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Research and Development Exchange Proceedings: Enhancing Network Security Technology: R&D Collaboration
This proceedings document is a compilation of discussions from the President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee's (NSTAC) third Research and Development (R&D) Exchange. The NSTAC will further review the proceedings and recommendations in
preparation for NSTAC XXII and will consider any recommendations arising from this review at that time. Discussions concentrated on four broad areas: national R&D priorities; the appropriate roles of government, industry, and academia; obstacles; and alternative approaches to collaboration. The deliberations at the R&D Exchange resulted in several recommendations for consideration
by the government and the NSTAC.
United States. President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee
1998-10-20
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Information Infrastructure Group Report (1998)
Since the last meeting of the President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC), December 1997, the Information Infrastructure Group (IIG) has concentrated its efforts on issues related to information assurance, infrastructure protection,
electronic commerce, and cyber security. The IIG established two subgroups to investigate these topics, the Transportation Information Infrastructure Risk Assessment Subgroup and the Electronic Commerce (EC)/Cyber Security Subgroup. The Transportation Information Infrastructure Risk Assessment Subgroup report recommended that more information be gathered, particularly in the area of intermodal transportation, and concluded that broader participation from the transportation industry was desirable. The EC/Cyber Security Subgroup developed an issue paper that focused on one aspect of EC/cyber security training and forensics. That paper centers on the importance of industry and Government cooperation in addressing cyber security. This paper focuses on the analysis, conclusions and recommendations of these groups.
United States. President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee
1998-09
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Operations Support Group Report (1999)
This report presents the charge, activities, conclusions, and recommendations of the OSG and its two subgroups since the last NSTAC meeting in September 1998. In reviewing the functions of the NCC, the NCC Vision-Operations Subgroup considered revisions to electronic incident intrusion reporting criteria/process flow proposed by the NCC to guide NCC participants in reporting activities they identify as deviating from normal thresholds.
The subgroup also assessed current participation in the NCC to see whether augmentation was needed for the NCC to fulfill its electronic indications, assessment, and warning (IAW) function. The subgroup agreed that broadening participation in the NCC would widen the scope of
expertise and operational personnel available to fulfill the NCC's function and enable the NCC to
grow as NS/EP telecommunications evolve. The subgroup developed, through consensus, a list of companies and Government departments and agencies for consideration by the National Communications System for participation in the NCC.
United States. President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee
1999-06
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Network Group Report (1999)
Since the last meeting of the President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) in September 1998, the Network Group (NG) has directed its efforts to four activities. Two of these activities involve the NG's ongoing responsibilities: facilitating the exchange of network security research and development (R&D) information between industry
and Government and overseeing the NSTAC Network Security Information Exchange (NSIE). Discussions at NSTAC XX resulted in an additional tasking that has now been completed: examining how national security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP) operations might be affected by a severe disruption of Internet service. Lastly, in conjunction with the gap analysis effort by the Office of the Manager, National Communications System (OMNCS), NG members provided their individual perspectives on the Public Network (PN) Alternative Analysis Report
developed by the OMNCS. This report outlines these activities.
United States. President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee
1999-06
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Department of Treasury United States Secret Service Strategic Plan FY 2000 - FY 2005
As we enter the 21st century, the Secret Service faces many challenges. The U.S. Secret Service Strategic Plan provides a roadmap to accomplish its protective and investigative missions. This plan serves as direct communication to the American public, to Congress, and to Secret Service employees outlining our priorities for the next five years, as well as the plans to accomplish them.
United States. Secret Service
2000-09
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Proceedings of the International Conference of Fire Research for Fire Investigation
Mr. Patrick R. Schambach, ATF Assistant Director for Science and Technology working with the Department of Fire Protection Engineering at the University of Maryland, the Building and Fire Research Laboratory of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and Hughes Associates, Inc. (HAI) convened the International Conference on Fire Research for Fire Investigation. Approximately 70 leading authorities from the fields of fire research, investigation, and education from the Unites States and five other countries gathered at the Sheraton International Hotel at Baltimore-Washington International Airport, MD on November 12 through 14, 1997. The Conference was charged with the following: a) Assessing the current state of the art in fire investigation from a scientific and applied technology view point; b) Assessing the current needs for research, education, and related resources in the field of fire investigation; c) Recommending the role and direction that the ATF F.I.R.E. Center should take in advancing the capabilities and credibility of fire investigation and analysis; d) Advising what specific types of tests and facilities should be incorporated in the ATF F.I.R.E. Center; e) Making recommendations on the staffing that will be needed for the F.I.R.E. Center. The Conference addressed its charges and came to the following determinations.
