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Procuring Differently: How Colorado Used User Research and Active Vendor Management for COVID-19 Technology
From the Summary: "As part of an effective pandemic response, the State of Colorado needed a comprehensive digital solution for case investigation and contact tracing, which has been used by local public health agencies. In June 2020, the state implemented an innovative and entirely virtual vendor selection process to evaluate these solutions under the direction of the Colorado Digital Service (CDS), a team within the Governor's Office of Information Technology. 'Vendors were invited to provide a test environment where their solution could be assessed' based on functionality, user experience, and technical fit. Stakeholders across the state of Colorado participated directly in an interactive evaluation and selection process, which provided opportunities to assess vendors' work style and culture, center evaluation on user needs, and generate buy-in from users. A human-centered approach was essential to ensure widespread use of the solution and to provide robust data for state-level decision-making on its case-investigation and contact-tracing efforts. By requiring vendors to demonstrate value through 'demos not memos [hyperlink],' CDS was able to support the Colorado Department of Public Health and the Environment (CDPHE) in selecting the solution that enhanced CDPHE's ability to meet public health needs while still saving the state time and money. 'A vendor was selected in just 19 days and $15 million under budget.' Separate from this project, the State of Colorado has also enabled software for the public to receive exposure notifications [hyperlink]."
Georgetown University. Beeck Center for Social Impact and Innovation
Faust, Elaina; Martin, Reilly; Carroll, Conor . . .
2021-02
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One- and Two-Family Residential Building Fires (2017-2019)
From the Document: "This topical report is an update to the 'One- and Two-Family Residential Building Fires (2013-2015)' (Volume 18, Issue 2) report, which was released in June 2017. As part of a series of topical reports that address fires in the major residential building types, the remainder of this report addresses the characteristics of one- and two-family residential building fires as reported to NFIRS [National Fire Incident Reporting System]. This data is useful by itself and as a point of comparison with other residential building categories. Comparisons to multifamily residential building fires noted throughout the report are based on analyses from the 'Multifamily Residential Building Fires (2017-2019)' (Volume 21, Issue 7) topical report. The focus is on fires reported from 2017 to 2019, the most current data available at the time of the analysis. Complete or full years of data are required for statistical analyses presented in these topical reports. Although the NFIRS data for a calendar year are often reported to the USFA [U.S. Fire Administration] throughout the year, fire departments and or states have until the official cutoff date as set forth by the National Fire Data Center to submit their data to the USFA. Typically, this cutoff date is July 1 after the end of the previous calendar year."
United States Fire Administration; United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency
2021-07
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Multifamily Residential Building Fires (2017-2019)
From the Document: "This topical report is an update to the 'Multifamily Residential Building Fires (2013-2015)' (Volume 18, Issue 3) report, released in June 2017. As part of a series of topical reports that address fires in the major residential building types, the remainder of this report addresses the characteristics of multifamily residential building fires as reported to the NFIRS [National Fire Incident
Reporting System]. Comparisons to one- and two-family residential building fires are noted based on analyses from the 'One- and Two-Family Residential Building Fires (2017-2019)' (Volume 21, Issue 6) topical report. The focus is on fires reported from 2017 to 2019, the most current data available at the time of the analysis. Complete or full years of data are required for statistical analyses presented in these topical reports. Although the NFIRS data for a calendar year are often reported to the USFA [U.S. Fire Administration] throughout the year, fire departments and or states have until the official cutoff date as set forth by the National Fire Data Center to submit their data to the USFA. Typically, this cutoff date is July 1 after the end of the previous calendar year. [...] For this report, the terms 'residential fires' and 'multifamily fires' are synonymous with 'residential building fires' and 'multifamily residential building fires,' respectively. 'Multifamily fires' is used throughout the body of this report; the findings, tables, figures, headings and endnotes reflect the full category of 'multifamily residential building fires.'"
United States Fire Administration; United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency
2021-08
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Addressing Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities Facing Our Nation's Physical Infrastructure, Hearing Before the Committee on Environment and Public Works, United States Senate, One Hundred Seventeenth Congress, First Session, July 21, 2021
This is the July 21, 2021 hearing on "Addressing Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities Facing Our Nation's Physical Infrastructure," held before the U.S. Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works. From the opening statement of Thomas R. Carper: "We are joined this morning by leaders who will discuss cyber vulnerabilities in our highways, our municipal drinking water, our wastewater, rural water systems, as well as inland waterway systems. [...] These threats are large in scale and require widespread collaboration. I am looking forward to hearing from all of our distinguished witnesses today on how Federal and State agencies can work together with industry and community leaders to strengthen the cybersecurity of each of these vital parts of our infrastructure[.]" Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Mike Gallagher, Angus King, Shailen Bhatt, John Sullivan, Sophia Oberton, and Evan Pratt.
