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DoD Directive 5100.76: Physical Security Review Board
1. This Directive reissues DoD directive 5100.76, May 17, 1977 (hereby canceled) to continue, in restructured form, the Physical Security Review Board, and modify the reporting criteria previously set forth. It outlines the authorities, responsibilities, and functions relative to the formulation of world-wide uniform policy, standards, and procedures for the physical security of nuclear weapons, devices, reactors, and materials, and conventional arms, ammunition, and explosives in the possession or custody of DoD Components. 2. This Directive also authorized the issuance of DoD Manual 5100.76-M, "Physical Security of Sensitive Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives," and appropriate supplements, consistent with the requirements of DoD Directive 5210.41, September 12, 1978.
United States. Department of Defense
1981-02-10
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DoD Directive 4640.7: DoD Telecommunications Systems (DTS) in the National Capital Region (NCR)
This Directive updates policy, responsibilities, and procedures for the acquisition, management, and operation of a consolidated and centrally managed telecommunications system. That system includes support to Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) functions for the Department of Defense in the NCR.
United States. Department of Defense
1993-10-07
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DoD Directive 5160.5: Responsibilities for Research, Development, and Acquisition of Chemical Weapons and Chemical and Biological Defense
The Directive reissues reference DoD Directive 5160.5, "Responsibility for Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) on Chemical Weapons and Chemical and Biological Defense, " March 30, 1976 (hereby canceled) to reflect national policy decisions; update budgeting, and programming and operational procedures; and assign responsibilities for DoD research, development, and acquisition (RDA) of weapons and chemical and biological defense.
United States. Department of Defense
1985-05-01
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DoD Directive 5525.5: DoD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials
This Directive reissues DoD Directive 5525.5, March 22, 1982 "to update uniform DoD policies and procedures to be followed with respect to support provided to Federal, State, and local civilian law enforcement efforts; and assigns responsibilities."
United States. Department of Defense
1986-01-15
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DoD Directive 5400.4: Provision of Information to Congress
This Directive reissues DoD Directive 5400.4 , February 20, 1971, to incorporate provisions of OMB Circular A-19-R, "legislative Coordination and Clearance," July 31, 1972, and update DoD policies and procedures governing the furnishing of information, both classified and unclassified, to the Congress. DoD Directive 5400.4, February 20, 1971 is hereby superseded and canceled.
United States. Department of Defense
1978-01-30
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DoD Directive 6205.3: DoD Immunization Program for Biological Warfare Defense
This Directive: (1) Establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures for members of the Department of Defense against validated biological warfare threats, and prioritization of research, development, testing, acquisition, and stockpiling of biological defense vaccines under 10 U.S.C. (2) Provides vaccination guidance that focuses exclusively on defense against biological warfare threats and complements immunization requirements for naturally occurring endemic disease threats outlined in DODI 6205.2, October 9, 1986 and AR 40-562/NAVMEDCOMINST 6230.3/AFR 161-13/CG COMDTINST M6230.4D, "Immunizations and Chemoprophylaxis," November 7, 1988. (3) Addresses peacetime and contingency requirements for immunization against biological warfare threats against U.S. personnel. (4) Designates the Secretary of the Army as the "DoD Executive Agent" for the DoD Immunization program for Biological Warfare Defense. (5) Provides direction on levels of acquisition and stockpiling of biological defense vaccines and prioritizes research and development efforts in defending against current and emerging biological warfare threats.
United States. Department of Defense
1993-11-26
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DoD Directive 5505.9: Interception of Wire Electronic, and Oral Communications for Law Enforcement
This Directive: 1. Replaces DoD Directive 5200.24, April 3, 1978 to update policy and responsibilities governing the interception of wire, electronic, and oral communications for law enforcement under Sections 2510-2521, 2701-2711, and 3121-3127 of title 18, United States code. 2. Provides guidance for the internal operation of the Department of defense, but is not intended to, does not, and may not be relied on to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by law against the United States or the Department of Defense, or its officers, employees, or agents. 3. Authorizes publication of DoD O-5505.9-M in accordance with DoD 5025.1-M, August 1994.
