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Legislative and Judicial Developments Affecting Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) [Updated February 1, 2022]
From the Document: "The Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) [hyperlink] system is the U.S. Court's web-based service that gives registered users electronic access to documents filed in the U.S. Courts via the online Case Management/Electronic Case Files system, known as CM/ECF [hyperlink]. The Administrative Office of the United States Courts [hyperlink] (the 'AO'), the federal judicial entity responsible for maintaining PACER, currently charges users 10 cents per PACER search as well as 10 cents per page accessed using the system (with a ceiling of $3 per document). The judiciary waives fees on accounts incurring $30 or less in any given quarter. With most users not exceeding this $30 threshold, 25% of PACER users reportedly [hyperlink] pay fees in a given quarter. Individuals or groups may prospectively petition for a fee exemption [hyperlink] to conduct their PACER searches for specified research projects. This Legal Sidebar discusses recent legislative proposals and litigation that may affect the cost of public access to PACER."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Reiss, Theresa A.
2022-02-01
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Public-Safety Broadband Network: Congressional Action Required to Ensure Network Continuity, Report to Congressional Committees
From the Governmenrt Accountability Office (GAO) Highlights: "Communication systems are essential for first responders in emergencies. In 2012, FirstNet was established by statute as an independent authority within the Department of Commerce's National Telecommunications and Information Administration. FirstNet was charged with establishing a nationwide broadband network for use by public-safety entities. In March 2017, FirstNet awarded a $6.5 billion contract to AT&T to deploy the network, which is currently expected to reach its final operating capability in March 2023. The statute creating FirstNet included provisions for its authority to terminate in 2027 and for GAO to report on what actions the Congress should consider regarding this sunset. This report examines: (1) FirstNet's statutory requirements and contract responsibilities that Congress should consider before FirstNet's authority sunsets in 2027 and (2) options to oversee and manage the network when FirstNet's authority sunsets and the associated operational implications and potential costs. GAO reviewed relevant statutes and documents, including FirstNet's contract with AT&T, and reviewed GAO's prior relevant reports. GAO also interviewed FirstNet and other government officials and a nongeneralizable selection of publicsafety stakeholders. [...] The Congress should consider reauthorizing FirstNet and ensure that key statutory and contract responsibilities are addressed before the 2027 sunset. In doing so, it can consider organizational options."
United States. Government Accountability Office
2022-02
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Prioritizing Cybersecurity Risk for Enterprise Risk Management
From the Abstract: "This document is the second in a series that supplements NIST [National Institute of Standards and Technology] Interagency/Internal Report (NISTIR) 8286, 'Integrating Cybersecurity and Enterprise Risk Management (ERM).' This series provides additional detail regarding the enterprise application of cybersecurity risk information; the previous document, NISTIR 8286A, provided detail regarding stakeholder risk guidance and risk identification and analysis. This second publication describes the need for determining the priorities of each of those risks in light of their potential impact on enterprise objectives, as well as options for properly treating that risk. This report describes how risk priorities and risk response information are added to the cybersecurity risk register (CSRR) in support of an overall enterprise risk register. Information about the selection of and projected cost of risk response will be used to maintain a composite view of cybersecurity risks throughout the enterprise, which may be used to confirm and, if necessary, adjust risk strategy to ensure mission success."
National Institute of Standards and Technology (U.S.)
Quinn, Stephen D.; Ivy, Nahla; Barrett, Matthew . . .
2022-02
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Closing the Gap: Aligning Arms Control Concepts with Emerging Challenges
From the Executive Summary: "If arms control is to survive as a national security tool, it will be necessary to explain its ability and limitations in achieving U.S. deterrence and strategic stability goals in an era of great power competition. These goals are what ultimately should dictate the format of a potential agreement. To assist in this effort, this paper draws three important conclusions. The first is the need to look beyond simple numbers of launchers and warheads in the next arms control agreement to the challenges of quantitative asymmetries, the erosion of strategic stability, and the pressures of externalities. Deep numerical reductions are unlikely. While limits on launchers could remain and limits on warheads could be imposed, the most important quantitative asymmetry exists in the U.S.-Russian nuclear production complexes. [...] Externalities--the factors outside an agreement--are as important now as they were during the height of the Cold War. If they cannot be directly addressed in the text of an agreement, the agreement must be framed in their terms. The second conclusion is that there needs to be a sea change in the metrics used to assess the feasibility of future arms control proposals. [...] Above all else, this paper highlights that more analysis is needed. U.S. arms control goals remain nebulous. Big questions remain unanswered. What specific problems does the United States want to solve? How does an arms control tool solve it? How much is it willing to spend? What is the contingency plan, beyond mere rhetoric, if arms control disappears? Arms control toolkits need to be explored for these problems."