United States. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
1998-04
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National Church Arson Task Force: First Year Report for the President
In early 1996, federal officials detected a sharp rise in the number of reported attacks on our nation's houses of worship, especially African American churches in the South. This trend troubled communities, challenged law enforcement agencies, and stirred the nation's conscience.
In June 1996, President Clinton formed the National Church Arson Task Force ("NCATF" or "Task Force"), made the investigation of these fires a top priority of federal law enforcement, and called on all Americans to come together in a spirit of respect and reconciliation. The President directed his Administration to implement a strategy to (1) identify and prosecute the arsonists; (2) help communities rebuild the burned houses of worship; and (3) offer assistance in preventing more fires. Working with state and local law enforcement and private groups, federal officials achieved great success on these fronts. Significantly, many Americans came together as a result of these arsons, often independent of the federal effort, to lend assistance in many ways.
United States. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
1997-06
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Homeland Security: The New Role for Defense
"Evolving national strategy for homeland security requires that DOD consider the employment of military forces in ways previously considered outside the scope of operations. As President George W. Bush has said, 'To win this war, we have to think differently.' Homeland security should not be viewed as exclusively or even primarily a military task. Securing the 'domestic battlespace'-- a highly complex environment--requires Federal departments and agencies, state and local governments, the private sector, and individual citizens to perform many strategic, operational, and tactical level tasks in an integrated fashion. These actions must be synchronized with others that are being taken on the international front to prosecute the war against global terrorism. The challenges and demands associated with this undertaking are immense. Success will depend largely upon the Nation's ability to achieve unity of effort at all levels of government."
National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies
Tomisek, Steven J.
2002-02
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Financing Wars on Terrorism and Iraq
One of the key questions about the current U.S. war against terrorism and rogue states remains largely unanswered: The extent to which defense/security expenditures will have to expand to meet the threat. Clearly, the ultimate cost will depend upon events that are still unfolding: Will the United States be able to maintain the peace in Afghanistan with the current level of effort? Will the remaining terrorist cells engage in further major acts of violence? Will the United States attack Iraq? If the attack occurs, how is that conflict likely to develop in terms of the intensity and duration? The time and resources required for reconstruction and nation building? The added amount of foreign aid to affected countries?
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Contemporary Conflict
Looney, Robert E.
2003-01-01
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IMF Stabilization Programs and the War on Terrorism: Conflicting or Complementary Objectives in Pakistan?
Because it is one of the front-line states in the war on terrorism, Pakistan's economy and economic management will be tested to the limit. Not only will the country have to likely allocate an increasing amount of resources to defense and security, it will also have to generate rates of growth sufficient to begin lifting large segments of the population out of dire poverty, a potential breeding ground for terrorism. A related weighty task is the development of strong governance institutions capable of facilitating the country's transition out of poverty (Bremer and Kasarda, 2002).
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Contemporary Conflict
Looney, Robert E.
2002-12-02
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Homeland Security: Intelligence Indications and Warning
September 11, 2001 demonstrated that policy makers and intelligence organizations had conducted business in traditional ways, not in response to today's threats to our nation. The attacks in September suggest that inadequate information sharing between law enforcement and national intelligence agencies led to lost opportunities to thwart the attacks launched by Al-Qaeda. Little has yet been done to fix many of these problems. The nation has failed to formulate significant changes in the way it tasks, collects, analyzes, produces and disseminates intelligence information. The architecture needed to provide intelligence for homeland defense has not yet emerged. The September 11 attacks are a "watershed event" that should change our current intelligence organization, perhaps resulting in legislation as important as the National Security Act of 1947.
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Contemporary Conflict
Luikart, Kenneth A.
