Advanced search    Help

Clear all search criteria

Only 2/3! You are seeing results from the Public Collection, not the complete Full Collection. Sign in to search everything (see eligibility).

• Upgrading Public Health Infrastructure: The Need to Protect, Rebuild, and Strengthen State and Local Public Health Departments, Hearing Before the Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis of the Committee on Oversight and Reform, House of Representatives, One Hundred Seventeenth Congress, First Session, September 29, 2021

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  This is the September 29, 2021 hearing on 'Upgrading Public Health Infrastructure: The Need to Protect, Rebuild, and Strengthen State and Local Public Health Departments,' held before the U.S. House Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis of the Committee on Oversight and Reform. From the opening statement of James E. Clyburn: "For decades, state and local public health departments have been chronically underfunded and understaffed. Throughout the pandemic, we have seen firsthand how our under resourced public health system was ill-equipped for such a large-scale emergency, with limited disease monitoring and surveillance capabilities, testing and reporting deficiencies, and outdated technology hampering the response. [...] Since the pandemic began, public health officials have faced unprecedented levels of harassment, threats, and attacks from members of the public, particularly in response to their attempts to adopt proven mitigation measures, such as masks and social distancing guidelines, after they were recklessly politicized by the past President and his anti-science allies. [...] I commend President Biden's historic efforts to revitalize our public health system. We must keep building on this progress to ensure our public health work force consistently receives the resources it needs over the long term. I want to thank our witnesses for being with us here today. I look forward to learning more about the challenges you have experienced working on the front lines of the pandemic response and how we can better support and strengthen our state and local public health infrastructure." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Jennifer Bacani McKenney, Mysheika Roberts, Joseph Kanter, and Beth Resnick.

  United States. Government Publishing Office

  2021
• Bioterrorism: Summary of a CRS/National Health Policy Forum Seminar on Federal, State, and Local Public Health Preparedness [December 21, 2001]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "The September 11th attack and subsequent intentional release of anthrax spores via the U.S. postal system have focused policymakers' attention on the preparedness and response capability of the nation's public health system. The anthrax attacks put a tremendous strain on the U. S. public health infrastructure, an infrastructure that many experts argue has been weakened by years of neglect and under-funding. To better understand the preparedness gaps that exist, as well as the disparate functions and agencies that define public health in this country, the Congressional Research Service (CRS), in conjunction with George Washington University's National Health Policy Forum (NHPF), convened a seminar on October 26, 2001, entitled, The U.S. Health Care System: Are State and Local Officials Prepared for Bioterrorism? How Should the Federal Government Assist? [...]. Based upon their varied experiences, there was general consensus among all the speakers that public health preparedness, while dependent upon federal financial and other assistance, was largely a local matter. They argued that mending the gaps in the current public health fabric will require significant long-term commitments from the federal government, including investments and improvements in: laboratory capacity, regional planning, workforce training, epidemiology and surveillance systems, information systems, communication systems, and media relations. The panelists stressed that as priorities are set and resources committed, it is imperative that all preparedness efforts be coordinated at all levels of government--federal, state, and local."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Strongin, Robin J.; Redhead, C. Stephen

  2001-12-21
• Bioterrorism: Summary of a CRS/National Health Policy Forum Seminar on Federal, State, and Local Public Health Preparedness [Updated March 8, 2002]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "The September 11th attack and subsequent intentional release of anthrax spores via the U.S. postal system have focused policymakers' attention on the preparedness and response capability of the nation's public health system. [...] Mending the gaps in the current public health fabric will require significant long-term commitments from the federal government, including investments and improvements in: laboratory capacity, regional planning, workforce training, epidemiology and surveillance systems, information systems, communication systems, and media relations. [...] It is imperative that all preparedness efforts be coordinated at all levels of government-federal, state, and local."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Strongin, Robin J.; Redhead, C. Stephen

  2002-03-08
• Learning from COVID-19: Reimagining Public-Private Partnerships in Public Health

