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Legal Authorities for Isolation and Quarantine
"Isolation and quarantine are public health practices used to stop or limit the spread of disease. Isolation is used to separate ill persons who have a communicable disease from those who are healthy. Isolation restricts the movement of ill persons to help stop the spread of certain diseases. For example, hospitals use isolation for patients with infectious tuberculosis. Quarantine is used to separate and restrict the movement of well persons who may have been exposed to a communicable disease to see if they become ill. These people may have been exposed to a disease and do not know it, or they may have the disease but do not show symptoms. Quarantine can also help limit the spread of communicable disease. Isolation and quarantine are used to protect the public by preventing exposure to infected persons or to persons who may be infected. In addition to serving as medical functions, isolation and quarantine also are 'police power' functions, derived from the right of the state to take action affecting individuals for the benefit of society."
National Center for Infectious Diseases (U.S.). Division of Global Migration and Quarantine
2009-03
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Airtightness Evaluation of Shelter-in-Place Spaces for Protection against Airborne Chemical and Biological Releases
"Due to concerns about potential airborne chemical and biological (chembio) releases in or near buildings, building owners and managers and other decision makers are faced with a number of options for increasing their buildings' level of protection against such events. A wide range of technologies and approaches is being proposed with varying levels of efficacy and cost, as well as varying degrees of applicability to any particular building. In particular, shelter-in-place (SIP) has been proposed as a strategy to protect building occupants from chembio releases, particularly outdoor releases. SIP strategies involve having the building occupants stay in the building, generally in a space designated for such sheltering, until the event is over, the outdoor contaminant levels have decreased, and it is safe to leave the building. SIP is often considered as an alternative to building evacuation under conditions where the outdoor exposure is likely to be higher than the exposure in the shelter. While much guidance is available on the implementation of SIP in buildings, important technical issues remain about the degree of protection provided by a particular space and the factors that determine the level of protection. This project has consisted of the following tasks: conducting a literature review of SIP strategies and performance issues; developing a study plan for testing SIP airtightness evaluation methods; implementing the study plan through a combination of experiments and simulations; and, finally, developing recommendations on SIP evaluation and possible performance criteria for candidate SIP spaces."
National Homeland Security Research Center (U.S.)
Persily, Andrew K.; Emmerich, Steven J.; Davis, Heather L. . . .
2009-03
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Shelter-In-Place: Indoor Exposure Assessment During an Airborne Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Event
From the thesis abstract: "The goal of Shelter-In-Place (SIP) is to reduce human exposure to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) agents in the event of an accidental or intentional airborne release into the outdoor environment. The Air Force Bioenvironmental Engineering (BE) career field is responsible for providing hazard identification, evaluation, and control capabilities as well as executing health risk assessments to recommend appropriate courses of action to commanders pre-, trans-, and post-incident. Specifically, BE is responsible for providing sampling, identification, and quantification input to hazard prediction models and supporting evacuation plan development to provide risk-based control recommendations. This also includes providing exposure and contamination control recommendations for sheltered populations. A Gaussian plume model combined with indoor box model was used to test the consequences associated with the delay of implementing SIP procedures. It is imperative that emergency planners pre-plan the installation SIP protocol for likely scenarios identified during the various vulnerability surveys conducted for both on- and off-installation. The decision to shelter-in-place must be made immediately in order to reduce the exposure and depending on scenario, a delay greater than one minute can significantly increase the exposure resulting in additional casualties presenting at the local medical treatment facility."
Air Force Institute of Technology (U.S.)
Schmidtgoessling, Robert D.
2009-03
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Guam Memorial Hospital Authority Pandemic Flu Plan
"An influenza pandemic will create significant challenges for our hospital. The number of children and adults seeking care for febrile and respiratory illnesses will increase substantially; some disease will be severe requiring inpatient care; and many of those infected will have underlying risk factors for adverse outcome including death. Influenza also will occur among health care workers and their family members resulting in shortages of trained staff to care for others. Physical resources, such as hospital beds and respiratory therapy equipment may not be sufficient to meet demand. Shortages of antiviral medications and vaccine will limit the ability to implement these preventive interventions. And large numbers of influenza-infected patients and staff shortages will stress the ability to implement good infection control in the hospital, leading to nosocomial disease; further exacerbating the problem. Although these stresses on our hospital are inevitable in an influenza pandemic, coordination, planning and exercising preparedness plans can improve the effectiveness of a pandemic response and limit mortality and morbidity."