Center for Global Security Research; Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Albertson, Michael
2022-02
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Role Clarity for the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Officer
From the Document: "As of February 1, 2022, the roles of the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Officer (CDAO), as specified in my February 1, 2022 memorandum, 'Initial Operating Capability of the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Officer,' will differ from the roles of other OSD [office of the secretary of defense] Principal Staff Assistants (PSAs) as follows: 'Chief Information Officer (CIO).' CIO will continue to lead on core infrastructure, including cybersecurity, cloud, transport, and networks. OCDAO will help set requirements for core infrastructure and provide policy and guidance for the data, analytics, and AI that uses this infrastructure. The Chief Data Officer (CDO) shall be operationally aligned to the OCDAO, and the CDO's supporting office will transfer to the OCDAO; however, the CDO himself or herself will continue to report to the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense through the Chief Information Officer of the Department of Defense (DoD CIO), as required by Section 903(b)(3) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020. 'Under Secretary of Defense for Research & Engineering (USD(R&E)).' USD(R&E) will set the technology and innovation strategy and investments for DoD - consistent with the National Defense Strategy (NDS) priorities and missions - to deliver technology solutions that enable the warfighter to retain technological superiority on the battlefield."
United States. Department of Defense
Hicks, Kathleen H.
2022-02-01
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Office of Refugee Resettlement Generally Ensured That Selected Care Provider Facilities for Its Unaccompanied Children Program Complied with Federal Emergency Preparedness Requirements
From the Document: "The Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), a program office of the Administration for Children and Families within HHS [U.S. Department of Health and Human Services], manages the Unaccompanied Children (UC) Program, which serves children who have no lawful immigration status in the United States. Because of emergency events in 2017, 2018, and 2019, such as hurricanes and wildfires, we conducted several audits of HHS agencies to identify risks in preparing for and responding to emergency events. This audit continues those efforts. This is the second of two reports addressing emergency preparedness at ORR-funded facilities that provide care to children in the UC Program. The first report addresses communicable disease preparedness, and this report addresses emergency events. This report does not address emergency intake sites that were opened in response to the surge of unaccompanied children that occurred in 2021. Our objective was to determine whether ORR ensured that selected facilities followed Federal requirements in preparing for and responding to emergency events."
United States. Department of Health and Human Services. Office of Inspector General
Grimm, Christi A.
2022-02
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Securing Defense-Critical Supply Chains: An Action Plan Developed in Response to President Biden's Executive Order 14017
From the Executive Summary: "The Department of Defense (DoD) requires healthy, resilient, diverse, and secure supply chains to ensure the development and sustainment of capabilities critical to national security. The ongoing COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] pandemic highlighted vulnerabilities in complex global supply chains in very real ways to the public, government, and industry. Beyond COVID-19, supply chain disruptions have become more frequent and severe overall. In order to strengthen the national industrial base during times of disruption, President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. signed Executive Order (E.O.) 14017, America's Supply Chains, on February 24, 2021. The E.O. calls for a comprehensive review of supply chains in critical sectors, including the defense industrial base (DIB). This report provides DoD's assessment of supply chains in the DIB and articulates the Department's plans to ensure security of supply for items vital to national security."
