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Joint Technical Alert: FASTCash 2.0: North Korea's BeagleBoyz Robbing Banks

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From the Summary: "This joint Technical Alert (TA) is the result of analytic efforts among the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Department of the Treasury (Treasury), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM). Working with U.S. government partners, CISA, Treasury, FBI, and USCYBERCOM identified malware and indicators of compromise (IOCs) used by the North Korean government in an automated teller machine (ATM) cash-out scheme--referred to by the U.S. Government as 'FASTCash 2.0: North Korea's BeagleBoyz Robbing Banks.' CISA, Treasury, FBI, and USCYBERCOM highlight the cyber threat posed by North Korea--formally known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)--and provide recommended steps to mitigate the threat."

United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency; United States. Department of the Treasury; United States. Department of Justice . . .

2020?
Election Infrastructure Security Resource Guide: Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency U.S. Department of Homeland Security

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From the Document: "Americans' confidence that their votes count--and are counted correctly--relies on secure election systems. In recent years, American citizens have become increasingly uneasy about potential threats to the Nation's election infrastructure. Cyber intrusions to voting machines and voter registration systems diminish the overall public confidence elected officials need to perform their public duties and undermine the integrity of the Nation's democratic process. If left unaddressed, system vulnerabilities will continue to threaten the stability of our Nation's democratic system. Election infrastructure security is a priority for the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), based in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). As the lead agency for securing the Nation's homeland, DHS, through CISA, is responsible for maintaining public trust and confidence in America's election system. CISA works directly with election officials throughout the United States to help them protect election systems by sharing timely and actionable threat information and offering cybersecurity services to safeguard their election systems."

United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency

2020-09
Ransomware Guide

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From the Overview: "Ransomware is a form of malware designed to encrypt files on a device, rendering any files and the systems that rely on them unusable. Malicious actors then demand ransom in exchange for decryption. In recent years, ransomware incidents have become increasingly prevalent among the Nation's state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) government entities and critical infrastructure organizations. Ransomware incidents can severely impact business processes and leave organizations without the data they need to operate and deliver mission-critical services. Malicious actors have adjusted their ransomware tactics over time to include pressuring victims for payment by threatening to release stolen data if they refuse to pay and publicly naming and shaming victims as secondary forms of extortion. The monetary value of ransom demands has also increased, with some demands exceeding US $1 million. Ransomware incidents have become more destructive and impactful in nature and scope. Malicious actors engage in lateral movement to target critical data and propagate ransomware across entire networks. These actors also increasingly use tactics, such as deleting system backups, that make restoration and recovery more difficult or infeasible for impacted organizations. The economic and reputational impacts of ransomware incidents, throughout the initial disruption and, at times, extended recovery, have also proven challenging for organizations large and small. This 'Ransomware Guide' includes two resources: Part 1: Ransomware Prevention Best Practices; Part 2: Ransomware Response Checklist."

United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency

2020-09
Securing Industrial Control Systems: A Unified Initiative, FY 2019-2023

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From the Document: "Through this 'One CISA' initiative, CISA [Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency] will work with critical infrastructure (CI) owners and operators to build industrial control systems (ICS) security capabilities that directly empower ICS stakeholders to secure their operations against ICS threats. We will also work to improve CISA's ability to anticipate, prioritize, and manage national-level ICS risk. [...] 'Securing Industrial Control Systems: A Unified Initiative' lays out a five-year plan (Fiscal Years 2019--2023) that defines how CISA will prioritize and organize our approach to ICS security."

United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency

2020-07
Cyber Threats to Voting Processes Could Slow But Not Prevent Voting

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From the Document: "The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) are issuing this announcement to inform the public that attempts by cyber actors to compromise election infrastructure could slow but not prevent voting. The FBI and CISA have not identified any threats, to date, capable of preventing Americans from voting or changing vote tallies for the 2020 Elections. Any attempts tracked by FBI and CISA have remained localized and were blocked, minimal, or easily mitigated."