United States. Government Publishing Office
2021
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Fiscal Year 2022 Rotary Wing Aviation Budget Request: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred Seventeenth Congress, First Session, June 30, 2021
This is the June 30, 2021 hearing on "Fiscal Year 2022 Rotary Wing Aviation Budget Request," held before the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces of the Committee on Armed Services. From the opening statement of Donald Norcross: "We obviously have a large and distinguished panel of witnesses here today, and I thank them for being on time, even though not all of us were, and making the time to have this discussion on what is incredibly important, the services' rotary wing aviation program, and the process, certainly the challenges we need to be aware of before we mark up the 2022 National Defense Authorization Act. Rotary wing aircraft serves diverse and unique purposes across the military branches, and each service is currently in different stages of modernization of its helicopter fleets. Successful modernization and sustainment of rotary wing aircraft will lay a solid foundation for the futures of the joint force." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Douglas Bush, Darlene Costello, and Frederick "Jay" Stefany.
United States. Government Publishing Office
2021
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Safety of Hazardous Liquid Pipelines (Part 2): Integrity Management, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, Second Session, July 15, 2010
From the opening statement of Corrine Brown: "The Subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on pipeline operation management of the safety of hazardous liquid pipelines, more common known as 'integrity management.' This hearing is the third in a series of oversight hearings the Subcommittee will hold as we look toward reauthorizing the Department's pipeline safety program. On February 1, 2000, in the wake of several tragic pipeline ruptures, PHMSA [Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration] issued a Final Ruling, requiring pipeline operators to develop and implement a written Integrity Management Program. Under the program, operators are required to identify all of their pipeline segments that could affect a high-consequence area, such as a high-population area, an environmentally sensitive area, evaluate the integrity of such pipeline segments and repair and report certain defects identified as a result of these evaluations. A lot of successes came out of the Integrity Management Program. For example, operators have reported to PHMSA that they have made more than 31,000 repairs to hazardous liquid pipeline segments, that if left unaddressed, could have resulted in a spill. Of these, about 7,000 detects were considered to be so serious that immediate repairs were required under the regulations. Another 25,000 detects had to be repaired within a 60- to a 180-day time period. This is a real success, and I anticipate that we will see similar successes from the gas Integrity Management Program, but there is always room for improvement, and that is why we are here today." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Laura Richardson, Richard Adams, David Guttenberg, Greg Jones, Richard B. Kuprewicz, and Cynthia L. Quarterman.
United States. Government Printing Office
2010
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Department of Defense Information Technology, Cybersecurity, and Information Assurance for Fiscal Year 2022: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Cyber, Innovative Technologies, and Information Systems of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred Seventeenth Congress, First Session, June 29, 2021
This is the June 29, 2021 hearing on "Department of Defense Information Technology, Cybersecurity, and Information Assurance for Fiscal Year 2022," held before the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Cyber, Innovative Technologies, and Information Systems of the Committee on Armed Services. From the opening statement of Donald Norcross: "So I want to welcome everyone to today's hearing on the Department of Defense information technology, cybersecurity, and information assurance. This is the subcommittee's first hearing on the Department's current IT [information technology] efforts and the requested investments for fiscal year 2022. Since this subcommittee was formed at the start of the 117th Congress, our members have been eager and encouraged to see the Department of Defense approach its information technologies with a prioritization that has been lacking in the past. Of the many lessons from the pandemic, we have seen clearly that technology can revolutionize how we conduct our business, whether that is in Congress, or in the Department of Defense. However, it also requires that the infrastructure which enables our technology is prioritized and secured in a commensurate way." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: John Sherman.