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  From the Introduction: "The COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] pandemic presented the most significant public health challenge in decades in the United States and globally. Nearly all facets of society scrambled to respond to the crisis while navigating the multitude of existing and emergent complex public-health challenges. Chronic underfunding of our outdated public-health infrastructure, the lack of seamless political coordination, a swirling infodemic [hyperlink], and a strained response all further exacerbated the crisis. As a result, as of December 2021, about 505 million cases have been reported and nearly 800,000 individuals lost their lives to COVID-19 in the United States alone. [...] Lessons from public-private partnerships strengthened or newly formed during pandemic response are bright spots in imagining a better future. The Milken Institute Center for Public Health leveraged our network of thought leaders to maximize learnings from this unique moment in time, focused on examining the private sector's role and responsibility in supporting public health. This report uncovers and spotlights innovative and collaborative partnerships that emerged in response to the crisis and offers lessons to promote and protect public health so that they can be leveraged for the future, both in times of crisis and non-emergencies."

  Milken Institute

  Kocsis, Sarah Wells; Roesler, Athena Rae; Marshall, Jessica . . .

  2022
• First Confirmed Cases of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV) Infection in the United States, Updated Information on the Epidemiology of MERS-CoV Infection, and Guidance for the Public, Clinicians, and Public Health Authorities - May 2014

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "Since mid-March 2014, the frequency with which cases of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) infection have been reported has increased, with the majority of recent cases reported from Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (UAE). In addition, the frequency with which travel-associated MERS cases have been reported and the number of countries that have reported them to the World Health Organization (WHO) have also increased. The first case of MERS in the United States, identified in a traveler recently returned from Saudi Arabia, was reported to CDC [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention] by the Indiana State Department of Health on May 1, 2014, and confirmed by CDC on May 2. A second imported case of MERS in the United States, identified in a traveler from Saudi Arabia having no connection with the first case, was reported to CDC by the Florida Department of Health on May 11, 2014. The purpose of this report is to alert clinicians, health officials, and others to increase awareness of the need to consider MERS-CoV infection in persons who have recently traveled from countries in or near the Arabian Peninsula. This report summarizes recent epidemiologic information, provides preliminary descriptions of the cases reported from Indiana and Florida, and updates CDC guidance about patient evaluation, home care and isolation, specimen collection, and travel as of May 13, 2014."

  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.)

  Bialek, Stephanie R.; Allen, Donna; Alvarado-Ramy, Francisco

  2014-05-14
• Public Health Interim Guidance for Pre-K-12 Schools and Day Care Programs for Addressing COVID-19

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  This document provides information for schools and day care programs regarding the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. The following topics are addressed: [1] Procedures for Students, Faculty and Support Staff who Test Positive; [2] Procedures for Students, Faculty and Support Staff who are Close Contacts to a Confirmed COVID-19 Case; [3] Procedures for Students, Teachers, and Support Staff who Become Sick at School/Day Care; [4] Procedures for Contact Tracing and Quarantining Persons Exposed to a Confirmed COVID-19 Case; [5] Procedures for Temporary Closure and Environmental Cleaning and Disinfection when a Confirmed or Possible Case of COVID-19 is Identified in a School/Day Care; and [6] Procedures for Outbreak Response and Consideration for Closure.

  Illinois. Department of Public Health

  2020-08-17
• Guide to Expanding Mitigation: Making the Connection with Public Health

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  From the Document: "Though public health issues have not historically been addressed through mitigation projects, the health field proactively plans with the goal of making populations more resilient. Similarly, community officials use a hazard mitigation plan to identify resiliency goals, risks, and actions (potential projects). By bringing public health and community officials together, they can work together toward the common goal of minimizing the impacts of disasters. Public health experts can offer important insights in areas such as: [1] physical and mental health challenges, [2] environmental hazards and communicable disease, and [3] public health data. This 'Guide to Expanding Mitigation' explores how community officials can work with the public health sector to support hazard mitigation, including the planning process. This guide is a starting place for community officials to initiate a conversation about mitigation investments that also address public health goals."

