Advanced search    Help

Clear all search criteria

Only 2/3! You are seeing results from the Public Collection, not the complete Full Collection. Sign in to search everything (see eligibility).

• Estimate of Direct Spending and Revenue Effects of H.R. 1628, the Healthcare Freedom Act of 2017, an Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute [S.A. 667]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "CBO [Congressional Budget Office] and the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) have prepared an estimate of the direct spending and revenue effects of H.R. 1628, the Healthcare Freedom Act of 2017."

  United States. Congressional Budget Office

  2017-07-27
• S. 1519, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "The Congressional Budget Office [CBO] has completed an estimate of the direct spending and revenue effects of S. 1519, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, as reported by the Senate Committee on Armed Services on July 10, 2017. CBO's complete cost estimate for S. 1519, including discretionary costs, will be provided shortly. CBO estimates that enacting S. 1519 would increase direct spending by $621 million over the 2018-2027 period, primarily through adjustments to the TRICARE Health Benefit and the Special Survivor Indemnity Allowance. The bill would have an insignificant effect on revenues. Because enacting the bill would affect direct spending and revenues, pay-as-you-go procedures apply. CBO estimates that enacting S. 1519 would not increase net direct spending or on-budget deficits by more than $5 billion in any of the four consecutive 10-year periods beginning in 2028."

  United States. Congressional Budget Office

  2017-07-27
• National Mall: Actions Needed to Better Manage Physical Security, Report to the Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "The National Mall is one of the most recognizable landscapes in the United States. It is home to memorials to our nation's history and some of the most visited museums in the world. Threats to these assets-whether acts of terrorism, violence, or vandalism or theft of artifacts or art-could result not only in the loss of life but also the loss of iconic monuments or irreplaceable items from the Smithsonian's or National Gallery's collections. GAO [Government Accountability Office] was asked to review the steps Interior, the Smithsonian, and the National Gallery are taking to protect U.S. assets, employees, and the visiting public. This report examines: (1) the extent to which these entities assess physical security risks and (2) the extent to which the entities use goals, measures, and testing to assess their physical security programs. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in May 2017. GAO reviewed applicable federal requirements; Interior-, Smithsonian-, and National Gallery-specific policies and related documents; and interviewed officials. In the sensitive report, GAO recommended that (1) the National Gallery document its risk management decisions and that (2) Interior, the Smithsonian, and the National Gallery link performance measures with security goals and seek input to enhance their testing programs. Interior, the Smithsonian, and the National Gallery agreed with GAO's recommendations and indicated they will begin taking steps to address them."

  United States. Government Accountability Office

  2017-07-27
• Department of Defense Instruction 5200.44: Protection of Mission Critical Functions to Achieve Trusted Systems and Networks (TSN)

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "This Instruction, in accordance with the authorities in DoD Directive (DoDD) 5134.01 (Reference (a)) and DoDD 5144.02 (Reference (b)): a. Establishes policy and assigns responsibilities to minimize the risk that DoD's warfighting mission capability will be impaired due to vulnerabilities in system design or sabotage or subversion of a system's mission critical functions or critical components, as defined in this Instruction, by foreign intelligence, terrorists, or other hostile elements. b. Implements the DoD's TSN strategy, described in the Report on Trusted Defense Systems (Reference (c)) as the Strategy for Systems Assurance and Trustworthiness, through Program Protection and cybersecurity implementation to provide uncompromised weapons and information systems. The TSN strategy integrates robust systems engineering, supply chain risk management (SCRM), security, counterintelligence, intelligence, cybersecurity, hardware and software assurance, and information systems security engineering disciplines to manage risks to system integrity and trust. c. Incorporates and cancels Directive-Type Memorandum 09-016 (Reference (d)). d. Directs actions in accordance with the SCRM implementation strategy of National Security Presidential Directive 54/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23 (Reference (e)), section 806 of Public Law 111-383 (Reference (f)), DoDD 5000.01 (Reference (g)), DoDI 5000.02 (Reference (h)), DoDI 8500.01 (Reference (i)), Committee on National Security Systems Directive No. 505 (Reference (j)), and National Institute for Science and Technology Special Publication 800-161 (Reference (k))."

