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• Protecting Our Employees: Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and the Federal Workforce, Hearing Before the Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia Subcommittee of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, First Session, June 16, 2009

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  From the opening statement of Daniel K. Akaka: "Pandemic influenza continues to be a grave threat facing the United States and the world. The United Nations' World Health Organization (WHO), which coordinates global pandemic preparedness and response efforts, has said that infectious diseases are spreading faster than at any time in history. [...] I am concerned that Federal agencies have not done enough to protect the Federal workforce from the current outbreak of H1N1. Employees who interact with hundreds or thousands of travelers daily in the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Transportation Security Administration (TSA) received conflicting guidance. This is unacceptable. As reports from the field indicate, employees who asked to wear protective masks were told they could not. However, this policy is not part of the official guidance distributed by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), or the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). The men and women on the front lines must be able to trust that their agencies will develop and distribute clear policies in a timely manner during an emergent event. Proper coordination between DHS, OPM, and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is needed to accomplish this. Public health officials warn that we may see a resurgence of a stronger, more threatening version of the novel H1N1 virus later this fall. Agencies need to make sure now that the workforce is properly informed of policies and guidance so we are ready if that happens." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Daniel K. Akaka, George V. Voinovich, W. Craig Vanderwagen, Elaine C. Duke, Nancy H, Kichak, Bernice Steinhardt, T.J. Bonner, and Maureen Gilman.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2010
• Airtightness Evaluation of Shelter-in-Place Spaces for Protection against Airborne Chemical and Biological Releases

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  "Due to concerns about potential airborne chemical and biological (chembio) releases in or near buildings, building owners and managers and other decision makers are faced with a number of options for increasing their buildings' level of protection against such events. A wide range of technologies and approaches is being proposed with varying levels of efficacy and cost, as well as varying degrees of applicability to any particular building. In particular, shelter-in-place (SIP) has been proposed as a strategy to protect building occupants from chembio releases, particularly outdoor releases. SIP strategies involve having the building occupants stay in the building, generally in a space designated for such sheltering, until the event is over, the outdoor contaminant levels have decreased, and it is safe to leave the building. SIP is often considered as an alternative to building evacuation under conditions where the outdoor exposure is likely to be higher than the exposure in the shelter. While much guidance is available on the implementation of SIP in buildings, important technical issues remain about the degree of protection provided by a particular space and the factors that determine the level of protection. This project has consisted of the following tasks: conducting a literature review of SIP strategies and performance issues; developing a study plan for testing SIP airtightness evaluation methods; implementing the study plan through a combination of experiments and simulations; and, finally, developing recommendations on SIP evaluation and possible performance criteria for candidate SIP spaces."

  National Homeland Security Research Center (U.S.)

  Persily, Andrew K.; Emmerich, Steven J.; Davis, Heather L. . . .

  2009-03
• Pandemic Influenza Pediatric Office Plan Template: Product of a Pediatric Healthcare Response to Pandemic H1N1 Influenza Stakeholder Meeting

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  "This Pandemic Influenza Pediatric Office Plan Template is a planning tool developed by pediatric stakeholders that is intended to assist pediatric medical offices that have no pandemic influenza plan in place, but may experience an increase in patient calls/visits or workload due to pandemic influenza. The suggestions and samples contained within this document were collected from a team of pediatric experts during a stakeholder meeting in September 2009. The content of this tool is not meant to be exhaustive or replace existing guidance. It is designed to be tailored by your office planning team to the needs of your practice to identify and plan for potential modifications to your current decision making process. In addition, this tool can also be adapted both for use during pandemic spread of a novel respiratory virus and as a planning tool for future pandemic respiratory virus events. Please note that the current tool references many links or tools developed for Pandemic 2009 H1N1 Influenza. Should this tool be adapted for specific respiratory events, you may wish to update some of the links to reflect the latest clinical and epidemiologic information."

  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.)

  2010
• Postentry Quarantine Manual for State Inspectors: Procedural Manual for State Inspectors Conducting Postentry Quarantine Duties

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  "The Postentry Quarantine (PEQ) Manual enables State inspectors to perform the following tasks: 1. Complete appropriate form for the Permit Unit (PPQ Form 546 only) 2. Complete appropriate forms for the Postentry Quarantine Unit (PEQU) 3. Conduct a survey of the growing site to determine whether to approve the site 4. Inspect postentered plant material during the growing period for pests (primarily plant pathogens). This manual covers procedures for conducting PEQ tasks beginning with the request to approve a growing site and ending with the release or refusal of the plant material."