  United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency

  2020-07-21?
• Public Health Preparedness: Medical Countermeasure Development for Certain Serious or Life-Threatening Conditions, Report to Congressional Committees

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  From the Highlights: "Past bioterrorist attacks, such as the anthrax attacks of 2001, highlight the threat of widespread illness and death posed by CBRN [chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear] agents and the importance of medical countermeasures. GAO [Government Accountability Office] has previously reported on the challenges of developing medical countermeasures. Medical countermeasures may need to be developed and approved under FDA's Animal Rule. The Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness and Advancing Innovation Act of 2019 included a provision for GAO to review medical countermeasure development under the Animal Rule. In this report GAO describes (1) FDA efforts to support medical countermeasure developers under the Animal Rule, and (2) the extent of animal model qualification under FDA's Animal Model Qualification Program, and the effect of qualified models on medical countermeasure development."

  United States. Government Accountability Office

  2022-06
• Multi Attribute Decision Analysis in Public Health - Analyzing Effectiveness of Alternate Modes of Dispensing

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  From the thesis Abstract: "Local emergency planners are creating mass prophylaxis plans to prophylax entire populations within forty eight hours in order to reduce mortality after a bioterrorist attack. The Points of Dispensing (PODs) used in prophylaxis are central to an area's mass prophylaxis plans, but they are insufficient because of their staffing and security constraints. Several alternate modes of dispensing that have similar attributes and are considered best practices are presently being implemented in local health departments (LHDs). The purpose of this thesis is to develop models to evaluate alternate modes of dispensing using multi-attribute value function (MAVF), an approach that supports multi-attribute decision-making by taking into account the trade-offs a decision-maker is willing to make between attributes. Two models are created for Los Angeles County (LAC). The models showed that in LAC, the door-to-door option, pharmacy option, civil service option and Kaiser Permanente option work best. The study finds that alternate modes of dispensing can be useful in filling the gaps in the POD-based approach by increasing critical resources or lowering the pressure on existing resources." A 6-minute, 10-second video interview on this thesis is also available at the following link: [https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=36619]

  Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Homeland Defense and Security; Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)

  Khan, Sinan

  2007-09
• H. Rept. 117-26: Transportation Security Public Health Threat Preparedness Act of 2021, Report to Accompany H.R. 1895, Including Cost Estimate of the Congressional Budget Office, April 30, 2021

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  From the Purpose and Summary: "H.R. 1895, the 'Transportation Security Public Health Threat Preparedness Act of 2021,' authorizes the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to analyze the preparedness of the Nation's transportation security system for public health threats. The analysis should include information sharing challenges among Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components, other Federal agencies, international entities, and stakeholders, as well as impacts to TSA policies and procedures. H.R. 1895 requires TSA to brief Congress on the public health threat analysis, as well as necessary technologies at airport checkpoints to protect from these threats and the estimated costs of the technology improvements. Additionally, the briefing to Congress should describe security checkpoint policies and procedures to protect TSA personnel, passengers, aviation workers, and airport personnel from public health threats to the transportation security system. The briefing should also note TSA's role--and how it can be improved--in establishing priorities, developing solutions, and coordinating and sharing information with the relevant domestic and international entities during a public health threat. In addition, H.R. 1895 authorizes non-frontline TSA personnel to be detailed to other DHS components and Federal agencies to improve coordination to prepare for, protect against, and respond to these public health threats."

  United States. Government Publishing Office

  2021-04-30
• National Priorities to Combat Misinformation and Disinformation for COVID-19 and Future Public Health Threats: A Call for a National Strategy

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  From the Executive Summary: "The COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] pandemic has shown that health-related misinformation and disinformation can dangerously undermine the response to a public health crisis. Contradictory messaging and active subversion have reduced trust in public health responders, increased belief in false medical cures, and politicized public health measures aimed at curbing transmission of the disease. Setbacks in the COVID-19 response have highlighted that health-related misinformation or disinformation can lead to more infections, deaths, disruption, and disorganization of the effort. The public health response and communication environment in the United States have been disrupted by significant distrust in government, exacerbated by confusing and conflicting messages from leaders. As a result, information voids have developed, easily filled by false or misleading information and directly targeted by perpetrators of disinformation. Taken together, the spread and consequence of public health misinformation and disinformation can lead to a range of outcomes that have national security implications and require effective response. [...] The development of a national strategy to prevent and respond to COVID-19 and future public health misinformation and disinformation is an important first step in the establishment of a solution set to this threat."

  Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health. Center for Health Security

  Sell, Tara Kirk; Hosangadi, Divya; Smith, Elizabeth . . .

  2021-03
• Defending Against Public Health Threats, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, Second Session, Special Hearing, September 29, 2010

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  This is the September 29, 2010 hearing, "Defending against Public Health Threats" before the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies. From the statement of Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services: "Our greatest responsibility in government is keeping the American people safe. We have always maintained a powerful military that can guard against conventional threats. But in today's world, the range of threats is ever-widening to include biological, chemical, nuclear, and radiological hazards in addition to the conventional threats. The next public health emergency could be a dirty bomb set off in a subway system. It could be a biological weapon we've never seen before, assembled by a terrorist in a lab. And, as we have seen, it could be naturally-occurring novel strain of influenza virus." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Andrew T. Pavia, Infectious Diseases Specialist, George and Esther Gross Presidential Professor, and Chief of the Division of Pediatric Infectious Diseases, University of Utah; Chair, IDSA's [Infectious Diseases Society of America] Pandemic Influenza Task Force; Colonel Randall J. Larsen, Chief Executive Officer, The WMD Center; Eric A. Rose, CEO and Chairman, Siga Technologies, New York, NY; Co-Chair, Alliance for Biosecurity, Washington, D.C.; and Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2011
• Public Health and Medicine in Emergency Management [Chapter 16]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  From the Abstract: "Public health and medicine have many parallels with emergency management in terms of overall goals, basic conceptual models, and many operational modalities. The health sector and emergency management (EM) both strive to protect the public from maladies using organizational and science-based tools. Both health and EM are multi-disciplinary in their scientific underpinnings, although health has gone much further than EM in developing its own scientific disciplines. Despite many common values and foci, as well as having many similar operational characteristics, health and emergency management have mostly failed to share their tools and personnel and have not collaborated smoothly in preparing for, and responding to mass emergencies. This chapter addresses the medical/public health approach to addressing threats to human well-being, and outlines specific tools that health and emergency management need to share in order to enhance their future collaboration toward better population outcome in emergencies and disasters."

  United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency; Emergency Management Institute (U.S.)

  Bissell, Richard

  2006?
• Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate: H.R. 3299, Strengthening Public Health Emergency Response Act of 2016

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  This is the Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate as ordered reported by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce on July 13, 2016. From the Summary: "H.R. 3299 would establish an incentive program that awards vouchers for priority review to companies that obtain approval from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for certain drugs that can be used to counter the effects of biological, chemical, radiological, or nuclear agents. The bill also would make several changes to the processes used to procure medical countermeasures in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Finally, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) would be required to report on programs to improve state, local, and hospital preparedness. CBO [Congressional Budget Office] estimates that implementing H.R. 3299 would cost $20 million over the 2017-2021 period, assuming appropriation of the necessary amounts. Pay-as-you-go procedures do not apply to this legislation because it would not affect direct spending or revenues. CBO estimates that enacting H.R. 3299 would not increase net direct spending or on-budget deficits in any of the four consecutive 10-year periods beginning in 2027. H.R. 3299 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) and would not affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal governments."

  United States. Congressional Budget Office

  2016-09-07
• State Emergency Preparedness and Response Inventory: A Tool for Rapid Assessment of State Capacity to Respond to Bioterrorism, Other Outbreaks of Infectious Disease and Other Public Health Threats and Emergencies

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "The Emergency Preparedness and Response Inventory (EPRI) provides a rapid assessment of a public health agency's ability to respond to public health threats and emergencies. The Inventory includes measures to assess progress towards meeting the benchmarks and critical and enhanced capacities described in the grant guidance for Fiscal Year 2002 Supplemental Funds for Public Health Preparedness and Response to Bioterrorism (Announcement Number 99051)."

  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.)

  2002-02
• How to Confront the Coronavirus Catastrophe: The Global Public Health Plan and Emergency Response Needed Now

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  From the Document: "This virus is impacting everyone across the globe. People are living in fear for their own health and for that of their loved ones. The virus preys most on the vulnerable and people in poverty, at home and around our world. The Coronavirus threatens to take many millions of lives and push billions more into poverty. The virus exposes the extreme inequalities that define our world. We cannot let it exploit the huge gap between the richest and rest of society. Between the rich world and the poor world. Between women and men. If we allow this to happen then millions of the poorest will die, and millions more will face terrible economic hardship."