  United States. Department of Defense

  2017-07-27
• Department of Defense Instruction 8520.03: Identity Authentication for Information Systems

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "In accordance with the authority in DoD Directive (DoDD) 5144.1 (Reference (a)), this Instruction: a. Implements policy in DoD Instruction (DoDI) 8500.01 (Reference (b)), assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures for implementing identity authentication of all entities to DoD information systems. b. Establishes policy directing how all identity authentication processes used in DoD information systems will conform to Reference (b). c. Implements use of the DoD Common Access Card, which is the DoD personal identity verification credential, into identity authentication processes in DoD information systems where appropriate in accordance with Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum (Reference (c)). d. Aligns identity authentication with DoD identity management capabilities identified in the DoD Identity Management Strategic Plan (Reference (d)). e. Establishes and defines sensitivity levels for the purpose of determining appropriate authentication methods and mechanisms. Establishes and defines sensitivity levels for sensitive information as defined in Reference (b) and sensitivity levels for classified information as defined in Volume 1 of DoD Manual 5200.01 (Reference (e))."

  United States. Department of Defense

  2017-07-27
• Department of Defense Instruction 5205.13: Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Cyber Security (CS) Activities

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "This Instruction establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and delegates authority in accordance with the authority in DoD Directive (DoDD) 5144.02 (Reference (a)) for directing the conduct of DIB [defense industrial base] CS/IA [cyber security/information assurance] activities to protect unclassified DoD information, as defined in the Glossary, that transits or resides on unclassified DIB information systems and networks."

  United States. Department of Defense

  2017-07-27
• Agricultural Disaster Assistance [July 27, 2017]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) offers several programs to help farmers recover financially from natural disasters, including drought and floods. All the programs have permanent authorization, and only one requires a federal disaster designation (the emergency loan program). Most programs receive mandatory funding amounts that are 'such sums as necessary' and are not subject to annual discretionary appropriations. The federal crop insurance program offers subsidized policies designed to protect crop producers from unavoidable risks associated with adverse weather and weather-related plant diseases and insect infestations. Policies must be purchased prior to the planting season. Eligible commodities include most major crops and many specialty crops (including fruit, tree nut, vegetable, and nursery crops), as well as forage and pastureland for livestock producers. The Agricultural Act of 2014 (2014 farm bill; P.L. 113-79) enhances the crop insurance program by expanding its scope, covering a greater share of farm losses, and making other modifications that broaden policy coverage. Producers who grow a crop that is currently ineligible for crop insurance may apply for the Noninsured Crop Disaster Assistance Program (NAP)."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Stubbs, Megan

  2017-07-27
• U.S. Petroleum Trade with Venezuela: Financial and Economic Considerations Associated with Possible Sanctions [July 27, 2017]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "The political crisis in Venezuela is at a pivotal point 'See CRS Report R44841, Venezuela: Background and U.S. Policy.' President Nicolas Maduro is convening elections on July 30 for delegates to a constituent assembly to rewrite the country's constitution and possibly dismantle the legislative branch. On July 17, 2017, President Donald Trump issued a statement that declared that 'the United States will take strong and swift economic actions' if the assembly elections occur. Those actions reportedly could include sanctions on Venezuela's energy sector, which generates 95% of its export earnings. While there are humanitarian and political risks of implementing sanctions on Venezuela, this insight explores economic considerations of potential petroleum sector sanctions."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Brown, Phillip (Specialist in Energy Policy); Seelke, Clare Ribando

  2017-07-27
• Selected International Insurance Issues in the 115th Congress [July 27, 2017]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "U.S. insurers and Congress face new policy issues and questions related to the opportunities and risks presented by the growth in the international insurance market and trade in insurance products. Insurance is often seen as a localized product and U.S. insurance regulation has addressed this through a state-centric regulatory system. The McCarran-Ferguson Act, passed by Congress in 1945, gives primacy to the individual states, and every state has its own insurance regulator and state laws governing insurance. While the risks of loss and the regulation may be local, the business of insurance, as with many financial services, has an increasingly substantial international component as companies look to grow and diversify."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Webel, Baird; Fefer, Rachel F.