United States. Department of Defense
1995-04-20
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DoD Directive 6490.2: Joint Medical Surveillance
This Directive: 1. Establishes policy and assigns responsibility, under DoD Directive 5136.1, May 27, 1994, and DoD Directive 4715.1, February 24, 1996, for routine joint medical surveillance of all Military Service members during active Federal service, especially military deployments. 2. Designates the Secretary of the Army as the DOD Executive Agent for the medical surveillance for deployments for the Department of Defense and for the maintenance of the Armed Forces Serum Repository consistent with this Directive.
United States. Department of Defense
1997-08-30
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DoD Directive 8520.1: Protection of Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)
This Directive implements Section 403-5(a) of title 50, United States Code, to establish policy
and assign responsibilities regarding the protection, use, and dissemination of Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) within the Department of Defense.
United States. Department of Defense
2001-12-20
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DoD Directive 6420.1: Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC)
This Directive reissues DoD Directive 6420.1, December 9, 1982 to reflect changes in the organization and conduct of DoD medical intelligence activities.
United States. Department of Defense
1996-09-30
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Homeland Security: Proposal for Cabinet Agency Has Merit, But Implementation Will be Pivotal to Success Statement of David Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate
Since September 11, the President and Congress have taken aggressive steps to protect the nation, including creating an Office of Homeland Security (OHS); passing new laws, such as the USA Patriot Act and an emergency supplemental spending bill; establishing a new agency to improve transportation security; and working with federal, state, and local governments, private sector entities, non-governmental organizations and other countries to prevent future terrorist acts and to bring those individuals responsible to justice. More recently, Congress and the President have proposed greater consolidation and coordination of various agencies and activities. The President has proposed establishing a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and has sent draft legislation to Congress. This testimony focuses on two major issues: (1) the need for reorganization and the principles and criteria to help evaluate what agencies and missions should be included in or left out of the new DHS and (2) issues related to the transition, cost, and implementation challenges of the new department.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-06-25
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National Preparedness: Integrating New and Existing Technology and Information Sharing into an Effective Homeland Security Strategy, Statement of Randall A. Yim, Managing Director, National Preparedness, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Technology and Procurement Policy, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
Federal, state, and local governments, and the private sector, are taking steps to strengthen the safety and security of the American people, including actions to strengthen border and port security, airport security, health and food security and to protect critical infrastructure. There are date, information-sharing, and technology challenges facing the country in developing and implementing a national preparedness strategy. The nature of the terrorist threat makes it difficult to identify and differentiate information that can provide an early indication of a terrorist threat from the mass of data available to those in positions of authority. Further, the nation faces considerable cultural, legal, and technical barriers in effectively collecting and sharing information. Many technologies key to addressing threats are not yet available, and many existing technologies have not effectively been adapted for the threats the country now faces. The real challenge, however, is not just to find the right solutions to each of these problems but to weave solutions together in an integrated and intelligent fashion.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-06-07
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Homeland Security: Key Elements to Unify Efforts are Underway but Uncertainty Remains, Report to Congressional Requesters
The issue of homeland security crosscuts numerous policy domains, impinging on the expertise and resources of every level of government, the private sector, and the international community. GAO found that although combating terrorism crossed organizational boundaries, it did not sufficiently coordinate the activities of the 40 federal entities involved, resulting in duplication and gaps in coverage. The homeland security efforts of public and private entities do not yet represent a unified approach, although key supporting elements for such an approach are emerging. Progress has been made in developing a framework to support a more unified effort. Other remaining key elements--a national strategy, establishment of public and private sector partnerships, and the definition of key terms--are either not in place yet or are evolving. At the same time, key terms, such as "homeland security," have not been defined officially; consequently, certain organizational, management, and budgetary decisions cannot currently be made across agencies. In the interim, the potential exists for an uncoordinated approach to homeland security that may lead to duplication of efforts or gaps in coverage, misallocation of resources, and inadequate monitoring of expenditures.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-06-07
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Information Security: Corps of Engineers Making Improvements, But Weaknesses Continue