Guam Memorial Hospital Authority
2009-03
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London Regional Resilience Flu Pandemic Response Plan: Special Arrangements for Dealing with Pandemic Influenza in London [Version 4]
"The Government judges that one of the highest current risks to the UK is the possible emergence of a human influenza pandemic--that is, the rapid worldwide spread of influenza caused by a novel virus to which people would have no immunity, resulting in serious harm to human health, and wider social and economic damage and disruption. In 2005, the Cabinet Office required Regional Resilience Forums to oversee the development of individual and multi-agency resilience and response plans for a potential influenza pandemic. The London Regional Resilience Flu Pandemic Response Plan was first approved at the May 2006 meeting of the London Regional Resilience Forum (LRRF)." Two later versions of the plan incorporated lessons learned during Exercise Winter Willow, "the largest ever civil contingency exercise to have been conducted in the UK," and recommendations and guidance from the Department of Health (DH) and Cabinet Office (CO). Version 4 of the London Regional Resilience Flu Pandemic Response Plan "follows a national review of multi-agency pandemic planning undertaken by the Cabinet Office in early 2008, and incorporates the recommendations of that review. It aims to provide the agencies that make up the London Resilience Partnership with a strategic framework to support their integrated preparedness and response to pandemic influenza. This document will inform and support the development of local and organisational responses that are appropriate to local circumstances and sufficiently consistent to ensure a robust regional response to pandemic influenza. The document summarises key plans, guidance and procedures to allow a comprehensive overview of London's co-ordinated planning and response arrangements for human pandemic influenza."
London Resilience Partnership
2009-03
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Threats to Public Health Security - A State Public Health Official's Perspective
This presentation was developed by Mark B. Horton, Director of the California Department of Public Health, as part of a March 2009 webinar on the top threats to public health and homeland security. The presentation includes an overview of the public health threats and 15 national planning scenarios representing a range of potential terrorist attacks and natural disasters. It also reviews the role of state public health in public health security, categories of bioterrorism agents, the potential impact of pandemic flu, and current challenges and opportunities for public health preparedness.
California. Department of Public Health; National Governors' Association. Center for Best Practices
Horton, Mark
2009-02-18
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LLIS Lessons Learned: Pandemic Influenza Preparedness: Establishing Clear Guidance for School Closure
State public health and education departments should collaborate to establish clear plans and policy guidance regarding school closure recommendations during a pandemic influenza outbreak.
Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS)
2009-02-13?
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LLIS Lesson Learned: Pandemic Influenza Preparedness: Alternate Care Site Roles and Responsibilities
State public health departments should engage hospital and mass care partners to clarify roles and responsibilities for establishing and operating alternate care sites during a pandemic influenza outbreak.
Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS)
2009-02-13?
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Public Health and Medical Preparedness and Response: Issues in the 111th Congress [February 10, 2009]
"Key recent events--the 2001 terrorist attacks, Hurricane Katrina, and concerns about an influenza ('flu') pandemic, among others--sharpened congressional interest in the nation's systems to track and respond to public health threats. The 109th Congress passed several laws that established, reorganized, or reauthorized key public health and medical preparedness and response programs in the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS) and Homeland Security (DHS). The 110th Congress was engaged in oversight of the implementation of these laws, focused in particular on such matters as (1) the fitness of HHS and DHS--in terms of authority, funding, policies, and workforce--to respond to health emergencies; (2) the effectiveness of coordination among them and other federal agencies; and (3) the status of major initiatives such as pandemic flu preparedness and disaster planning for at-risk populations. The 111th Congress is likely to remain engaged in oversight of the nation's readiness for health threats. [...]. The 111th Congress may review HHS's disaster response capabilities, including its authority to declare a public health emergency and the means to fund its response efforts. [...]. At this time, there is no federal assistance program designed purposefully to cover the uncompensated or uninsured health care costs for disaster victims. The 111th Congress may reconsider earlier proposals to provide such assistance under certain circumstances. [...]. This report summarizes key issues in domestic public health and medical preparedness and response, citing other CRS Reports and sources of additional information."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Lister, Sarah A.