United States. Department of Defense; United States. Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy; United States. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment
2022-02
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Supply Chain Assessment of the Transportation Industrial Base: Freight and Logistics
From the Executive Summary: "Our national economic strength and quality of life depend on the safe and efficient movement of goods throughout our nation's borders and beyond. Supply chains--the interconnected webs of businesses, workers, infrastructure processes, and practices that underlie the sourcing, manufacturing, transportation, and sale of goods--are vital to our everyday lives. In the past they have been invisible to consumers, but the pandemic and its consequences have made clear their vital importance to our daily lives, livelihoods, and basic day-to-day convenience and well-being. To perform well, supply chains require success in transportation, in production, and in sourcing. Americans pay lower prices and face fewer disruptions when goods move efficiently and reliably and businesses and consumers have predictable access to goods and materials. [...] The Administration has taken aggressive action to respond to supply chain disruptions stemming from the current pandemic. But even before these disruptions worsened over the course of the past year, the President issued Executive Order 140171 calling for a review of the transportation and logistics industrial base. These recommendations are meant not only to respond to the current disruptions, but to stand the test of time by building supply chains resilient to future disruptions, in whatever form they take."
United States. Department of Transportation
2022-02
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USDA Agri-Food Supply Chain Assessment: Program and Policy Options for Strengthening Resilience
From the Introduction: "As a nation, we are fortunate to have a highly productive agricultural system, a vigorous private agribusiness sector, extensive infrastructure, and supportive public policies and institutions that together work to provide a dependable, affordable, and diverse food supply. However, recent events - especially the COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] pandemic and the on-going pandemic recovery -- have revealed serious cracks in this system. Addressing these vulnerabilities to strengthen the resilience of our country's agri-food supply chains is what this report is about. [...] Throughout this report, most of the proposed recommendations to address vulnerabilities focus on this second, longer-term timeframe as a path forward to achieve much needed resiliency."
United States. Department of Agriculture
2022-02
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Army History (Winter 2022)
From the Editor's Journal: "In the Winter 2022 issue of 'Army History', we are pleased to offer two engaging articles on very disparate topics, a great selection of book reviews, a look at some interesting Army art, and a visit to an Army museum at the foot of Cheyenne Mountain. The first article, by Center of Military History (CMH) historian Thomas Boghardt, examines the covert life of Willy Brandt, the former West German chancellor and mayor of West Berlin. CMH recently published Boghardt's book, 'Covert Legions: U.S. Army Intelligence in Germany, 1944-1949.' An outgrowth of that book, this article tells the fascinating story of Brandt's involvement with various intelligence services, including the U.S. Army's Counter Intelligence Corps, during and after World War II and throughout the Cold War. [...] The second article, by Gary A. Mitchell, looks at the rise of female military organizations from 1875 to 1900. He argues that these groups, often referred to as 'broom brigades,' paved the way for women's enlistment during World War I, and that this necessary precursor helped the suffrage movement and led to the eventual ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment. Many antisuffrage arguments prior to 1920 called notice to the fact that women could not perform military service. Without this crucial element, women were denied full citizenship and, thus, the right to vote."
Center of Military History
2022-02?
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2021 Report to Congress on China's WTO Compliance
From the Document: "This is the 20th report prepared pursuant to section 421 of the U.S.-China Relations Act of 2000 [...], which requires the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to report annually to Congress on compliance by the People's Republic of China (China) with commitments made in connection with its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), including both multilateral commitments and any bilateral commitments made to the United States. [...] In Part One of this report, we provide an assessment of China's WTO membership, including the unique and very serious challenges that China's state-led, non-market approach to the economy and trade continue to pose for the multilateral trading system. In Part Two, we review the effectiveness of the various strategies that have been pursued over the years to address the unique problems posed by China. In Part Three, we emphasize the critical need for new and more effective strategies - including taking actions outside the WTO where necessary - to address those problems. Finally, in Part Four, we catalogue the numerous problematic policies and practices that currently stem from China's state-led, non-market approach to the economy and trade."
United States. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
2022-02
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Ransomware Risk Management: 'A Cybersecurity Framework Profile'
From the Abstract: "Ransomware is a type of malicious attack where attackers encrypt an organization's data and demand payment to restore access. Attackers may also steal an organization's information and demand an additional payment in return for not disclosing the information to authorities, competitors, or the public. This Ransomware Profile identifies the Cybersecurity Framework Version 1.1 security objectives that support identifying, protecting against, detecting, responding to, and recovering from ransomware events. The profile can be used as a guide to managing the risk of ransomware events. That includes helping to gauge an organization's level of readiness to counter ransomware threats and to deal with the potential consequences of events." National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has also produced a companion "Quick Start Guide" titled "Getting Started with Cybersecurity Risk Management: Ransomware" which is located here in HSDL: [https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=864873].