GAO tested selected general and application controls of the Corps of Engineers Financial Management System (CEFMS). The Corps relies on CEFMS to perform key financial management functions supporting the Corps' military and civil works missions. The Corps has made substantial progress in improving computer controls at each of its data processing centers and other Corps sites. The Corps had completed action on 54 of GAO's 93 previous recommendations and partially completed or had action plans to correct the remainder. During the current review, nine new weaknesses were identified and corrected. Nevertheless, continuing and newly identified vulnerabilities involving general and application computer controls continue to impair the Corps' ability to ensure the reliability, confidentiality, and availability of financial and sensitive data. Such vulnerabilities increase risks to other Department of Defense networks and systems to which the Corps' network is linked. Weaknesses in general controls impaired the Corps' ability to ensure that (1) computer risks are adequately assessed, and security policies and procedures within the organization are effective and consistent with overall organizational policies and procedures; (2) users have only the access needed to perform their duties; (3) system software changes are properly documented before being placed in operation; (4) test plans and results for application changes are formally documented; (5) duties and responsibilities are adequately segregated; (6) critical applications are properly restored in the case of a disaster or interruption; and (7) the Corps has adequately protected its network from unauthorized traffic. Application control weaknesses impaired the Corps' ability to ensure that (1) current and accurate CEFMS access authorizations were maintained, (2) user manuals reflect the current CEFMS environment, and (3) the Corps is effectively using electronic signature capabilities.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-06-10
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Homeland Security: Intergovernmental Coordination and Partnership Will Be Critical to Success, Statement of JayEtta Hecker, Director, Physical Infrastructure, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management, and Intergovernmental Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives [July 1, 2002]
"In my testimony today, I will focus on the challenges facing the federal
government in (1) establishing a leadership structure for homeland
security, (2) defining the roles of different levels of government, (3)
developing performance goals and measures, and (4) deploying
appropriate tools to best achieve and sustain national goals. My comments
are based on a body of GAO's work on terrorism and emergency
preparedness and policy options for the design of federal assistance, our
review of many other studies, and the Comptroller General's June 25,
2002, testimony on the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
proposal. In addition, I will draw on GAO's ongoing work for this
Subcommittee, including an examination of the diverse ongoing and
proposed federal preparedness programs, as well as a series of case
studies we are conducting that examine preparedness issues facing state
and local governments. To date, we have conducted interviews of officials
in four geographically diverse cities: Baltimore, Maryland; New Orleans,
Louisiana; Denver, Colorado; and, Los Angeles, California. We have also
interviewed state emergency management officials in these states."
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-07-01
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Homeland Security: Title III of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 Statement of (Ms) Gary L. Jones, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives
I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss several aspects of
the Homeland Security Act of 2002. The proposed legislation would bring
many federal entities with homeland security responsibilities into a
Department of Homeland Security in an effort to mobilize and focus assets
and resources. Title III of the proposed legislation would task the new
department with developing national policy for and coordinating the
federal government's research and development efforts for responding to
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats. It would also
transfer to the new department responsibility for certain research and
development programs and other activities, including those of the
Department of Energy (DOE). In my testimony today, which focuses on Title III of the proposed legislation, I will address (1) the need for clarification of certain roles and responsibilities of the new department and (2) our observations on transferring certain activities of DOE to the new department. Our testimony is based largely on our previous and ongoing work on national
preparedness issues, as well as a review of the proposed legislation.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-07-09
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Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination but May Complicate Public Health Priority Setting, Statement of Janet Heinrich Director, Health Care--Public Health Issues, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives
"In order to assist the committee in its consideration of this extensive
reorganization of our government, my remarks today will focus on Title V
of the President's proposal and the implications of (1) the proposed transfer of specific public health preparedness and response programs currently housed in HHS into the new department and (2) the proposed transfer of control over certain other public health preparedness assistance programs from HHS to the new department. My testimony today is based largely on our previous and ongoing work on federal, state, and local preparedness in responding to bioterrorist threats,3 as well as a review of the proposed legislation."
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-06-25
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Information Security: Advances and Remaining Challenges to Adoption of Public Key Infrastructure Technology, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management and Intergovernmental Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
The federal government must overcome several major challenges before public key infrastructure (PKI) technology can be widely and effectively used. These challenges include providing interoperability among agency PKIs, ensuring that PKI implementations can support a potential large scale of users, reducing the cost of building PKI systems, setting policies to maintain trust levels among agencies, and establishing training programs for users at all levels. Although such challenges are difficult to overcome in the near term, the federal government can take steps to better assist agencies develop and implement PKIs that may eventually be interconnected into a federal governmentwide system. The recent effort to develop a Federal Bridge Certification Authority (FBCA) is an excellent first step in this direction, but this effort lacks the context of a well-defined program plan for the government as well as key policy and technical standards. Establishing a federal PKI management framework could facilitate and accelerate participation in the FBCA as well as overall federal adoption of key technology for enabling electronic government.