2009-02-10
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After Action Report of Interrelationships Between Response Organizations During SARS Attack Exercise of November 5, 2008
"On November 5, 2008, a large scale functional exercise named SARS Attacks was conducted by many metro Portland, Oregon, hospitals, a local public health incident command organization, emergency management operations centers at the city, county, and state levels, and a state health agency operation center. The scenario was an outbreak of a highly contagious and serious disease, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, occurring during an influenza epidemic. Each organization was encouraged to draft an AAR/IP specific to their unique objectives and internal processes. This AAR addresses the interrelationships between organizations relative to common objectives. (1) Resource ordering. Clear resource ordering processes, flow of information, and ordering points for each response organization are identified and working well. (2) Allocation of resources. Orders of scarce resources are filled according to properly made allocation decisions, e.g. by a IC/UC for its operations, an AC for its IC/UCs, or a MAC group for broader application. (3) Situational Awareness. Information is rapidly shared between response organizations and displayed at suitable levels of detail at each organization. Response actions are monitored (operations reports, field observers), communicated to ICP, reflected on situation display, analyzed, and applied to adjustments to current and/or next period's operations. (4) Command, Control, Support, Coordination Relationships between activated response organizations are clear, agreed upon, and operate as an efficient system. (5) Tactical Communications between activated response organizations are efficient and effective."
United States. Office of Emergency Preparedness
2009-02-04
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Alabama's Pandemic Influenza Operational Plan
This document provides basic planning assumptions and operating objectives during a pandemic influenza event in Alabama.
Alabama. Department of Public Health
2009-02-03
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Great Lakes Border Health Initiative: Infectious Disease Emergency Communications Guideline
"This document has been prepared as a component of the Great Lakes Border Health Initiative, a cooperative endeavor between the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long‐Term Care and bordering U.S. state health departments, to enhance early warning infectious disease surveillance at our international borders.
The purpose of this document is to create a tool to categorize emergency vs. non‐emergency public health events and to pre‐determine preferred routes of communications for such events involving the public health partners listed above."
New York (State). Department of Health; Minnesota. Department of Health; Michigan. Department of Community Health . . .
2009-02
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News from NACCHO: Mass Fatality Planning for Pandemic Influenza: A Planning Model from a Seven-County Region in Kentucky
Within Kentucky, the responsibility for pandemic influenza preparedness and response lies heavily on public health. Angela Woosley, a regional public health preparedness coordinator in Kentucky, called upon the cooperation and expertise of coroners, the medical examiner, local funeral home directors, emergency management, hospitals, academia, the healthcare community and professional associations to develop a unique Natural Death Surge Plan for Catastrophic Public Health Emergencies' for western Kentucky. This plan would be activated if the mortuary capacity in Region 3 were overwhelmed by an influenza pandemic or other long-term catastrophic mass fatality event.
National Association of County & City Health Officials (U.S.)
Johnson, Victoria A.
2009-01-16?
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DPH Pandemic Influenza Spring Exercise: May 12-13, 2008: After Action Report [San Francisco, California]
From the Lessons Learned Information Sharing abstract: "On May 13, 2008, the San Francisco Department of Public Health (DPH) participated in the Pandemic Influenza Spring Exercise to test the ability of DPH staff to make infection control and other recommendations while facing shortages in infection control supplies and staffing, and communication between the Infections Disease Emergencies, Response, area hospitals and the DPH Departmental Operating Center. This after-action report analyzes exercise results, identifies strengths to be maintained and built upon as well as potential areas for improvement, and supports the development of corrective actions."
