract Management: INS Contracting Weaknesses Need Attention from the Department of Homeland Security
With annual obligations for goods and services totaling $1.7 billion, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) is one of the largest of 23 entities in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). INS's procurement organization will continue to acquire goods and services under DHS. GAO was asked to review INS's contracting processes to assess whether INS has an adequate infrastructure to manage its acquisitions and to determine whether INS is following sound contracting policies and procedures in awarding and managing individual contracts. Because INS has become a significant part of DHS and brings with it a procurement function that needs attention, it is imperative for DHS leadership to address these problems early in the development of the new department.
United States. General Accounting Office
2003-07