  Oxfam International

  2020-03-30
• After Action Report for Multnomah County Incident Command Post Operations during 'PandORa' - A State-wide Public Health Pandemic Influenza Exercise [Oregon; November 1 - 2, 2006]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "PandORa was a state-wide pandemic influenza exercise held on November 1 and 2, 2006. 'This report focuses on Multnomah County operations led by an Incident Commander (IC) at the Multnomah County Health Department-based Incident Command Post (ICP)'. This ICP directly collaborated with the operation centers of major hospital systems, six hospitals in the county, adjacent county health departments, State Department of Human Services Public Health Division, and a joint Multnomah County and City of Portland Emergency Operation Center (EOC). Health Department Incident Management Team (IMT) members formed the core of ICP operations. They served in Command and General Staff, Leader, and most staff positions. They were joined by Red Cross, City of Portland, and the Multnomah County Department of Human Services staff. While individual levels of training, experience, and performance varied widely, the ICP organization was seeded with enough well-trained, prepared, and experienced IMT members so that it generally operated as a Type 3 Incident Management Team1; well qualified to competently apply Incident Command System to a significant local/regional incident requiring hundreds of resources. However, this was a regionally significant Type 2 scenario that was escalating to a complex, large, prolonged Type 1 event. Therefore the scenario tested and strained the response organization and highlighted many opportunities to improve our capacity to apply ICS to a major incident/event."

  Multnomah County (Or.). Health Department

  Spitzer, James; Holm, Robin

  2007-06
• Public Health Emergency Planning: Developing Emergency Response Triggers for Infectious Disease Outbreaks

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  This documents discusses how to develop emergency response triggers for infectious disease outbreak emergency planning.

  Medina County (Ohio). Medina County Health Department

  Bechtel, Justin S.

  2008-06-03
• Forward Virginia: A Blueprint for Easing Public Health Restrictions [presentation]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  This presentation covers the reopening steps during the COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] epidemic.

  Commonwealth of Virginia

  2020?
• National Strategic Plan for Public Health Preparedness and Response

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "CDC [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention] provides technical assistance and resources to state and local public health agencies to support their efforts to build prepared and resilient communities. CDC provides subject-matter expertise and assistance for domestic and global surveillance, laboratory, occupational health and epidemiology functions, and health threats including anthrax, smallpox, influenza and other infectious diseases, food-borne illness, and radiation, among others. CDC's Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response (OPHPR) leads the agency's preparedness and response activities by providing strategic direction, support, and coordination for activities across CDC as well as with local, state, tribal, national, territorial, and international public health partners. In the decade since September 11th and the anthrax attacks, significant investments have been made in the nation's public health system to respond to all-hazard threats. Public health departments at all levels of government can now quickly staff public health emergency operations centers; there is improved proficiency in laboratories testing for biological and chemical agents across the nation and the globe; and states can receive urgent disease reports and rapidly communicate information about health threats and related preventive and protective actions to the public."

  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.). Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response

  2011-09
• Healthcare Surge Capacity Planning--Modeling as a Decision-Making Tool for Public Health Officials

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  From the Overview: "Modeling allows health officials and policymakers to make decisions based on future projections. States are using an array of COVID-19 [coronavirus disease] modeling tools to inform community mitigation and hospital response strategies; however, differences in the inputs, assumptions, and data systems may result in different forecasts. This brief will help states understand how projections are calculated across several models, each of which have been cited by the media and used or developed by state/territorial health officials and ASTHO [Association of State and Territorial Health Officials] alumni. Although there are at least a dozen models in use across the nation, the four cited in this brief represent a sample that is designed to forecast hospital capacity at the regional or state level."

  Association of State and Territorial Health Officials (U.S.)