2002-12-02
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Trouble: Pearl Harbor and 9/11
"The sense of having been played for a fool was most definitely part of the emotional mix after Pearl Harbor, as it was following the al-Qaeda attacks last year, which brought allusions to 1941 briefly to the surface of policy chatter. It was the only other time anybody could think of when Americans had so complacently leaned into such a ferocious sucker punch. Strategically, of course, the analogy has nothing whatever to recommend it, which is presumably why it has faded from view. Psychologically, too, the thing is all wrong, which is more interesting. "Pearl Harbor" stands for a call to arms--for everyone putting down their tools and tending to the trouble. Nothing remotely like that has followed the advent of the "war on terror," an expression one feels compelled to place within quotation marks not to disown it, but because its meaning is so plainly metaphorical: more like the war on drugs, on poverty, on cancer, than the war against Japan. Setting aside the fact that nobody knows what a mass mobilization against terrorism would entail, such a thing, were it to happen, would be widely (and reasonably) regarded as a victory for terrorism in itself."
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Contemporary Conflict
Moran, Daniel
2002-12-02
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What's New in the New U.S. Strategy to Combat WMD?
At first inspection, the Bush administration's new "National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction," released to the public on 11 December 2002 [1], reads like old wine in a new bottle--certainly not the "fundamental change from the past" claimed by its authors. The assertion that "weapons of mass destruction (WMD)--nuclear, biological, and chemical--in the possession of hostile states and terrorists represent one of the greatest security challenges facing the United States," has become one of the more common claims heard in Washington. But words are words and deeds are deeds, Bush administration officials keep telling us. Thus it is particularly surprising that the three pillars of the Bush strategy--counterproliferation to combat WMD use, enhanced nonproliferation to combat WMD proliferation, and consequence management to respond to WMD use--were central elements of the previous administration's policy on WMD. In fact, these policy components came together early in President Clinton's first term. On closer examination, however, there is much in the Bush strategy that truly is new, much that stands out as an improvement over previous U.S. approaches to WMD, and much that already is being implemented with some success.
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Contemporary Conflict
Lavoy, Peter R. (Peter René), 1961-
2002-12-16
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Biological Warfare: A Nation at Risk--A Time to Act
There is a regrettable tendency to think about defense against biological warfare either as unnecessary or as "too hard." Unfortunately, the danger of biological warfare did not dissipate with the dismantling of our own offensive program in 1969, the signing of the Biological Weapons Convention in 1972, the fall of the Berlin Wall, or the threat of nuclear retaliation against Saddam in 1991. Only by planning and preparing will we be able to diminish the likelihood that biological weapons will be used, and reduce the risks if they are. Fortunately, substantial improvements can be made in our biological defensive capabilities at relatively small levels of investment
National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies
Danzig, Richard
1996-01
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Defining Civil Defense in the Information Age
We have entered an era of immense global change and we must recognize that protection of the public during domestic emergencies has taken on new meanings with new consequences. A new process needs to be developed that defines the specific responsibilities of federal and state governments for technological disasters. The DOD has taken the initiative and has established new educational and training programs focused on Information Warfare and Strategy, Command and Control Warfare, and Information Operations. But solutions to the problem are larger than the DOD and other organizations must be engaged. Issues involving information technology, national security, and civil defense cross many if not all of the traditional governmental boundaries thus ultimately requiring a truly holistic solution.
National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies
Rudolph, Earle L. , Jr.; Round, W. Oscar
1995-09
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Will the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Impede the War on Terrorism?
The current round of hostilities between Israel and the Palestinians has the potential to greatly complicate -- and perhaps thwart entirely -- the War on Terrorism. A spillover of the Palestinian conflict into the larger region would threaten the stability of Pro-American regimes and would play right into the hands of regimes and groups hostile to American interests in the region. How did we get to this point? The newest Israeli-Palestinian fighting began in September 2000 when then-opposition leader (now prime minister) Ariel Sharon made a provocative visit with 1,000 Israeli police to the Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem -- a site considered holy by Muslims around the world. Sharon's stated goal was to assert permanent Israeli sovereignty over the entirety of Jerusalem, including over Muslim areas and shrines. Sharon's ulterior motive appears to have been to undermine then-prime minister Ehud Barak's peace proposals (which included allowing for some Palestinian control in Muslim parts of Jerusalem), and to thrust himself and his Likud party into power. Sharon's gambit worked, but not without a heavy price.