  United States. Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

  2007-03
• Miscellaneous and Processed Products: Regulating the Importation of Miscellaneous and Processed Products Regulated by Plant Protection and Quarantine

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  "The Miscellaneous and Processed Products Manual provides the background, procedures, and reference tables for regulating imported articles of nonplant origin (i.e., goatskins, brassware, and beeswax) that might serve to introduce exotic pests and parasites. The articles from the countries of origin listed in this manual are regulated because just one destructive pest might be enough to start a pest outbreak that can cause millions of dollars of damage to crops, trees, flowers, or lawns. By their destructiveness, pests can increase the price and reduce the quality of food, lower property values, and ruin recreational areas. The extinction of just one plant species does away with the aesthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational, commercial, and scientific value of our world. […] The Miscellaneous and Processed Products Manual covers all nonplant articles that could serve to introduce exotic pests or parasites (e.g., goatskins are entered because they can sustain populations of the khapra beetle; while beeswax is entered because it could introduce exotic bee mites or diseases of bees). Specifically, the manual covers: 1. Products that result from the harvesting and milling of field crops--principally corn, cotton, rice, sugarcane, and wheat 2. Products that result from the harvesting, preserving, and processing of fruits, herbs, nuts and other seeds, and vegetables 3. Nonplant articles that could become contaminated with exotic plant pests, parasites, and/or animal secretions 4. Decorative articles and handicrafts constructed using plants and plant parts 5. Herbarium specimens."

  United States. Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

  2010-01
• Agricultural Quarantine Inspection Monitoring (AQIM) Handbook

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  "The AQIM [Agricultural Quarantine Inspection Monitoring] Handbook covers background information about the Government Performance Results Act (GPRA) and its influence to integrate risk analysis and risk management into Agriculture Quarantine Inspection (AQI) program. With that introduction, the Handbook then provides necessary information about statistics, risk analysis, and a sampling process to provide the foundation for implementing AQIM. Next, the Handbook provides guidelines and instruction for setting up designated locations for AQIM. The remainder of the Handbook is divided into pathway sections. Given that AQIM is a different way of conducting business, this Handbook is an attempt to provide officers and managers with background and guidance to implement AQIM activities. As processes improve and are developed, the Handbook will expand in its scope. Along with specific documents written to establish local procedures, such as a standard operating procedure, this Handbook will serve as the information tool for implementing AQIM activities and for training individuals about risk analysis and risk management."

  United States. Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

  2009-08
• Pandemic Influenza Plan: Module 1: Surveillance and Infection Control (November 2009)

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  This Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) offers updated information from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention regarding pandemic H1N1 influenza.

  United States. Bureau of Prisons

  2009-11
• Guidance from Pediatric Stakeholders: A Coordinated Approach to Communicating Pediatric-related Information on Pandemic Influenza at the Community Level

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  "Effective communication is a key component of emergency response planning. It can help direct the medical community and the general public to take appropriate action to contain a disease outbreak, limit exposure, and reduce morbidity and mortality. On the other hand, ineffective communication can lead to confusion in both the general public and the emergency response community. It can interfere with the response to an incident. It can lead to public distrust and skepticism, and, once that has happened, it is difficult to regain that trust. The purpose of this document is to provide a suggested approach, based on input from pediatric stakeholders, to communicating pediatric-related information on pandemic influenza at the community level in a step-by-step manner. This is a suggested approach to coordinating communication and disseminating information; it can be adapted or modified to suit most communities as they see fit. The goal is to give community planners 'talking points' for discussions on a coordinated approach to communication in their community."

  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.)