United States. Federal Bureau of Investigation; United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency

2020-09-23
CISA Analysis: FY2020 Risk and Vulnerability Assessments

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From the Introduction: "This report analyzes a sample attack path that a cyber threat actor could take to compromise an organization with weaknesses that are representative of those CISA [Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency] observed in the FY20 RVAs [Risk and Vulnerability Assessments]. The path comprises six successive tactics, or 'steps': 'Initial Access', 'Command and Control', 'Lateral Movement', 'Privilege Escalation', 'Collection', and 'Exfiltration'. In addition to this analysis, the report includes the following observations: [1] Most of the successful attacks proved to be methods commonly used by threat actors, e.g., phishing, use of default credentials. [2]The list of tools and techniques used to conduct these common attacks is ever changing. [3] Many of the organizations exhibited the same weaknesses."

United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency

2021-07
Chain of Custody and Critical Infrastructure Systems

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From the Document: "Chain of custody is a complex process. Often associated with the preservation of evidence for law enforcement, chain of custody also plays an important role in security and risk mitigation for critical infrastructure sectors and their assets. Without secure chain of custody practices, critical infrastructure systems and assets could be unknowingly accessed and manipulated by threat actors. The integrity of critical infrastructure assets and systems could also be questioned, with the inability of critical infrastructure owners and operators to prove otherwise. This CISA [Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency] Insights provides an overview of what chain of custody is, highlights the potential impacts and risks resulting from a broken chain of custody, and offers critical infrastructure owners and operators an initial framework for securing chain of custody for their physical and digital assets."

United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency
Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation Program Network Security Management - What is Happening on the Network? How is the Network Protected?

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From the Document: "The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) Program is a dynamic approach to fortifying the cybersecurity of government networks and systems. The CDM Program provides cybersecurity tools, integration services, and dashboards to participating agencies to help them improve their respective security postures. The CDM Program ultimately reduces the threat surface and improves federal cybersecurity response through four capability areas: Asset Management, Identity and Access Management, Network Security Management (NSM), and Data Protection Management. The NSM capability is designed to provide agencies with greater visibility into what is happening on their networks, which also gives them a better understanding of how the networks are being protected. This capability makes use of defense-in-depth boundary protection mechanisms and incident detection and response procedures to protect agencies against hacking, misuse, and unauthorized changes of network devices. NSM capabilities protect the external and internal boundaries of agency systems by providing visibility into network behavior, firewall traffic, encrypted and decrypted data, virtual private network connection, and ports and protocols. NSM consists of four overarching component capabilities, including: boundary protection (BOUND); manage events (MNGEVT); operate, monitor, and improve (OMI); and design and build in security (DBS)."

United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency

2021-05-26?
Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation Program Data Protection Management - How is Data Protected?

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From the Document: "The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) Program is a dynamic approach to fortifying the cybersecurity of government networks and systems. The CDM Program provides cybersecurity tools, integration services, and dashboards to participating agencies to help them improve their respective security postures. The CDM Program ultimately reduces the threat surface and improves federal cybersecurity response through four capability areas: Asset Management, Identity and Access Management, Network Security Management, and Data Protection Management (DPM). The DPM capability is intended to provide additional protections to the most critical mission data and systems on federal civilian networks. While the other CDM capabilities provide broader protections across federal networks, the DPM capability is focused on protecting sensitive (especially private) data within the agency. Protecting sensitive data requires security and privacy protections at rest, in use, and in transit to ensure the integrity, availability, and confidentiality of data and data assets. The CDM Program employs the DPM capability to help agencies and industry partners strengthen data protections to include identifying sensitive data, classifying data assets based on severity and impact, supporting timely response procedures to notify stakeholders of data breaches or spillage, and more. DPM helps agencies protect sensitive data through five capabilities: data discovery/classification (DATA_DISCOV), data protection (DATA_PROT), data loss prevention (DATA_DLP), data breach/spillage mitigation (DATA_SPIL), and information rights management (DATA _IRM)."

United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency

2021-05-26?
Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation Program Asset Management - What is on the Network?