San Francisco (Calif.). Department of Public Health
2009-01-09
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Public Health and Medical Preparedness and Response: Issues in the 111th Congress [February 25, 2009]
"Key recent events-the 2001 terrorist attacks, Hurricane Katrina, and concerns about an influenza ("flu") pandemic, among others-sharpened congressional interest in the nation's systems to track and respond to public health threats." This report addresses public health and medical preparedness and response issues facing the 111th Congress and its proposed efforts in the oversight of the nation's readiness for health threats. Included in this report are laws and engagements passed by the 109th and 110th Congress; the progress and implementation of such programs, and consideration of proposals in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (the economic stimulus proposal) to enhance funding for the development of medical countermeasures (e.g., drugs and vaccines), and for pandemic flu preparedness. "At this time, there is no federal assistance program designed purposefully to cover the uncompensated or uninsured health care costs for disaster victims. The 111th Congress may reconsider earlier proposals to provide such assistance under certain circumstances."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Lister, Sarah A.
2009
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Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Guidance for Healthcare Workers and Healthcare Employers [2009]
"The goal of this document is to help healthcare workers and employers prepare for and respond to an influenza pandemic. The guidance document is organized into four major sections: 1) Clinical background information on influenza 2) Infection control 3) Pandemic influenza preparedness 3) OSHA [Occupational Safety and Health Administration] standards of special importance Given the technical nature and breadth of information available in the document, each section has been subdivided (see Table of Contents) in order to allow readers to quickly focus on areas of interest. The document also contains appendices which provide pandemic planners with samples of infection control plans, examples of practical pandemic planning tools and additional technical information. Topic areas include Internet resources, communication tools, sample infection control programs, selftriage and home care resources, diagnosis and treatment of staff during a pandemic, planning and supply checklists and risk communication. This educational material has been provided for informational purposes only and should be used in conjunction with the entire document in order to ensure that healthcare workers are adequately protected during a pandemic. OSHA does not recommend one option over the many effective alternatives that exist."
United States. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
2009
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Hospital 2009 H1N1 Pandemic Influenza Readiness Review Checklist
"Hospitals have planned for an influenza pandemic for several years, but thus far the characteristics of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic are different than the high-severity pandemic that had been anticipated. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and The Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) have developed this Readiness Review Checklist as a supplement to existing hospital emergency management plans. This list focuses on information hospitals can use in response to a surge in H1N1 and seasonal flu patients rather than the basic planning and regulatory considerations included in earlier checklists."
United States. Department of Health and Human Services. Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response
2009
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FEMA Disaster Assistance Fact Sheet: Pandemic Influenza
"The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), including the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), in cooperation and coordination with various State and Federal agencies, is prepared to take appropriate and authorized action in response to requests for Federal assistance through the Stafford Act as a result of a pandemic influenza. […] In order to assist States in assessing impacts and evaluating the need for Federal assistance in a pandemic influenza, FEMA has developed these guidelines for requesting Stafford Act assistance from the Federal Government."