United States. Government Publishing Office
2021
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Safety of Hazardous Liquid Pipelines: Regulated vs. Unregulated Pipelines, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, Second Session, June 29, 2010
From the opening statement of Corrine Brown: "The Subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on the safety of hazardous liquid pipeline. Today's hearing will focus on which pipelines are regulated, which pipelines are exempt from safety regulations, and any gaps that may exist in those regulations. With almost 200,000 miles of on-shore and off-shore hazardous liquid pipelines in the United States, it is critical that DOT [Department of Transportation] ensure that all pipelines, regardless of their size and location, are being operated in a safe manner. A few things have become crystal clear as a result of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. One is that the industry cannot be relied upon to regulate itself. It is up to Congress and the Federal agencies to establish that high bar of safety that the industries must meet and that our constituents expect and then to enforce those safety standards. Second, although the industry talks a lot about safety, it is clear that the culture of safety is not there. This is evident in their history of accidents, their lack of compliance with existing regulations, and their disregard for worker safety." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Lois N. Epstein, Stephen Falgoust, Deborah A. Hersman, Cynthia Quarterman, Steve Cohen, James L. Oberstar, Laura Richardson, Corrine Brown, Rick Larsen, and Albio Sires.
United States. Government Printing Office
2010
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After Action Report/Improvement Plan: Full Participation Plume Exposure Pathway Exercise, Limerick Generating Station, Pottstown, Pennsylvania [November 19, 2019]
From the Executive Summary: "On November 19, 2019, a full participation Plume Exposure Pathway Exercise was conducted and evaluated for the IO-Mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) around the Limerick Generating Station (LGS) by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Region III. The previous full participation exercise at this site was evaluated on November 14, 2017. [...]The purpose of the exercise and out-of-sequence demonstrations was to assess the capabilities of State, counties, and local jurisdictions to implement Radiological Emergency Response Plans (RERP) and Procedures to protect the property and lives of residents and transients in the event of an emergency at the Limerick Generating Station. The findings in this report are based on the evaluations of the Federal evaluation team, with final determinations made by the FEMA, Region III Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) Chairperson, and approved by FEMA Headquarters."
United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency
2020-03-04
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North Korea Military Power: A Growing Regional 'and' Global Threat
From the Preface: "In September 1981, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger asked the Defense Intelligence Agency to produce an unclassified overview of the Soviet Union's military strength. The purpose was to provide America's leaders, the national security community, and the public a comprehensive and accurate view of the threat. The result: the first edition of Soviet Military Power. DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency] produced over 250,000 copies, and it soon became an annual publication that was translated into eight languages and distributed around the world. In many cases, this report conveyed the scope and breadth of Soviet military strength to U.S. policymakers and the public for the first time. DIA also produced similar documents describing North Korean military strength in 1991 and 1995. In 2017, DIA began to produce a series of unclassified Defense Intelligence overviews of major foreign military challenges facing the United States. This volume provides details on North Korea's defense and military goals, strategy, plans and intentions; the organization, structure, and capabilities of its military to supporting those goals; and the enabling infrastructure and industrial base. This product and other reports in the series are intended to inform our public, leaders and troops, the national security community, and partner nations about the challenges we face in the 21st century."
United States. Defense Intelligence Agency
2021
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After Action Report/Improvement Plan: Point Beach Nuclear Plant [April 17, 2012]
From the Executive Summary: "On April 17, 2012, a Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Plume Exposure Pathway Exercise was conducted for the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) around the Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP) by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS/FEMA), Region V. The purpose of the exercise was to assess the level of State and local preparedness for response to a radiological emergency. [...] There was one Deficiency identified for Manitowoc County. On June 28, 2012, this Deficiency was successfully re-demonstrated. No Deficiencies were identified during this exercise for the State of Wisconsin or Kewaunee County. There were two Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCAs) identified for the State of Wisconsin."
United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency
2012-07-17
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United States Navy Administration (NAVADMIN): COVID-19 Consolidated Disposition Authority (CCDA)
From the Purpose: "This NAVADMIN [Naval Administrative Message] announces the assignment of the Chief of Naval Personnel as the COVID [Coronavirus Disease] Consolidated Disposition Authority (CCDA), and provides procedural guidance and reporting requirements for administrative disposition of individual Navy service members, active duty and Selected Reserve, who are not fully vaccinated[.]"
United States. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
2021-10-13
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DoD OIG COVID-19 Oversight Plan: 2021 Q4 Update
This is the 2021 fourth quarter (Q4) update of the Department of Defense (DoD) Office of Inspector General (OIG) coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) Oversight Plan. From the Introduction: "Since the start of the coronavirus disease-2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, the DoD has supported the Nation's efforts to prevent, prepare for, and respond to the challenges during these uncertain times. The DoD has coordinated closely with other Federal agencies and provided medical, logistical, and humanitarian assistance in the United States and across the globe. In response to an executive order issued by President Joe Biden, the Secretary of Defense mandated COVID-19 vaccinations of all Service members at the end of August 2021. On October 1, 2021, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a separate memorandum mandating that DoD civilian employees be fully vaccinated against COVID-19 by November 22, 2021. In a recent message to the force, the Secretary of Defense reiterated the importance of the vaccines, stating, 'All FDA-authorized COVID-19 vaccines are safe and highly effective. They will protect you and your family. They will protect your unit, your ship, and your co-workers. And they will ensure we remain the most lethal and ready force in the world.' The DoD Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) released its initial COVID-19 Pandemic Oversight Plan in May 2020 and continues to publish regular updates listing DoD OIG pandemic-related projects and published reports."