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From the Document: "The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) Program is a dynamic approach to fortifying the cybersecurity of government networks and systems. The CDM Program provides cybersecurity tools, integration services, and dashboards to participating agencies to help them improve their respective security postures. The CDM Program ultimately reduces the threat surface and improves federal cybersecurity response through four capability areas: Asset Management, Identity and Access Management, Network Security Management, and Data Protection Management. The Asset Management capability is aimed at providing agencies with a centralized overview of their network devices and the risks associated with such devices. Asset Management enables an agency to maintain and improve its cyber hygiene through five capabilities: hardware asset management (HWAM), software asset management (SWAM), configuration settings management (CSM), vulnerability management (VUL), and enterprise mobility management (EMM). Asset Management is the foundation of a strong cybersecurity strategy--it allows agencies to supervise network assets as they are being configured and deployed on the network, which ensures the assets are properly configured and that vulnerabilities have been identified and remediated. CDM's automated asset management tools have been deployed to federal civilian agencies since 2014. These tools continue to be important today as shadow Information Technology (IT) (i.e., hardware/software that is on the network but is managed outside of, and without the knowledge of, the primary IT department) at agencies continue to expand."

United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency

2021-05-26
Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation Program Identity and Access Management - Who is on the Network?

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From the Document: "The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) Program is a dynamic approach to fortifying the cybersecurity of government networks and systems. The CDM Program provides cybersecurity tools, integration services, and dashboards to participating agencies to help them improve their respective security postures. The CDM Program ultimately reduces the threat surface and improves federal cybersecurity response through four capability areas: Asset Management, Identity and Access Management (IDAM), Network Security Management, and Data Protection Management. The IDAM capability is intended to manage the access and privileges of agency network users. Managing who is on the network requires the management and control of account and access privileges, trust determination for people granted access, credentials and authentication, and security-related behavioral training. IDAM is deployed within the CDM Program through four component capabilities: trust determination for people granted access (TRUST), security-related behavioral training (BEHAVE), credentials and authentication (CRED), and management and control of account and access privileges (PRIV). These four capabilities have significant interdependencies and are managed together as part of the IDAM capability area. IDAM encourages enhanced cyber hygiene through the utilization of identification, authentication, and authorization."

United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency

2021-05-26
Protect Pool and Water Park Chemicals from Use in a Terrorist Attack

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From the Overview: "Every year, millions of people visit water parks and pools for exercise, therapy, and fun-filled recreation. Chemicals are critical in ensuring that the water is safe for swimming and that equipment, such as water slides and diving boards, are properly sanitized. In the wrong hands, however, some of these same chemicals can be used for great harm."

United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency

2021-08-12?
Resilience Series: Bug Bytes

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From the Website Description: "Second in the series, 'Bug Bytes' demonstrates how threat actors use social media and other communication platforms to spread inaccurate information [hyperlink] for the sole purpose of planting doubt in the minds of targeted audiences to steer their opinion. Readers follow protagonist Ava, a graduate, who uses her wits and journalism skills to uncover a disinformation campaign set to damage Fifth Generation (5G) [hyperlink] critical communications infrastructure in the United States."

United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency

Watts, Clint; Haque, Farid, 1977-

2021-05?
Risk Management Process: An Interagency Security Committee Standard [2021]

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From the Executive Summary: "'The Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities: An Interagency Security Committee Standard' defines the criteria and processes that those responsible for a facility's security should use to determine its facility security level (FSL). 'The Risk Management Process' provides an integrated, single source of physical security countermeasures for all federal facilities. This standard also provides guidance for how to customize countermeasures for facilities and how to integrate the standards and concepts contained in the Interagency Security Committee's (ISC) 'Appendix A: The Design-Basis Threat Report.'"

United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency

2021
Making Our Roads Safer: One Countermeasure at a Time

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From the Abstract: "The Proven Safety Countermeasure Initiative (PSCi) is a collection of 28 countermeasures and strategies effective in reducing roadway fatalities and serious injuries on our Nation's highways. Transportation agencies are strongly encouraged to consider widespread implementation of PSCs [Proven Safety Countermeasures] to accelerate the achievement of local, State, and National safety goals. This booklet provides 1-page handouts for all 28 PSCs, broken into the focus areas of speed management, roadway departure, intersections, pedestrians/bicyclists, and crosscutting for countermeasures that apply across categories."