  2017-07-27
• Special Report: Challenges Facing DHS in Its Attempt to Hire 15,000 Border Patrol Agents and Immigration Officers

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "On January 25, 2017, the President directed DHS to hire an additional 15,000 law enforcement officers. Our objective was to determine whether the Department and its components have the human capital strategies and capabilities to quickly and effectively hire a highly qualified and diverse workforce. While we made no recommendations, this report provides lessons learned from prior DHS OIG, Government Accountability Office, and DHS departmental reports on challenges relating to hiring and other important areas of human capital management. The Department, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) are facing significant challenges in identifying, recruiting, hiring, and fielding the number of law enforcement officers mandated in the Executive Orders. Neither CBP nor ICE could provide complete data to support the operational need or deployment strategies for the additional 15,000 additional agents and officers they were directed to hire. Although DHS has established plans and initiated actions to begin an aggressive hiring surge, in recent years the Department and its components have encountered notable difficulties related to long hire times, proper allocation of staff, and the supply of human resources. Proper workforce planning is needed to ensure correct staffing levels, ratios, and placements, and to guide targeted recruitment campaigns. Conversely, inadequate workforce planning will likely undermine the ability of CBP and ICE to achieve hiring mandates and perform mission essential duties and functions."

  United States. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Inspector General

  2017-07-27
• EMR-ISAC: InfoGram, Volume 17 Issue 30 [July 27, 2017]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  The Emergency Management and Response Information Sharing and Analysis Center's (EMR-ISAC) InfoGram is a weekly publication of information concerning the protection of critical infrastructures relevant to members of the Emergency Services Sector.This issue includes the following articles: "Marijuana Grow Houses a Threat to Firefighters," "Law Enforcement Use of UAS," and "Refresh Training Programs With Short Drills."

  Emergency Management and Response-Information Sharing and Analysis Center (U.S.)

  2017-07-27
• DOD Excess Property: Enhanced Controls Needed for Access to Excess Controlled Property, Statement of Zina D. Merritt, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, Wayne A. McElrath, Director, Forensic Audits and Investigative Service, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) has taken some actions and is planning additional actions to address identified weaknesses in its excess controlled property program. However, internal control deficiencies exist for, among other things, ensuring that only eligible applicants are approved to participate in the Law Enforcement Support Office (LESO) program and receive transfers of excess controlled property. DLA is establishing memorandums of understanding with participating federal agencies intended to, among other things, establish general terms and conditions for participation, revise its program application to require additional prospective participant information, and plans to provide additional online training for participating agencies that is expected to begin in late 2017. However, GAO [Government Accountability Office] created a fictitious federal agency to conduct independent testing of the LESO program's internal controls and DLA's transfer of controlled property to law enforcement agencies. Through the testing, GAO gained access to the LESO program and obtained over 100 controlled items with an estimated value of $1.2 million, including night-vision goggles, simulated rifles, and simulated pipe bombs, which could be potentially lethal items if modified with commercially available items (see photos). GAO's testing identified that DLA has deficiencies in the processes for verification and approval of federal law enforcement agency applications and in the transfer of controlled property, such as DLA personnel not routinely requesting and verifying identification of individuals picking up controlled property or verifying the quantity of approved items prior to transfer. Further, GAO found that DLA has not conducted a fraud risk assessment on the LESO program, including the application process."

  United States. Government Accountability Office

  Merritt, Zina D.