United States. Department of Defense. Office of the Inspector General
2021-10-20?
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Environmental Assessment of Proposed Tracer Particle and Gas Releases: Chemical and Bio-Defense Testbed (CBT) Program, Urban Threat Dispersion (UTD) Program, Version 5
From the Executive Summary: "The United States (U.S.) Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), in partnership with the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) and other stakeholders in New York City (NYC), is proposing to conduct testing events to improve resiliency of urban areas and transportation systems against chemical or biological terrorist attacks (Proposed Action). This Environmental Assessment (EA) documents the analysis of any potential effects on the environment resulting from the Proposed Action. This EA is being coordinated with stakeholders and the public for information and comment, in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 as outlined in 40 CFR [Code of Federal Regulations] Parts 1500-1508 and DHS Directive 023-01, Rev. 01 and DHS Instruction Manual 023-01-001-01, Rev.01, implementing NEPA. [...] The Proposed Action would take place between September 2021 and May 2022 and involves the release of particle and gas tracer materials directed into the open-air space in several predetermined locations within NYC. The Proposed Action would include the release of low concentrations of safe particle and gas tracer materials as part of two programs - the Urban Threat Dispersion (UTD) program and the Chemical and Bio-defense Testbed (CBT) program. The Proposed Action and the No Action Alternatives are considered in this EA."
United States. Department of Homeland Security. Science and Technology Directorate
2021-08-17
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Exercise Report: Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant [June 24, 2009]
From the Executive Summary: "On June 24, 2009, a Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Ingestion Exposure Pathway Exercise was conducted for the 50-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) around the Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP) by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS/FEMA), Region V. The purpose of the exercise was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency. [...] The June 24, 2009, Ingestion Exposure Pathway Exercise completed the commitment by the State of Wisconsin to reschedule the Ingestion Exposure Pathway Exercise that was originally to take place on December 9 and 10, 2008. This exercise was terminated early by the State of Wisconsin due to a real-world weather emergency. The early termination precluded the completion of virtually all activities for both the plume and ingestion phases of the exercise that were scheduled for December 9 and 10, 2008. [...] There were no out of sequence activities for the State of Wisconsin or Kewaunee and Manitowoc Counties. [...] There were no Deficiencies identified during this exercise for the State of Wisconsin or the Counties of Kewaunee and Manitowoc. There were no Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCAs) identified for the State of Wisconsin and Kewaunee and Manitowoc Counties during this exercise."
United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency
2009-07-22
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Final Exercise Report: Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant [December 5, 2006]
From the Executive Summary: "On December 5, 2006, a Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Partial Participation Plume Exposure Pathway Exercise was conducted for the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) around the Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant (PBNPP) by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Chicago Field Office (CFO). The purpose of the exercise was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency. [...] There were no Deficiencies identified during this exercise for the State of Wisconsin or the Counties of Kewaunee and Manitowoc. [...] There was one Area Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA) identified during this exercise for the State of Wisconsin under Criterion 1 .e. 1 - Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations, whereby the permanent record dosimeters used at the MS-1 [Medical Services] hospital were out of date. [...] There was one ARCA identified for Kewaunee County under Criterion 5.b. 1 - Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media, whereby conflicting instructions were concurrently broadcast in Livestock Advisory and EAS [Emergency Alert System] Evacuation messages directing farmers to simultaneously tend to their livestock and evacuate the area. [...] There was one ARCA identified for Manitowoc County under Criterion 5.b. 1 - Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media, whereby an incorrect 'hotline' telephone number for special populations was given to the media."