National Institute of Standards and Technology (U.S.); United States. Department of Commerce
Barker, William C.; Scarfone, Karen; Fisher, William . . .
2022-02
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Getting Started with Cybersecurity Risk Management: Ransomware
From the Document: "'With the threat of ransomware growing, this "quick start guide" will help organizations use the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) "Ransomware Risk Management: A Cybersecurity Framework Profile" to combat ransomware.' Like the broader 'NIST Cybersecurity Framework', which is widely used voluntary guidance to help organizations better manage and reduce cybersecurity risk, the customized ransomware profile fosters communications and risk-based actions among internal and external stakeholders, including partners and suppliers. 'The Framework is organized by five key Functions - Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover.' These five terms provide a comprehensive way to view the lifecycle for managing cybersecurity risk. The activities listed under each Function offer a good starting point for any organization, including those with limited resources to address cybersecurity challenges. They help to set priorities so that an organization gets the greatest value out of its efforts to manage ransomware risks. Much depends on how sophisticated your current operations are in terms of cybersecurity risk management. While there are many other things that can and should be done to combat ransomware, it is important to recognize that you don't need to do everything all at once. 'Getting started is the key in cybersecurity, including managing ransomware risks!'" This document is a companion guide to "Ransomware Risk Management: 'A Cybersecurity Framework Profile'" located here in HSDL: [https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=864618].
National Institute of Standards and Technology (U.S.)
2022-02
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National Money Laundering Risk Assessment [2022]
From the Executive Summary: "This is the third publication of the National Money Laundering Risk Assessment (NMLRA) since the inaugural publication in 2015. The Department of the Treasury is publishing it during a transformative time for crime with increasing cybercrime complaints from the public exceeding $4.1 billion in 2020, a proliferation of ransomware attacks holding hostage sensitive information and demanding payment from U.S. citizens and businesses, and a growing overdose crisis that has killed over 100,000 citizens in a one-year period, quadrupling over the last decade, largely driven by synthetic opioids like fentanyl. Fundamentally, money laundering is a necessary consequence of almost all profit-generating crimes. Money laundering remains a significant concern because it facilitates and conceals crime and can distort markets and the broader financial system. The United States is particularly vulnerable to all forms of illicit finance because of the size of the U.S. financial system and the centrality of the U.S. dollar in the payment infrastructure supporting global trade. [...] The 2022 NMLRA's purpose is to inform the understanding of risk by governmental and private sector actors, risk mitigation strategies of financial institutions, and policy deliberations by the U.S. government. In addition to identifying the most significant money laundering risks to the United States, the 2022 NMLRA includes 'special focus' snapshots on topics that have not been identified or fully addressed in previous risk assessments."
United States. Department of the Treasury
2022-02
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National Proliferation Financing Risk Assessment [2022]
From the Executive Summary: "Since the 2018 National Proliferation Financing Risk Assessment (NPFRA), the United States has seen continued efforts by proliferation financing (PF) networks to exploit the U.S. financial system to raise and move revenue and procure goods for their weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. Based on a review of the relevant data since 2018, the following trends have marked the PF context for the United States: [1] The size of the U.S. financial system, the centrality of the U.S. dollar in the payment infrastructure supporting global trade, and the role of U.S. manufacturers in the production of proliferation-related technology (including dual-use items) continue to make the United States a target of exploitation by PF networks. [2] The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), followed by Iran, continues to pose the most significant PF threats for the United States[.] [...] [3] This period saw continued illicit use of correspondent banking relationships in PF efforts, with PF networks creating multiple front and shell companies to conduct their trade. [...] [4] The COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] pandemic offers new context for thinking about WMD proliferation risks. The pandemic has focused global attention on biological threats, whether naturally occurring, accidental, or deliberate. [...] The 2022 NPFRA informs the context for the forthcoming 2022 National Strategy for Combating Terrorist and Other Illicit Financing (2022 Strategy), which will discuss how to further strengthen the U.S. anti-money laundering (AML), countering the financing of terrorism (CFT), and countering proliferation financing (CPF) (AML/CFT/CPF) regime."