United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency
2009
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Foodborne Active Disease Surveillance Network (FoodNet) 2006 Surveillance Report
"The Foodborne Diseases Active Surveillance Network (FoodNet) is the principal foodborne disease component of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC's) Emerging Infections Program (EIP). FoodNet is a collaborative project among CDC, ten state health departments, the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition (CFSAN) and the Center for Veterinary Medication (CVM) of the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA). FoodNet is an active sentinel surveillance network designed to produce stable and accurate national estimates of the burden and sources of foodborne diseases in the United States through active surveillance and additional studies. This enhanced surveillance and investigation conducted by FoodNet are integral to developing and evaluating new prevention and control strategies to improve the safety of our food and the public's health. In 2006, the FoodNet surveillance area included 45.5 million persons, or 15.2% of the United States population. FoodNet ascertained 17,432 laboratory-confirmed infections of Campylobacter, Cryptosporidium, Cyclospora, Listeria, Salmonella, Shigella, Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli (STEC) O157, STEC non-O157, Vibrio and Yersinia. Most infections were due to Salmonella (38%) or Campylobacter (33%). Infections were approximately equally distributed between genders, and, for many pathogens, the highest risk of reported infection occurred among children
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.); United States. Department of Health and Human Services
2009
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Foodborne Active Disease Surveillance Network (FoodNet) Surveillance Report, 2007
"The Foodborne Diseases Active Surveillance Network (FoodNet) is the principal foodborne disease component of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC's) Emerging Infections Program (EIP). FoodNet is a collaborative project among CDC, ten state health departments, the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition (CFSAN) and the Center for Veterinary Medication (CVM) of the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA). FoodNet is an active sentinel surveillance network designed to produce stable and accurate national estimates of the burden and sources of foodborne diseases in the United States through active surveillance and additional studies. This enhanced surveillance and investigation conducted by FoodNet are integral to developing and evaluating new prevention and control strategies to improve the safety of our food and the public's health. In 2007, the FoodNet surveillance area included 45.9 million persons, or 15.2% of the United States population. FoodNet ascertained 18,039 laboratory-confirmed infections of Campylobacter, Cryptosporidium, Cyclospora, Listeria, Salmonella, Shigella, Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli (STEC) O157, STEC non-O157, Vibrio and Yersinia. Most infections were due to Salmonella (38%) or Campylobacter (33%). Infections were equally distributed between genders, and the highest incidence of infection with many pathogens occurred among children
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.); United States. Department of Health and Human Services
2009
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Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response: A WHO Guidance Document
"The information and recommendations contained in this guidance is the product of expert opinion, derived from several international consultations which included examination of available information and modeling studies, input from public health experts on lessons learned from SARS [severe acute respiratory syndrome] and both animal and human influenza responses, and consolidation of recommendations in existing WHO [World Health Organization] guidance. This guidance was subject to an extensive public review. All external experts and contributors for all meetings and consultations, including those in the public review, have signed a declaration of interest statement in accordance with WHO policy. A small number of participants indicated a conflict of interest. However it was deemed by the working group that these declarations were not sufficient in conflict with the recommendations, to exclude them from the guidance development process. The declarations of interest are available upon request. For more information on the revision process, see Annex 2. The Global Influenza Programme will revise this guidance in 2014, or sooner in the event of significant developments which impact pandemic preparedness and response planning."
World Health Organization
2009
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Limiting the Impact of Pandemic Influenza through Community-Level Actions
"Influenza pandemics are rare but recurring events. Ten pandemics have been recorded over the last 300 years, with starting points ranging from 10 to 49 years apart. In the 20th century, pandemics occurred in 1918, 1957 and 1968. Considered one of the deadliest disease events in human history, the 'Spanish influenza' in 1918 claimed more than 40 million people worldwide. By any calculation, that outbreak killed more people in a year than the Black Death of the Middle Ages killed in a century; it killed more people in 24 weeks than AIDS has killed in 24 years."
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
2009
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Health Care Workers in Peril: Preparing to Protect Worker Health and Safety During Pandemic Influenza
"An influenza pandemic is projected to have a global impact requiring a sustained, large-scale response from the healthcare community to provide care to sick patients. Healthcare workers will be at very high risk of becoming infected when caring for patients with pandemic flu unless adequate health and safety measures are in place, in advance of the pandemic, that will protect them. There is no existing comprehensive federal OSHA standard with mandatory and enforceable provisions that require planning and preparation designed to protect healthcare workers from exposures to pandemic influenza. Nevertheless, it is essential that workplaces plan and prepare for safety and health issues before the flu arrives. In an effort to assess the extent of employer efforts in planning adequate safety and health measures for healthcare workers, a group of unions developed a 'pandemic flu preparedness survey' to assess the level of preparedness on a facility basis. The survey was distributed to union leaders across the country who represent healthcare workers in unionized facilities. One hundred four (104) facility surveys were collected by six unions in fourteen states. The results of the survey indicate that health care facilities have made some progress in preparing for an influenza pandemic but much more needs to be done. More than one-third of the respondents believe their workplace is either not ready or only slightly ready to address the health and safety needs necessary to protect healthcare workers during a pandemic."