United States. Department of Homeland Security
2007-03-04
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Exercise Report: Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant [December 9, 2008]
From the Executive Summary: "On December 9 and 10, 2008, a Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Full Participation Plume and Ingestion Exposure Pathway Exercise was scheduled for the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) around the Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant (PBNPP) by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region V. The purpose of this exercise was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency. The exercise was terminated early by the State of Wisconsin due to a real-world weather emergency. The termination occurred prior to notification to the State by the PBNPP that the site had declared a General Emergency (GE) Emergency Classification Level (ECL). The early termination precluded the completion of virtually all activities for both the plume and ingestion phases of the exercise that were scheduled for December 9 and 10, 2008. A determination was made by DHS/FEMA that credit would be given only for the out-of-sequence activities completed on December 8, 2008, and for prior issues corrected during exercise play up until the time the State terminated play in the exercise. The exercise activities for which credit was given were held in accordance with DHS/FEMA's policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local radiological emergency response plans (RERPs) and procedures."
United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency; United States. Department of Homeland Security
2009-03-09
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Final Exercise Report: Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant [December 5,2000]
From the Executive Summary: "On December 5, 2000, an exercise was conducted in the Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) around the Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Region V. The purpose of the exercise was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency. This exercise also incorporated draft evaluation materials proposed for the 'New Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Exercises Evaluation Methodology,' as defined by FEMA National Office. [...] There were no Deficiencies identified as a result of this exercise."
United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency
2001-03-19
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After Action Report/Improvement Plan: Point Beach Nuclear Plant [October 26, 2010]
From the Executive Summary: "On October 26, 2010, a Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Plume Exposure Pathway Exercise was conducted for the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) around the Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP) by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS/FEMA), Region V. The purpose of the exercise was to assess the level of State and local preparedness for response to a radiological emergency. This exercise was conducted in accordance with DHS/FEMA's policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local Radiological Emergency Response Plans (RERPs) and procedures."
United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency; United States. Department of Homeland Security
2011-01-19
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After Action Report/Improvement Plan: Point Beach Nuclear Plant [September 19 & 20, 2017]
From the Executive Summary: "On September 19 & 20, 2017, a Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Full-Participation Ingestion Pathway Exercise was conducted for the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) around the Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP) by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS/FEMA), Region V. The purpose of the exercise was to assess the level of State and local preparedness for response to a radiological emergency. This exercise was conducted in accordance with DHS/FEMA's policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local Radiological Emergency Response Plans (RERPs) and procedures. The previous exercise for this site was conducted on September 15, 2015. The qualifying emergency preparedness exercise for the PBNP was conducted on March 9, 1982."
United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency; United States. Department of Homeland Security
2017-12-28
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Final Exercise Report: Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant [September 13, 2000]
From the Executive Summary: "On September 13, 2000, an exercise was conducted in the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zones (EPZ) around the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant. The purpose of the exercise was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency. This exercise was held in accordance with the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local Radiological Emergency Response Plans (RERP's) and procedures. [...] The State and local organizations, except where noted in this report, demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and adequately implemented them. No Deficiencies were identified during this exercise. Four Areas Requiring Corrective Action (two for the State of Minnesota, one for the State of Wisconsin, and one for Pierce County) were identified during this exercise. There were three prior issues (two for the State of Minnesota and one for Pierce County). All prior issues were resolved during this exercise."
United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency
2001-01-04
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Medical Services Drill Report: Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant [October 20, 1999]
From the Executive Summary: "On October 20, 1999, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Region V, conducted a medical drill in the plume exposure pathway emergency-planning zone (EPZ) around the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant. The purpose of this medical drill was to assess the ability of off-site agencies to respond to a medical emergency involving a potentially radioactively contaminated onsite worker from the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant. The medical drill was held in accordance with FEMA's policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local emergency response plans. [...] The local organizations, except where noted in this report, demonstrated knowledge of their organizational emergency response plans and procedures, and adequately implemented them. There were no Deficiencies or Areas Requiring Corrective Actions (ARCAs) identified as a result of this drill."
United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency
1999-11-15
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Final Exercise Report: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station [July 12, 2000]
From the Executive Summary: "On July 12, 2000, an exercise was conducted in the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ) around the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Region V. The purpose of the exercise was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency. [...] There were no Deficiencies and three Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCAs) identified as a result of this exercise."
United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency
2001-02-02
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Final Exercise Report: Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant [May 15, 2002]
From the Executive Summary: "On May 15, 2002, an exercise was conducted in the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zones (EPZ) around the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Region V. The purpose of this exercise was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency. [...] No Deficiencies were identified during this exercise. Four Area's Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA) were-issued in conjunction with this exercise."
United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency
2002-08-14
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Final Exercise Report: Quad Cities Generating Station [July 10, 2002]
From the Executive Summary: "On July 10, 2002, a partial participation exercise was conducted in the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ) around the Quad Cities Generating Station by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Region V. The purpose of the exercise was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency. [...] There were no Deficiencies or Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCAs) identified as a result of this exercise."