  2020-04-03
• COVID-19: Supporting Ethical Care and Responding to Moral Distress in a Public Health Emergency Guidance, Tools, and Resources for Hospital Ethics Committees (HECs) Clinical Ethics Consultation (CEC) [presentation]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  From the Objective: "This slide deck is designed for use within a health care institution's COVID-19 preparedness and response activities, supplementing public health, clinical practice, and ethical guidance. It aims to quickly prepare hospital ethics committees (HECs) and clinical ethics consultation (CEC) services to 1) assess and shift their operations to reflect new tasks and work conditions, including resource scarcity, and 2) respond to changing ethical needs and concerns among clinicians caring for patients under contingency levels of care and, potentially, crisis standards of care."

  Hastings Center

  Berlinger, Nancy; Cohn, Felicia; Bruce, Lori . . .

  2020-03-23
• Policy for Temporary Compounding of Certain Alcohol-Based Hand Sanitizer Products During the Public Health Emergency Immediately in Effect Guidance for Industry

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  From the Introduction: "Due to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA or Agency) has received a number of queries concerning compounding of alcohol-based hand sanitizers. The Agency is issuing this guidance to communicate its policy for the temporary compounding of certain alcohol-based hand sanitizer products by pharmacists in State-licensed pharmacies or Federal facilities and registered outsourcing facilities (referred to collectively in this guidance as compounders) for the duration of the public health emergency declared by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) on January 31, 2020. In light of the public health emergency posed by COVID-19, this guidance is being implemented without prior public comment because the FDA has determined that prior public participation for this guidance is not feasible or appropriate."

  United States. Food and Drug Administration

  2020-03
• Serial No. 108-9: SARS Threat: Is the Nation's Public Health Network Prepared for a Possible Epidemic? Hearing before the Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, One Hundred Eighth Congress, First Session, April 9, 2003

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  From the opening statement of Tom Davis: "The SARS [Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome] threat is the first challenge to our Nation's health network capabilities. It provides us with a chance to evaluate existing procedures and safeguards. SARS has brought fear and confusion to everyone's lives, particularly international travelers, airline crews and health care workers. Currently there is no known cure and the disease is easily communicable. In a precautionary effort to prevent further spread of the disease, President Bush signed an Executive order on Friday, April 4, authorizing the use of quarantine if necessary. The President's unprecedented actions prove how serious the threat of SARS epidemic is to our country. SARS is believed to have originated in China in the fall of 2002. It has since spread to 17 countries. As of today there have been over 2,600 SARS cases reported worldwide, with 98 deaths. In the United States the number of cases continues to rise. Today this country has approximately 148 suspected cases in 30 different States, with the highest concentrations in New York and California. Fortunately, no deaths have been reported. We've actually seen two suspected cases of SARS nearby in northern Virginia. I'm pleased that we'll hear testimony from the director of the Loudoun County Health Department, who is responsible for the treatment of a SARS patient in early February." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Janet Heinrich, Tommy G. Thompson, Lacy Clay, Tom Davis, David Goodfriend, and Margaret Hamburg.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2003
• Learning from SARS: Renewal of Public Health in Canada

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  The National Advisory Committee on SARS and Public, Health was established in early May 2003 by the, Minister of Health of the Government of Canada, the, Hon. A. Anne McLellan, in the circumstances surrounding, the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome [SARS]. The Committee's mandate was to provide a third party, assessment of current public health efforts and lessons, learned for ongoing and future infectious disease control." Committee members represented a multitude of disciplines, and perspectives from across Canada. Several were, directly involved in responding to SARS in different, capacities. We reviewed source documents, conducted, interviews, and engaged consultants to undertake surveys,, additional interviews, and analyses to illuminate aspects, of the SARS experience. Advice was also sought from a, constitutional legal expert. Over 30 non-governmental, and voluntary sector stakeholders submitted helpful, briefs and letters."

  Canada. Health Canada

  2003-10-01?
• Overview of Public Health and Social Measures in the Context of COVID-19

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  From the Background: "The overarching goal for all countries is to control COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] by slowing down transmission of the virus and preventing associated illness and death. In response to COVID-19, every country should be implementing a comprehensive set of measures, calibrated to the local context and epidemiology of the disease. Central to this comprehensive strategy are time-tested, core public health measures that break chains of person-to-person transmission, including (i) identification, isolation, testing, and clinical care for all cases, and (ii) tracing and quarantine of all contacts, which should be a part of all national COVID-19 responses. A comprehensive strategy to control COVID-19 will also include other public health and social measures, which are actions by individuals, institutions, communities, local and national governments, and international bodies to suppress or stop community spread of COVID-19. Public health and social measures contribute to stopping individual chains of transmission and preventing outbreaks, and are therefore critical in limiting further spread of COVID-19, particularly while vaccines and therapeutics are not yet available."