  2017-07-27
• State Department Telecommunications: Information on Vendors and Cyber-Threat Nations

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "Reliance on complex, global information technology (IT) supply chains introduces multiple risks to federal telecommunications systems, including the risk of these systems being manipulated or damaged by leading foreign cyber-threat nations (cyber-threat nations) such as China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. Threats and vulnerabilities created by these cyber-threat nations and other malicious actors can be sophisticated and difficult to detect, and thus pose a significant risk to organizations and federal agencies. Such supply chain risks may include the insertion of counterfeits, tampering, or installation of malicious software or hardware. The federal government views dependence on foreign-manufactured equipment as an emerging threat that introduces potential risks to agency networks. Although it is impossible to completely eliminate all risks, the federal government has taken some steps to mitigate supply chain risks. Agencies are required by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) to ensure that contracts include quality requirements that are determined necessary to protect the government's interest. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has prescribed guidance intended to mitigate supply chain risks. The Department of State (State) has also enacted agency policies that broadly reflect federal law and guidance; these policies are intended to operationalize the federal rules and regulations. We have previously reported on risks to the IT supply chain, as well as risks originating from foreign-manufactured equipment. The Department of State Authorities Act, Fiscal Year 2017 (State Authorities Act), includes a provision for us to review State's critical telecommunications equipment or services obtained from vendors, or those vendors' contractors or subcontractors, that are closely linked to leading cyber-threat nations."

  United States. Government Accountability Office

  2017-07-27
• United States Pacific Command and United States Forces Korea, Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, One Hundred Fifteenth Congress, First Session, April 27, 2017

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  This testimony compilation made by the HSDL staff is from the April 27, 2017 hearing, "United States Pacific Command and United States Forces Korea," before the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services. From the witness statement, this hearing is, "my assessment of the regional security challenges and opportunities of strategic value. First, I will outline some of the specific challenges we face in the Indo-Asia-Pacific including threats to the Homeland. I will highlight critical needs in order to seek your support for budgetary and legislative actions to improve U.S. military readiness in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. I will discuss the value of U.S. strategic force posture and forward presence and how these preconditions improve the readiness of our joint force to fight tonight, enhance our ability to reassure allies and partners, and maintain regional stability. And finally, I will discuss how USPACOM [U.S. Pacific Command] strengthens existing alliances and cultivates critical partnerships with regional actors - both of which deliver strategic benefits and improve readiness to protect and defend U.S. interests." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Harry B. Harris Jr.

  United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services

  2017-07-27
• Sexual Assaults: Expedited Transfer and Special Victims Counsel Program (Fiscal Year 2017 Report to Congress)

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "This report responds to language in House Report 114-668 accompanying the Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act (P.L. 115-31). House Report 114-668 states: The Committee directs the Coast Guard to continue to provide an annual report, due within 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, on the number of expedited requests for transfer made by victims of sexual assault during the prior fiscal year, including the number of applications denied and a description of the rationale for each denied request. The report shall also include the number of service members served by the Special Victim Counsel program during the same period."

  United States. Department of Homeland Security; United States. Department of Homeland Security. Office of the Chief Financial Officer

  2017-07-27
• Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman 2017 Annual Report Teleconference [presentation]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  From the Document: "Under section 452(c) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Ombudsman must submit an Annual Report to Congress by June 30 of each year. The Ombudsman's Annual Report focuses on: [1] The Ombudsman's mission and services; [2] USCIS [United States Citizenship and Immigration Services] programmatic and policy challenges during the reporting period; [3] Pervasive and serious problems, recommendations, and best practices in the administration of our immigration laws."

  United States. Department of Homeland Security

  Kirchner, Julie

  2017-07-27
• Methane and Other Air Pollution Issues in Natural Gas Systems [July 27, 2017]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "Congressional interest in U.S. energy policy has often focused on ways through which the United States could secure more economical, reliable, and cleaner fossil fuel resources both domestically and internationally. Recent expansion in natural gas production, primarily as a result of new or improved technologies (e.g., hydraulic fracturing, directional drilling) used on unconventional resources (e.g., shale, tight sands, and coalbed methane) has made natural gas an increasingly significant component in the U.S. energy supply. This expansion, however, has prompted questions about the potential impacts of natural gas systems on human health and the environment, including impacts on air quality."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Lattanzio, Richard K.