United States. General Accounting Office
2001-02-26
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Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied Capabilities; Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination, Report to Congressional Requesters
Eight federal agencies now have teams that can respond to a terrorist attack involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. Each team varies in size, structure, geographical scope, and task. The teams do not duplicate one another. They have unique capabilities and functions, and many have experience dealing with different types of agents and weapons. The type of terrorist incident would determine which team would be most appropriate to respond. GAO found that federal agencies lack a coherent framework to develop and evaluate budget requirements for their response teams because there is no national strategy with clearly defined outcomes. To improve interagency cooperation, federal agencies have participated in several group activities. For example, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Interagency Steering Group, led by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, is identifying federal response teams that could respond to different terrorist scenarios. Federal, state, and local agencies have also participated in major field exercises that simulated urban terrorist acts. These efforts could go a long way toward improving the operational coordination of federal response teams.
United States. General Accounting Office
2000-11-30
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September 11: More Effective Collaboration Could Enhance Charitable Organizations' Contributions in Disasters, Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate
Surveys suggest that as many as two-thirds of American households have donated money to charitable organizations to aid in the response to the September 11 disasters. To provide the public with information on the role of charitable aid in assisting those affected by the attacks, GAO was asked to report on the amount of donations charities raised and distributed, the accountability measures in place to prevent fraud by organizations and individuals, and lessons learned about how to best distribute charitable aid in similar situations.
Although it may be difficult to precisely tally the total amount of funds raised in response to the September 11 attacks, 35 of the larger charities have reported raising an estimated $2.7 billion since September 11, 2001. About 70 percent of the money that has been collected by these 35 charities has been reported distributed to survivors or spent on disaster relief since September 11, 2001. Charities used the money they collected to provide direct cash assistance and a wide range of services to families of those killed, those more indirectly affected through loss of their job or residence, and to disaster relief workers. At the same time, lessons have been learned that could improve future charitable responses in disasters, including easing access to aid, enhancing coordination among charities and between charities and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), increasing attention to public education, and planning for future events.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-12-19
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September 11: Small Business Assistance Provided in Lower Manhattan in Response to the Terrorist Attacks, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Small Business, House of Representatives
The attacks on the World Trade Center had a substantially negative impact on the New York City economy, severely affecting businesses. In the aftermath of the attacks, Congress, among other things, appropriated emergency supplemental funds to several federal agencies to aid and rebuild the affected areas.
The Chairman of the House Committee on Small Business asked GAO to describe the assistance provided to small businesses that is funded from emergency supplemental appropriations of federal Community Development Block Grant funds and other sources.
To assist in New York City's recovery from the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress appropriated $3.5 billion in Community Development Block Grant funding of which Congress earmarked at least $500 million to be used to compensate small businesses, nonprofit organizations, and individuals for their economic losses.
One year after the attacks, these funds, administered in part by New York State's Empire State Development Corporation (Empire State), have provided $266 million to about 9,000 small businesses, many with fewer than 10 employees (see fig. below).