  2010-01-27
• Gaps in Respiratory PPE for Infectious Disease Response

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  "Federal agencies continue to implement equipment cache programs to assist communities with the response to disaster situations. Equipment contained within federally funded caches should meet national standards where appropriate. This paper will focus on recommendations to increase the availability of respiratory protection for first responders (first receivers) using cache programs that relate to infectious disease response. Appropriate protective ensemble will also include disposable protective clothing to include caps, gowns, boots, gloves and eye/face splash protection. For respirators, caches should include materials that support training, use and proper fit. Sufficient quantities of fit test kits should be included in the caches for each type of respiratory equipment contained within. Appropriate medical assessment(s) and training must be considered for the use, selection and care of the materials contained within as well as the fit testing, doffing, donning and re-use procedures. Based on a review of available sources, it is the opinion of the IAB [InterAgency Board] that respiratory PPE [Personal Protective Equipment] supplies of N95 respirators are not sufficient to meet the potential demands of an Infectious Disease Response. In the event of a large scale-incident, there are demonstrated concerns about how long it will take for cache replenishments to occur as most of the respiratory protective equipment is not manufactured domestically. Many responder organizations have used DHS [Department of Homeland Security] grant funds to purchase enhanced PPE ensembles, however, until recently, grant funds could not be leveraged to maintain and sustain these products resulting in a degradation of preparedness and response levels."

  InterAgency Board

  2009-12-07
• USNORTHCOM Response to Pandemic Influenza

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  "The threat of future Pandemic Influenza (PI) has serious national security implications for the United States. Because humans have little or no immunity to a new virus, a pandemic can occur with substantially higher sickness and mortality rates than normal influenza. Three human pandemics have occurred in the 20th century, each resulting in illness in approximately 30% of the world population and death in 0.2% to 2% of those infected. Using this historical information and current models of disease transmission, it is projected that a modern pandemic could lead to the deaths of 200,000 to 2 million Americans. […]USNORTHCOM's response in support of civil authorities during a pandemic will not be the same as its response in a geographically limited emergency or disaster. USNORTHCOM's response takes into consideration that a pandemic is an environment, not an event. This environment, which may last up to 18-24 months, will have significant operational consequences.[…]USNORTHCOM's defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) mission, in support of natural disasters and other emergencies and contingencies, will remain in effect. Response to requested support will be within capabilities and may not be to the level currently expected.

  United States. Northern Command

  2009-08-13
• Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan: Part I of II

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  "Part I of the HHS Implementation Plan identifies eight cross-cutting issues that encompass many of the themes noted in the HHS [Health and Human Services] Strategic Plan and Guidance for State and Local Partners. These themes include infection control, laboratory diagnostics, surveillance, health care planning, and workforce support. Each chapter outlines actions and specific steps the Department will undertake to fulfill the directives of the HSC [Homeland Security Council] and accomplish pandemic preparedness. The eight cross-cutting issue chapters are: 1) International Activities 2) Domestic Surveillance 3) Public Health Interventions 4) Federal Medical Response 5) Vaccines 6) Antiviral Drugs 7) Communications 8) State, Local, and Tribal Preparedness. The action steps in these eight chapters are organized by the three pillars identified in the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza: preparedness and communication; surveillance and detection; and response and containment. The implementation of the HHS action steps is contingent upon the availability of resources."

  United States. Department of Health and Human Services

  2006-11
• Report to Congress: Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Spending [June 2007]

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  "This report is an update to the previous reports to Congress that were provided in June and December 2006. This report covers all activities from December 2005 to June 2007. The report covers both the December 2005 emergency supplemental (PL 109-148) and the June 2006 emergency supplemental (PL 109-234). In August 2005, animal outbreaks of highly pathogenic H5N1 had been reported in twelve countries around the world with 112 total human cases confirmed in four of those countries. […]. Overall, 61 percent of human cases have been fatal. Once a pandemic begins, time will be a critical factor in our ability to accomplish the necessary production and delivery of vaccines and other medical countermeasures required to mitigate the pandemic. On November 1, 2005, the President requested a total of $7.1 billion in emergency funding for pandemic influenza preparedness activities, of which $6.7 billion was for implementation of the HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan. This funding was requested in FY 2006 to fund a three-year preparedness effort to ensure the Nation could effectively respond in the event of a pandemic. In December 2005, Congress appropriated $3.3 billion in emergency funding for HHS in a FY 2006 supplemental, for the first year of the HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan. In June 2006, Congress appropriated $2.3 billion for HHS in emergency funding in a second FY 2006 supplemental for the second year of the HHS Plan. In addition, HHS has requested $870 million in the FY 2008 President's Budget in one-time funding to continue these efforts."