  2017-07-27
• Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 115th Congress [July 26, 2017]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "Political and economic developments in Cuba and U.S. policy toward the island nation, located just 90 miles from the United States, have been significant congressional concerns for many years. Especially since the end of the Cold War, Congress has played an active role in shaping U.S. policy toward Cuba, first with the enactment of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 (CDA; P.L. 102-484, Title XVII) and then with the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-114). Both measures strengthened U.S. economic sanctions on Cuba that had first been imposed in the early 1960s but also provided road maps for a normalization of relations, dependent upon significant political and economic changes in Cuba. Congress partially modified its sanctions-based policy toward Cuba when it enacted the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA; P.L. 106-387, Title IX) allowing for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Sullivan, Mark P.

  2017-07-26
• Transgender Servicemembers: Policy Shifts and Considerations for Congress [July 26, 2017]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "A series of Twitter posts on July, 26, 2017, by President Donald J. Trump are widely being interpreted as a shift in Department of Defense (DOD) policy on service in the Armed Forces by individuals who are transgender, stating. After consultation with my Generals and military experts, please be advised that the United States Government will not accept or allow[...]Transgender individuals to serve in any capacity in the U.S. Military. Our military must be focused on decisive and overwhelming[...]victory and cannot be burdened with the tremendous medical costs and disruption that transgender in the military would entail."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kamarck, Kristy N.

  2017-07-26
• U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Research Report: China's Response to U.S.-South Korean Missile Defense System Deployment and its Implications

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "In July 2016, the U.S. Department of Defense and South Korean Ministry of National Defense announced in a joint statement the alliance decision to deploy a U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) antimissile battery in South Korea to defend against the increasing North Korean missile threat. […] Beijing perceives THAAD as mostly directed at China and as a regional security concern, according to its official statements. Chinese observers claim the THAAD deployment signals the expansion of the U.S.- allied ballistic missile defense architecture in the Asia Pacific, weakens China's nuclear deterrent, and confirms longstanding fears of U.S. containment of China. […] China's forceful opposition to THAAD has significant implications for the United States and the geopolitical landscape in the Asia Pacific. These implications include: China's potential use of economic coercion against other countries during future disputes; the potential use of Chinese countermeasures to overcome the U.S.-led regional missile defense network; increased Chinese missile defense coordination with Russia; additional complications in coordinating U.S. policy toward North Korea with allies and partners in the Asia Pacific; and potential improvements in U.S.-South Korea-Japan cooperation."

  U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission

  Meick, Ethan; Salidjanova, Nargiza

  2017-07-26
• Social Security Numbers: OMB Actions Needed to Strengthen Federal Efforts to Limit Identity Theft Risks by Reducing Collection, Use, and Display, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Social Security, Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "The federal government uses Social Security Numbers (SSNs) as unique identifiers for many purposes, including employment, taxation, law enforcement, and benefits. However, SSNs are also key pieces of identifying information that potentially may be used to perpetrate identity theft. GAO [Government Accountability Office] was asked to review federal government efforts to reduce the collection and use of SSNs. This report examines (1) what government-wide initiatives have been undertaken to assist agencies in eliminating their unnecessary use of SSNs and (2) the extent to which agencies have developed and executed plans to eliminate the unnecessary use and display of SSNs and have identified challenges associated with those efforts. To do so, GAO analyzed reports and guidance on protecting SSNs. GAO also analyzed SSN reduction plans and other documents, administered a questionnaire, and interviewed officials from the 24 CFO [Chief Financial Officers] Act agencies. GAO recommends that OMB [Office of Personnel Management] require complete plans for ongoing reductions in the collection, use, and display of SSNs, require inventories of systems containing SSNs, provide criteria for determining 'unnecessary' use and display, ensure agencies update their progress in annual reports, and monitor agency progress based on clearly defined performance measures. OMB did not comment on GAO's recommendations. We received written comments from SSA and technical comments from eight other agencies, which were incorporated into the final report as appropriate. The other 15 agencies did not provide comments."