United States. Federal Highway Administration. Office of Safety

Albee, Matt; Bobitz, Phillip

2021-10
Origins of SARS-CoV-2: A Critical Review

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From the Summary: "Since the first reports of a novel severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)-like coronavirus in December 2019 in Wuhan, China, there has been intense interest in understanding how severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) emerged in the human population. Recent debate has coalesced around two competing ideas: a 'laboratory escape' scenario and zoonotic emergence. Here, we critically review the current scientific evidence that may help clarify the origin of SARS-CoV-2."

Elsevier; Cell Press

Holmes, Edward C.; Goldstein, Stephen A.; Rasmussen, Angela L. . . .

2021-09-16
After-Action Report/Improvement Plan: Medical Services Drill, Salem and Hope Creek Nuclear Generating Station [May 12, 2017]

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From the Executive Summary: "On May 12, 2017 a Medical Services (MS-1) Drill was conducted for the 10-mile Plume Exposure Pathway, Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) around the Salem and Hope Creek. Nuclear Generating Station by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region III. The most recent prior MS-1 Drill for this site was conducted on May 6, 2016."

United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency. Radiological Emergency Preparedness Division; United States. Department of Homeland Security

2017-06-27
EMR-ISAC: InfoGram, Volume 21 Issue 44, November 4, 2021

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The Emergency Management and Response Information Sharing and Analysis Center's (EMR-ISAC) InfoGram is a weekly publication of information concerning the protection of critical infrastructures relevant to members of the Emergency Services Sector. This issue includes the following articles: "Assistance to Firefighters Grant application period for FY 2021 opens Nov. 8, NOFO [Notice of Funding Opportunity] now available"; "Product notices on certain medical gloves and respirators from FDA and NIOSH [National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health]"; "Preparing for launch of 988 as National Suicide Prevention Lifeline: Resources for 911 and law enforcement"; "FEMA launches new tribal mitigation planning independent study course"; "CISA [Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency] releases directive on reducing the significant risk of known exploited vulnerabilities"; "NSA [National Security Agency] and CISA provide cybersecurity guidance for 5G [Fifth-generation] cloud infrastructures"; "FBI: HelloKitty ransomware adds DDoS [distributed denial-of-service] attacks to extortion tactics"; "States, localities to play critical roles in cyber defense collaborative, CISA says"; and "MS-ISAC [Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center] Webinar, Nov.8: Connecticut's new approach to improving cybersecurity."

Emergency Management and Response-Information Sharing and Analysis Center (U.S.)

2021-11-04
Security Guidance for 5G Cloud Infrastructures, Part I: Prevent and Detect Lateral Movement

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From the Document: "NSA [National Security Agency] and CISA [Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency] developed this document in furtherance of their respective cybersecurity missions, including their responsibilities to develop and issue cybersecurity specifications and mitigations. This information may be shared broadly to reach all appropriate stakeholders. [...] This four-part series builds on the ESF [Enduring Security Framework] 'Potential Threat Vectors to 5G [fifth generation wireless] Infrastructure' white paper, released in May 2021, which focused specifically on threats, vulnerabilities, and mitigations that apply to the deployment of 5G cloud infrastructures. Although all 5G network stakeholders can benefit from this guidance, the recommendations are intended for service providers and system integrators that build and configure 5G cloud infrastructures."

United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency; United States. National Security Agency

2021
BlackMatter Ransomware

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From the Summary: "This joint Cybersecurity Advisory was developed by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the National Security Agency (NSA) to provide information on BlackMatter ransomware. Since July 2021, BlackMatter ransomware has targeted multiple U.S. critical infrastructure entities, including two U.S. Food and Agriculture Sector organizations. This advisory provides information on cyber actor tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) obtained from a sample of BlackMatter ransomware analyzed in a sandbox environment as well from trusted third-party reporting. Using embedded, previously compromised credentials, BlackMatter leverages the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) and Server Message Block (SMB) protocol to access the Active Directory (AD) to discover all hosts on the network. BlackMatter then remotely encrypts the hosts and shared drives as they are found. Ransomware attacks against critical infrastructure entities could directly affect consumer access to critical infrastructure services; therefore, CISA, the FBI, and NSA urge all organizations, including critical infrastructure organizations, to implement the recommendations listed in the Mitigations section of this joint advisory. These mitigations will help organizations reduce the risk of compromise from BlackMatter ransomware attacks."