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Contemporary Conflict
Robinson, Glenn E., 1959-
2002-02
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Current WMD Challenges in the Middle East
The September 11th attacks and events that followed have again focused the U.S. administration, intelligence community, and Department of Defense on the danger that weapons of mass destruction (WMD) could be acquired by adversary states or non-state actors. Two threats in the Middle East currently stand out among the rest: Al-Qaeda's announced efforts to make or acquire WMD, and the suspected resumption of Iraq's nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs.
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Contemporary Conflict
Russell, James A. (James Avery), 1958-; Lavoy, Peter R. (Peter René), 1961-; Boureston, Jack
2002-02
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Homeland Defense: Ramping Up, But What's the Glide Path?
"The attacks of September 11, 2001 have brought about massive increases in spending for homeland security and have established defense of the homeland as a primary responsibility of the Defense Department. DoD's most recent Quadrennial Defense Review clearly states that defense of the continental United States has become a top priority for the military: 'The highest priority of the United States military is to defend the nation from all enemies. The United States will maintain sufficient military forces to protect the U.S. domestic population, its territory and its critical defense-related infrastructure against attacks emanating from outside U.S. borders as appropriate under U.S. law.'"
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Contemporary Conflict
Bravo, IIiana P.
2002-03
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Protecting Systems Task Force Report on Enhancing the Nation's Network Security Efforts
The objective of this report is to examine current Government and industry network security
strategies to determine whether alternative strategies might more effectively diminish risk and, if
appropriate, make recommendations regarding those alternatives. The study focuses on those network security efforts intended to diminish the risks from unauthorized access to or activity in an information system and does not address physical security.
United States. President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee
2000-05
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Information Sharing/Critical Infrastructure Protection Task Force Report (2000)
Following the 22nd meeting of the President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory
Committee (NSTAC), the NSTAC's Industry Executive Subcommittee (IES) charged the Information Sharing/Critical Infrastructure Protection (IS/CIP) Task Force with the following tasks-- Develop recommendations leading to significant advances toward the goals of Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 631, including mechanisms and processes for protected, operational information sharing to achieve these goals and for furthering the role of the National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications (NCC) as an Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) for telecommunications; and to continue interaction with Government leaders responsible for PDD-63 implementation. This report outlines the completion of those tasks, including recommendations to the President and to the the IES.
United States. President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee
2000-05
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Legislative and Regulatory Group Telecommunications Outage and Intrusion Information Sharing Report
The report is intended to provide the Industry Executive Subcommittee (IES) with a clearer understanding of information sharing initiatives, including those channels proposed by Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 63, Protecting America's Critical Infrastructures. The report includes
a compendium of entities with which companies share or will potentially share information. The list of entities was developed based on the entities known or identified by the LRG members and is not presented as a comprehensive list of all those with which all telecommunications companies
share information. The report also addresses potential legal barriers that might affect the sharing of information between telecommunications companies and the entities examined. The LRG used the legal impediments identified by the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) in their report, Critical Foundations: Protecting America's Infrastructures to explain some of the legal barriers that may influence the amount or type of information that is shared by
companies. The LRG did not conduct any original legal analysis of these impediments for this report. The Telecommunications Outage and Intrusion Information Sharing Report is intended for use by other NSTAC subgroups to continue addressing critical information sharing processes and issues as they unfold. In addition, further analysis and understanding of the lessons learned by the entities examined in this report could provide the foundation for determining best practices for
information sharing at the National level and could be beneficial to those entities responsible for
implementing PDD-63.
United States. President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee
1999-06
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Information Technology Progress Impact Task Force Report on Convergence
This report identifies implications of Convergence (as defined in Section 1.3) for existing NS/EP priority services, and examines evolving network technologies and capabilities that could assist in satisfying existing NS/EP functional requirements in an NGN environment. This report recommends that the President, in accordance with responsibilities and existing mechanisms established by Executive Order 12472, Assignment of National Security and Emergency Preparedness Telecommunications Functions, direct the appropriate departments and agencies, in coordination with industry, to-- promptly determine precise functional NS/EP requirements for Convergence and the NGN, and
ensure that relevant NS/EP functional requirements are conveyed to standards bodies and service providers during NGN standards development and implementation.