United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency
2002-10-01
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After Action Report/Improvement Plan: Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant [July 10, 2012]
From the Executive Summary: "On July 10, 2012, a Full Participation Plume Exposure Pathway Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Exercise evaluation was conducted by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) around the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP). The purpose of the exercise was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency. This exercise was held in accordance with DHS/FEMA's policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local Radiological Emergency Response Plans (RERPs) and procedures. The most recent exercise at this site was conducted on August 24, 2010. The qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted on December 8, 1981. [...] Sections 3 and 4 of this report provide detailed information regarding any Deficiencies, ARCAs, Planning Issues and Schedule of Corrective Actions."
United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency; United States. Department of Homeland Security
2012-10-29
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After Action Report/Improvement Plan: Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant [August 24, 2010]
From the Executive Summary: "On August 24, 2010, a Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Full Participation Plume Exposure Pathway Exercise evaluation was conducted by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) around the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP). The purpose of the exercise was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency. This exercise was held in accordance with DHS/FEMA's policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local Radiological Emergency Response Plans (RERPs) and procedures. The most recent exercise at this site was conducted on July 22, 2008. The qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted on December 8, 1981. [...] Except where noted in this report, the State and local organizations demonstrated knowledge of and adequately implemented their emergency response plans and procedures."
United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency; United States. Department of Homeland Security
2010-12-03
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After Action Report/Improvement Plan: Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant [June 28, 2016]
From the Executive Summary: "On June 28, 2016, a Full Participation (State of Minnesota) and Partial Participation (State of Wisconsin) Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Plume Exposure Pathway Exercise for the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) was conducted in the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) around the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS/FEMA), Region V. The purpose of the exercise was to assess the level of preparedness of State and local jurisdictions in responding to a radiological emergency. This exercise was held in accordance with DHS/FEMA policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local Radiological Emergency Response Plans (RERPs) and procedures. The most recent exercise at this site was conducted on July 29, 2014. The qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted on December 8, 1981. [...] The State and local organizations demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and adequately implemented them. No Level 1 or Level 2 Findings, or Plan Issues were identified for the State of Minnesota and the Counties of Dakota and Goodhue during this demonstration. No Level I or Level 2 Findings, or Plan Issues were identified for the State of Wisconsin or for Pierce County during this demonstration."
United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency; United States. Department of Homeland Security
2016-07-28
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Final Exercise Report: Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant [June 16, 2004]
From the Executive Summary: "On June 16, 2004, an exercise was conducted in the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) around the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Region V. The purpose of this exercise was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency. This exercise was held in accordance with DHS/FEMAs policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local Radiological Emergency Response Plans (RERPs) and procedures. The most recent exercise at this site was conducted on May 15, 2002. The qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted on December 8, 1981. [...] State and local organizations, except where noted in this report, demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and adequately implemented them."
United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency; United States. Department of Homeland Security
2004-09-30
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Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation: Hearing Before the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, One Hundred Fourteenth Congress, First Session, December 9, 2015
This testimony compilation is from the December 9, 2015 hearing, "Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation," before the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary. From the opening statement of Chuck Grassley: "The FBI's mission is to protect us from the most dangerous threats facing our nation. The deadly attacks in Paris last month, and in California last week, confirmed that radical Islamic terrorism continues to be such a threat, regardless of whether that's politically correct or convenient for President Obama. ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] is a determined enemy executing a plan to gain and hold territory, enrich itself, inspire followers worldwide, and launch deadly attacks against the West. And the American people are worried. Not just about terrorism. But about the President's inability or unwillingness to rally the country, lead our international partners, develop a credible strategy to destroy ISIS, and execute it. We are now paying the price for that weakness. At almost every turn, events have proven the President wrong about ISIS. In August 2012, he drew a 'red line,' warning the Assad's regime not to use chemical weapons in Syria. But the President backed down after Assad gassed his own people, and ISIS blossomed in the chaos that followed. In January 2014, the President referred to ISIS as the 'j.v.,' or junior varsity. It promptly spent the next six months conquering territory across Syria and Iraq. In August of that same year, the President conceded that he didn't have a strategy to defeat ISIS. A year and a half later, he remains without a coherent one. Even former Secretary Clinton admitted the other day that we're not winning this fight." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: James B. Comey, Jr..
United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary
2015-12-09