United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency; United States. Federal Bureau of Investigation; United States. National Security Agency

2021-10-18
Federalism and Disaster Response: Examining the Roles and Responsibilities of Local, State and Federal Agencies: Hearing Before the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress, First Session, October 19, 2005

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Johnny L. Dupree: "The single most important thing I discovered after Katrina was that FEMA and state officials have not thought enough about how to support cities that are near enough to the scene of a natural disaster to be somewhat affected by it, but also far enough away that they will be a location to which large numbers of evacuees flee. Hattiesburg suffered damage from Katrina-including widespread loss of power and communications. Additionally, as the first major city in Mississippi north of the Coast, we were a prime location for evacuees to flee. As a result, even as our city's infrastructure suffered from Katrina itself, we were faced with trying to help thousands of people in the worst of conditions. Although FEMA officials bragged about the way they had pre-positioned supplies before the storm's impact, I found that the materials we needed to help thousands of evacuees in the first crucial days after Katrina's landfall were not available. It does not seem that FEMA did a good job pre-positioning supplies to help communities directly on the Coast, but it certainly did not do a good job pre-positioning supplies for in-land locations that would house massive numbers of evacuees." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Peter T. King, Bennie G. Thompson, Donna M. Christensen, Charlie Dent, Norman D. Dicks, Bob Etheridge, Jim Gibbons, Katherine Harris, Sheila Jackson-Lee, Nita M. Lowey, Daniel E. Lundgren, Michael McCaul, Kendrick B. Meek, Eleanor Holmes Norton, Bill Pascrell, Jr., Stevan Pearce, Ted Poe, Dave G. Reichert, Loretta Sanchez, Lamar S. Smith, Jeb Bush, Rick Perry, Janet Napolitano, Roberts Eckels, David G. Wallace, Audwin M. Samuel, Billy Broomfield, Johnny L. Dupree, Vivian Juan-Saunders and Oscar G. Ortiz.

United States. Government Printing Office

2007
Assessing Central Indiana's Preparedness for a Mass Casualty Event, Field Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, First Session, August 6, 2013

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This is from the August 6, 2013 field hearing "Assessing Central Indiana's Preparedness for a Mass Casualty Event" held before the U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security. From the opening statement of Susan W. Brooks: "According to Indiana's recent Threat Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment or, known in the emergency management community as THIRA, natural disasters, industrial emergencies, and cyber attacks ranked among our highest concerns. I also received a briefing just last week from the Department of Homeland Security regarding threats posed by weapons of mass destruction and what they would look like. Chemical, biological, nuclear, and radio- logical attacks are still very real threats. A successful attack in the Indianapolis or Central Indiana area could severely strain our medical and hospital systems and have grave consequences for our people and our economy. After the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the 9/11 Commission, which was co-led by former Indiana Congressman Lee Hamilton, stated that one of the main failures that led to the attack was the lack of our own imagination. Although Central Indiana may be more susceptible to events such as flooding and tornadoes, for which we have all trained and prepared, we must not let our own failure of imagination catch us flat-footed, and we must be prepared for the range of threats to which we are vulnerable." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Andrew Velasquez, III, John Hill, Mark Bowen, Steven Orusa, Diane Mack, Chad Priest, Virginia Caine, Louis Profeta, H. Clifton Knight, R. Lawrence Reed, and Mercy Obeime.