United States. President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee
2000-05
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Information Infrastructure Group Report (1999)
Since the last meeting of the President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) in September 1998, the Information Infrastructure Group (IIG) has concentrated its efforts on several issues related to information assurance and infrastructure protection: global information infrastructure (GII), transportation information infrastructure risks, electronic commerce (EC), cyber crime, and Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 63. This report captures the efforts of the IIG through the current cycle. The NSTAC XXII IIG members are listed in Annex A. The IIG's current charge is outlined in this report.
United States. President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee
1999-06
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Legislative and Regulatory Group Report (1999)
The National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee's (NSTAC) Legislative and
Regulatory Group (LRG) is charged with examining legislative, regulatory, and judicial actions
for their possible impact on national security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP) telecommunications. Following NSTAC XXI, the LRG was tasked with addressing several key issues, including identifying and assessing the legal and regulatory obstacles to sharing outage and intrusion information. To that end, the LRG determined that identification and discussion of existing and proposed NS/EP-related outage and intrusion information sharing channels could
provide additional insights to assist the Industry Executive Subcommittee (IES) in assessing critical information sharing issues, particularly those associated with the implementation of Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 63 . To better understand the information sharing environment and the entities involved in the process, the LRG developed this report to illustrate the entities with whom telecommunications companies share outage and intrusion information, and to review the potential legal barriers that could inhibit the information sharing process.
United States. President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee
1999-06
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National Church Arson Task Force: Third Year Report for the President
In its third year, the Task Force has effectively integrated its work into existing federal law enforcement structures and taken steps to ensure that church arson prosecutions will be a permanent priority. The innovative and highly successful protocols and best practices for the joint investigation and prosecution of suspected church arsonists that were developed by the NCATF Operations Team have been integrated into the operations of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice, the United States Attorneys' offices, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and have become a regular part of federal law enforcement efforts. Responsibility for federal prosecution of church arsons and bombings motivated by race and religion has been lodged in the Criminal Section of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice, which has jurisdiction over these and other federal criminal civil rights cases. Regional offices of the Community Relations Service have assumed responsibility for the work of the CRS Church Burning Response Team to help heal community tensions resulting from church arson. At the same time, ATF and the FBI, in close partnership with state and local law enforcement, continue to investigate every arson, bombing, and attempted bombing at houses of worship in the United States. The Department of Housing and Urban Development continues to work with the National Council of Churches, the Congress of National Black Churches, leading financial institutions, and others to help victimized congregations rebuild.
United States. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
2000-09-15
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National Church Arson Task Force: Fourth Year Report for the President
The National Church Arson Task Force issued its fourth report to the President today, highlighting statistics that indicate that the number of arsons at houses of worship continues to decline. Task Force officials attribute their success, in part, to continued vigilance, well-publicized arrests and ongoing prevention efforts. In the year 1996, when the Task Force was created, there were 297 arsons, bombings or attempted bombings at our nation's houses of worship. In 1997, that number dropped to 209 incidents; in 1998 there were 165 incidents; and in 1999 there were 140. These data represent a 53% decrease in the rate of such incidents between 1996 and 1999. This downward trend continues into the year 2000. As of August 15, 2000, there were 82 incidents. The Task Force's arrest rate of 36.2% continues to be more than twice the national average for arson cases. To date, 305 defendants have been convicted in connection with 224 arsons or bombings. "Four years ago, President Clinton declared church arsons a national priority and directed his Administration to investigate and prosecute the arsonists, rebuild burned churches and prevent additional fires," said James E. Johnson, Under Secretary of the Treasury for Enforcement, and co-chair of the Task Force. "Since 1996, the NCATF arrest rate is more than double the national solve rate for all arsons, and more than 945 church fires have been investigated. The investigators, prosecutors and state and local authorities should be highly commended for their vigor and compassion in solving these horrific crimes."