  United States. Department of Health and Human Services

  2007-11
• Report to Congress: Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Spending [December 2006]

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  "This report is an update to the report to Congress on the first six months of activity that was provided on June 15, 2006. This report covers all activities from December 2005 to December 2006. The report covers both the December 2005 emergency supplemental (PL 109-148) and the June 2006 emergency supplemental (PL 109-234). In August 2005, animal outbreaks of highly pathogenic H5N1 had been reported in twelve countries around the world with 112 total human cases confirmed in four of those countries. Just over a year later, in December 2006, the number of countries confirming animal outbreaks has jumped to 53, with 258 total human cases confirmed in ten of those countries. Once a pandemic begins, time will be a critical factor in our ability to accomplish the necessary production and delivery of vaccines and other medical countermeasures required to mitigate the pandemic. On November 1, 2005, the President requested a total of $7.1 billion in emergency funding for pandemic influenza preparedness activities, of which $6.7 billion was for implementation of the HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan. This funding was requested in FY 2006 to fund a three-year preparedness effort to ensure that the Nation could effectively respond in the event of a pandemic. In December 2005, Congress appropriated $3.3 billion in emergency funding in a FY 2006 supplemental for HHS, for the first year of the HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan, and in June 2006, Congress appropriated $2.3 billion for the second year of the HHS Plan in emergency funding in a second FY 2006 supplemental."

  United States. Department of Health and Human Services

  2006-12
• Extensively Drug-Resistant Tuberculosis (XDR-TB): Emerging Public Health Threats and Quarantine and Isolation [November 26, 2010]

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  "The international saga of Andrew Speaker, a traveler thought to have XDR-TB, a drug-resistant form of tuberculosis, placed a spotlight on existing mechanisms to contain contagious disease threats and raised numerous legal and public health issues. This report presents the factual situation presented by Andrew Speaker. It also discusses the application of various public health measures available to contain an emerging public health threat posed by an individual who ignores medical advice and attempts to board an airplane or take other forms of public transportation. These measures include quarantine and isolation authorities, the 'Do Not Board' List, and application of certain provisions of the International Health Regulations. This report also examines constitutional issues relating to due process and equal protection. Legal issues which may be raised by application of federal nondiscrimination laws when emergency public health measures are used to contain emerging public health threats are also discussed."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Swendiman, Kathleen S.; Jones, Nancy Lee

  2010-11-26
• 1918 Flu Pandemic Implications for Homeland Security in the New Millennium

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  "The National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza notes that pandemic flu could overwhelm the heath and medical capabilities of the United States, cause hundreds of thousands of deaths, millions of hospitalizations, and cost hundreds of billions of dollars. The consensus within scientific circles is that the nation will likely face one or more pandemics in this century, although there is disagreement as to the probable timing of such an event. Studying the 1918 pandemic will assist modern day planners in mitigating the effects of pandemic flu and the contingency planning will have widespread applicability to other events, both natural and manmade, that may significantly impact the nation's health and security. This paper reviews the 1918 pandemic, explores concerns about the avian influenza virus H5N1, and considers current planning for pandemic flu. Weaknesses in the current schema are examined and recommendations are offered to facilitate both enhanced pandemic planning efforts and Homeland Security."

  Army War College (U.S.)

  Kirkland, Stephen

  2007-07-09
• Report to Congress: Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Spending [June 2006]

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  "The current pandemic influenza threat stems from outbreaks of avian influenza in Asia and Europe. The ability of the H5NI virus to infect a wide range of hosts, including birds and humans, is of great concern to the public health and medical community. Although the virus has not yet shown an ability to transmit efficiently between humans, it has the potential to acquire this capability. Once a pandemic begins, time will be a critical factor in our ability to accomplish the necessary production and delivery of vaccines and other medical countermeasures required to mitigate the pandemic. To prepare for the 'possibility of a pandemic, the President requested a total of $7.1 billion to fund a three-year strategy to enhance the Nation's pandemic influenza preparedness, of which $6.7 billion was designated for the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). HHS is responsible for the public health and medical response for a pandemic of human influenza. On November 2,2005, HHS released the HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan, which defines the HHS strategy for preparedness and response to this threat and provides a detailed framework for the operational plans being developed by HHS agencies and State, local, and tribal health authorities."

  United States. Department of Health and Human Services

  2006-06
• Building the Quarantine System

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  "Growing concern about the threat of importing infectious diseases through mobile populations, bioterrorism, animals, and cargo has prompted the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to invest in building a Quarantine System that meets the needs of the 21st Century. As was evidenced in the response to SARS in 2003 and in planning for a possible pandemic, CDC's Division of Global Migration and Quarantine (DGMQ) provides leadership in coordinating a nationwide response to global infectious disease threats that may cross U.S. borders. DGMQ's Quarantine System provides the critical infrastructure necessary to support the all-hazards (any public health threat) preparedness activities going on across the United States and throughout the world."