  World Health Organization

  2020-05-18
• Top 10 Influenza Pandemic Response Planning Tips for Senior Public Health Officials

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "CDC [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention] is closely monitoring the avian influenza A (H7N9) situation in China and is taking several preparedness measures. While no H7N9 cases have been detected in the United States or anywhere outside of China at this time and there is no evidence of sustained human-to-human transmission, CDC encourages state and local public health agencies to use this time to review and reinforce their pandemic preparedness plans in case the situation escalates. CDC has developed these Top 10 Influenza Pandemic Response Planning Tips to help senior public health officials at the state, local, tribal, and territorial levels identify the most critical capabilities and activities needed to assure jurisdictional readiness for an influenza pandemic response. These suggestions are designed to help jurisdictions identify remaining influenza pandemic preparedness operational gaps and improve readiness for potential response. This is not an exhaustive list of all the steps necessary for a sustained influenza pandemic response, but it is intended to give senior public health officials a quick guide for accelerated planning. CDC recommends jurisdictions review their respective H1N1 after-action reports and other relevant data to better assess operational requirements."

  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.); United States. Department of Health and Human Services

  2013-05
• Public Health Decision-Making During the COVID-19 Pandemic [presentation]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  These are PowerPoint slides from the April 23, 2020 webinar "Public Health Decision-Making During the COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] Pandemic" hosted by the Network for Public Health. From the Document: "Public health decisions should be based on timely and reliable data and science . . .But, information absent + a moving target."

  Network for Public Health Law

  Chrysler, Denise; Jacobson, Peter D.

  2020-04-23
• Public Health Decision-Making During the COVID-19 Pandemic [video]

  Show summary     Open resource [html]     (open full abstract)

  From the Video Description: "Public health officials must routinely make difficult decisions to protect the public from a threat such as COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019]. State public health codes establish the legal authority to act, but rarely provide a clear course of action about whether, when, and how to act. Most decisions are discretionary, relying on professional judgment, subject-matter experts, and the best currently available information. Public health officials must balance competing interests to avoid acting prematurely without sufficient information or exposing the public to potential harm while obtaining and evaluating evidence that supports a particular course of action. This webinar will provide you with: [1] A legal and ethical framework for executive decision-making, covering mandatory and discretionary actions and the exercise of professional judgement in responding to COVID-19; [2] Strategies to avoid second-guessing and reduce exposure to liability based on hindsight; [3] A tool for effective and ethical executive decision-making and real-time documentation of the factual basis for a decision, reflecting information available at the time the decision was made."

  Network for Public Health Law

  Jacobson, Peter D.; Chrysler, Denise

  2020-04-23
• Overview of the U.S. Public Health System in the Context of Emergency Preparedness [Updated March 17, 2005]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  From the Summary: "This report describes the U.S. public health infrastructure: the structure, organization, and legal basis of domestic public health activities. In contrast with healthcare, public health practice is aimed at decreasing the burden of illness and injury in populations, rather than individuals. Public health agencies use epidemiologic investigation, laboratory testing, information technology, public and provider education, and other tools to support their mission, activities that in turn rely on an adequate and well-trained public health workforce. Federal leadership for public health is based in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and in particular at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Most public health authority, such as mandatory disease reporting, licensing of healthcare providers and facilities, and quarantine authority, is actually based with states as an exercise of their police powers. Local and municipal health agencies vary in size, governance, and authority, but they are the front line in responding to public health threats. In 2001, terrorist attacks on the nation brought the weaknesses of our public health system into sharp focus. Prior to the 2001 terrorist attacks, Congress passed the Public Health Threats and Emergencies Act (P.L. 106-505), to address the decaying public health infrastructure and to prepare for bioterrorism and other public health emergencies."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Lister, Sarah A.

  2005-03-17