United States. Government Printing Office

2014
Assessing the Nation's State of Preparedness: A Federal, State, and Local Perspective, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, First Session, September 19, 2013

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This is the September 19, 2013 hearing on "Assessing the Nation's State of Preparedness: A Federal, State, and Local Perspective" held before the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications of the U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security. From the opening statement of Susan Brooks: "In order to help measure the nation's preparedness, the Administration, in April 2011 publicly released Presidential Policy Directive [PPD] 8 -- National Preparedness. PPD-8 required that the Secretary of Homeland Security submit to the President a national preparedness goal and a new national preparedness system that will help achieve the goal. […] In this hearing I am interested to learn the level of involvement State and local organizations had in the development of these frameworks, and how they are planning, if at all, to incorporate these frameworks into their daily operations. Additionally, I am interested to learn when the final framework -- the Protection framework -- and the Federal Interagency Operations Plans will be released. […] According to a 2012 survey by FEMA [Federal Emergency Management Agency], 46 percent of respondents reported being familiar with their local hazards, but only 39 percent said that they have an emergency plan in place that they discussed with the household. […] Through this hearing, I hope to learn more about the strengths and weaknesses of our nation's state of preparedness, and also gain a greater understanding of how the nation is working together to build resilience." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Susan W. Brooks, Donald M. Payne, Bennie G. Thompson, Timothy Manning, Mark Ghilarducci, Jeffrey W. Walker, James Schwartz, and Kathy Spangler.

United States. Government Printing Office

2014
Ensuring Effective Preparedness and Response: Lessons Learned from Hurricane Irene and Tropical Storm Lee, Field Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, November 29, 2011

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From the opening statement of Gus M. Bilirakis: "This year, the subcommittee has focused on ensuring this country has effective preparedness response and recovery capabilities at all levels of government, and the private sector among individuals and communities. This subcommittee has assessed the response and recovery efforts to the many storms this country has experienced this year. This hearing will continue those efforts by assessing the impact of Hurricane Irene and Storm Lee, particularly on this area, because this area was greatly impacted, and we want to consider the lessons learned from those storms so we can continue to enhance our preparedness, response, and recovery capabilities." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Gus M. Bilirakis, Tom Marino, MaryAnn Tierney, David E. Anderson, Glenn M. Cannon, Marita C. Wenner, James J. Brozena, and James Good.

United States. Government Printing Office

2012
National Preparedness Report: Assessing the State of Preparedness, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, Second Session, June 6, 2012

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This is the June 6, 2012 hearing on "The National Preparedness Report: Assessing the State of Preparedness," held before the U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications. From the opening statement of Gus M. Bilirakis: "At the start of another hurricane season and with no evidence that the terrorist threat to the United States will decline, it is important that this subcommittee has an accurate picture of the level of preparedness across the country. Anecdotally, we are all aware of advancements made in preparedness. One need only look at the responses to the tornadoes in Joplin and Hurricane Irene to see evidence of enhanced preparedness and response capabilities at the State and local levels. However, there is more to the story, and it is my hope that the recently released National Preparedness Report will help us gain a better understanding of the work that remains to be done to ensure a prepared and resilient Nation." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Gus M. Bilirakis, Hansen Clarke, Bennie G. Thompson, Timothy W. Manning, Stanley J. Czerwinski, John W. Madden, Mike Sena, and Georges C. Benjamin.

United States. Government Printing Office

2013
Are We Prepared? Assessing Earthquake Risk Reduction in the United States, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, April 7, 2011

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From the opening statement of Benjamin Quayle: "In light of the devastating effects of the recent earthquake and subsequent tsunami that struck off the coast of northern Japan on March 11th, many countries are examining their own level of preparedness. The scale of the human tragedy is difficult to comprehend, and our thoughts and prayers are with the people of Japan. It is always a challenge to measure how prepared we are for the next unexpected event, and whether current efforts are adequate. Although earthquake risks vary across the country, portions of all 50 states are vulnerable to these hazards. Twenty-six urban areas in 14 different U.S. states face significant seismic risk. My own district in Arizona does not lie on top of a major subduction zone or fear the threat of tsunamis. But I believe today's topic is important for all of us. Earthquake catastrophes have the potential not only to destroy lives and buildings, but also to wreak havoc on civil and industrial infrastructure and the national economy. […] The impacts and consequences of a major earthquake are felt on a global scale. These hazards consequently represent a serious threat to both national security and global commerce. Given our current economic situation, it would be even more painful for the United States to endure a disastrous earthquake, the socioeconomic effects of which would reverberate for decades." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Benjamin Quayle, David Wu, Jack Hayes, Jim Mullen, Chris Poland, Vicki McConnell, and Randy Neugebauer.