  United States. Government Accountability Office

  2017-07-25
• RadResponder Network Applications

  Show summary     Open resource [html]     (open full abstract)

  "This Web page provides links to RadResponder apps for Windows, Apple iOs, and Android devices. RadResponder provides free software tools for logging, transmitting, storing, analyzing, and presenting environmental radiation monitoring data. Data are stored in a secure cloud environment accessible only by the user. RadResponder is a product of collaboration among Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)."

  United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency

  2017-07-25?
• Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate: H.R. 3210: SECRET Act of 2017 [July 25, 2017]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "H.R. 3210 would require the National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB), within the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), to provide three reports to the Congress. The reports would cover information about the backlog in federal investigations for security clearances, the process for conducting security clearances for the Executive Office of the President, and the costs to NBIB and the Department of Defense for such investigations. Information from OPM indicates that the information required for those reports is already compiled for other efforts. Thus, CBO [Congressional Budget Office] estimates it would cost less than $500,000 over the 2018-2022 period to prepare the reports; such spending would be subject to the availability of appropriated funds. Enacting H.R. 3210 would not affect direct spending or revenues; therefore, pay-as-you go procedures do not apply. CBO estimates that enacting H.R. 3210 would not increase net direct spending or on-budget deficits in any of the four consecutive 10-year periods beginning in 2028. H.R. 3210 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal governments."

  United States. Congressional Budget Office

  2017-07-25
• Lebanon [July 25, 2017]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "Since having its boundaries drawn by France after the First World War, Lebanon has struggled to define its national identity. Unlike other countries in the region, its population included Christian, Sunni Muslim, and Shia Muslim communities of roughly comparable size, and with competing visions for the country. Seeking to avoid sectarian conflict, Lebanese leaders created a confessional system that allocated power among the country's religious sects according to their percentage of the population. The system was based on Lebanon's last official census, which was conducted in 1932. As Lebanon's demographics shifted over the years, Muslim communities pushed for the political status quo, favoring Maronite Christians, to be revisited, while the latter worked to maintain their privileges. This tension at times manifested itself in violence, such as during the country's 15-year civil war, but also in ongoing political disputes such as disagreements over revisions to Lebanon's electoral law. To date, domestic political conflicts continue to be shaped in part by the influence of external actors, including Syria and Iran."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Humud, Carla E.

  2017-07-25
• Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process [July 25, 2017]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "This report reviews the process and procedures that currently apply to congressional consideration of foreign arms sales proposed by the President. This includes consideration of proposals to sell major defense equipment, defense articles and services, or the retransfer to third-party states of such military items. Under Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), Congress must be formally notified 30 calendar days before the Administration can take the final steps to conclude a government-to-government foreign military sale of major defense equipment valued at $14 million or more, defense articles or services valued at $50 million or more, or design and construction services valued at $200 million or more. In the case of such sales to NATO member states, NATO, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, or New Zealand, Congress must be formally notified 15 calendar days before the Administration can proceed with the sale. However, the prior notice threshold values are higher for sales to NATO members, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, or New Zealand. Commercially licensed arms sales also must be formally notified to Congress 30 calendar days before the export license is issued if they involve the sale of major defense equipment valued at $14 million or more, or defense articles or services valued at $50 million or more (Section 36(c) AECA). In the case of such sales to NATO member states, NATO, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, or New Zealand, Congress must be formally notified 15 calendar days before the Administration is authorized to proceed with a given sale. As with government-to-government sales, the prior notice threshold values are higher for sales to NATO members, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, or New Zealand."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kerr, Paul K.