  National Center for Infectious Diseases (U.S.). Division of Global Migration and Quarantine

  2007-12
• Legal Authorities for Isolation and Quarantine

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  "Isolation and quarantine are public health practices used to stop or limit the spread of disease. Isolation is used to separate ill persons who have a communicable disease from those who are healthy. Isolation restricts the movement of ill persons to help stop the spread of certain diseases. For example, hospitals use isolation for patients with infectious tuberculosis. Quarantine is used to separate and restrict the movement of well persons who may have been exposed to a communicable disease to see if they become ill. These people may have been exposed to a disease and do not know it, or they may have the disease but do not show symptoms. Quarantine can also help limit the spread of communicable disease. Isolation and quarantine are used to protect the public by preventing exposure to infected persons or to persons who may be infected. In addition to serving as medical functions, isolation and quarantine also are 'police power' functions, derived from the right of the state to take action affecting individuals for the benefit of society."

  National Center for Infectious Diseases (U.S.). Division of Global Migration and Quarantine

  2009-03
• U.S. Quarantine Stations [Fact Sheet]

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  "U.S. Quarantine Stations are part of a comprehensive system that serves to limit the introduction and spread of contagious diseases in the United States. U.S. Quarantine Stations are located at 20 ports of entry and land-border crossings where international travelers arrive (see map). They are staffed with medical and public health officers from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and managed by CDC's Division of Global Migration and Quarantine. These health officers decide whether ill persons can enter the United States and what measures should be taken to prevent the spread of contagious diseases."

  National Center for Infectious Diseases (U.S.). Division of Global Migration and Quarantine

  2014-08
• Division of Global Migration and Quarantine [website]

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  The Public Health Mission of the Division of Global Migration and Quarantine [DGMQ] is "To reduce morbidity and mortality among immigrants, refugees, travelers, expatriates, and other globally mobile populations, and to prevent the introduction, transmission, and spread of communicable diseases through regulation, science, research, preparedness, and response." From the DGMQ About Page: "DGMQ achieves its mission by focusing on the following topic areas: Immigrant, Refugee and Migrant Health promotes and improves the health of immigrants, U.S.-bound refugees, and migrants through domestic and overseas programs.[....] Quarantine and Border Health Services protects the public's health through detection of and response to communicable diseases related to travel and imported pathogens and improves the health of globally mobile populations transitioning to U.S. communities[....] Travelers' Health works to safeguard the health of U.S. residents traveling internationally or living abroad[....] Policy and Regulatory Affairs ensures effective policies and regulations are in place to prevent the introduction, transmission, and interstate spread of communicable diseases in the United States and its territories[....] Community Interventions for Infection Control works to prevent and slow the spread of pandemic influenza and other infectious diseases in communities through non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs)[....] United States-Mexico Health works to improve the health of migrating populations through public health partnerships, science, and response at the U.S.-Mexico land border."

  National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (U.S.). Division of Global Migration and Quarantine
• Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Guidance for Healthcare Workers and Healthcare Employers [2009]

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  "The goal of this document is to help healthcare workers and employers prepare for and respond to an influenza pandemic. The guidance document is organized into four major sections: 1) Clinical background information on influenza 2) Infection control 3) Pandemic influenza preparedness 3) OSHA [Occupational Safety and Health Administration] standards of special importance Given the technical nature and breadth of information available in the document, each section has been subdivided (see Table of Contents) in order to allow readers to quickly focus on areas of interest. The document also contains appendices which provide pandemic planners with samples of infection control plans, examples of practical pandemic planning tools and additional technical information. Topic areas include Internet resources, communication tools, sample infection control programs, selftriage and home care resources, diagnosis and treatment of staff during a pandemic, planning and supply checklists and risk communication. This educational material has been provided for informational purposes only and should be used in conjunction with the entire document in order to ensure that healthcare workers are adequately protected during a pandemic. OSHA does not recommend one option over the many effective alternatives that exist."