Such assistance has included grants to compensate businesses for part of their economic losses--for both physical and economic injuries--and payments to attract and retain small businesses in efforts to revitalize the affected areas. Hundreds of millions of dollars remain available through these and other programs to assist an estimated 18,000 affected businesses. Empire State has employed mailings, visits, walk-in centers, and mass media to inform businesses of assistance programs. Other efforts by the Small Business Administration, New York City and State, banks, and nonprofit organizations have provided critical assistance to address the immediate and additional unmet needs of small businesses.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-11-01
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Container Security: Current Efforts to Detect Nuclear Materials, New Initiatives, and Challenges, Statement of JayEtta Z. Hecker, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform
After the attacks of September 11th, 2001, concerns intensified over the vulnerability of U.S. ports to acts of terrorism. One particular concern involves the possibility that terrorists would attempt to smuggle illegal fissile material or a tactical nuclear weapon into the country through a cargo container shipped from overseas. This testimony discusses the programs already in place to counter such attempts, new initiatives now under way to enhance the nation's security against such attempts, and the key challenges faced in implementing these various efforts. U.S. ports have programs in place to detect illegal fissile material or nuclear weapons, but these programs are limited in several respects. They focus on screening a small portion of total cargo as it enters the country, and they are carried out without the use of adequate detection aids, such as equipment that can scan entire containers for radiation. These initiatives include such efforts as establishing international standards for ports, carriers, and maritime workers; stationing Customs personnel overseas; reducing security vulnerabilities all the way back to points of manufacture; and using new technology to monitor the contents and movement of containers from their point of origin.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-11-18
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September 11: Interim Report on the Response of Charities, Report to the Honorable Charles E. Grassley, Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate
Some surveys suggest that as many as two-thirds of American households have donated money to charitable organizations in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11. Although it may be difficult to precisely tally the amount of money raised, 34 of the larger charities have reported raising an estimated $2.4 billion since September 11. Charities reported distributing these funds for a broad range of assistance to the families of those killed or injured, for those more indirectly affected through the loss of their jobs or homes, and for disaster relief workers. To distribute aid, charities had to make extensive efforts to identify victims and survivors as there were no uniform contact lists for families of victims; charity officials also said privacy issues affected the sharing of information among charities. Charities, government agencies, watchdog groups, and survivors' organizations reported to GAO lessons learned about how to improve the charitable aid process in future disasters. First, good information about and easy access to available assistance could help survivors in the recovery process. Next, public and private agencies could better assist survivors by coordinating and sharing information with each other. Further, public education could clarify charities' role in disasters and help maintain the public's confidence in charities. Finally, planning for the role of charitable aid in disasters could aid the recovery process for individuals and communities.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-09-03
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Military Readiness: Civil Reserve Air Fleet Can Respond as Planned, but Incentives May Need Revamping, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives
"In the event of a national emergency, the Department of Defense (DOD) can use commercial aircraft drawn from the Civil Reserve Air Fleet to augment its own airlift capabilities. The Civil Reserve Air Fleet is a fleet of aircraft owned by U.S. commercial air carriers but committed voluntarily to DOD for use during emergencies. This sparked concern about the fleet's ability to respond, if activated, and prompted the Subcommittee to ask GAO to determine whether the fleet could respond to an activation with the required number of aircraft and crews and in the required time frame. Civil Reserve Air Fleet participants can respond to an emergency or a war with the required number of aircraft and crews and within the required time frame. Currently, there are more aircraft committed to the fleet than are needed to fill the wartime requirements identified in the DOD Mobility Requirements Study 2005, which determined the requirements to fight and win two major theater wars. The incentives currently in place to encourage participation in the program, especially the incentive to participate in DOD's peacetime business, might be losing effectiveness and could become disincentives in the future. Some participants are not able to bid on peacetime cargo business because their fleets do not include B- 747s, the predominant aircraft DOD uses for peacetime cargo missions. Using smaller aircraft would provide more peacetime business to a greater share of program participants, thus enhancing current incentives."
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-12-30
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Federal Electrical Emergency Preparedness Is Inadequate
GAO reviewed the vulnerability of the nation's electric power systems to disruptions from acts of war, sabotage, and terrorism and analyzed the federal role in dealing with major, long-term electrical emergencies resulting from such acts.
Federal leadership for electrical emergency planning and preparation is unorganized and ineffective. GAO found that: (1) the Department of Energy (DOE) has an inadequate program for dealing with major electrical disruptions; (2) DOE Emergency Electric Power Administration representatives are unsure of their status, roles, authority, and responsibility, and doubtful that the organization could operate during an emergency; (3) DOE does not have adequate plans to manage and mitigate electric power disruptions; (4) emergency plans to manage such disruptions and restore the power system are needed; and (5) problems exist in federal coordination with respect to electric emergency preparedness.