United States. Department of the Treasury
2022-02
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2022 National Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment
From the Introduction: "The 2022 National Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment (NTFRA) identifies the TF [terrorist financing] threats, vulnerabilities, and risks that the United States currently faces, updating the 2018 NTFRA. This report, as well as the 2022 National Money Laundering Risk Assessment (NMLRA) and 2022 National Proliferation Financing Risk Assessment (NPFRA), provide an overview of the current illicit finance risks to the United States. Terrorism remains a significant concern for the United States because terrorist groups at home and abroad still seek to conduct attacks inside the United States. To counter these threats, Treasury focuses on disrupting the financial and support networks of these groups so they have access to fewer resources to develop and carry out attacks. Even as low-cost attacks by individuals inspired but not directed by terrorist groups have become more prominent, tracking and sharing financial information can still facilitate the disruption of such terrorist activity. The United States is particularly vulnerable to TF and other forms of illicit finance because much of the global economy touches the United States or the U.S. financial system, and the United States is the primary trading partner to many other countries. Trade transactions are often denominated in U.S. dollars and settled with a U.S. dollar-denominated funds transfer even if a U.S. customer is not a party to the transaction. In addition, U.S. currency is used globally as either the primary or de facto secondary reserve currency or store of value."
United States. Department of the Treasury
2022-02
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COVID-19 Pandemic Further Strains Public Health Workforce
From the Introduction: "Prior to the COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] pandemic, investment in public health was declining nationwide. ASTHO's [Association of State and Territorial Health Officials] 2020 Profile of State and Territorial Public Health--the only comprehensive source on public health agency resources and infrastructure trends--showed a nearly 10% reduction in public health workforce between 2019 and 2021 and a 10.3% decrease in state and federal public health funding between 2010 and 2018. Although public health agencies maintained core services despite the reduction in funding, the underinvestment left a tenuous and fragile public health system to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. The public health workforce weathered extraordinary conditions in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, including long shifts, potential exposure to the disease, and abuse and threats from the public. These intense conditions negatively impacted the mental and emotional health of the workforce, with 52.8% of public health workers reporting symptoms of anxiety, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), or suicidal ideation in Spring 2021."
Association of State and Territorial Health Officials (U.S.)
2022-02-01?
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Chemical Accident Prevention: EPA Should Ensure Regulated Facilities Consider Risks from Climate Change, Report to Congressional Requesters
From the Government Accountability Office (GAO) Highlights: "Over 11,000 RMP [Risk Management Plan] facilities across the nation have extremely hazardous chemicals in amounts that could harm people, property, or the environment if accidentally released. Risks to these facilities include those posed by natural hazards, which may damage the facilities and potentially release the chemicals into surrounding communities. Climate change may make some natural hazards more frequent or intense, according to the Fourth National Climate Assessment. GAO was asked to review climate change risks at RMP facilities. This report examines, among other things, (1) what available federal data indicate about RMP facilities in areas with natural hazards that may be exacerbated by climate change; and (2) challenges RMP facilities face in managing risks from natural hazards and climate change, and opportunities for EPA [Environmental Protection Agency] to address these challenges. GAO analyzed federal data on RMP facilities and four natural hazards that may be exacerbated by climate change, reviewed agency documents, and interviewed agency officials and stakeholders, such as industry representatives."
United States. Government Accountability Office
2022-02
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COVID-19 Response: Living with COVID-19
From the Introduction: "The Government's aim throughout the COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] pandemic has been to protect the lives and livelihoods of citizens across the United Kingdom (UK). This document sets out how the Government has and will continue to protect and support citizens by: enabling society and the economy to open up more quickly than many comparable countries; using vaccines; and supporting the National Health Service (NHS) and social care sector. It also sets out how England will move into a new phase of managing COVID-19. The Devolved Administrations will each set out how they will manage this transition in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The global pandemic is not yet over and the Government's Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) is clear there is considerable uncertainty about the path that the pandemic will now take in the UK. This document therefore also sets out how the Government will ensure resilience, maintaining contingency capabilities to deal with a range of possible scenarios."