AFSCME
2009
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Broadcasting Flu Messages -- Citywide Transmission and Community Reception: An Evaluation of Ready New York's Pandemic Influence Outreach Campaign
From the Executive Summary: "Public health risk communication is a central feature of New York City's pandemic flu preparedness plan. Particularly in the early stages of a pandemic, before effective therapeutic measures are available, non-pharmaceutical interventions such as social distancing, personal protective hygiene, and voluntary isolation are critical strategies for suppressing the spread of a novel viral strain. New York City health and emergency management officials have decided to use the city's risk communication structure - the Office of Emergency Management's Ready New York outreach and dissemination capacities - as one of the primary means to communicate pandemic flu health messages. In October 2008, NCDP [National Center for Disaster Preparedness] contracted with Public Health Solutions and the Office of Emergency Management (OEM) to evaluate the reach and effectiveness of its planned Ready NY [New York] Pandemic Flu community outreach campaign."
National Center for Disaster Preparedness; Joseph L. Mailman School of Public Health
Abramson, David M. (David Michael), 1958-; Walsh, Lauren; Sury, Jonathan . . .
2009
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Hospital Preparedness Checklist for Pandemic Influenza: Focus on Pandemic (H1N1) 2009
"Hospitals play a critical role within the health system in providing essential medical care to the community, particularly during a crisis, such as an epidemic or a pandemic. Prolonged and combined outbreaks can lead to the progressive spread of disease with rapidly increasing service demands that can potentially overwhelm the capacity of hospitals and the health system at large. To enhance the readiness of the health facilities to cope with the challenges of an epidemic, a pandemic or any other emergency or disaster, hospital managers need to ensure the initiation of relevant generic priority action. This document aims to provide a checklist of the key action to carry out in the context of a continuous hospital emergency preparedness process."
World Health Organization. Regional Office for Europe
2009
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California Department of Education Pandemic Influenza Manual
From the document: "This manual is intended to complement federal guidance to LEAs [Local Educational Agencies] regarding pandemic influenza and to provide resources and guidance specific to the state of California. It is the policy of the California Department of Education (CDE) to take all possible steps to help limit the spread of influenza, mitigate disease and suffering, and lessen the impact on staff, children and families, and child care and after school providers."
California. Department of Education
O'Connell, Jack
2009
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American Association of Swine Veterinarians Position Statement on Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza
"The American Association of Swine Veterinarians (AASV) Board of Directors has approved the adoption of a series of position statements regarding the A/H1N1 2009 pandemic influenza virus. The document was developed by the AASV H1N1 Influenza Working Group chaired by Dr Joe Connor. While pork continues to be safe to eat, concerns have arisen regarding the potential cross-species transmission of the novel virus. Recognizing the necessity to protect both animal and human health, the AASV Executive Committee created the working group, which it charged with examining the influenza issue and developing recommendations based on the best available current knowledge and pertinent published literature. In response, the working group developed a series of recommendations to address concerns in four broad topic areas: protection of swine workers, vaccination of swine herds, vaccine development, and movement of animals from herds infected with the novel virus. The specific recommendations are outlined below. The emergence of the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza virus has reminded us of the potential for cross-species transmission of influenza viruses. As veterinarians, we believe that protecting human health is of primary importance, and all reasonable measures should be taken to avoid any unnecessary risk to human health. The 'One Health Initiative' of the American Veterinary Medical Association and the American Medical Association recognizes the impact that animals have on human health and vice versa. An essential component of protecting human health is providing a safe, high quality, and affordable food supply."