United States. Government Printing Office

2011
Reviewing Efforts to Secure U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel, Hearing Before the Select Committee on the Events Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attacks in Benghazi, Libya, House of Representatives, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, Second Session, December 10, 2014

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This is the December 10, 2014 hearing on "Reviewing Efforts to Secure U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel," held before the House Committee on the Events Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attacks in Benghazi, Libya. From the Opening Statement of Trey Gowdy: "It has been two years [since the establishment of the committee]. We know the requests for additional equipment and personnel were denied but we still do not have a full understanding of why those requests were denied. And we should not move on until there is a complete understanding of why the official position of our government is so different today than it was in the days and weeks after Benghazi. The facts have not changed. The evidence has not changed. But the explanations offered by our government certainly did. This hearing will continue our committee's efforts to ensure the recommendations made after the attacks in Benghazi are actually implemented. Again, we pledge a process worthy of the memory of those who died and worthy of the respect of our fellow Americans. But I also pledge we are going to keep asking questions. We will have a hearings [sic] in January, February, March and until there is a full understanding of what happened in Benghazi. That means access all documents and all witnesses. We are going to answer the questions surrounding the attacks in Benghazi. We may answer some more than once. I would rather answer a question twice than risk not answering it at all. That would seem a rather small investment compared to what others have done and are doing in service to our country." Statements, letters and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Trey Gowdy, Gregorry B. Starr, and Steve Linick,

United States. Government Printing Office

2014-12-10
Examining Recent Regulatory and Enforcement Actions of the Mine Safety and Health Administration, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Workforce Protections, Committee on Education and the Workforce, U.S. House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, March 3, 2011

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This is the March 3, 2011 hearing on "Examining Recent Regulatory and Enforcement Actions of the Mine Safety and Health Administration," held before the U.S. House Committee on Education and the Workforce. From the opening statement of Chairman Tim Walberg: "Improving miner safety must consider the efforts already underway within MSHA. Since the explosion at Upper Big Branch, MSHA has developed a series of reforms geared toward enhancing mine safety through existing law. These initiatives include changes to the pattern of violations process and emergency temporary standard on rock dusting and new regulations on miner exposure to coal dust. However, if there is one thing we know, it is the strongest laws on the books cannot protect miners if the agency charged with enforcing those laws fails to do so." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Joseph A. Main.

United States. Government Printing Office

2011
Ensuring Effective Preparedness Responses and Recovery for Events Impacting Acting Health Security, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, March 17, 2011

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From the opening statement of Gus M. Bilirakis: "While this hearing has been scheduled for some time, it is particularly timely in light of the recent catastrophe in Japan. Our thoughts are with the Japanese people as they continue to respond to this tragedy and begin to recover. Of course, the United States stands ready to assist our ally in this difficult time. As we work to assist Japan, we must also reflect on our own level of preparedness and learn from Japan's experience so we can be better prepared here in the United States. The Office of Health Affairs' [OHA] mission is to provide health and medical expertise in support of the Department's mission to prepare for, respond to, and recover from all hazards impacting the Nation's security; that is, to protect our health in the case of a National incident with health consequences. This is a valid mission that I think is not always well understood, but OHA's accomplishments are real. For example, during the 2009 H1N1 influenza outbreak, the Assistant Secretary briefed the Secretary and other DHS leaders on matters such as where the flu was spreading, whether closing the border with Mexico could slow its progression, and how DHS could mobilize resources to assist in the response." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Gus M. Bilirakis, Laura Richardson, and Alexander G. Garza.

United States. Government Printing Office

2012
Exercise Report: Salem/Hope Creek Nuclear Generating Station [March 16,2004]

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From the Executive Summary: "The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Region II evaluated an exercise on March 16,2004 and related out of sequence activities ending on June 22,2004 in the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ) around the Salem/Hope Creek Nuclear Generating Station (S/HC NGS). The purpose of the exercise and out of sequence activities was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency. [...] No Deficiencies and five Areas Requiring Corrective Actions were identified as a result of this exercise. Two prior Areas Requiring Corrective Actions were successfully addressed. There are no unresolved prior Areas Requiring Corrective Action."

United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency

2004-09-03

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