Great Britain. HM Government
2022-02
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Maternal Mortality Rates in the United States, 2020
From the Document: "This report presents maternal mortality rates for 2020 based on data from the National Vital Statistics System. A maternal death is defined by the World Health Organization as, 'the death of a woman while pregnant or within 42 days of termination of pregnancy, irrespective of the duration and the site of the pregnancy, from any cause related to or aggravated by the pregnancy or its management, but not from accidental or incidental causes'. Maternal mortality rates, which are the number of maternal deaths per 100,000 live births, are shown in this report by age group and race and Hispanic origin. This report updates a previous one that showed maternal mortality rates for 2018 and 2019. In 2020, 861 women were identified as having died of maternal causes in the United States, compared with 754 in 2019. The maternal mortality rate for 2020 was 23.8 deaths per 100,000 live births compared with a rate of 20.1 in 2019[.]"
National Center for Health Statistics (U.S.)
Hoyert, Donna L.
2022-02
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Social Protection in the COVID-19 Pandemic: Lessons from South Africa
From the Abstract: "South Africa responded to the stresses of the COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] pandemic and lockdown using a combination of existing social protection programmes, unemployment insurance, and additional measures to support those most affected. This paper reviews policies and implementation with the objective of highlighting lessons for the global community, including on the use of digital mechanisms. The government adopted a two-pronged and largely cash-based approach: unemployment benefits for formal sector workers and cash transfers to vulnerable individuals, informal workers, and beneficiaries of existing grants. Top-up payments for existing grants were rolled out efficiently; the new Special Relief of Distress (SRD) grant posed challenges but ultimately succeeded in reaching over six million previously uncovered beneficiaries. It may even become a permanent feature of South Africa's social protection system. Overall, the government reached over 30 million South Africans with cash-based relief measures. A distinctive feature of cash-based emergency relief was the use of digital technologies, especially in the application and verification process for the new SRD grant. The payment system, however, relied heavily on manual cash disbursements, thus failing to reflect the adoption of innovative digital technologies observed in many other African countries."
Center for Global Development
Gronbach, Lena; Seekings, Jeremy; Megannon, Vayda
2022-02
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Impact of the Pandemic on New York City's Municipal Workforce
From the Document: "New York City employs the largest municipal workforce in the United States. [...] The City government, like other public employers, was quickly confronted with a number of challenges after the COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] pandemic took hold in March 2020, including a decline in anticipated resources and a substantial change in the demand for certain municipal services. Largely in response to fiscal challenges, the City's workforce has decreased (through attrition) to 283,809 through November 2021 (5.5 percent), but some agencies and occupations experienced a sharper decline, which may have led to service disruptions in the past and could pose service challenges as normal activity resumes. Overtime has also increased sharply in Fiscal Year (FY) 2022. Only a few days into the new administation [sic], the Mayor directed his agency heads to identify ways to achieve annual savings of 3 percent of City-funded spending beginning in FY 2022, exempting public health agencies and the Department of Correction. The decline in staffing presents an opportunity for the City to re-examine its workforce and to restructure how its programs and services are delivered, in order to achieve efficiencies without the need for layoffs or service cuts."
New York (State). Office of the State Comptroller
Lotridge, Christopher
2022-02
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K-12 School Security Assessment Tool: Technical Appendix
From the Introduction: "The purpose of the 'School Security Assessment Tool' (SSAT) is to help schools create safe and secure learning environments without requiring the primary audience for this tool--i.e., school principals, assistant principals, facilities managers, and other staff involved in the physical security planning and implementation process--to be security experts. It provides action-oriented guidance to school staff by assisting them in identifying the physical security assets they already have in place and the gaps they have in their physical security system. The tool provides actionable results and relevant options for consideration that school staff can use to increase the overall benefits of the school's security system. The SSAT recognizes that no two schools across the United States are identical, and that creating safe and secure environments that promote teaching and learning requires considering unique school attributes such as the size of a student body, student demographics, the location and physical layout of a school campus, and the age of a school, among other factors. It applies the systems-based approach described in the 3rd edition of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructures Security Agency's (CISA's) 'K-12 [kindergarten through 12th grade] School Security Guide,' a companion product that can be used in conjunction with this tool to improve school physical security."