  2017-07-25
• Aviation Bills Take Flight, but Legislative Path Remains Unclear [July 25, 2017]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "Both the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee and the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation acted favorably on bills to reauthorize the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and other aviation programs during the last week of June. The two bills, H.R. 2997 and S. 1405, have significant differences, many of them related to provisions in the House bill that would create a not-for-profit private corporation to take over responsibility for running the national air traffic control system. The Senate bill contains no similar provisions, and the path forward for the legislation will depend on whether the two houses can reach agreement on an issue that they were unable to bridge last year. Lack of agreement on air traffic control reforms in the 114th Congress led to the passage of a one-year aviation extension (P.L. 114-190) that will expire at the end of FY2017."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Tang, Rachel; Elias, Bartholomew

  2017-07-25
• Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy [July 25, 2017]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "Oman is located along the Arabian Sea, on the southern approaches to the Strait of Hormuz, across from Iran. Except for a brief period of Persian rule, Omanis have remained independent since expelling the Portuguese in 1650. The Al Said monarchy began in 1744, extending Omani influence into Zanzibar and other parts of East Africa until 1861. A long-term rebellion led by the imam of Oman, leader of the Ibadhi sect (neither Sunni nor Shiite and widely considered 'moderate conservative') ended in 1959. Oman's population is 75% Ibadhi-a moderate form of Islam that is closer in philosophy to Sunni Islam than to Shiism. Sultan Qaboos bin Sa'id Al Said, born in November 1940, is the eighth in the line of the monarchy; he became sultan in July 1970 when, with British support, he forced his father, Sultan Said bin Taymur Al Said, to abdicate."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth

  2017-07-25
• Weekly Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Cost Report Through June 30, 2017

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  This document provides information on the daily and weekly costs of US Department of Defense operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) through June 30, 2017.

  United States. Department of Defense

  2017-07-25
• Southwest Border: Additional Actions Needed to Strengthen Management and Assess Effectiveness of Land-based Surveillance Technology, Statement of Rebecca Gambler, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) deploys land-based surveillance technologies to help monitor and secure the border and apprehend individuals who attempt to cross the border illegally. GAO [Government Accountability Office] has reported on the progress and challenges DHS and its components have faced implementing its border security efforts. This statement addresses (1) the status of CBP efforts to deploy land-based surveillance technologies along the southwest border and (2) CBP's efforts to measure the effectiveness of these technologies. This statement is based on GAO reports and testimonies from 2011 through 2016, selected updates conducted in 2017, and ongoing work for this subcommittee related to border surveillance technology. For ongoing work and updates, GAO analyzed technology program documents; interviewed DHS, CBP, and U.S. Border Patrol officials; and conducted site visits to Arizona and Texas to observe technologies. GAO has made recommendations to DHS to improve its management of plans and programs for surveillance technologies. DHS has generally agreed. DHS has taken actions or described planned actions to address some of these recommendations. GAO continues to believe that these recommendations could strengthen CBP's management efforts and will continue to monitor CBP's efforts."

  United States. Government Accountability Office

  Gambler, Rebecca

  2017-07-25
• Coast Guard Acquisitions: Limited Strategic Planning Efforts Pose Risk for Future Acquisitions, Statement of Marie A. Mak, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "In order to meet its missions of maritime safety, security, and environmental stewardship, the Coast Guard, a component within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), employs a variety of assets, several of which are approaching the end of their intended service lives. As part of its efforts to modernize its surface and air assets (known as recapitalization), the Coast Guard has begun acquiring new vessels and air assets. Concerns surrounding the affordability of this effort remain as the Coast Guard continues to pursue new acquisitions such as the polar icebreaker, while also acquiring the Offshore Patrol Cutter-which is estimated to cost $12.1 billion through 2032. This statement addresses the (1) extent that the Coast Guard develops planning tools to guide its acquisition portfolio, and (2) potential risks the Coast Guard faces in its polar icebreaker acquisition. This statement is based on GAO's extensive body of published and ongoing work examining the Coast Guard's acquisition efforts over several years. GAO [Government Accountability Office] is not making recommendations in this statement but has made them to the Coast Guard and DHS in the past regarding recapitalization, including that the Coast Guard develop a 20-year fleet modernization plan that identifies all acquisitions and the fiscal resources needed to acquire them. DHS agreed with this recommendation.

  United States. Government Accountability Office

  Mak, Marie A.

  2017-07-25