  United States. Occupational Safety and Health Administration

  2009
• Report to Congress: Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Spending [January 2009]

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  "This report is an update to the previous five reports to Congress that were provided in June and December of 2006 and 2007, and in June of 2008. This report covers all activities from December 2005 to January 15, 2009. The report covers the pandemic influenza funding provided in both the December 2005 emergency supplemental appropriations bill (PL 109-148) and the June 2006 emergency supplemental appropriations bill (PL 109-234). Concern surrounding the threat of an influenza pandemic sparked by the existence of a novel influenza virus reemerged in August 2005 when animal outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1virus were reported in twelve countries around the world with 112 total human cases confirmed in four of those countries. Three and a half years later, the number of countries confirming animal outbreaks has expanded to 61, with 387 total human cases confirmed in fifteen of those countries. During the past twelve months, animal outbreaks due to the H5N1 influenza virus have continued in Asia and North Africa, where the virus is now endemic. Despite education efforts to minimize exposure to infected poultry, human cases continue to be associated with these outbreaks. The virus has also been identified in European countries, including Germany and the United Kingdom in 2008. In addition to the ongoing global concern raised by the spread and evolution of the H5N1 virus subtype, other novel influenza viruses have emerged. In the United Kingdom, a highly pathogenic avian influenza H7N7 virus infection appeared in domestic poultry."

  United States. Department of Health and Human Services

  2009-01
• Report to Congress: Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Spending [December 2007]

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  "This report is an update to the previous reports to Congress that were provided in June and December 2006 and in June 2007. This report covers all activities from December 2005 to December 2007. The report covers the pandemic influenza funding provided in both the December 2005 emergency supplemental appropriations bill (PL 109-148) and the June 2006 emergency supplemental appropriations bill (PL 109-234). In August 2005, animal outbreaks of highly pathogenic H5Nl had been reported in twelve countries around the world with 112 total human cases confirmed in four of those countries. Just over two years later in December 2007, the number of countries confirming animal outbreaks has jumped to 61, with 346 total human cases confirmed in fourteen of those countries. While the majority of human cases to date can be attributed to exposure to infected poultry, and sustained human-to-human transmission has not been observed, the human infections have been severe. Overall, 62 percent of human cases have been fatal. History shows that the mortality rate of a human pandemic virus is not likely to be this high. However, even a two percent case-fatality rate, as was seen in the 1918 pandemic, would constitute a public health catastrophe. Once a pandemic begins, time will be a critical factor in our ability to accomplish the necessary production and delivery of vaccines and other medical countermeasures required to mitigate the pandemic."

  United States. Department of Health and Human Services

  2007-12
• Next Flu Pandemic: What to Expect

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  "A flu (influenza) pandemic is an outbreak caused by a new human flu virus that spreads around the world. Because the pandemic flu virus will be new to people, many people could get very sick or could die. Seasonal flu shots do not protect people from pandemic flu. […] Public health experts say it's not a matter of IF a flu pandemic will happen, but WHEN. We cannot predict when the next flu pandemic will happen."

  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.)

  2008-10
• Report to the President on Reengineering the Influenza Vaccine Production Enterprise to Meet the Challenges of Pandemic Influenza: Backgrounder

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  This document is a backgrounder to "Report to the President on Reengineering the Influenza Vaccine Production Enterprise to Meet the Challenges of Pandemic Influenza," a report that "examines how the Nation can more rapidly and reliably produce effective vaccines, at a sufficient scale to protect all of the Nation's residents, in response to the emergence of pandemic influenza."

  United States. Executive Office of the President

  2010
• Hospital 2009 H1N1 Pandemic Influenza Readiness Review Checklist

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  "Hospitals have planned for an influenza pandemic for several years, but thus far the characteristics of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic are different than the high-severity pandemic that had been anticipated. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and The Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) have developed this Readiness Review Checklist as a supplement to existing hospital emergency management plans. This list focuses on information hospitals can use in response to a surge in H1N1 and seasonal flu patients rather than the basic planning and regulatory considerations included in earlier checklists."

  United States. Department of Health and Human Services. Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response

  2009
• Report to the President on Reengineering the Influenza Vaccine Production Enterprise to Meet the Challenges of Pandemic Influenza

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  This report "examines how the Nation can more rapidly and reliably produce effective vaccines, at a sufficient scale to protect all of the Nation's residents, in response to the emergence of pandemic influenza. [...]. The report recommends a number of steps that can be taken over the next one to two years to cut several weeks from the time currently needed to produce the first doses of a new vaccine. In addition, PCAST [President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology] identified actions that could greatly improve the reliability of the vaccine manufacturing enterprise over a two to ten year timeframe, further shortening the time required to provide vaccine to the entire U.S. population. Several of the recommendations can also improve the Nation's ability to mount medical counter-measures against a variety of infectious agents. Finally, the successful production of an effective pandemic influenza vaccine requires coordinated actions on the part of government and the private sector; as part of its review, PCAST identified ways to better utilize public-private partnerships to optimize the Nation's vaccine production enterprise."