United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency
2022-02?
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K-12 School Security Assessment Tool: User Guide
From the Quick-Start Guide: "This Quick-Start Guide is intended to help users of the K-12 School Security Assessment Tool (SSAT) use the tool and interpret the results. Security and safety planning is a continuous process. Consider using the SSAT regularly, or whenever your school experiences substantial changes in relevant threats or in safety or security plans or capabilities. More information about the SSAT structure and limitations can be found in the accompanying User Guide and Technical Appendix. [...] The SSAT will help you identify the physical security assets already in place at your school, and the gaps in your physical security system. The results that it provides are actionable, relevant to your school's context, consider cost implications as well as the impact that security measures may have on school climate, and aim to increase the overall security benefits of your school's entire physical security system."
United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency
2022-02?
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State of Innovation in Antibacterial Therapeutics
From the Introduction: "Antibacterial drug discovery and development during the 20th century yielded one of the greatest armaments available to physicians, with more than 90% of all antibacterial drugs discovered during this period. Since the introduction of numerous antibiotic classes during the 1940s, deaths from bacterial infections have been reduced significantly. However, this next century is already presenting challenges that may render these older antibiotics obsolete. The COVID [coronavirus disease 2019] pandemic, which exposed multiple preparedness shortcomings, has elevated attention to the increasing threat of drug-resistant strains of bacteria. More than 1.2 million people worldwide are dying each year from antibiotic resistant infections and it is estimated this number will grow to 10 million per year by 2050. In the U.S. alone, more than 2.8 million antibiotic-resistant infections occur each year, with more than 35,000 people dying as a result. The CDC, EMEA [European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products], WHO [World Health Organization], IDSA [Infectious Diseases Society of America], Pew, and other groups have issued warnings to public policymakers for more than a decade about the reduced effectiveness of last century's antibiotic arsenal."
Biotechnology Innovation Organization
Thomas, David; Wessel, Chad
2022-02
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Preparing for and Mitigating Foreign Influence Operations Targeting Critical Infrastructure
From the Threat Overview: "Malicious actors use influence operations, including tactics like misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation (MDM) [hyperlink], to shape public opinion, undermine trust, amplify division, and sow discord. Foreign actors engage in these actions to bias the development of policy and undermine the security of the U.S. and our allies, disrupt markets, and foment unrest. While influence operations have historical precedent, the evolution of technology, communications, and networked systems have created new vectors for exploitation. [...] This CISA [Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency] Insights product is intended to ensure that critical infrastructure owners and operators are aware of the risks of influence operations leveraging social media and online platforms. Organizations can take steps internally and externally to ensure swift coordination in information sharing, as well as the ability to communicate accurate and trusted information to bolster resilience. CISA encourages leaders at every organization to take proactive steps to assess their risks from information manipulation, increase resilience, and mitigate the impact of potential foreign influence operations."
United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency
2022-02
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COVID-19 Related State of Emergency Measures: Impact and Responses
From the Executive Summary: "The American Bar Association (ABA) Center for Human Rights (CHR) undertook this report to analyze the impact of COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] emergency measures on HRDs [human rights defenders] and explore the responses of HRDs through the use of strategic litigation and other actions to push back against disproportional restrictions related to COVID-19 states of emergency. This report captures the successes and challenges of such strategies. It examines the viability of such approaches to effectively push back against attempts to normalize restrictive measures that do not meet public health goals and maintain civic space for HRDs and other civil society actors. The report finds that the success of challenges largely hinged on the nature of the authorizing statute and scope of its enforcement. Successful legal efforts challenged the repurposing of statutes originally meant to target activity 'unrelated to public health or public safety.' Further, in cases where litigants focused on separation of powers, courts seemed more receptive to challenges to executive measures without legislative oversight. As the viability and success of strategic litigation largely depends on the degree of respect for rule of law and the independence of the judiciary, the report also examines non-litigation approaches adopted by civil society actors to challenge 'de facto' measures and practices, including the deployment of military forces to enforce lockdown measures, selective or disproportionate enforcement, and police brutality. Through the formation of new coalitions, enhanced coordination with other actors, and pressure on government agencies, civil society actors successfully challenged 'de facto' measures. Finally, the report concludes with a set of recommendations for all stakeholders to help ensure that, in the future, governments effectively respond to public health crises while protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms."