American Association of Swine Veterinarians
2009
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Pandemic Flu: Closing the Gaps, Hearing Before the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on State, Local, and Private Sector Preparedness and Integration, of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, First Session, June 3, 2009
From the opening statement of Mark L. Pryor: "This is the Subcommittee on State, Local, and Private Sector Preparedness and Integration and it is time for us to update our efforts on pandemic influenza. The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) has described pandemic flu as both inevitable and as one of the biggest threats to public health in the Nation. In October 2007, I chaired a hearing entitled, ''Pandemic Influenza: State and Local Efforts to Prepare.'' At that hearing, HHS, DHS, and State and local health officials testified. The witnesses cited efforts underway that included national strategies, plans, and exercises. Now less than 2 years later, we are faced with the reality of a pandemic threat. In late March and early April 2009, the first cases of a new flu virus, the H1N1, were reported in Southern California and San Antonio, Texas. So far, the CDC has confirmed 10,053 cases in 50 States and in the District of Columbia. This includes seven cases in my home State of Arkansas according to the CDC. The CDC reports that most of the influenza viruses being detected now in the United States are of the strain. Further, CDC's Dr. Anne Schuchat has said this will be a marathon and not a sprint, and even if this outbreak is a small one, we can anticipate that we may have a subsequent or follow-up outbreak several months later and we need to stay ready." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: John Ensign, Bernice Steinhardt, John Thomasian, Paul E. Jarris and Stephen M. Ostroff.
United States. Government Printing Office
2009
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Beyond the Checklist: Addressing Shortfalls in National Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity and Science and Technology, of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, First Session, September 26, 2007
From the opening statement of James R. Langevin, "Today we will explore what it takes to prepare for and respond to an influenza pandemic that would affect every sector of society and every person in the world. Planning is problematic to begin with because it is so difficult to fathom both the potential casualties and the impact of such a pandemic. Even when we focus just on our own country, the projected numbers are still staggering--200,000 dead, 2 million ill, all sectors and every aspect of the infrastructure negatively impacted. Though this is a problem that we will not be able to control through standard disease management practices, we can and must rise to the challenge. Make no mistake about it--we are due for a severe influenza pandemic at some point for a variety of reasons. The influenza viruses that could result in a pandemic are increasing in virulence. Record numbers of humans are now living in close proximity to current and potential animal carriers. Rapid transit moves people and cargo at increasingly faster rates, fostering the movement and transfer of diseases. Influenza viruses are already mutating faster than we could have imagined, and the toll that avian influenza is taking on other countries is already devastating." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: James R. Langevin, Michael T. McCaul, Bill Pascrell Jr., B.Tilman Jolly, Bernice Steinhardt, W. Craig Vanderwagen, L. Anthony Cirillo, Michael C. Caldwell, Peter A. Shult and David L. Lakey
United States. Government Printing Office
2009
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Beyond Readiness: An Examination of the Current Status and Future Outlook of the National Response to Pandemic Influenza, Hearing Before the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, First Session, July 29, 2009
From the opening statement of Bennie G. Thompson: The committee is meeting today to receive testimony on 'Beyond Readiness: An Examination of the Current Status and Future Outlook of the National Response to Pandemic Influenza.' [...] The good news is that a vaccine is currently under development, and over the last 4 years, Congress has provided approximately $8.6 billion for pandemic planning efforts. But unfortunately, despite this amount of funding, according to GAO [Government Accountability Office] there are still major gaps in pandemic planning and preparedness efforts. Among the major gaps is the failure to plan for additional bed space and medical supplies. Additionally, GAO determined that leadership roles and responsibilities for an influenza pandemic need to be further clarified, tested, and exercised. Given this country's recent experience with disasters, it is hard to believe that there are those who underestimate the importance of plans and drills. [...] Finally, we need to understand that the emergency preparedness and response community and the health care community have always shared resources during crises and disasters. These formal and informal partnerships may be strained during a pandemic. Increased drills and exercises will strengthen these relationships, decrease uncertainty, and improve response and recovery. Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Bennie G. Thompson, Peter T. King, Paul C. Broun, Stephen F. Lynch, Jane Holl Lute, William Corr, Bernice Steinhardt, Colleen M. Kelley, Richard G. Muth, and Thomas A. Farley.
United States. Government Printing Office
2009