  United States. Executive Office of the President

  President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (U.S.)

  2010-08
• Report of the Interagency Workgroup on Pandemic Influenza and At-Risk Individuals

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  "This report is an introduction to planning for at-risk individuals during pandemic influenza. Limited explicit information is available to prepare emergency planners, public health agencies, and human services providers for the impact that pandemic influenza will have on the medical, behavioral health, and human services networks that provide needed functional support for at-risk individuals. Using the functional definition of at-risk (special needs) individuals in the National Response Framework (NRF); at-risk individuals may constitute as much as 62% of the U.S. population. Historically, these individuals have not been well integrated into the emergency planning process and their needs and concerns have only recently begun to be more comprehensively addressed in State and local emergency planning. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Interagency Workgroup on At-Risk Individuals and Pandemic Influenza was tasked to make recommendations for integrating the needs and concerns of at-risk individuals into pandemic influenza emergency planning. This report presents these recommendations. It is intended as a resource for service providers and emergency planners. The report serves as an introduction to planning for at-risk individuals during pandemic influenza. It begins with a review of the needs and concerns of at-risk individuals, moves to key concepts and planning assumptions, and provides specific recommendations and resources for integration of at-risk individual needs into Federal, State, and local pandemic influenza response plans."

  United States. Department of Health and Human Services. Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response

  2009-08
• Listening Session on At-Risk Individuals in Pandemic Influenza and Other Scenarios: After Action Report

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  "On August 14, 2009 the Office for At-Risk Individuals, Behavioral Health, and Human Services Coordination (ABC) in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) held a Listening Session on 'At-Risk Individuals in Pandemic Influenza and Other Scenarios.' The Listening Session was designed and conducted as a 'facilitated discussion' to engage stakeholder participants in a robust open dialogue. The Listening Session brought together a diverse group of more than 35 experts and practitioners representing public health non-governmental organizations, health care providers and federal agencies involved in public health preparedness and planning, emergency response, and at-risk individuals. The group was brought together to engage and promote dialogue about the challenges and solutions needed to effectively address the needs of at-risk individuals during pandemic influenza and other emergencies in five main areas: 1) Locating and identifying at-risk individuals; 2) Unique concerns of at-risk individuals in accessing public health and medical services; 3) Best Practices in public health and medical service delivery for at-risk individuals; 4) Successful program implementation at the state, tribal and local level, and: 5) Gaps and Barriers to accessing public health and medical services for at-risk individuals."

  United States. Department of Health and Human Services. Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response

  2009-08-14
• EMS Pandemic Influenza Guidelines for Statewide Adoption

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  "While this document provides broad-based Pandemic Influenza Guidelines for consideration by State and local emergency medical services agencies, the specifics of pandemic influenza preparation and response are unique to the configuration and resources of each State EMS [emergency medical services ] system and local EMS agency. The EMS Pandemic Influenza Planning Assumptions provide the basic underpinnings of the recommended guidelines. Each of the guidelines is presented in this section; the remainder of the document provides detailed information about each guideline including the rationale, considerations and pertinent background material. Coordination among the 9-1-1 Public Safety Answering Point, the Emergency Medical Services System and the Public Health System is of paramount importance. The Sample Call Flow for Standard EMD Calls vs. Pandemic Flu Calls (Figure 1) illustrates a sample call flow decision to be made in a period of pandemic influenza vs. an agency's regular day-to-day operation; coordination between EMS and 9-1-1 is essential to system operation. The Sample Pandemic Influenza EMS Dispatch Protocol (Figure 2) shows examples of modified EMS and 9-1-1 system response plans based on the CDC's Pandemic Severity Index - again demonstrating the need for close coordination between 9-1-1 and EMS. The Sample Pandemic Influenza EMS Operating Protocol (Figure 3) demonstrates the potential need for EMS protocol modifications, and also utilizes the Pandemic Severity Index for planning. Each of these is a sample only and is intended to demonstrate the need for systems coordination and the difference in 'conceptual thinking' necessitated by a potential influenza pandemic."

  United States. Department of Transportation

  2007-05-03