ABA Center for Human Rights
McCourt, Kersty; Nyaundi, Ken; Ndiku, Shalom M. . . .
2022-02
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Banking Services: Regulators Have Taken Actions to Increase Access, but Measurement of Actions' Effectiveness Could Be Improved, Report to Congressional Requesters
From the Highlights: "Access to reliable and affordable banking services is essential for household financial well-being. In 2019, FDIC [Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation] estimated that 5.4 percent of surveyed U.S. households were unbanked. GAO [U.S. Government Accountability Office] used the survey data to estimate another 17.9 percent had a bank account but used alternative financial services, such as check cashing or payday loans that can have high fees or interest rates. GAO was asked to review factors affecting household access to basic banking services. Among other objectives, this report examines factors associated with households' use of basic banking services, statutory and regulatory factors affecting service availability and cost, and the efforts of selected federal financial regulators to address these issues. GAO analyzed survey data from FDIC on unbanked and underbanked households, reviewed studies on laws and regulatory factors, examined agency documentation, and interviewed market participants and observers and agency officials. [...] GAO recommends that FDIC, NCUA [National Credit Union Administration], and OCC [Office of the Comptroller of the Currency] establish outcome-based performance measures reflecting the full scope of their efforts to achieve strategic objectives related to access to banking services. The agencies generally agreed with these recommendations."
United States. Government Accountability Office
2022-02
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Understanding the Threat of Biological Weapons in a World with COVID-19
From the Introduction: "Threats posed by biological weapons have been evolving for nearly a century. However, the pace of change has been accelerating in recent years due to several intersecting trends, including the accessibility of sophisticated biotechnology tools, plunging costs of sequencing and synthesis, and the convergence of new technology areas (e.g., synthetic biology, AI [Artificial Intelligence]/machine learning, and robotics). In 2020, a new set of dynamics around biological weapons emerged as a result of widespread failures of many nations around the world to effectively respond to the global spread of the novel coronavirus that causes COVID-19 [Coronavirus Disease 2019]. After more than two years of global efforts to contain the spread of this highly transmissible disease, world leaders are still unable to discern the threat parameters of a COVID-19 era. However, one thing remains clear: the ongoing crisis could profoundly alter how countries perceive biological weapons and how these weapons may advance their security interests. For the hopefully-small number of nations that may consider biological weapons, the human, security, and economic toll of the COVID-19 pandemic is likely to shape their views regarding the deliberate use of disease to cause disruption and destruction. [...] In this paper, we present findings from our 'futures research' in which we investigated 1) the incentives and disincentives for the development of biological weapons; 2) historical signals related to biological weapons; and 3) other trends, issues, and problems."
Janne E. Nolan Center on Strategic Weapons
Bajema, Natasha E.; Parthemore, Christine; Rezzonico, Andrea . . .
2022-02
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Public Health Supply Chain and Industrial Base One-Year Report In Response to Executive Order 10417
From the Foreword: "One year ago, President Joseph R. Biden issued Executive Order (EO) 14017, 'On America's Supply Chains.' In response to EO 14017, the Department of Health and Human Services is proud to report what it has done to help make our public health supply chain and industrial base more resilient, diverse, and secure. This report identifies the successes and practical strategies that HHS is implementing to further the U.S. Government's goals for America's public health supply chain and industrial base. Despite these great strides towards a more resilient public health supply chain, challenges remain. The actions outlined in this report ensure the U.S. is better prepared for the next public health emergency. We look forward to working towards a stronger and more resilient public health supply chain and industrial base so we can better protect the health of the Nation during public health emergencies."
United States. Department of Health and Human Services. Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response; United States. Department of Health and Human Services
2022-02