United States. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
2000-10
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Failed Economic Take-Offs and Terrorism: Conceptualizing a Proper Role for U.S. Assistance to Pakistan
During the 1990s Pakistan's economy suffered on two accounts. One, lack of vision by the civilian ruling elites to make efficient use of public financial resources to boost economic growth, contain poverty, and develop human resources. Two, the inability of these governments (B. Bhutto and N. Sharif) to check unbridled corruption and cronyism. This failure resulted in the political use of public resources, the bending of rules and regulations to benefit a selected few and the erosion of any institutional accountability. Four key economic breakdowns evolved out of this environment: (1) high fiscal deficits; (2) an unsustainable public debt (domestic and foreign); (3) a sharp deterioration in the distribution of income; and (4) a disturbing rise in the level of poverty.
Under the Musharraf Administration, considerable progress was made in correcting the first and second problems, but possibly at the expense of a further sizeable increase in the numbers of people below the poverty line. In part, economic performance under Musharraf stems from the emphasis placed over the last three years on macroeconomic stabilization as a key to fighting poverty. The strategy hinges on the premise that stability will result in higher rates of investment and eventually the restoration of rates of growth of over 6% (Malik 2003) per annum achieved during the 1960s, and through most of the 1980s. In turn high growth will pull large segments of the population up over the poverty line. The hope is that in the near future sustained rates of growth of over 6% will again be the norm.
The question that immediately arises is whether this is a realistic goal for the economy.
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Contemporary Conflict
Looney, Robert E.
2003-02-01
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Strategic Response to Terrorism: A Framework for U.S. Policy
Deterrence by denial is the ultimate objective of the terrorism response framework. Although most counter-terror strategies begin with deterrence, their aim is to prevent an attack, not to deter the terrorist strategy. Some also describe deterrence of terrorism in terms of deterrence by punishment. While it is possible to deter a specific attack by threatening punishment, it is unlikely to succeed in terms of deterring a terrorist campaign in the first place. This framework depicts deterrence as the net result of operational, tactical, and strategic programs that range from pre-attack policies through the long-term response to a terrorist incident. This is ultimately deterrence by denial. Delegitimized and marginalized, the terrorists' message falls on deaf ears, and recruits no longer rush to their cause. They are denied sanctuary, funding, and logistics support. Their organization, communication, and movement is disrupted. Their planning, training, and access to weapons is curtailed. They are denied victims. They are denied the ability to generate fear and as a result are unable to influence targeted government. With this across-the-board denial, the terrorists and the terrorists' message are marginalized, and their strategy is rendered impotent. At that point terrorism is deterred.
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Contemporary Conflict
Smith, James M.
2003-02-06
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Return of Strategy
Today there is a return to strategy in the foreign and defense policies of the United States and its allies. Strategy's return has been prompted by the need to make decisions about when, where and how to use force to deter, disrupt and destroy individuals, groups and states that seek to attack the United States and its overseas interests and to stop the spread of democracy and free markets. Because force is now being considered not just to deter war, but also to wage war, there is a need to revive the fine art of strategy.
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Contemporary Conflict
Wirtz, James J., 1958-
2003-01-01
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With New Nuclear Arms Pact, Attention Shifts to What Post-Cold War Arms Agenda Should Be
On May 24, 2002, at a summit meeting in Moscow, U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a treaty to reduce both sides' deployed strategic nuclear warheads. The two presidents also signed a joint declaration outlining a new strategic relationship involving increased cooperation between the two countries. The U.S. government refers to the new arms treaty as the Treaty of Moscow, while some commentators have adopted the acronym SORT, for strategic offensive reductions treaty. The treaty requires cutting deployed strategic warheads from approximately 6000 on each side today to between 1700 and 2200 by the end of 2012. It does not set any specific targets along the way; each side can reduce as fast or as slow as it wishes (or even temporarily increase its forces) as long it meets the deadline ten years from now. In contrast to earlier treaties, the agreement allows both sides complete freedom to choose the types and mix of delivery vehicles on which their permitted warheads will be deployed. The treaty expires at the end of 2012 unless the two sides agree to extend it. Either party can withdraw from the treaty before then by giving three months notice, half the withdrawal period specified in previous arms control pacts.
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Contemporary Conflict
Knopf, Jeffrey W.
2002-07-01