United States. General Accounting Office
1981-05-12
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FBI Internal Audit: Opportunities for Improvement, Report to Congressional Requesters
In response to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) internal audit activities to determine the: (1) extent of the audits' focus on major FBI investigative programs; (2) steps FBI took to increase the qualifications, independence, and permanence of its inspection and audit staffs; and (3) potential weaknesses in audit quality and effectiveness. GAO found that, since 1979, FBI has: (1) improved its inspection and program evaluation activities by focusing on its 11 major investigative programs during division and field office inspection; (2) evaluated all major investigative programs at least once, except for the recently established FBI Drug Program; and (3) raised the educational and experience requirements for its program evaluation staff. GAO also found that, by filling audit management positions temporarily with special agents, FBI could impair the independence of the internal audits.
United States. General Accounting Office
1988-11-23
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Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing U.S. Policy Tools for Combating Proliferation, Statement of Joseph A Christoff, Director, International Affairs and Trade
The attacks of September 11 and the recent anthrax cases have heightened long-standing concerns about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The United States and the international community have undertaken several efforts over the years to secure these weapons and prevent their spread. Today, there is renewed need to maintain strong international controls over such weapons and related technologies, and to reevaluate the effectiveness of the controls. The United States has used the following four key policy instruments to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: (1) international treaties, (2) multilateral export control arrangements, (3) U.S. export controls, and (4) security assistance to other countries. Each instrument is important to preventing the transfer of weapons of mass destruction and associated technologies to terrorists or rogue states, but each has limitations. International treaties restrict transfers of weapons of mass destruction technologies, but their effectiveness depends on whether treaties can be verified and enforced and whether all countries of concern are members. Multilateral export control arrangements are voluntary, nonbinding agreements under which countries that produce the technologies used to develop weapons of mass destruction agree to restrict the transfer of these technologies. U.S. export controls set the legal and regulatory conditions under which goods and technologies can be exported. Security assistance to other countries helps control or eliminate nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and otherwise stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
United States. General Accounting Office
2001-11-07
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Assessment of Various Aspects of This Nation's Nuclear Safeguards Programs
Protecting nuclear material from violent use against society has been an issue at the very heart of the nuclear energy debate from its beginning. A review was made to determine the effectiveness of the Department of Defense's (DOD) nuclear safeguards system and to compare that system to the systems used by the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) who are also responsible for the security of nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons-grade materials against theft, diversion, or sabotage. In addition, the on-site security at a number of sites within the responsibility of each of these agencies was investigated by interviewing site officials and employees, touring the sites, and by testing various elements of the security system. DOD is responsible for the security of nuclear weapons and for the security of nuclear weapons-grade materials found in research reactor fuel and in fuel for naval propulsion reactors. In carrying out this responsibility, DOD has established minimum standard security requirements that are to be met by its nuclear facilities. At five weapon sites that were reviewed, it was discovered that while all of the sites met most of the minimum requirements, each one needed important improvements before all of the requirements would be met. With regard to DOD's research reactor and naval fuel storage facilities, the security appeared to be adequate. Some minor improvements could be made, but their importance to the overall security of the facility was not significant. Like DOD, NRC and DOE are also responsible for protecting the public against the hazards of theft, diversion, or sabotage of nuclear materials. While all three agencies are responsible for large amounts of nuclear materials, DOD and DOE also have custody of nuclear weapons themselves. Each agency designs its security system to what it believes to be the existing threat, and each has different estimates of what that threat is. These different threat levels have resulted in a situation where similar nuclear materials are receiving different levels of protection.
United States. General Accounting Office
1980-02-19
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DoD Directive 5230.16: Nuclear Accident and Incident Public Affairs (PA) Guidance
This Directive reissues DoD Directive 5230.16, February 7, 1983 to update DoD policy, responsibilities, and procedures for the prompt release of information to the public in the interest of public safety, and to prevent public alarms in the event of accidents or significant incidents involving nuclear weapons or nuclear components, radioactive material, nuclear weapon launch or transport vehicles (when a nuclear weapon is aboard), or nuclear reactors under DoD control. Updates DoD policy, responsibilities, and procedures during an improvised nuclear device (IND) incident.
United States. Department of Defense
1993-12-20
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DoD Directive 5230.25: Withholding of Unclassified Technical Data From Public Disclosure
Under Title 10, United State Code, Section 140c, as added by Public Law 98-94, "Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1984," Section 1217, September 24, 1983, this Directive establishes policy, prescribes procedures, and assigns responsibilities for the dissemination and withholding of technical data.
United States. Department of Defense
1984-10
